

THE RISE
OF THE
BRITISH POWER IN THE EAST

UNIFORM WITH THE PRESENT WORK.

THE HISTORY OF INDIA. The Hindú and Mahometan Periods. By the Hon. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE. 6th Edition. With Notes and Additions by E. B. COWELL, M.A., late Principal of the Sanskrit College, Calcutta. With Map, 8vo. 18s.

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THE RISE
OF THE
BRITISH POWER IN THE EAST

BY THE LATE
HON. MOUNTSTUART ELPHINSTONE

*BEING A CONTINUATION OF HIS 'HISTORY OF INDIA
IN THE HINDÚ AND MAHOMETAN PERIODS'*

EDITED
BY SIR EDWARD COLEBROOKE, BART.

WITH MAPS

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PREFACE.

MR. ELPHINSTONE'S 'History of India,' which appeared in 1841, closes with the battle of Paniput, fought in 1765, on which occasion the Marattas, whose power was then at its zenith, suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of Ahmed Shah Durráni, supported by the Mahometan princes of Northern India. The conquerors were unable to follow up their victory ; the Afghan prince returned to his dominions beyond the Indus, and the territory, which was formerly comprised in the Mogul Empire, was broken up into separate States. Here, therefore, the author observed, the history of the Mogul Empire closes of itself.

It appears from the author's journals that he had made considerable progress in a third volume prior to the former publication, but his labours had been interrupted by attacks of illness, and soon after the resumption of his work his health gave way, and led to its final abandonment. Other causes contributed to interfere with its completion. Such was his diffidence that had it not been for the advice of Lord Jeffrey, whom he

consulted about publishing the first volume, it is probable they would never have appeared. This distrust assumed the form of despair when he read the brilliant essays, or rather lives, of Clive and Hastings by Macaulay, to whose estimate of the character and career of these great men he rendered warm testimony in his journals. At length, after many doubts of being able to throw any new light on the history of Hastings, or of producing a narrative which would supersede the work of Mill, he threw aside his task for ever.

The greater part of the manuscript which is now published had been copied by a clerk and received some subsequent corrections at the hand of the author. The tenth chapter, which brings the narrative down to the grant of the *Díwání* in 1765, is in the author's handwriting. He had commenced some further chapters on the early relations of the British Government with the Marattas, on the affairs of the Rohillas, and on Hastings's treatment of the *Rája* of Benares; but they are mere fragments.

There are also some careful notes on the characters of Clive and Hastings, some of which are quoted in the published life of the author. Those on Clive were written at intervals, and were evidently intended for a review of his career at its close. They will, I think, interest the readers of this volume, but are in too incomplete a shape to form a part of this history. They are prefaced by what seems to have been commenced as an introduction to this period of Indian history :—

‘The period treated of in these volumes neither ad-

mits of novelty in the facts or originality in the ideas. The documents have been searched out for Parliament by the diligence of parties anxious to support their conflicting opinions. The materials they furnish have been combined and commented on by the master spirits of the last age. A new picture of these times must be flat in the ablest hands. I have therefore no expectation that the following pages will be attractive. My hope is that they may be useful. The passions which clouded the former period have passed away, and an ordinary writer may profit by the light shed from different quarters on the scene which none before looked on but in one aspect. This consideration influences the author in entering on so well occupied a field, and he will think his labours repaid a thousandfold if they contribute to just views of the present and wise resolutions for the future, and contribute to throw even a greater lustre on the nation by the actions which it suggests than by those which it records.

MEMORANDUM.

‘The only chance of success in this part of the history lies in stern impartiality, mixed with candour and indulgence, towards all the parties concerned. Measures must be discussed, serving no doubt to illustrate the characters of the leading men of the day, but more with a view to utility, and to pointing out what objects are to be attained and what are the sure means of ascertaining and promoting them.

‘This is the key to the treatment of Clive’s character, commanding respect and admiration from its great qualities, which feelings are painfully checked by instances of duplicity and meanness.

‘The impression he leaves is that of force and grandeur; a masculine understanding; a fine judgment; an inflexible will, little moved by real dangers, and by arguments and menaces not at all. He exercised a supreme control over those who shared his counsels or executed his resolves. Men yielded to a pressure which they knew could not be turned aside, and either partook of its impulse or were crushed by its progress.

‘When overmatched by his enemies he appears in even greater grandeur. He meets the most formidable accusations with bold avowal and a confident justification. He makes no attempt to soften his enemies or conciliate the public, but stands on his merits and services with a pride which in other circumstances would have been arrogance. . . .

‘After acknowledging his errors, history presents few great characters more blameless (?)¹ than that of Clive. Though stern and imperious by nature, his temper was proof against a thousand trials, and in a life spent amidst scenes of blood and suffering he has never been accused of a single act of cruelty. He coveted money as an instrument of ambition, but he never acquired it in any manner that he did not openly avow, and he scorned to preserve it by swerving a hair’s breadth from his duty. His few political offences he was led into by zeal for the public,

¹ The mark of interrogation is by the author.

and for the same object, he sacrificed the peace of his last years and risked his accumulations of wealth and glory. He possessed undaunted courage, a strong understanding, sagacity and soundness of judgment, and unrivalled vigour in action. A mind so endowed rises high above ordinary imperfections ; at worst it is a rough-hewn Colossus, where the irregularities of the surface are lost in the grandeur of the whole.

‘ Though naturally bold, open, and direct, Clive did not despise the use of artifice when his purposes required it, and it is this propensity that casts a shade of meanness over his great qualities that prevents that unmixed respect which so powerful a character must otherwise have commanded.

‘ *November 8, 1843.*

‘ Though Clive had a natural sense of honour, his independent and even reckless character made him indifferent to the opinion of others and regardless of form and propriety. The society in which he lived in India was not likely to promote refinement ; the agitated scene in which he was soon engaged, the eagerness for success, the calamities and disgrace attendant on failure, left little time for reflection or hesitation. The practice of the natives, the example of the French, and the maxims current among his brother officers, led him to rate boldness and vigour far above scrupulous correctness, and the result was a high sense of honour with little delicacy of sentiment. He could sacrifice his life to his duty, but not his interest to his moderation ; he was generous to his

friends, but barely just to his enemies. He would have rejected praise he had not earned, but neither forgot nor allowed others to forget the extent of his real deserts. . . .

‘ Clive’s estimate of his own services, great as they were, by no means fell short of their actual value. This does not arise from any indulgence of vanity on his part, but there is no occasion on which they can promote his views or interest when they are not brought forward in an exaggerated form, with a boldness and consciousness of worth that command our respect and overcome our dislike to self-praise. Hence arose a marked peculiarity of Clive’s character. After the enormous extent to which he had profited by his situation he delights to dwell on his integrity and moderation, and speaks of greed and rapacity in others with scorn and indignation. Convinced that the bounty of Mír Jáfir fell short of his claims on the Company, he inveighs against his successors who received presents which they had not earned, and speaks of them with disgust as the most criminal as well as the meanest of mankind. Nor are these sentiments assumed to impose upon the public; they are most strongly expressed in his most confidential letters, and appear to be drawn forth by the strength of his feelings. In no stage of his life did Clive appear with more dignity than during his persecution. His boasts of merit and service now appear as a proud resistance to calumny and oppression; the spirit with which he avowed and gloried in the acts which excited the most clamour and odium, his independence towards his judges, his defiance

of his powerful enemies, excite our interest while they command our respect and admiration.

‘Clive’s views were clear within the circle of his vision, but they were not extensive. His political plans were founded on the existing relations without much attention to prospective changes. His reforms were temporary expedients, and even his knowledge of the state of India in his time was only accurate within the scene where he had himself been an actor.

‘CLIVE’S RETURN HOME.

‘He now paid dear for his disinterestedness. All who had been brought to punishment by his severity ; all who had suffered indirectly by his reforms ; all who were disappointed in their hopes of wealth and favour, with their numerous connections among the Proprietors, and with the old band of enemies at the India House, combined to raise a clamour against him ; and in this were speedily joined those who envied his wealth and reputation, and a numerous class whose indignation against Indians had been roused by the very abuses which Clive had put down and which in their ignorance they imputed to him in common with all the Company’s servants. Against these attacks the Government gave him no protection.

‘All his former proceedings, over which many years had passed, and which, when not applauded at the time, had received a general sanction from his appointment to the government of India at a time when honesty

and public spirit were regarded as much as talent, all were scrutinised as if they were now mentioned for the first time.

‘ But all these investigations brought forth no fresh charge against the accused. Whatever faults Clive might have committed, the facts had never been denied, and his acquisitions, if immoderate, were on too great a scale to be concealed. There were no petty peculations, no lurking corruption to be detected. A committee, with a hostile president, with Mr. Johnston himself for a member, produced after two sessions a report, the effect of which may be judged of by the result. A motion strongly inculpatory was made by the chairman, Clive replying by avowing everything of which he was accused, and declaring that in similar circumstances he would do the same again.

‘ The decision of the House was worthy the best days of the Roman Senate. Without approving of actions of mixed merit or demerit, or sanctioning questionable principles, they voted Robert Lord Clive had rendered great and meritorious services to his country.

‘ But this honourable testimony could not remove the effect of two years of persecution ; and it is doubtful whether the sense of injury and ingratitude did not concur with sufferings from disease to cut short the career of this proud and aspiring genius.’

As Mr. Elphinstone’s narrative leaves the account of the struggle between the English and French incomplete, I have added a chapter which brings the story

to a close. French historians of these events treat them very briefly, and were it not that the disastrous close of the war was followed by a long trial, at the end of which the unfortunate French General perished by the hand of the executioner, it is probable that very little light would have been thrown on this chapter of history from French sources. But the charges against the Comte de Lally led to the publication of a mass of documents, which, with the correspondence attached to them, fill many volumes. Lally himself produced three, which are referred to in the chapter in this volume which describes his career. The most elaborate is entitled, 'Mémoire pour le Comte de Lally contre Monsieur le Procureur Général,' and consists of a detailed reply to all the attacks made on his conduct. Next we have a summary of his case, in itself a volume, entitled 'Tableau historique de l'expédition de l'Inde,' and lastly, a tract directed against the Commander of the French fleet during the war entitled 'Vraies causes de la perte de l'Inde.' On the other side we have mémoires of the Sieur de Bussy, the Comte d'Aché, the admiral, others from the representatives of M. de Leyrit, the Governor of Pondicherry, and from M. de Soupire and others.

In this controversy the true causes of the loss of the Indies are lost sight of in elaborate attacks on individuals on especial occasions, and it is fortunate that we possess so full an account of the war by so impartial a writer as Orme. He was a member of the council of Madras, and had access to the best sources of information, and his

volumes combine the value of a history with a personal narrative. The diffuseness which is often complained of is due to the nature of the war, which partook of the character of a war of posts. No one complains of the excess of details when he describes Clive's defence of Arcot, the campaign of Trichinopoly, or the battle of Vandewash, but when the same diffuseness is applied to smaller encounters or the sieges of hill forts, the details become wearisome. I have followed the guidance of this excellent writer in tracing the history of the campaign, and, without following it servilely, I have endeavoured to make this sketch an abridgment of his narrative, in this respect following the precept and example of Mr. Elphinstone (see page 82 of this volume) in trying, whenever it was possible, to give the very words of the historian.

The references at the foot of the pages, where the author is not named, are to the first edition of Mr. Elphinstone's 'History of India.' I have added the book and chapter referred to, for the convenience of those who have only access to the later editions.

E. C.

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THE RISE OF BRITISH POWER IN INDIA.

CHAPTER I.

Progress of maritime adventure at the close of the fifteenth century—Voyage of Vasco da Gama—His proceedings at Calicut—Jealousy of the Arab traders—His detention—Attacked by the forces of the Zamorin—Return to Europe—Voyage of Cabral—Barbarous acts of reprisal by the Portuguese under Cabral and Vasco da Gama—Establishment of Portuguese authority on the West Coast of India under Albuquerque—War with the Mamlúk sovereigns of Egypt and with the rulers of Bijapúr—Barbarous warfare—Conquest of Goa—Decline of the power of the Portuguese—Causes of decline—War in Guzerát—Character and extent of Portuguese dominion—Their policy towards the natives.

THE influence of the European nations on India dates from the arrival of Vasco da Gama on its shores.¹

CHAP.
I.

The irruption of the barbarians in the fifth century destroyed the class who had produced a demand for Indian luxuries in the greater part of Europe, and the occupation of Egypt and Syria by the Mahometans

¹ [Since this work was written a valuable contribution has been made to the history of Portuguese maritime discovery by the publication of Gaspar de Correa's *Lendas da Índia*. That part of the work which relates to Vasco da Gama's expeditions was translated for the Hakluyt Society by Lord Stanley of Alderley, and is enriched by the notes of the translator and by an Introduction containing some valuable remarks on the causes of the decline of Portuguese rule in India. Correa went to India sixteen years after the first voyage of Vasco da Gama, was an eyewitness of many of the events he narrates, and is regarded by Lord Stanley as entitled to the first place as an authority on this chapter of Portuguese history.—Ed.]

CHAP. in the seventh century obstructed the communication
 of the remaining portion with the East.

As the gradual refinement of Europe led to a renewed taste for the productions of India, the trade had to force its way through intricate and dangerous channels ; until political causes gave an ascendancy to the Venetians and Genoese in the Levant, and enabled them to establish a commercial intercourse with Constantinople and Alexandria, then the great emporia for Oriental commodities.

The trade of Venice through Egypt at length swallowed up its rivals, and raised that republic to a pitch of wealth and power that excited the envy of all the other states of Europe. It became an object of general interest to find out an independent channel for the commerce with India ; the idea of a communication by sea was entertained among others, and led to the voyage of Columbus and to a discovery of incomparably greater magnitude than that which the projector had in view. This event gave a fresh impulse to the spirit of maritime adventure ; but the glory of accomplishing the original design and of all the important consequences that have flowed from it, was reserved for a nation whose resources seemed disproportioned to such great results. The natural intelligence and advanced civilisation of Italy had formed the genius which led the way to these mighty changes ; but the Italian republics, even if they had been accustomed to navigate the Ocean, could have no inducement to explore new routes which would undermine their own established monopoly. The Spaniards had supplied the means for the great enterprise of Columbus, and its success had kindled their enthusiasm for similar adventures ; but their attention was

attracted to the vast scene which had just opened on them, and their object was to obtain the gold which they found abundant in their new possession, by shorter means than those of commerce.

The French and English were not yet maritime nations. The former was fully occupied by her designs on Italy ; the latter was reposing after long civil wars, and what ambition she retained was still directed to fruitless triumphs in France. The Portuguese alone, who had first conceived the idea of a passage by sea, continued to pursue it until it was crowned with full success. The favourable situation of their territory and some circumstances in the disposition and education of their princes had given rise to a regular series of attempts to explore the Coast of Africa, which had been continued for near a century and had dispelled many of the existing prejudices against the possibility of circumnavigating that Peninsula.

At length the question was decided by Bartholomew Diaz, who stretched his discoveries for 1,000 miles beyond his predecessors, and reached the cape to which, as it put an end to all fear of interruption by a prolongation of the continent, his sovereign gave the name of 'Good Hope.'

A.D. 1486.

Notwithstanding the brilliant prospect announced by this appellation, several years elapsed before any steps were taken to realise it.

It was not till 1497 that a squadron was fitted out for that purpose. It consisted of three ships, containing in all 180 men,² and was commanded by Vasco da Gama, the results of whose skill and courage have made his name familiar to every reader.

² This is the number given by an Italian who accompanied the expedition (Ramusio, i. 119) ; others make it 160 and 120.

The expedition was dismissed with solemnities suited to the greatness of the anticipations entertained. It sailed on July 8, and in a few months completed the course which near a century had been required to explore. On November 20 it passed the Cape in favourable weather, and entered on the new ocean amidst the sound of trumpets and the acclamations of the mariners.

At Mozambique the Portuguese were delighted to meet with Arab colonists, whose decent garments and civilised manners were a contrast to the rude barbarians whom they had hitherto seen in Africa. But in these foreigners, whose first appearance was so welcome, they soon discovered a hostile disposition. Common bigotry and mutual suspicion increased the ill-will between the parties, and it was from the Arabs and their followers that the Portuguese met with the chief opposition to their early progress in India.

The Shékh of Melinda, however, was distinguished from his countrymen by his favour to the strangers. At his port Gama found a flourishing city and met with several Indian vessels that had come direct from Guzerát. He engaged a pilot who was a native of that province : under his guidance he stretched across 3,000 miles of sea ; and in twenty-two days attained his long wished for object, entering the port of Calicut in the end of May 1498.³

Calicut was the capital of a small principality which like those adjoining in Malabar and Cochin had never been invaded by the Northern Mussulmans. It extended at that period for twenty-seven leagues along the shore,⁴ and was governed by a Súdra family whose

³ Faria, *Portuguese Asia*, English translation, part i. books 1, 2, 3, and 4 ; Murray's *British India*, i.

⁴ Faria, i. 96.

name was Támara, pronounced Zamorin by the Portuguese, and who had already enjoyed a portion of this limited territory for some centuries. They retained their independence till dispossessed by Heider Ali in 1767, and are now pensioners of the British Government.⁵ The town and temples of Calicut, the dress, equipage, and attendants of the Rájá and the ceremonies of his little court, are all described correctly and without the least exaggeration by the Portuguese, but such was the effect of novelty, of the numerous population of India, and of the profuse employment of materials which were rare and precious in Europe, that Gama and his companions were filled with admiration of the Zamorin's magnificence and described him to their countrymen as a great and potent Emperor. How humble was his real station among the princes of India, the reader who remembers that the period referred to was that of the dissolution of the Bahmani monarchy in the Deckan and about thirty years previous to the accession of the House of Teimur, will easily be able to perceive.

Gama was at first received with kindness, and encouraged to sell his merchandise and purchase that of the country. His success awakened a powerful opposition by the Arab merchants, who, from commercial jealousy rather than religious animosity, used every means of bribery and misrepresentation to convey to the Zamorin an impression that his new guests were adventurers if not pirates, and to induce him to seize them or expel them from his territory. Gama had now to endure all the vexation and anxiety which could be produced by the alternate employment of attention and intimidation by persons in whose power he was placed.

⁵ *Journey of Dr. Francis Buchanan*, ii. 345, 349, 393.

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He was on one occasion put under restraint himself,⁶ and on another his agent was detained in spite of remonstrances, until Gama seized some of the Zamorin's officers and effected his release through an exchange. His danger, which was really great, and must have seemed doubly alarming from his total want of acquaintance with the country and its inhabitants, had no effect in shaking his firmness: he conducted himself through all his difficulties with equal prudence and resolution; and it was not till the close of his intercourse with the natives that he was betrayed into a departure from his previous moderation. After his agent had been released (as has been mentioned) he detained some of the hostages as pledges for the restitution of the goods which he had left ashore, and from some unaccountable suspicion or misconception he carried them off to sea, although the goods were on the point of being restored to him. Whether in consequence of this outrage or of previous designs formed against him, he was pursued from Calicut by sixty vessels of the Zamorin's, which he repulsed by means of his artillery, and on approaching the shore at different points further to the north, he found fleets of

⁶ Macpherson (probably on the authority of De Barros) relates, that on this occasion Da Gama went ashore with only twelve men, leaving orders with the inferior commanders that in the event of his being made prisoner, they were to attend to no orders from him, but after using all means which they might think expedient to procure his liberation, they were to return to Portugal and leave him to his fate. (*History of the Commerce of India*, p. 14.)

[The detention of Vasco da Gama and his followers is given at great length by Correa, and formed an important incident in the proceedings at Calicut. Da Gama was treated with much indignity, and endured it with wonderful temper and firmness. He sent a message to his brother, that in the event of his detention being prolonged, he was to set ashore all hostages and start at once for Europe. This counsel was warmly rejected by Paulo da Gama, who threatened reprisals. Da Gama was finally released, and shortly after quitted the port.—ED.]

boats prepared to act against him, and was constrained to desist from further attempts at intercourse and again to cross the Indian Ocean to Melinda.

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Both in Africa and in India he found Moors from the shores of the Mediterranean, and it was by means of one of them who spoke Spanish that he was enabled to communicate with the natives.⁷ But the Portuguese extended the name of Moor to all the Arabs, and perhaps to all Mahometans.⁸ The Moorish merchants whose enmity was so much felt at Calicut were the descendants of Arabs who had settled on the West Coast of India in the first century of the Hejira (seventh century after Christ⁹) and had probably converted and incorporated the old colonists of their nation who had been found there by the ancients.

The return of Vasco da Gama (though he had lost two-thirds of his companions) was received with joy and triumph in Portugal.

He landed in August 1499 : and in March 1500, Alvarez Cabral was despatched with a more considerable expedition to take advantage of his discovery. Cabral had thirteen ships and 1,200 men, and was accompanied by eight Franciscans and eight chaplains, who were to preach the gospel to the heathen.

A.D. 1500.

The most important result of this expedition was the accidental discovery of Brazil on the passage, which, however, had no effect at the time in withdrawing the public attention from the proceedings of the squadron in India. On reaching Calicut, Cabral's first act was

⁷ Faria, and Murray's *British India*.

⁸ [The Spaniards and Portuguese applied the term Moor to the Arab conquerors of the peninsula who came from Mauritania, and hence to all Mahometans, and their example was followed by the Dutch and English in the East. It continued in use in India till the close of the last century.—Yule's *Glossary of Anglo-Indian Words*.—ED.]

⁹ *Dr. Buchanan's Journey*, ii. 421.

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to send on shore the natives who had been carried off by Gama. Their report made a favourable impression, and he was invited to land, but refused to do so until hostages had been given for his safety. He assumed throughout a higher tone than Gama, and even in paying court to the Zamorin, he contrived to give him a specimen of his powers of offence. A ship from Ceylon happened to pass the port carrying seven or eight elephants, on one of which the Zamorin had set his heart. Alvarez sent a vessel to capture it, which was not done without an action of some duration, when the Rája took possession of his prize.

The Zamorin had in the mean time shown favour to the trade of the Portuguese and allowed them a house for a factory; in which they placed sixty or seventy of their men; but the established credit and influence of the Moors gave them an advantage in the market over the new comers, and these last were moreover unprovided with specie, which alone can always command a supply of goods in India: they continued to procure cargoes and send off ships for Arabia, while those of the Portuguese proceeded very slowly in their lading. Cabral considered this so serious a grievance, that he often remonstrated with the Zamorin, and at length, by the Portuguese accounts, he obtained permission to stop the loading of goods by the Arabs and even to take the freight out of their ships when laden, on repaying the original price of the articles. If this permission was ever given, it was done without due consideration: when the Portuguese proceeded to act on it, the consequence was a popular insurrection of Hindús as well as Mussulmans, and an attack on the Portuguese factory which terminated in the massacre of fifty Portuguese, the rest with difficulty escaping to

their ships. Cabral's retaliation was severe: he burned ten Moorish ships that were in the harbour and cannonaded the town for two days, during which he set fire to it in several places and killed a considerable number of the inhabitants. After this rupture he made sail for Cochin, the Rája of which place was an enemy of the Zamorin. He was of course well received, and had nearly completed his cargoes when he learned that a fleet of eighty-five vessels had set out from Calicut to attack him. He affected the utmost readiness to anticipate the assault, and sailed out on June 10, 1501, to meet the enemy. Just as he got within shot, however, he took advantage of the wind and bore up for Cananore, the Rája of which place voluntarily sent one of his subjects with him to Portugal.¹

Alvarez Cabral brought back only six ships out of thirteen. The opposition he had met with, which produced discouragement among the Portuguese, only served to stimulate the ambition of their king, Don Emanuel. He had previously despatched John De Nueva with 400 men to reinforce Cabral, and that officer on arriving at Cochin had retrieved the honour of the Portuguese arms by defeating a fleet sent against him from Calicut. Emanuel now prepared a powerful fleet of twenty ships, which he formed into three divisions, and gave the command of the whole to Vasco da Gama.

A.D. 1502.

On this occasion that great discoverer disclosed the defects of his own nature, and gave the first striking example of the arbitrary and sanguinary spirit which animated the Portuguese Government during the whole period of its prosperity. He made an unprovoked attack on Quiloa in Africa and compelled the ruler to

¹ Faria and Murray, but chiefly a narrative by a Portuguese officer of the expedition, in Ramusio, i. 121.

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become tributary to Portugal. He then sailed for Cananore, and on his way fell in with a ship of Calicut returning with a cargo from Jedda and bringing back pilgrims from Mecca. She had on board 240 men (among whom were some of the wealthiest merchants of Calicut) besides an extraordinary number of women and children. This vessel surrendered without opposition, and the passengers tried all means by offers of ransom and of concessions to be obtained by them from the Zamorin to procure their liberty or at least their safety. But the admiral was inexorable; and after compelling them to give up their property and searching the ship to be sure there was none left, he ordered her to be towed to some distance from the fleet and burned with all on board. The unfortunate crew begged hard for their lives, the men redoubling their offers and the women holding out their children over the side and endeavouring by the most affecting gestures to move compassion. When they found all in vain, they had recourse to a desperate resistance; drove off the boats which were to burn them; attacked the nearest vessels; and maintained a running fight which lasted for four days before Gama was enabled to consign them to the flames.²

² Thomas Lopez (a clerk on board the fleet) says, in Ramusio, i. 136, that the admiral burned them all 'con molta crudeltà, e senza pietà alcuna;' but Faria states that twenty of the children were saved and made Christians.

[This hideous act is described by Correa with the utmost callousness, and the same brutal spirit is evinced by other historians quoted by Lord Stanley. Camoens passes over the exploit in silence. Da Gama is described by Correa as vindicating his conduct as an act of reprisal for the conduct of the Arab merchants in instigating the attack on the Portuguese factory on his first voyage, and causing the death of some of his countrymen. In reply to the promise of a ransom by the Moors the captain-general replied, 'Alive you shall be burned, because you counselled the King of Calicut to kill and plunder the factors and Portuguese; and since you are so powerful as that you oblige yourself to give me a

From Cananore the admiral proceeded to Calicut, where he anchored before the place and required, as a preliminary to negotiation, that all the Moors should be expelled from the Zamorin's territory and all trade with their nation forbidden. The Zamorin objecting to this demand, and pleading that the Moors amounted to four or five thousand families, had long been faithful subjects to him and his ancestors, and were the most opulent merchants in his dominions, Gama cut short all further discussion by turning down an hour-glass in the presence of the Indian deputies and announcing that if his demand was not complied with before the sand was run out, he would put to death a number of the Zamorin's subjects who had fallen into his hands in a vessel in the harbour. This barbarous threat he carried into full effect by hanging his prisoners, to the number of thirty-four, at the yard-arm, after which he cut off their heads, hands, and feet, and threw them overboard to be washed ashore by the tide. He then poured a destructive fire into the town, and at length sailed away to the friendly port of Cochin. Some distrust of the Rája of this place, as well as of the chief of Cananore, afterwards sprung up, but was removed by negotiation. This was followed by some more battles and executions which had no important consequences, though on one occasion Gama gave a proof of his daring character which might have been attended with a more serious result. On some overture for submission by the Zamorin he sailed in a single ship into one of the enemy's ports, where he was immediately set on by

cargo gratuitously for these ships, I say that for nothing in the world would I desist in giving you a hundred deaths, if I could give you so many.' To the honour of the Portuguese one of the historians of their conquests in India, Osorio, Bishop of Silves, condemns in the strongest terms the many shocking acts of cruelty that disfigured the history.—*Ed.*]

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A.D. 1503.

thirty vessels and was only rescued from destruction by his extraordinary vigour and promptitude. His departure for Europe, which took place soon after, enabled the Zamorin to revenge himself on his neighbour of Cochin : the latter prince was inferior to his enemy, but showed a manly spirit of resistance ; though often defeated he refused to give up some Portuguese who had been left with him, and at length was obliged to abandon his capital and retire to a small island where he was out of immediate danger from the hostile army. He was restored to Cochin by one of three small squadrons, of nine ships in all, which were simultaneously despatched in 1503. The famous Alfonso d'Albuquerque commanded one of the squadrons. They returned after completing their cargoes and conducting some other transactions, without performing any exploit worth mentioning.

They obtained leave to construct a fort at Cochin, and, at the Rájá's earnest request, they left Duarte Pacheco with 400 men to protect him against his enemies. This measure led to one of the most memorable displays of Portuguese valour in India, and materially contributed to the subsequent aggrandisement of that people. When the fleet had sailed for Europe, the Zamorin assembled an army which the Portuguese call 50,000 strong, and which was accompanied by ships and boats, and supported by artillery. Against this force Pacheco had to defend a fordable channel, deriving no advantage from nautical skill, and but little from superiority in arms and discipline ; but the commander was a man of distinguished courage and capacity, and the troops were inspired by the recent success and glory of their nation. The force was distributed, part in the fort, part along the shore, and part in four boats moored

in such a position as to protect the flanks from attacks by sea. In this order they received the onset of the Indian multitude, supported by numerous ships and boats and accompanied by floating towers and fireships. All these formidable assailants were again and again repulsed ; and the Zamorin, after a great and final effort, was constrained to draw off defeated to his own country. This victory, being gained by fair fighting on dry land, completely established the reputation of the Portuguese, at the same time that it filled them with additional confidence and increased their contempt for their enemies.³

The next fleet arrived in 1505 under a commander named Soarez ; and in 1507 a permanent representative of the king of Portugal was first appointed under the title of Viceroy of India.

The name of this great functionary was Francisco de Almeyda, and the institution of his office seems to have been connected with a general plan for consolidating the Portuguese power in the East. He himself had orders to build forts at Quilon, in Africa,⁴ at Anjedio, an island about fifty miles to the south of Goa, and at Cananore on the coast of Canara ; while another fleet was sent to take similar measures at Sofala, a place in Africa where there is a gold mine. A fort was also ordered to be built at Mozambique and a factory at Melinda, and soon after this a fleet of thirteen ships was despatched from Lisbon under Tristan d'Acunha and Alphonso d'Albuquerque to promote their king's interests on the coast of Africa. Their exploits were

³ Faria, i. 75 ; Maffei, *Historiæ Indiciæ*, lib. ii. 39.

⁴ 'The fort of Quilon was afterwards razed by the same hands that built it, after having cost many lives, all the effect of the ill-usage of the Portuguese towards the natives, proceeding from their unlimited pride and boundless avarice.'—Faria, i. 109.

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rather of a predatory nature than calculated to gain any permanent advantage, until, after completing their coasting voyage, they took possession of the island of Socotra opposite the mouth of the Red Sea. After this D'Acunha crossed over to India. Albuquerque proceeded along the coast of Arabia, sacked several towns in that country (among which was Mascat), and at last reached the island of Ormuz, which even then contained a flourishing city under a prince of considerable power. To this prince Albuquerque, who was at the head of 460 fighting men, proposed, without the shadow of a reason, that he should acknowledge the sovereignty of the King of Portugal, should pay him a large tribute, and should allow a fort to be erected on his island. The prince seems to have been confounded by the audacity of the demand; but comparing the small numbers of the Portuguese with his own force, which consisted of a large fleet at anchor and 20,000 men on shore, he evaded a decision until Albuquerque, after insisting on a categorical answer, dashed into the heart of the fleet, boarding, sinking, and setting fire to the vessels, whose numbers were no protection against the impetuosity of his attack. The prince of Ormuz had now recourse to concession, and the Portuguese had made some progress with their fort, when he once more gathered courage and determined on resistance. His force when fairly exerted would probably have proved too great for Albuquerque, even if that commander had not been obliged by the cowardice and insubordination of three of his own captains to give up his undertaking without a contest.⁵

While these things were passing in the west, Almeyda had to contend with an expedition from

⁵ Faria, vol. i.; Maffei, lib. iii.

Egypt, which the Portuguese seem to regard as the greatest danger to which they were ever exposed in India. The Mamlúk Sultan is said to have been stimulated and assisted by the Venetians from jealousy of the Portuguese commerce. He equipped twelve large vessels in the Red Sea and sent them to India, where he had secured the co-operation of Mahmúd, king of Guzerát.⁶ They first repaired to Mahmúd's port of Diu and afterwards proceeded against the Portuguese. Almeyda probably expected them to attack his principal settlement; for he remained himself on the coast of Malabar and sent on his son Lorenzo with eight ships to observe the enemy. The young admiral was at anchor at Choul, to the south of Bombay, when the whole Turkish fleet appeared at the mouth of the harbour. Not daunted by their superiority in numbers, Lorenzo immediately began the attack; and had taken two of the Turkish ships when he was checked by the appearance of the Guzerát fleet under Aíáz Sultáni (so often mentioned in the history of that country). This reinforcement immediately turned the scale; and night setting in soon after, suspended the action. Next morning the Portuguese took advantage of the ebb tide to drop down the harbour, and had nearly passed

A.D. 1508.

⁶ See vol. ii. 206; book viii. chap. 2.

[Mahmúd, surnamed Bégarra, is described by Mr. Elphinstone as one of the greatest of the kings of Guzerát. In a note he adds, 'The European travellers of his day seem to have formed a tremendous idea of this monarch. Bartema (in Ramusio, i. 147) and Barbosa are both full of him. One of them gives (Ramusio, i. 296) a formidable account of his personal appearance, and both agree that a principal part of his food consisted of mortal poisons; and so impregnated was his system with this diet that if a fly settled on him, it instantly dropped down dead. His usual way of putting men of consequence to death was to blow on them after he had been chewing bitel. He is the original of Butler's 'Prince of Cambay,' whose

daily food

Is asp, basilisk, and toad.'—ED.

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the Mussulman fleet when their admiral's own ship struck on some fishing stakes, from which it could not be disengaged.

A Portuguese captain made a spirited attempt to tow it off, and afterwards pressed Lorenzo to escape on board of his ship ; but that gallant young man refused to quit his vessel, and having had his leg and thigh carried off by a cannon ball, he made himself be supported against the mast, and continued to encourage his crew until a second shot put an end to his existence. His men fought with a desperation worthy of such a leader. Only nineteen survived the capture of the ship. They were taken charge of by Aiáz, who humanely offered to release them for a ransom, writing at the same time to the Portuguese admiral to compliment him on his son's gallantry and condole with him on his loss.⁷

Alneyda made immediate preparations to revenge this calamity. He sailed from Cananore with nineteen vessels and 1,600 men, of whom 400 were Malabar auxiliaries. For some reason, he delayed while on his voyage for the purpose of attacking Dabul, where he massacred the inhabitants without distinction of age or sex and set fire to the town.⁸ He was doubtless excited to this barbarity by rage for the death of his son ; and from the same motive he put to death the whole crew of a Turkish vessel which fell into his hands at sea. At length he reached Diu, and found the Egyptian and Guzerát fleets, reinforced by a squadron of the Zamorin's. He immediately commenced the attack, and after a severe action sunk and dispersed the Indian ships and completely destroyed those of the Mamlúks. The Egyptian admiral escaped to the shore ; his men and all the other Mussulmans

⁷ Faria, i. 135, &c. ; Maffei, lib. iv. 58.

⁸ Maffei, lib. iv. 63, 64.

who fell into the hands of the captors were put to the sword, or slaughtered as they endeavoured to escape by swimming. CHAP.
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The conduct of Almeyda on this expedition was shocking even to the Portuguese, who ascribed his subsequent fate to the judgment of heaven on his cruelty. He was superseded soon after his victory by Alphonso d' Albuquerque, and lost his life in a skirmish with some savages in Africa while on his return to Portugal.⁹

Albuquerque was the greatest of all the Portuguese commanders, and is looked on by his nation as the founder of their Eastern empire. He had many difficulties to contend with at his outset. Almeyda refused to recognise his commission, and even committed him to prison.¹ Coutinho, a nobleman who arrived with a fresh body of troops at this juncture, persuaded Almeyda to resign the command, but afterwards claimed for himself an equal authority with Albuquerque. The two generals agreed to unite their forces for an attack on Calicut, and for that purpose assembled a force of 1,600 Europeans and 600 Malabars. They took a fort or battery near the landing-place, penetrated into the town and stormed the fortified palace of the Zamorin. But their attack had been precipitated by the emulation of the rival generals; the troops lost their order and dispersed to plunder, and the Zamorin's people rallying, set upon them in such numbers and with such fury, that they drove them out of the place with serious loss. Coutinho was killed and Albuquerque severely wounded.²

It is probable that Albuquerque had intended to fix the seat of the Portuguese government in the capital of

⁹ Faria, i. 152, 153.

¹ Faria, i. 151.

² Faria, i. 154; Maffei, lib. iv. 62.

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the Zamorin ; for after failing in his attempt on Calicut, he turned his eyes on Goa, which was afterwards his residence and that of all his successors. Goa was at this time in the hands of an officer of the Bijapúr government, whose name or title cannot be recognised under the appellation of Zabaim or Sabayo by which he passes in Portuguese authors. Those writers always speak of Sabayo as a great potentate, and generally confound him with the king of Bijapúr himself. Sabayo was absent on some local expedition when the defenceless state of his town was pointed out to Albuquerque by Timoja, a Hindú of Onór in the Rajah of Bijanagar's country, who, on some family quarrel, had turned pirate in the neighbouring islands and had become a close confederate of the Portuguese. The viceroy immediately acted on this suggestion, and so effectual were his measures that he obtained possession of the city almost without resistance.

A.D. 1510.

This encroachment seems to have provoked or alarmed Eusof Adil Sháh, the founder of the kingdom of Bijapúr. He set out in person from his capital with a force which the Portuguese call 5,000 horse and 40,000 foot, but which Ferishta describes as 3,000 chosen men. It is probable that of the two accounts the last is most in error, for although the Portuguese defended themselves with their accustomed valour, they were overpowered by numbers and compelled to seek for safety on board their ships. Before the end of the year, however, Albuquerque had received a reinforcement from Europe, while Eusof Adil Sháh was dead and had been succeeded by his son, a minor. Albuquerque had therefore little difficulty in regaining his conquest ; and the Regent of Bijapúr, who was busily employed in warding off attacks on his imperfectly

established authority, was not able at the moment to attempt to recover this distant possession.²

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Albuquerque, now secure, commenced a city worthy of the dominion of which it was to be the head, and himself assumed the state and pomp of a sovereign, which has been maintained by his successors in the last stage of their decline.

He next engaged in a bold plan for extending the Portuguese influence in the eastern part of Asia. He left an officer with 400 Portuguese in charge of Goa, and committed the civil government of the natives in the adjoining district to a nephew of Timoja, who served under him at the head of 5,000 Indian troops. He then sailed with 800 Portuguese and 600 Malabars against Malacca, a town commanding the straits between the Indian and Chinese Seas. He took Malacca, received an embassy from Siam; and sent ships to explore the East, the commanders of which first opened a direct communication with the Moluccas or Spice Islands, and entered into friendly engagements with the chiefs.³

May,
A.D. 1511.

On his return to India he found Goa besieged by Folád Khán, an officer of the Bijapúr government, but had no difficulty in obliging him to raise the siege and withdraw. He then set out against Aden in Arabia, which was probably thought important as commanding the entrance to the Red Sea. His force on this expedition was increased by reinforcements from Europe to a considerable superiority over that which conquered Malacca, yet he failed in two attempts on Aden, and after a long and fruitless cruise in the Red Sea he returned to India.⁴ He was more successful next year

February,
A.D. 1512.

August,
A.D. 1513.
A.D. 1514.

² Faria, i. 162-174; Maffei, lib. iv. 69-74; Briggs's *Ferishta*, iii. 30 and 34.

³ Faria, i. 175-184; Maffei, lib. v. 74-79.

⁴ Faria, i. 183-193; Maffei, lib. v. 85.

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in an expedition to Ormuz. The king seems to have been alarmed at the designs of Sháh Ismaél of Persia, who had established an influence in his council ; whatever was his motive, he appears to have countenanced Albuquerque in putting his prime minister to death, after which he acknowledged himself a vassal of the King of Portugal, and before long became a pageant in the hands of his new superior.⁵

On Albuquerque's return to India after this important acquisition, he found himself superseded without warning or explanation by a personal enemy ; his health, which was before declining, sank under this blow, and he expired at the entrance to Goa harbour in December 1514.

In numerous expeditions under his own command he had displayed the Portuguese flag along the whole coasts of Africa, Arabia, and India as far as the neighbourhood of China ; he had founded a capital which has remained unassailed to this day ; by his posts at Socotra, Ormuz, and Malacca, he commanded the access to the Arabian and Persian Gulfs and the Sea of China, and appropriated the commerce of their shores ; while his discovery of the Moluccas placed his countrymen in possession of the spice trade, then the most lucrative of the East.

The conquests of the Portuguese may be said to have ceased with Albuquerque ; their wars after his time were unsuccessful except when they were defensive, and their acquisitions in the same period were gained by negotiation.

The riches which flowed from their immense commerce appear by the account of their own historian to have corrupted their military spirit.⁶ The officers took eagerly to trade, and became indifferent to the public

⁵ Faria, i. 201, &c. ; Maffei, lib. v. 89.

⁶ Faria, i. 210.

service and insensible to the calls of honour. They inherited from the first conquerors a mixture of superstition and licentiousness, and they now fell into habits of sloth and effeminacy which completed the degradation of their character. Though the progress of this alteration was gradual and did not for a long time diminish their activity, their military operations do not henceforward require minute attention. The most important of them were directed against Diu. The first and second armaments, both on a great scale, were beaten off with discredit. The arrival of Vasco da Gama (who returned as viceroy after an absence of twenty-one years) might have changed their fortune ; but that great commander only lived for three months after he reached India, and the attack on Diu was not resumed for several years. The third and last expedition consisted of 5,000 Portuguese and 10,000 natives, besides sailors. This force, so far exceeding those which were sufficient to achieve the early conquests, was as unsuccessful as its predecessors.⁷ After the failure of this great effort, the Portuguese gave up all hopes of the reduction of Diu ; yet before the expiration of four years, the object of so many exertions fell into their hands without a struggle. Bahádur Sháh being driven out of the continent of Guzerát by Humáyun, and constrained to take refuge among the fastnesses of the peninsula, had recourse to the Portuguese for assistance ; and on condition of their furnishing him with a small body of infantry, he ceded Bassein and Salsette to them, and allowed them to erect a fort, or (according to the Mahometan writers) a factory, at Diu.⁸ The Portuguese

CHAP.
I.

A.D. 1520-
1521.

A.D. 1531.

A.D. 1535.

⁷ Faria, i.

⁸ Faria, i. 377 ; Maffei, lib. xi. 178 ; Miráti Secunderi, in Col. Briggs's note on *Ferishta*, iv. 138.

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A.D. 1537. took advantage of the confusions which ensued to complete this fortification; and when Bahádúr, after recovering his dominions, endeavoured to check their encroachments, he lost his life, as has been mentioned,⁹ at an interview with their viceroy. During the weakness and distractions which succeeded until the final subjugation of Guzerát by the Moguls, it was scarcely to have been expected that any of its rulers should have had time to undertake the recovery of Diu. They did, however, make two attempts, both vigorous, and one so formidable as to give occasion to a defence of which the Portuguese are as proud as of any of their victories.

A.D. 1538. In their first attack the Guzerátis were assisted by a fleet belonging to the Turks (who were now in possession of Egypt), which the Portuguese historian alleges to have amounted to seventy sail. The brunt of the siege fell on these allies, and was raised on their withdrawing their fleet.¹

The second siege, though the most celebrated, was only carried on by the troops of Guzerát, commanded, as on the former occasion, by Khója Zafar, an Italian renegade of Otranto. It was raised after eight months' continuance by the viceroy, Don John De Castro, in person, whom this achievement has immortalised among his countrymen. On his return to Goa he was received with transports, and made his entry in a grand procession, crowned with laurel, accompanied by his prisoners in chains, and so far emulating the pride and magnificence of the ancient Romans, as to lead the Queen of Portugal to remark that he had fought like a Christian, but had triumphed like a heathen.²

This was not the last of the gallant defences of the

⁹ See the *History of Guzerát*, in vol. ii. App. 767.

¹ Faria, i. 433 to the end; Maffei, lib. xi.

² Faria, ii. 95-116; Maffei, lib. xiii.

Portuguese. Twenty years afterwards, they repelled two powerful attacks made at the same time on Choyl and Goa by the kings of Ahmednagar and Bijapur in person ;³ and still later, they resisted another invasion by the king of Ahmednagar alone.⁴ By this time they had fallen under the dominion of Spain,⁵ and their national spirit was ere long extinguished.

CHAP.
I.
A.D. 1592.

Their Indian territory, when at the greatest extent, consisted of about sixty miles along the coast round Goa, and half that distance inland ; and a longer but still narrower tract, extending from Bombay inclusive to Daman, the chief town of which was Bassein. The whole of their territory was not equal in extent to the least of the collectorates under Madras or Bombay. Even within this small space was a portion of uninhabited forest, but the rest was granted in estates to Portuguese proprietors subject to a quit-rent, and was brought by them into the most flourishing condition. Near the towns, in particular, they carried cultivation to the highest pitch of perfection, making roads, enclosures, and watercourses of the most substantial description ; raising the richest sorts of produce in abundance ; and introducing improvements in fruits and gardening, the effects of which are now felt in the most distant parts of India.⁶

Besides these compact territories, the Portuguese had forts and factories at different points along the coast, where they exercised various degrees of influence,

³ Faria, ii. 281 ; Briggs's *Ferishta*, iii. 134 and 254.

⁴ Briggs's *Ferishta*, iii. 284. ⁵ The annexation took place in 1580.

⁶ The mango, an original Indian fruit, has been brought to such perfection at Bombay and Goa that the trees of those places furnish grafts all over India, and everywhere bear the names given them by the Portuguese (Alphonso, Fernandez, Mazagon, &c.). The Nizam has a post laid to bring fresh mangoes from Goa to Heiderabad ; and I rather think the Great Moguls had formerly a similar communication with Delhi.

CHAP. always pushing their authority to the utmost extent
J. that their power would admit.⁷

The importance of the Portuguese transactions in India has been a good deal overrated, owing to the numerous and distant points in which they appeared, as well as to the inflated style of their own writers, who use the terms of fleets and armies, kings and emperors, in speaking of the petty warfare of nameless rājās and zemindars, who were in reality ignorant of the insignificant part performed by their antagonists on the great theatre of India. When they were engaged with more considerable enemies, it was in defending forts at places open to the sea, and inaccessible owing to mountains and forests from the interior of the country.

But though the scale of the Portuguese actions was small, their spirit was equal to the conquest of the world. Their first expeditions to India consisted of twelve or fifteen hundred men in all, and they seldom exceeded that amount in any one armament which they afterwards brought together. With these diminutive forces they dictated to comparatively powerful states, and spoke to the proudest princes with whom they had intercourse in the tone of superiors and masters. They were as prompt to resent as to offer offences, and were always ready to stake their existence on the issue of every quarrel. This waste of courage led them into many repulses and defeats; yet they were never disheartened by reverses, and were prepared on the arrival

⁷ In Guzerát they had and still have the strong fort and island of Diu; between that and their territory at Bassein they had Damán, which they still possess, Dánu and Saint John's. Between the Bassein territory and Goa was Choul; and south of Goa were forts at Onór, Barcelór, Mangalór, Cannanór, Cranganór, Cochin and Quilon; on Ceylon they had Columbo, Manár, Galle, and some other forts; and on the coast of Coromandel, Negapatam, Meliapúr (or St. Thome) close to Madras; and further north, Masulipatam. (Faria, iii. 415. See also ii. 499.)

of the first reinforcement to resume the attack in which they had failed, or enter on a new one as disproportioned to their strength. Their vices were at least equal to their virtues, and arose from the excess of the same qualities. They were as careless of the rights of others as fearless of their power; they never sought and never showed mercy; their confidence degenerated into arrogance, their religion into bigotry and persecution; and their self-esteem swelled to a pitch of pompousness and ostentation, which threw a degree of ridicule over their greatest actions.

Their exploits, as has been shown, were not confined to India. Not to mention their great empire in South America, the shores of Africa and Asia, from the Cape of Good Hope to China, were studded with their forts^a and factories, and the vessels which there found protection domineered over all the Eastern Seas. No ship could sail without contributing to increase their resources. Those who purchased their passes were tributaries, and those who sailed without them enemies. These obstructions to the trade of others increased the value of their own; and the mixture of commerce and piracy poured wealth into India which displayed itself in various forms. Goa is defended by works on a great scale, and even in its decay exhibits the gaudy magnificence of a capital in the south of Europe. Their other principal cities have a proportionate display of forts, churches, and convents.

^a Their forts on the African coast were at Sofala, Mombasa, and Mozambique, and they possessed the islands of Socotra; in Arabia they had Mascat; in Persia Ormuz and a fort or factory at Guadel in Mekran; in the countries east of India, they had the fortified towns of Malacca and Macao; and also Tidore, Amboyna, Manilla, and other places in the Eastern Islands. Besides these forts, they had factories at various other places. (Faria, iii. 415, and Bruce's *Annals of the East India Company*, i. 116.)

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I.

Their internal government was as daring as their foreign policy. They treated the prejudices of the natives with a contempt which neither the Moguls nor the British would have ventured on in the plenitude of their power. They insulted the religion of the country, used their whole influence without disguise to draw over adherents to their own, and at times endeavoured to enforce conversion by such violent and sanguinary means as provoked extensive and desperate insurrections. To prevent the falling off of converts once gained, they established an Inquisition, which from the cruelties and iniquity of its proceedings, has given an unenviable celebrity to the name of Goa.

The descendants of these Christians, with the marriages which the Government used to encourage between the Portuguese and the female converts, have filled their old possessions with a race rather blacker than the natives, who in towns retain the Portuguese language and dress, but in the country can hardly be distinguished from the Hindú peasantry. They are called by Portuguese names and profess the Christian religion, without understanding any part of it except the respect due to the clergy.⁹

The brilliant portion of the Portuguese history was short and by no means unsullied ; but the most powerful nations of Europe might envy the twenty years of the reign of Don Emanuel comprised between the voyage of Vasco da Gama and the death of Albuquerque.¹

⁹ Twelve hundred families of these Christians in the Northern Concan returned to idolatry, about the year 1820, in consequence of their priests refusing to allow them to propitiate the cholera morbus (which had then first broken out) by some Hindú sacrifices and expiations.

¹ [Many causes contributed to the decline of Portuguese power in the East, and, among others, the neglect of their possessions during the

dependence of Portugal on Spain, from 1580 to 1640. Some were wrested from them by the Dutch ; others declined from internal decay. That which proved fatal to its duration was the corruption of the Government. The seeds of this were sown during the lifetime of Correa, who is reported by Lord Stanley as saying that 'the beginnings of the affairs of India were so golden that they did not seem as though they had beneath the iron which afterwards they disclosed. . . . Evils increased and good things diminished, so that almost the whole became a living evil, and the historian of it would rather be called its imprecator than the writer of illustrious deeds !'

The Portuguese editor of Correa's work, commenting on this passage, makes some strong remarks on 'the moral leprosy and the internal canker' which resulted from the corruption of the Governors, and there is much more to the same effect quoted by Lord Stanley from a manuscript in the library of Lisbon, entitled, *History of the Elevation and Decadence of the Portuguese Empire in Asia*.

Faria de Souza, at the conclusion of his history (vol. iii. 417, English translation) makes some strong remarks on the plunder and speculation that prevailed. The royal revenue amounted to 1,000,000 crowns, of which 330,000 was drawn from customs, 200,000 from small tributary states, and the remainder from shares of prizes and miscellaneous sources ; but, according to the historian, the revenue should have been double, but it was reduced by the frauds of office. The commanders of all the forts realised large sums from their private trade, and the viceroy drew a salary of 18,000 crowns, besides what he derived from the disposal of places, which were all sold ; but they made much more by their trade. 'All other officers,' he adds, 'have great salaries, besides their lawful profits and their more considerable frauds, though their salaries are enough to make them honest ; but avarice knows no bounds.'

Mickle, in the sketch of the rise and fall of Portuguese empire in the East, prefixed to his translation of the *Lusiad*, while following Portuguese writers in putting as the first cause of its ruin the arbitrary power of the Governors and the cruelty and rapine which accompanied their conquests, adds some interesting remarks on the commerce of their settlements, showing how little the mother country profited by their conquests. For many years the King of Portugal was the sole merchant, and the traffic a regal monopoly. In 1587 an exclusive Company of Merchants was founded who farmed the trade on a plan such as prevailed in the Brazils and in Mexico under the Spaniards ; but from the beginning they were surrounded by the monopolies of the Governors, whose luxury was unbounded. The coasting trade was in the hands of private adventurers, and gradually degenerated to a state of piratical anarchy. The Merchant Company sent forth every year a colony of adventurers some 3,000 in number, the greater part of whom settled in India, and their descendants are now scattered over the country.—ED.]

CHAPTER II.

Progress of maritime enterprise—Incorporation of an English Trading Company in 1599—Voyages to the Eastern Islands and to Surat—Mission to the Emperor Jehángir—Middleton's voyage—Collision with the Portuguese at Surat—Sir T. Roe's mission—Formation of a rival Company, and its piratical proceedings—Formation of a new Company—Controversy on free trade or a regulated Company—Cession of Bombay by Portugal—Considerations on the expediency of territorial possessions—Sir E. Winter and occurrences at Madras—Civil and military servants of the Company—Mutiny of troops—Interlopers—Sir Joshua Child and the 'great design'—Invasion of Bengal—Its failure—Operations at Surat—Renewal of the war—Sir J. Child sues for peace—Low state of the Company's affairs—Piracy in the Eastern Seas—Formation of a new Company and its struggle with the old—Union and incorporation of the two—Mission to the Emperor and its success—Suppression of piracy—Note on martial law and the legal condition of Europeans in India.

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WHILE the Portuguese declined, the spirit of maritime enterprise spread rapidly in other quarters. The English in particular entered vigorously on a course so well adapted to their insular situation. They were among the first who turned their attention to the discovery of a communication with India to the north of the Continents of Asia and America.¹

Drake, who (in 1577) had followed the footsteps of Magellan round Cape Horn, endeavoured to return by a northern passage, but was at last obliged to take the

¹ The first *English* voyage was in 1496, under the celebrated Venetians, John Cabot and his son Sebastian : but a still earlier attempt had been made in 1463 by Cortereal, a Portuguese, who subsequently (in 1501) pushed his discovery as far as the river of St. Lawrence. The search for a passage by the north-east was commenced in 1553, under Sir H. Willoughby (who was frozen to death with all his crew on the coast of Lapland), and Robert Chancellor, who first discovered an entrance by sea into Russia, then cut off from the Baltic by Lithuania, and from the Black Sea by the Tartars of Kipchák (Barrow's *Arctic Voyages*).

course by the Cape of Good Hope, and thus passed through the Indian Ocean and visited the Moluccas and Java. This track was rendered more familiar by Cavendish in 1586; and not long after, in 1591, a squadron of three ships under Captain Raymond was despatched from London for the express purpose of trading with India by the Cape of Good Hope. The expedition was unfortunate; but one ship reached India, and though she was lost on her return, an opportunity had been afforded to Captain Lancaster, her commander, to attain that experience which led to the establishment of a permanent intercourse with the East. Another squadron, sent by private individuals in 1596, was equally unsuccessful. The discouragement occasioned by this commencement was changed into eagerness and activity by the example of the Dutch. That people, still struggling for their independence against the Spaniards, determined to appropriate to themselves the wealth derived by their enemies from the Portuguese trade in the East. In 1595 they sent their first four ships to the Spice Islands; and such was the effect of mercantile cupidity and republican energy, that during the short period which remained of the century they had forty ships employed in those seas,² and before many years of the next had passed they had dispossessed the Portuguese of their principal settlements in the Eastern Islands, had founded many of their own both there and in India, and had secured a monopoly of all the spice trade in the East.

It was the success of their first voyage that roused the emulation of the English; and as early as 1599, a number of the principal merchants of London formed themselves into an Association for Trading with India,

² Macpherson's *Commerce of India*, 44.

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—

subscribed 30,000*l.* to promote their object, and applied to the Queen for a charter and certain reasonable privileges and exemptions.

The grant of such a charter would have been an open attack on the pretensions of the King of Spain (as representing Portugal) to an exclusive commerce in the Eastern Seas ; and, as Queen Elizabeth was at the time endeavouring to make peace, she was unwilling to introduce a new topic of dispute which might embarrass her negotiations.

The merchants, however, after enumerating the ports and territories which had been in any way under the influence of the former Government of Portugal, gave a long list of countries to which the Spaniards could make no pretensions, and defied them to show why they should bar her Majesty's subjects 'from the use of the vast, wide, and infinitely open ocean sea, and of access to the territories of so many free princes, kings, and potentates in the East, in whose dominions they have no more sovereign command or authority than we or any Christians whatever.'

The Queen at length was convinced by these arguments, and granted a charter, incorporating a Company for fifteen years, empowering them to trade to all places in India not claimed by other European nations ; to punish by fine and forfeiture all others of her Majesty's subjects who should engage in the India trade without a licence ; to purchase land of the natives for factories, which was thenceforward to become their private property ; and to make bye-laws for themselves and their servants, not repugnant to the laws of England : at the same time exempting them from the payment of customs either on exports or imports for a period of four years.

The Company began by appointing a Governor and twenty-four Directors. They purchased five ships, large and small, and manned them with 440 seamen; thirty-six factors of different degrees accompanied the fleet, which was commanded by Sir James Lancaster, formerly mentioned as one of the captains of a previous unfortunate expedition.

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A.D. 1601.

Though their object was strictly commercial, the requisite intercourse with local Governments and the jealousy of European rivals compelled them, and all others in that age, to engage in political and military transactions. On the very first voyage, Lancaster made a treaty with the king of Achin in Sumatra, who granted to the English exemption from customs, permission to build a factory, and the right to be guided by their own laws among themselves, while they submitted to those of the country in their intercourse with the inhabitants. On the same voyage likewise he engaged with a Dutch officer in an attack on the Portuguese, then at war with the English, and finished by capturing a rich Portuguese vessel which contributed more than his mercantile dealings to render his voyage highly profitable to his employers.

The first three voyages made by the Company were to the Eastern Islands, and to that quarter their attention was for a long time directed, their visits to India being chiefly undertaken as the means of exchanging their European commodities for others which were found to be more in request with the islanders from whom they purchased pepper and other spices.³ But this subordinate traffic soon became of consequence enough to attract notice on its own account.

³ The Eastern trade, though of much importance in the history of the Company, is of none to that of India, and need not be followed out.

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A.D. 1609.

On the third voyage, in 1609, Captain Hawkins was landed at Surat on a mission to the Emperor Jehángir. He repaired to Agra and solicited the grant of land for a factory at Surat, and likewise of some commercial privileges in that part of India; but he was not furnished with the means of making his way at a corrupt court and was thwarted by the calumnies of the Portuguese Jesuits and the hostility of Mokerreb Khán, Governor of Surat, and at last withdrew after a residence of two years at the court.⁴

A.D. 1610.

Some notion of the peculiarities of the Company's situation at this period may be derived from the adventures of their sixth voyage, in 1610. It was on a greater scale than any hitherto attempted. One vessel is differently represented as of 1,000 or 1,200 tons, but was certainly the largest trading vessel yet built. King James was present at the launch, and dined on board, off china dishes, then quite new in England. The voyage, however, was not successful. Sir Henry Middleton, who commanded, was brave to rashness, but violent and imprudent. He allowed

Bantam, in the island of Java, was, for the first half century, the principal English station; to it all the other factories founded during that period were subject. They took in Bengal and Coromandel, and extended eastward to Borneo and Japan; Surat, from its remoteness, remained independent and became a sort of head to the factories in the West of India, Persia, and Arabia (Bruce, i. 192, &c.) The great desire of the English at that time was to obtain a share in the trade of the Moluccas or Spice Islands; they were strenuously opposed by the Dutch, who, instead of admitting them to the Spice Islands, aspired to drive them out of all the Eastern Archipelago. This rivalry led to many contests, and an attempt was made in 1619 to put an end to them by means of an union between the Dutch and English Companies; but this unnatural alliance produced further discord, and ended in the Massacre of Amboyna (1622-1623). The English never recovered their ground in that quarter, but they retained their factory at Bantam till 1682, when they were stripped of that also by the Dutch, and left with no possession in the Eastern Islands except Bencoolen in Sumatra.

⁴ Purchas's *Pilgrims*, book iii. chap. vii.

himself to be inveigled ashore by the Turkish Governor of Mocha, and was treacherously seized after eight of his men had been killed and himself and several others wounded. Though threatened with torture and death, he refused to give such orders as would place his ships in the power of the Turks ; and when after six months' imprisonment, he effected his escape and joined his squadron on the coast of Abyssinia, his first measure was to take up a position before Mocha and threaten to reduce the town to ruins if the other prisoners were not immediately released and compensation paid. He accomplished both these objects and then sailed to India.⁵ At the entrance to the river of Surat he found a Portuguese fleet, the admiral of which opposed his entrance on the ground of the exclusive rights of his nation, although Great Britain was then at peace with Spain and Portugal. Sir Henry protested against such a pretension, and resisted all the attempts of the Mogul governor to persuade him to remove to another port where he was less likely to clash with the Portuguese. Two months were spent in negotiations, at the end of which the Portuguese moved down the river to attack the English. Notwithstanding the prodigious superiority of their numbers, they were repelled both by land and sea, and the English were permitted to carry on their trade without further obstruction. The overbearing temper of Sir Henry, however, led to a quarrel with the Mogul governor himself, who ordered him to quit the port, without allowing him time to complete his bargains or collect his debts. Having tried in vain to obtain admission to another port, he returned to the Red Sea, where in retaliation for his supposed injuries at Surat, he detained all Indian vessels to a considerable

⁵ Purchas's *Pilgrims*, vol. i. book iii. chap. xi. sec. 5.

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 II. of them, paying them in European articles for which
 they had no desire.⁶

Having made up his cargoes by this sort of commercial piracy, he sailed for Bantam to exchange them for the productions of that region. He there suffered shipwreck, and finally died worn out with fatigue and anxiety.

A.D. 1612. A subsequent expedition to Surat was more fortunate in its commander. Captain Best not only prevailed on the Mogul governor to renounce all memory of Sir H. Middleton's proceedings, but induced him to enter into many stipulations for the security of the English and their trade, and to procure the ratification by the Emperor himself of the engagement thus concluded.

Whilst he was waiting for the ratification, Captain Best was attacked by a numerous Portuguese fleet and was obliged to maintain a contest which lasted for several days, partly in the Tapti and partly in the open sea. In the end the Portuguese were obliged to give up the attack and sail for Goa, while the English resumed their position at Surat and were offered no further molestation. The Portuguese, however, did not desist from the practice of treating even friendly powers as enemies if found within their exclusive limits.

A.D. 1615. In 1615 Captain Downton, who was lying at the mouth of the Tapti with a trading squadron of four ships, was attacked by a powerful armament commanded by the Viceroy of Goa in person. He made up for the great

⁶ 'I thought wee should do ourselves some right and them no wrong, to cause them to barter with us, wee to take their indicoes and other goods of theirs, as they were worth, and they to take ours in lieu thereof.' (Middleton in Purchas, book iii. chap. xi. sec. 6.) He afterwards often speaks of 'ronnaging' Indian ships and taking what goods he wanted; and we may conclude he paid for them, though at his own price.

inferiority of his force by engaging the enemy among shallows and narrow channels, and, although the attack of the Portuguese was neither deficient in skill nor courage, and was renewed during several days, it was completely repulsed, and the viceroy was constrained to return to Goa with considerable loss both in men and honour.⁷

Perhaps the most important result of the Mogul grant to Captain Best was its enabling that officer to leave stationary factors at Surat.⁸ Hitherto the entire conduct of each voyage was left to the commander, and his behaviour to the natives varied with his character and the state of affairs at the moment. But the factors soon made themselves acquainted with the circumstances of the country, and were enabled to regulate their measures by more extensive views. They deputed one of their body to the Mogul's court to solicit some improvement in their firmán; they also set on foot inquiries with a view to opening a trade with Persia, and by the influence which they acquired from their knowledge and the permanence of their residence, were the means of introducing more system into the proceedings of the Company than had hitherto been observed.

This tendency to regular and uniform administration was promoted by a change which had taken place in the arrangements at home.

⁷ The accounts of the early voyages and other proceedings of the Company are taken from Bruce's *Annals*, Purchas's *Pilgrims*, and Harris's *Voyages*. I have also consulted Macpherson's *Indian Commerce*, Murray's *History of India*, and the tenth volume of the *Modern Universal History*; but the three last derive almost all their information from the preceding three. The statements regarding the Portuguese sea-fights are confirmed by Faria.

⁸ Purchas, book iv. chaps. vii. and viii.

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The first nine voyages of the Company had been carried on by separate Associations composed of such of the members as chose to embark on each adventure, occasionally admitting other merchants who were not members of the Company. Each voyage was managed by a subordinate committee appointed by the subscribers, though all were subject to the regulations of the Company, and were to a certain extent under the control of the Governor and Directors. But in the year 1612-13 it was resolved to raise a general stock from all the members sufficient to provide for four voyages to be conducted on the principle of a joint-stock company, the profits being shared according to the amount of each man's stock, and the whole to be exclusively conducted by the Governor and Directors.

A proof of the increased importance of the Company was soon after afforded by the appointment of Sir T. Roe as ambassador from the King to the Great Mogul for the sole purpose of promoting its interests. Sir Thomas sailed in the spring of 1615, and was four years absent, of which he spent two at the court of Jehángír.⁹ He was a man of judgment and ability, as he likewise proved in subsequent diplomatic employments in Europe, but he was opposed by all the influence of Mokerreb Khán, misrepresented by the Portuguese, and ill supported by the Company's factors from their own jealousies, and perhaps even from some narrow suspicions on the part of the Company itself,¹ and the consequence was that the advantages he gained were not proportioned to the high rank of his mission. The principal additions made to the old grant were, a

⁹ See ii. 359 ; book x. chap. i.

¹ See an extract of a letter from Sir T. Roe to the Company in Orme's *Fragments*. Vol. iii. of his works, p. 381.

general permission to establish factories throughout the empire, especially in Bengal, Sind, and Surat, together with some rules calculated to protect the English from exactions, and to facilitate the transit of their goods through all parts of India.

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The inquiries of the Company's factors regarding Persia ended in the establishment of a trade with that country. It was effected by means of an agreement with Sháh Abbás, but was opposed by the Portuguese, whom the English were obliged to encounter in more than one naval action. These provocations, together with the threats of Sháh Abbás, who would allow no neutrals in his dominions, induced their factors to co-operate with the Persian monarch in an attack on Ormuz. The capture of the island was chiefly effected by the exertions of the English fleet, which were repaid by a share in the booty, by the establishment of a factory at Gombroon, and by other concessions in favour of the Company's trade.²

After this the Company carried their jealousy of the Portuguese so far as to combine with their own inveterate enemies the Dutch in a plan to wrest Bombay from that nation. It proved abortive, and a joint expedition which was sent to Mocha in Arabia was repulsed with the loss of a large Dutch ship. The sea-fights between the English and Portuguese nevertheless continued, but their mutual animosity so far relaxed that in less than ten years the Viceroy of Goa made a truce with the President at Surat and threw open his ports to English commerce.

A.D. 1625-
1626.

A.D. 1634-
1635.

This pacification raised up a new enemy to the

² The fleet is said by Hamilton to have consisted of five ships, well manned, and carrying one with another forty guns to each. (*Account of the East Indies*, i. 103.)

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A.D. 1634-
5 to 1649-
50.

Company more formidable than the Portuguese. An Association was formed to trade with the newly opened ports by Sir W. Courten, who seems to have been a man of large property, and who contrived to prevail on men of influence at the court of Charles I. to embark in his scheme. By their means a charter was granted to Courten in violation of that of the Company, and in a manner little creditable to the plain dealing of the King.

The new Company were bold and unscrupulous speculators, not possessed of the experience of the old Company, and not bound by their engagements. They consequently became embroiled with the natives in various manners, and were guilty of acts of violence nearly amounting to piracy. For all this the representatives of the old Company were held responsible by the local powers, and were fined and imprisoned for the offences of their rivals. At the same time the commercial competition of the two Companies, being guided by passion and not by calculation, produced a glut of Indian commodities in Europe, which brought both Companies to the brink of ruin, and these distracted counsels had to bear up against the steady prudence of the Dutch Company, its maritime superiority, and the influence derived from its territorial possessions. As a last resource the two Companies agreed to a union for five years ; an Act of Parliament was passed to form a new Company, and to give it power to enforce obedience on British subjects by the infliction of punishments.

The new Company having latterly traded and made settlements in Africa, the trade with Guinea and on both coasts was granted to the new Company, but never made any figure in its history.³

³ The details of the proceedings of the two Companies will be found

During all these discouragements, the old Company had never relaxed its exertions to extend and protect its trade. Its agents had before fortified their factory at Armegon on the coast of Coromandel (in 1628-9), and they now obtained a grant of land at Madras, on which they erected Fort St. George, and soon after (1643-4) founded a town, the revenues of which they expected would be sufficient to defray the expense of the garrison.⁴ Both of these forts were designed for protection against the Dutch.

A.D. 1610-
1611.

The garrison of Armegon, though mounting twelve guns, consisted of only twenty-three men, including the factors, and that of Fort St. George at a later period amounted to no more than twenty-six soldiers.

The Company also attempted, though unsuccessfully, to open a channel for commerce by the Indus to Lahór, and they sent cargoes to Bussora and the Red Sea, which, however, did not repay the expense and risk. A more important step was their commencing a regular trade with Bengal for the conduct of which they established a factory at Balasore.⁵

A.D. 1640
1641.A.D. 1642-
1643.

On Portugal declaring her independence of Spain, the Company sent a mission of congratulation to Goa, and immediately entered on amicable relations with the Portuguese.

The profits of the Company, while their trade was new, while it was enriched by captures and by forced exchanges, and before it had to contend with the competition of the Dutch in the west of India, amounted on an average of the first eight voyages to from one hundred and thirty-eight to one hundred and seventy-

in Bruce's *Annals*, Macpherson's *Commerce*, the *Universal History*, x. 68, Dodsley's *History of India*, and Harris's *Voyages*.

⁴ Bruce's *Annals*, i. 377 and 402.

⁵ The native name is *Bahar*.

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one per cent.⁶ But this was a return on a concern which was not wound up till the end of seven years, and after making the deductions requisite for that and other reasons, the profits it is said were not much more than sufficient to make up for the risk.⁷ After the formation of the first joint-stock in 1613, the average profit fell to eighty-seven and a half per cent.;⁸ and during their subsequent distresses they probably could not obtain a full return of the outlay, for in 1640 the selling price of their stock fell to sixty per cent. (or forty per cent. discount).⁹

A.D. 1652. The ascendancy maintained by the Dutch, as well during the war which followed as at the peace which closed it, together with the disregard of the late Act and the encouragement given by the Protector to illicit traders (or, as they were then called, interlopers) induced the Company to wind up their affairs and put up bills in the Royal Exchange offering their privileges and fixed property for sale.

A.D. 1656. This led to new arrangements. Another Company was formed and another charter given, by which such of the interlopers as had not been ruined during the previous transactions were included in the joint-stock.

October,
A.D. 1657.

During the controversy between the old joint-stock Company and the advocates for free trade or a regulated Company, the arguments of the latter party were precisely those of the political economists of the present day, and were at once admitted by the Company, which rested its claims entirely on special grounds. These were—besides the injustice of depriving them of the

⁶ The first is the rate given in Macpherson's *Commerce*, and the second in Murray's *India*.

⁷ Macpherson, p. 92; see also Murray, i. 200.

⁸ Bruce, i. 167.

⁹ Macpherson, p. 117.

benefit of the factories they had established and the grants they had procured at a great expense—that, though free or regulated trade might succeed in a united monarchy like Turkey, where all affairs could be managed by the ambassador, they were quite inapplicable to a country much of which was divided among numerous petty chiefs and the rest distracted by civil war. In this last case expensive and defensible factories must be maintained; a steady and skilful course must be pursued with the native chiefs; and large presents must be made to those rulers, while orderly and consistent behaviour must be enforced even on the traders and mariners who had intercourse with the common natives; that the Company were now under engagements to the native chiefs which would be dissolved by the opening of the trade, with a palpable breach of faith, and a certainty of forfeiture of all grants and privileges; and, moreover, that the violent interruptions offered by the Dutch and Portuguese required to be resisted by larger vessels than private persons could afford to maintain. They concluded by a strong appeal to the experience of forty years and the failure of all attempts at free trade or regulated Companies that had been made during that period.

Some of these arguments might be answered, but on the whole it seems clear that the state of India at that period was not ripe for a free commerce.¹

¹ [The opposition to the Company at this time did not arise so much from private traders as from adventurers of the United Joint Stock, who prayed that the trade might be carried on by a Company, but with liberty for each member to employ his stock in separate adventures, and the question raised was not between private enterprise and a protected Company, but between private trading and joint-stock management. This appears distinctly in the first paragraph of the petition of the Merchant Adventurers, as set forth in Bruce (i. 518):

‘A free trade regulated will encourage industry and ingenuity, which

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On the Restoration, the Company received a new charter confirming their possessions, including the island of St. Helena which they had occupied on its being abandoned by the Dutch, giving them authority to make war and peace with all powers not Christians, and to raise troops in England for their service, and at the same time strengthening their hands against interlopers.

In 1662 the island of Bombay was ceded to the King as part of the portion of his queen, the Infanta of Portugal. The Earl of Marlborough was sent out with five ships to take possession, and Sir A. Shipman to act as Governor on the King's part. But the surrender of the place was delayed by the Portuguese; first on account of a dispute regarding the extent of the cession, and afterwards from objections to the validity of the new Governor's commission; so that the English did not obtain possession for two years. During this time, Lord Marlborough returned to England; and the intended garrison remained at Anjediva, an unhealthy island, where two-thirds of their number died. Sir A. Shipman was among the victims; and Mr. Cooke, his secretary, who succeeded him, worn out with suffering, accepted the cession in the limited sense put upon it by the Portuguese, and under a capitulation reserving many privileges to the inhabitants. This transaction was disapproved by the King, and Mr. Cooke was at the

hath latitude and scope to exercise itself, whilst each person hath the ordering of his owne affaires; whereas, on a joint stock, it is impossible for one to improve either, only to stand idle, without an opportunity to make use of his own talents.'

These arguments would have had much force had the Government undertaken the 'regulation' and protection of the trade by fleets and fortified posts, but this being left to the traders, the necessary security could only be afforded by the resources of a Company.

The subject is pursued at greater length on a subsequent page.—ED.]

same time superseded in the government; and being detected in several instances of corruption, was obliged to fly to Goa, where he put himself under the protection of the Jesuits, and by their aid afterwards endeavoured to attack Bombay by open force.

Disagreements likewise took place between the King's Governor of Bombay and the President of Surat (though both moderate and upright men); and in 1668 the King found it expedient to put a stop to these collisions by giving up Bombay to the Company. The transfer was full and complete, with the reservation of a quit-rent of ten pounds.

In the first years after the Company got possession of Bombay, they proceeded to build ships there for the defence of the place, to improve the fortifications, to establish a native militia, to invite native settlers by exemption from duties and other sorts of encouragement, to appoint courts of justice, to coin money, and to take measures for increasing their revenue. The whole receipts when they took charge amounted to 6490*l.* a year. The King's garrison which enlisted with the Company amounted to 150 English soldiers and fifty-four native Portuguese or negroes, with twenty one guns.

The Company had long been desirous of obtaining possession of this island and the nearest part of the continent, and had suggested the purchase of them from the Portuguese in the year 1653. Their object was to procure a place of security against European and native attacks; and they probably expected (as at Madras) that the revenue of their acquisition would defray the expense of the establishment. Up to the foundation of Fort St. George (for Armegon was but temporary), they were the only Europeans who attempted to trade in India without any territorial possession. The

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Portuguese and Dutch occupied considerable dominions ; and even the Danes began their operations (in 1621) by building a fort and town at Tranquebar, a district which they held of the Náik of Tanjore.²

It was probably more owing to want of power than inclination that the English remained on a different footing from their neighbours ; but it has often been maintained that such was the policy which they ought of their own accord to have adopted, and that prudence required them to abstain from the acquisition of forts or lands ; and even to dispense with factories and stationary agents, and confine themselves strictly to trading voyages. It is alleged that the possession of territory or even of factories was injurious to them as diminishing the profits of their commerce, and as leading by a sort of necessity to a still further extension of their dominions ; and it is contended that the same advantages might have been obtained without any drawback, by purchasing cargoes from native merchants or European adventurers settled in the country. This question stands on the same ground as that regarding free trade. The proposition is true of well-ordered and neighbouring countries ; the attention of individuals to their own interest will, when unobstructed, secure the accumulation of such commodities as the trader requires ; and if he is shut out of one country, by any rare occurrence such as invasion or revolution, he has timely notice to seek another market. But it was otherwise in India after the first years of Aurangzib. A trader arriving after a twelvemonth's voyage might find the European agent in a dungeon, and even the native merchants driven away by the exactions of a bad Governor ; he might find his port in the hands of plundering

² *Modern Universal History*, ii. 11.

Marattas, or the supply of all merchandise cut off by the distracted state of the surrounding countries. Even if he met with none of these obstructions from the natives, he would still be exposed to European rivals ; and would have to maintain an unequal contest with the influence conferred by the possession of territory and the skill derived from permanent residence.

There was not one of these supposed contingencies which was not undergone during the early voyages of the Company ; and the question is whether it was really profitable to continue those hazardous speculations, or to incur some expense for the purpose of gaining a greater degree of security ? Forts and territories are only useful as affording safety and permanence to the factories. It is observable that the continental nations still retain their trade, wherever they are possessed of territory, though they have lost it in most places where they had only commercial stations ; and so soon was the advantage of this sort of protection perceived, that the English Company's stock, which, before they had any possessions of their own, was long selling at from sixty to seventy per cent., rose, some years after the acquisition of Bombay, to five hundred per cent.³

The objection from the necessity of continued increase of dominion is not borne out by the example of the Dutch *in India*, or of the Danes, or even of the Portuguese after they ceased to make conquest their principal object. It has certainly been otherwise with

³ Sir Thomas Roe gave it as his opinion that the Portuguese and Dutch spent more on their territories than they gained by their trade, and that they never thrived after they became independent powers in India. But it may be answered that the Portuguese trade was an armed monopoly, and owed its existence to their political power ; and though the Dutch carried their buildings and establishments to an extravagant pitch, yet no one will contend that they were losers by their connection with the East.

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the English, but it is not so clear that the extension of their dominions has been injurious either to Great Britain or to India.

The advantage of such a retreat as Bombay became, more apparent at the time from the increasing disorders of the country. Surat was sacked by Sivaji in 1664 and again in 1670, on both which occasions the English owed their safety from the general calamity to the strength of their factory and their own courage in defending it. The consequence of this was, that not long after the grant of Bombay the Presidency was transferred to that place, and Surat made a subordinate station ; but to avoid exciting jealousy in the Mogul government, the President was still to affect to consider Surat as his head-quarters, and to reside there as much as he thought necessary, conducting the affairs of Bombay through a deputy.

While these transactions were going on in the west of India, an extraordinary occurrence took place at Madras. Sir E. Winter, who had been appointed Governor in 1661, was removed in 1666, but instead of surrendering his authority he imprisoned Mr. Foxcroft, who was appointed his successor, on pretence of his having uttered treasonable language against the King ; and in spite of repeated orders both from King and Company (which he treated as forgeries) he retained possession for two years. Serious apprehensions were entertained at one time of his making over the fort to the Dutch ; but at length, being threatened with a naval attack and offered a free pardon on condition of submission, he gave up the place in August 1668.

For the period that succeeded, the Company enjoyed comparative tranquillity. They were disturbed indeed by a national war with the Dutch ; and the distracted

state of India, owing to the wars between the Moguls and Marattas, occasioned considerable interruption to their trade, but they escaped without permanent injury from the war ; and the improved value of their stock, which has been mentioned, shows that their trade surmounted all the difficulties opposed to it. The favour of the Crown had put down interlopers, and the same influence, with the possession of Bombay and Madras, enabled them to assume something of the character of a Government. They accordingly made various regulations about their service, some unconnected instances of which may be mentioned before entering on a more general view. Among these was a regular system for rise in their civil service ; the lowest class, or apprentices, were, after certain periods for each rank, to become writers, factors, merchants, and senior merchants ; and nomination to employments was to be regulated by standing in the service.

The civil servants were particularly directed to apply themselves to the study of military discipline, so that in case of sudden attacks, or of superior fitness for military duty, they might receive commissions.

Another improvement was in organising a militia at Bombay and Madras. At Bombay there were at one time (1672) 1,500 native militia, half armed with fire-arms and half with lances ; but at a later period (1676) this force was reduced to 600 (probably employed more regularly and permanently), who were paid by the principal inhabitants.

The Government of Bombay seem at this early period to have been struck with the idea of introducing European discipline among their native troops ; for in 1682 they write to the Directors, reminding them of their frequent applications for European officers to

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command the militia, and add that 'without being exercised and trained up, they will never stand to do any good' (Papers at the India House). In 1684 they introduced an innovation which likewise showed a tendency to put the native troops on a footing with the Europeans. This was their entertaining 200 Rájput, who were to be divided into two companies, to be under chiefs of their own caste, to use their own arms, and when on duty to be blended with the regular European troops. These seem to have been beneficial regulations, but the general government of the Company was conducted on the narrowest principles, and displayed a total want of skill and consistency. They were incessantly changing the seats and the form of their Presidencies, and extending and diminishing the number of their factories. They were equally unsteady in their treatment of their agents, sometimes showing a capricious confidence in individuals, and then censuring and removing them with as little cause. Their trimming policy between Sivají and Aurangzib was a matter of necessity; but by allowing contributions to be levied on them by every petty rája on the Malabar coast, they fell into contempt with the native chiefs, and invited further oppression. When roused to something like resistance, they gave their servants discretionary authority to make war on native states; yet while granting these powers to their governors, and at the same time stimulating them to measures of defence against the Dutch, and to the assertion of their disputed privileges against the Portuguese, they reduced the garrison of Bombay, the seat of their supreme Presidency, to 180 men, the militia being at the same time abolished; Fort St. George, when threatened by an army of 4,000 Dutch and 12,000 troops of Golconda,

A.D. 1678-
1679.

could only muster 250 soldiers besides some native irregulars; and this was in 1674-5—before the great reduction. CHAP. II.

• But the error which most injured their interests was their inadequate remuneration to all descriptions of persons in their employment. A civil servant after five years' residence in India, received 10*l.* a year; the salaries of the higher ranks were on the same scale. The members of Council had 80*l.* a year, the Deputy Governor of Bombay, 120*l.*, and the President at Surat, who had the supreme control over all their affairs in India, 300*l.*⁴ These functionaries had not, as in England

⁴ At the time of these reductions the abundance of money and the expense of living in England were increasing at a rate never before known; and it is singular that our knowledge of this fact is principally derived from the writings of Sir Josiah Child, by whose orders the reductions were made in India. (Hume's *History*, viii. 329.)

[Dr. Fryer, a surgeon in the service of the East India Company, visited Surat and Bombay in 1674, and gives the following account of the salaries of the Company's servants at the time.

'The whole mass may be comprehended in these classes, viz. merchants, factors, and writers; some Bluecoat boys also have been entertained under notion of apprentices for seven years, which being expired, if they can get security, they are capable of employment. The writers are obliged to serve five years for 10*l.* per annum, giving a bond of 500*l.* for good behaviour. After which they commence factors and rise to preferment and trust, according to seniority or favour, and therefore have 1,000*l.* bond exacted of them and have their salary augmented to 20*l.* per annum for three years; then entering into new indentures, are made senior factors, and lastly, merchants after three years more; out of whom are chose chiefs of factories as places fall, and are allowed 40*l.* per annum during their stay in the Company's service, besides lodgings and victuals at the Company's charges.'

Notwithstanding the meanness of these emoluments, these public servants are described as vying with their superiors, and 'in their respective factories live in like grandeur.' The chiefs of the factories maintained great state. The following is the account of the President. 'The President has a large commission and is *Vice Regis*; he has a council, and a guard when he walks or rides abroad, accompanied with a party of horse which are constantly kept in the stables, either for pleasure or service. He has his chaplains, physicians, surgeons, and domestics, linguist and mint-master. At meals he has his trumpets

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at that period, fees, perquisites, and patronage to make up for their small salaries; unless they could gain something by speculation in managing the Company's investments, or could defraud the Mogul's revenue by applying the exemptions given for the Company's foreign trade to inland traffic of their own, they had no resource but to trade with Europe in violation of their duty and engagement. Accordingly the Company's own servants were always among the most dangerous interlopers; repeated orders were issued against their private trade; and one Governor was sent on a special mission with the unusual salary of 500*l.* a year, on purpose to put a stop to the practice.

A.D. 1682-
1683.

The year which succeeded the great reductions in 1678-9 was distinguished by the reappearance of avowed interlopers, a ship being built at Cadiz for the express purpose of illicit trade with India. Whether the civil servants of the Company were concerned in this undertaking does not appear; but a few years later two of the members of Council at Surat (Mr. Boucher and Mr. Petit) were detected in a connection with the interlopers, then become more numerous, and in intrigues with the Mogul governor of Surat tending to persuade him that a new Company, by which they pre-

usher in his courses, and soft music at his table. If he move out of his chamber the silver staves wait on him; if he go abroad the Bandarines and Moors under two standards march before him. He goes sometimes in the coach, drawn by large milk-white oxen, sometimes on horseback, other times in Palenkeens, carried by Cohors, Mussulman porters; always having a sombrero of state carried over him; and those of the English inferior to him have a suitable train.' (Vide J. Talboys Wheeler's *Early Records of British India*, from which the preceding extracts are quoted.) Dr. Fryer accompanied an embassy to the court of Sivaji, and was present at a coronation where this robber chieftain appeared in great pomp. Mr. Wheeler gives some extracts from the travels of Mandelslo, who visited Surat in 1638, and gives a particular account of the social life of the English at the time.—*Ed.*]

tended to be employed, was willing to concede to him much greater advantages than he derived from the old one. Still more ruinous was the parsimony with which they regulated the pay of their military establishment. Even before their last reduction, all the troops at Bombay had mutinied under their commanding officer ; one of the mutineers was shot, but the claims of the whole were admitted. After the reduction, the number of troops at Bombay fell off at one time to 100 men ; and this small body complained that their pay at the existing price of provisions was inadequate to their bare support. Soon afterwards the Company (who had before imposed a sort of conscription on the inhabitants) directed an increase to the taxes, and thus completed the disaffection of all classes. At last things came to a pitch which could no longer be borne. Captain Keigwin, the commander-in-chief (who at one time had a seat in Council), was allowed six shillings a day for his pay, in which every description of claim was to be included ; the local government made a small addition as subsistence money, but the Company insisted on a rigid compliance with their former orders, and directed the money advanced to Keigwin and some which had been issued to the private soldiers on another account to be refunded. In these circumstances, the troops mutinied and deposed the Deputy Governor ; they declared that they held the place for the King, and proclaimed Keigwin governor ; and these acts were at once accepted by every individual in the island. A year elapsed before this mutiny was put down, and then it was effected by a force under a King's officer, to whom, as his Majesty's representative, the mutineers surrendered. During their revolt, they were careful to do nothing inconsistent with their allegiance, nor was their rule attended with any extortion

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or misgovernment. There was not a drop of blood shed throughout the transaction ; they attended to the public interests with foreign states ; they maintained themselves on the regular revenue of the island, a sum of money which they had seized in a Company's ship being kept untouched, and restored when the fort was given up. A free pardon was one of the conditions of their surrender ; and if so obstinate a mutiny could ever be prudently overlooked, it would have been in their instance.

The suppression of this revolt allowed the Company to turn its attention to the interlopers, who had now increased to a serious extent. Its affairs were at that time entirely under the influence of Sir Josiah Child, a great London merchant, at the present day still well known for his writings on the principles of commerce. His brother, afterwards created a baronet by the name of Sir John Child, resided at Surat or Bombay, but was for the most important part of his career Governor-General of all India.

Both brothers were distinguished by their zeal for the Company's service, and their measures procured them applause from their employers and honours from their sovereign. The reward may have been more than was due to their services, in which they showed more activity than judgment, but it was overbalanced by the obloquy which most historians have agreed to cast on their internal government, on the faith of a single and very doubtful witness.

The arbitrary spirit of the times, their own presumption in foreign politics, and the narrowness of their views on many occasions, give us good ground to imagine a harsh and overbearing administration throughout ; but even of this there is no proof, and the ex-

travagant imputations of tyranny and cruelty which have been brought against them, are not only unsupported by evidence but inconsistent with known facts.⁵

The greatest part of the clamour which has been so widely echoed, arose out of their treatment of the interlopers, whom they certainly used every exertion to put down.

Those adventurers were mostly British subjects who equipped their vessels clandestinely in England ; and at a later period in the ports of the Continent or in the American Colonies. They were of three classes. The first were merely illicit traders, who were guilty of no irregularities except such as are inseparable from disregard of the law ; the second, when unsuccessful in trade had recourse to fraud and piracy ; the third were avowed buccancers, fitted out in the West Indies for piracy alone.⁶

Some even of the first class became dangerous to the existence of the Company, as well as destructive of its exclusive privilege, by which alone the charge of ful-

⁵ The single witness alluded to is Captain Hamilton, whose plain, vehement, sailor-like style is well adapted to gain confidence ; but he was himself an interloper, wrote from memory many years after the time, and was ready to believe every story that made against the Company and their servants, especially against those who had given him personal offence. He charges both the Childs in general terms with the blackest crimes, but against Sir John he brings forward specific instances of fraud, subornation of perjury, instigation to forgery, poisoning, and sacrilege (Hamilton, i. 185, 190, 193, 196). It could only be by stifling complaints that the perpetrator of so many atrocities could escape the highest penalty of the law ; yet Sir John Childs sent Captain Keigwin and some others of the mutineers, as well as many interlopers, to England ; he was on bad terms with the Judge of Admiralty at Bombay (Bruce, ii. 565) ; and was constantly in communication with officers of the Royal Navy ; so that any attempt to confine the knowledge of his misconduct to his own Government must have been futile. Harris's *Voyages* and Dodley's *History*, which are sometimes referred to as independent authorities, take their accounts verbatim from Hamilton.

⁶ Dr. Davenant, referred to in Macpherson, p. 241.

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II.

filling its engagements to the state could be defrayed. Their first leaders were Mr. Boucher and Mr. Petit, both Company's servants, who when detected by their employers, took refuge with the Mogul governor of Surat, and were strongly suspected of instigating the mutineers of Bombay, with whom they certainly corresponded, and to whom Mr. Petit repaired after the breaking out of the revolt.⁷ Boucher went to Aurangâbâd, and employed every exertion to excite the Mogul Government against the Company. The other classes were still more hurtful to the Company; they injured its credit by their pecuniary transactions and exposed it to risk by their excesses, its agents being held responsible even for the pirates, and fined and imprisoned for their misdeeds.

Vigorous measures were adopted against all classes of these offenders. A great number of their ships were seized by the King's and Company's cruisers, and condemned as prize by competent tribunals on the spot, and forty-eight of the persons principally concerned with them were sent home and prosecuted criminally before the Court of King's Bench.⁸

There seems to have been nothing irregular in these proceedings; but the strong temptation to commit the offence against which they were directed, and the numerous prosecutions which were necessary to repress it, afford the weightiest arguments against establishing exclusive privileges without necessity, or neglecting to abolish them the moment they cease to be required.⁹

But the ambition of the Childs was not satisfied with the extirpation of the interlopers. The Directors, influenced by their counsels, now contemplated the forma-

A.D. 1684
and 1685.

⁷ Bruce's *Annals*, iii. 130, 135.

⁸ Bruce, ii. 551.

⁹ See note at the end of the chapter.

tion of a sort of commercial empire, an imitation of the Dutch, who (as they said) made their power the foundation of their commerce and drew profits from their territory more than sufficient to meet the expense it occasioned.¹ 'Without that,' they observed at a later period, 'we are but as a great number of interlopers, united by his Majesty's royal charter, fit only to trade where no body thinks it their interest to prevent us.'² With a view to this object they proposed to increase and strengthen Bombay and Madras, and to obtain territory enough to defray the charges of each; they proposed to acquire a similar strong post at Priaman in Sumatra, or some other place in the Eastern Seas, but above all they decided to conquer Chittagong in Bengal from the Mogul, and there to establish the chief seat of their power. These possessions were to be called Regencies, and to be considered as independent territories under the protection of the British Crown; and in conformity to this resolution they directed that 'his Majesty's Union flag'³ should be hoisted at their principal stations. This project is often spoken of by the Company and their servants as their 'great design.'

But the scene of their dominion was still to be the sea-coast, and its object the security of their trade; the bold project afterwards imagined by another nation, of embarking in the wars and politics of the interior, and of conquering India by means of native troops and native allies, was far above their conception. Viewed with reference to their own limited object, their scheme

¹ Bruce, ii. 551.² Bruce, iii. 78.³ Bruce, ii. 590. This distinction between the national and personal colours of the King was seemingly intended to protect the Company's own pretensions to a sort of sovereignty, and is still kept up in India, where the royal standard is never displayed.

[It should be noted that this was written before the transfer of the Government of India to the Crown.—ED.]

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II.

was ill contrived, for such possessions as the Dutch had acquired in separate islands or in the states of petty rājās, were not so easily to be dismembered from the Mogul Empire, then extending its dominions by the conquest of neighbouring kingdoms.

But as the first and greatest of the operations contemplated was the invasion of Bengal, it is necessary, before proceeding further, to take a summary view of the state of English affairs in that province. Though
1616. Sir T. Roe had prevailed on Jehángír to grant a firmán for the establishment of trade and factories throughout his dominions, yet the Company had derived little advantage from it in Bengal until chance procured them the assistance of a local ruler. This was Prince Shujá, whose favourite mistress had been cured of a dangerous illness by Mr. Broughton, one of the Company's surgeons, and who repaid the benefit by steady kindness to the author. Mr. Broughton used his influence to obtain an order giving effect to the firmán, in consequence of which three or four factories were erected and trade was carried on free of duties.

About
A.D. 1640.

Shujá's order ceased to be valid on his defeat and expulsion by Aurangzib, but the English contrived by bribing the governors to obtain a precarious enjoyment of their privileges till about 1680, when the defect of their title was discovered by the viceroy of the day. They were then compelled to pay two per cent. customs like the Mussulmans, and one and a half per cent. as the Jeziá or infidel tax ; and in spite of their exertions both at Delhi and on the spot, that amount continued afterwards to be levied.⁴ The exaction of three and a half per cent. as customs could not be brought forward

⁴ The above account is from a report in the papers at the India House, written in 1684.

as a grievance, especially as the Dutch paid four and a half. But the English had other grounds of complaint : obstructions had been thrown in the way of their trade for the purpose of extorting bribes, their debtors were protected against them, and other minor annoyances occurred from time to time. But the most serious were the forcible release of some persons in the Company's service from their custody at Hugli in 1676, in the course of which the chief agent at the place was wounded ; the imprisonment of their wakil or native agent ; the levy of a fine of 500*l.* from him, and the suspension of their trade for six months before this fine was levied. A still more violent outrage was committed in 1680 at Patna ; that, however, was not in Bengal, but in the adjoining province of Behár. The Company's European agent there, having refused what was nominally a free gift to a new governor, was seized at the factory, dragged barefoot to Hájipur, the temporary residence of the governor, and kept in irons until he paid a forced present of ninety pounds.⁵

Serious complaints of these oppressions were addressed to the viceroy of Bengal ; the Governor of Madras, to which Presidency Bengal was then subordinate, even went so far in 1684 as to inform him that though the English were a peaceable people, they ' could not suffer such unreasonable abuses.'⁶ About the same time the Governor sent a native agent to Aurangzib's camp, and continued to urge his complaints from time to time in respectful but manly language, without receiving any redress.⁷

These were the grounds on which the Company

⁵ See list of grievances enclosed in Governor Gyfford's letters to the Nabob, dated September 17, 1684. (Papers at the India House.)

⁶ Letter above referred to.

⁷ Papers at the India House, February and March, 1686-7.

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entered on a war, which they must have thought in itself desirable as a necessary part of the fulfilment of their great design.

If the object of that design was beyond the Company's strength, the means adopted for attaining it were still more disproportioned to the end.

Decem-
ber, A.D.
1685.

An expedition was prepared in England under the express sanction of the King. It consisted of ten ships, carrying from twelve to seventy guns, and was to be commanded on the outward voyage by Captain Nicholson, under a commission from the King as vice-admiral; but the agent in Bengal was ultimately to be admiral and commander-in-chief, and six companies of soldiers (100 men each), which were sent out by this opportunity, were left without captains that they might be commanded by the members of Council. The troops were to be completed in India to 1,000 men, and the ships to nineteen sail, small and great.

The despatch of this expedition was to be kept a profound secret. It was to commence by taking Chittagong, which was to be strongly fortified and equipped with 200 pieces of ordnance. An alliance was at the same time to be made with the neighbouring Rájá of Aracán, and it was then to move on to Dacca, at that time the residence of the viceroy of Bengal, and to compel that functionary to cede the city and territory of Chittagong, and to grant many other privileges and immunities throughout his province. The expedition was next to proceed against the King of Siam, and was to oblige him to make satisfaction for some injuries offered to the English trade. This done, it was to conquer and fortify the intended Eastern Regency at Priaman, which was to be on a larger scale than Madras; and after all this it was to sail to the West Coast of India, and to

conquer Salsette and other disputed territories from the Portuguese.⁸ As if this was not employment enough for 1,000 men, Sir John Child at Bombay suggested that they should check the power of the Dutch on the Malabar coast; and the Company themselves, before they had heard of the result of the first operations, sent orders to the Government of Madras to assist the King of Golconda (of whose extinction they were not apprised) against the Dutch.

These ill-conceived measures were more absurdly executed. Instead of fixing the rendezvous at their own port of Madras, from whence their expedition might have sailed unsuspected to Chittagong, and might even have retained that nearly detached district, they ordered their force to assemble at Húgli, in the heart of the province of Bengal; and instead of directing their Governor-General to secure their interests before the war broke out, and to lay down a combined plan of operations, they sent their orders through the Governor at Madras to be executed by their agents in Bengal, and left the Governor-General, residing in the Mogul's city of Surat, in total ignorance of the progress of events in other parts of India.

The consequences were such as might have been expected. The Nabob of Bengal took the alarm at the first arrival of additional troops within his province, and sent a force of his own to observe their motions; mutual suspicions of the parties led to an affray; the English behaved with great gallantry and took Húgli, but having no use for an inland town they gave it up on a convention, and retired to Chúta Natti, twenty miles lower down the river, and the spot on which Calcutta now stands. It would have been easier for

October,
A.D. 1686.

⁸ Bruce, ii. 558, &c.

CHAP.
II.February,
A.D. 1687.

their expected reinforcement to join them there than at Húglí, but being threatened by the Nabob of Bengal, they afterwards moved still lower down the river to Hijelí. This spot was protected by a shallow channel which cut it off from the bank, but was low, unhealthy, and only supplied with brackish water. On their way to this place the English destroyed the fort of Tánna, and they afterwards sent some ships to Balasór, which plundered the town and destroyed many vessels in the harbour.

May, A.D.
1687.

But the climate of Hijelí rapidly reduced their numbers and impaired their efficiency ; and when a detachment of the Nabob's came to attack them, they were so ill off for supplies and saw so little prospect of ultimate success, that after defending themselves gallantly against ten times their number for four days, they were compelled to come to terms and to return to their old position at Chúta Natti.

End of
1688.

The terms agreed on were favourable, promising ground to build a factory, a compromise about the customs, and other advantages ; but the viceroy withheld his ratification, and a correspondence ensued which lasted till November 1687, when he heard of the taking of Goleonda by Aurangzib and thought himself entitled to dictate what terms he pleased. No further attack, however, was made on the English, and things remained in the same state till the arrival of fresh troops and new orders from England occasioned the renewal of active operations, as will be mentioned in its proper place.⁹

⁹ Letters of Mr. Charnock, Mr. Bradyll, and Mr. Gyfford at the India House, with native letters and agreements and other enclosures. Also Sir John Child's letters to the Company in the same collection. The instructions of the Company to Sir J. Child and the other Governors, if they still exist at the India House, cannot readily be found.

The news of the premature rupture in Bengal reached Sir John Child at Surat, where he was residing within the power of the Mogul governor, and to all appearance on terms of uninterrupted friendship with him. It was probably ascribed by the governor to some local irregularity to which he was accustomed both on the part of his countrymen and the Europeans.

It was not difficult therefore for Sir J. Child to temporise with him till sufficient time had elapsed to allow of his finding some pretence for going to Bombay, accompanied by some of the members of his Council.¹

April, A.D.
1687.

As soon as he found himself in safety, he despatched a vessel to Surat to endeavour to bring off the rest of the Company's servants, and at the same time sent ships to the Red Sea and Persian Gulf to seize on the Mogul vessels there, and detain the passengers as hostages for the English at Surat. All this was done without the slightest intimation of intended hostilities to the governor of Surat, and the plan was to preserve all appearances of cordiality towards him until the English still in his power should be removed to a place of safety. But it was disconcerted by a blunder of one of the captains, who seized a Surat ship on the Indian coast, on which the English at that place were thrown into confinement. Sir John Child then seized on as many Mogul vessels as were within his reach, not, he said, as an act of hostility, but in the way of reprisals, with an understanding that the ships would be given up as soon as the Company's servants were released and their property which had been seized at Surat restored. He, however, prepared for war by entering into a treaty with the Marattas, who were always ready for any combination against the Moguls: he also sent a statement of

¹ Bruce, ii. 600, &c.

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II.

End of
1687.

October 9,
A.D. 1688.

December
26, A.D.
1688.

his grievances and demands to the governor of Surat. It contained just grounds for complaint and remonstrance, but perhaps none sufficient to justify war, and certainly none to give a pretext for the abrupt commencement of hostilities without a declaration. Nevertheless, it was received with temper by the governor of Surat, and negotiations were still going on when the vessels from the Red Sea and Persian Gulf returned with many prizes, taken before the imprisonment of the English, and it became impossible any longer to disguise the existence of war.² But the governor of Surat (who had been lately appointed) is said to have been well disposed to the English, and at all events he could have foreseen nothing but loss of revenue from the interruption of their commerce. He therefore encouraged the detained English to write to Sir J. Child and invite him to the neighbourhood of Surat to negotiate. Sir John came with a fleet to the mouth of the Tapti, and at length made an agreement,³ to all appearance so satisfactory, that the Company on hearing of it sent him a present of 1,000 guineas.⁴

The fulfilment of this agreement was delayed for many months, and Sir J. Child, suspicious of the Mogul's sincerity, again repaired with a fleet of seven ships to the Tapti. He, however, forbore any act of aggression until he was suddenly informed that the governor of Surat had again imprisoned the English, had confiscated and sold the Company's goods, and had offered a reward to anyone who would bring in Sir John Child, dead or alive.⁵

These violent measures were probably by direct orders from Aurangzib, and the consequence of events

² Bruce, ii. 602, &c.

¹ Bruce, ii. 613.

³ Bruce, ii. 632.

⁵ Bruce, ii. 633.

which had just before taken place in Bengal. The truce concluded there in December 1687 had excited the utmost indignation of the Company. Enraged at the failure of their magnificent speculations, they inveighed against their servants in the coarsest language, accused them of pusillanimity, of corruption in applying the funds destined for the war to their own profit, and of a total insensibility to the honour of their employers and their country.⁶

They ordered the war to be renewed, and declared their resolution not to make peace without the cession of a defensible territory. To support these lofty pretensions, they sent out an armed ship and a frigate with a reinforcement of 160 soldiers under the command of Captain Heath. In conformity with their orders, this officer was invested by the Government of Madras with complete authority over all the public servants in Bengal, and empowered to renew the war or to conclude peace on any terms, provided it included the acquisition of a fortified place. On his arrival in Bengal, he found things in the same state of mutual forbearance in which they had remained since the refusal of the viceroy to ratify the terms. Contrary to the opinion of Mr. Charnock and the other civil servants, he determined immediately to begin military operations with the greatest vigour. He embarked all the Company's establishment on board the ships and forthwith sailed to Balasór, a considerable seaport in Orissa, which had before suffered from an attack of the English. The civil servants here entered into negotiations for the release of some English agents who resided at the place, but Captain Heath, who would hearken to no terms, landed a body of troops and sailors, with which he took and burned

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II.

August,
A.D. 1688.

October,
A.D. 1688.

⁶ Bruce, ii. 595.

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II.

the town and destroyed forty Mogul vessels that were in the port.⁷

December
13, A.D.
1688.

After this he sailed to Chittagong, but he did not show the same spirit there as at Balasór; for instead of attacking the place, he peaceably drew off to the coast of Aracán and commenced a negotiation for a cession in that country. Failing in this attempt, he entered on intrigues with a local chief against the rája, and at length, seeming incapable of pushing anything to a conclusion, he sailed off the coast and made direct for Madras.

March,
A.D. 1689.

It was probably the attack on Balasór that produced the violent measures already mentioned on the part of Aurangzib. That prince had been greatly incensed at the first disturbance at Húgli, but some noblemen at his court, whose friendship the English had contrived to secure, found the means of appeasing him, although their adversaries had, with a true knowledge of his character, coupled the report of the violence of the English with what he thought the still greater offence of seducing Mahometan women. Even as late as when Sir J. Child sent in his grievances and demands, the Emperor examined them deliberately and called for the remarks of the proper officers on each article before he decided on rejecting them. But he now seems to have been seriously provoked, for besides the seizure of the English at Surat, he afterwards ordered the expulsion of all that nation from his dominions. The barbarous zeal of a local officer made this order a ground for murdering the Company's servants at Vizagapatam, to the number of four or five; but this act was highly disapproved by the officer's superior, who looked with great apprehension to the

⁷ Bruce, ii. 647, &c.

effect which the report of it might produce on the Emperor. About the same time, or earlier, Aurangzib sent orders to the Sidi,⁸ or Abyssinian chief of Jinjera, to attack Bombay with all the troops he could collect. The Sidi landed on Bombay with 8,000 men in February 1689, and soon drove the English into their fort and took possession of the island, which he retained for more than a year, until the conclusion of the peace. This operation reduced the English to great distress. Their provisions ran short (the sooner from the presence of a large body of Marattas whom they had entertained), but as the sea was open they still contrived to receive a scanty supply. They, however, lost all confidence in the natives, whether troops or others; the Europeans, many of whom were foreigners, deserted in numbers to the enemy,⁹ and the Sidi, who had increased his force to 12,000 men, continued to play upon the fort from seven well-constructed batteries. Sir John Child fell sick amidst all these calamities, and perceiving that the Company's affairs in other parts of India were in nearly as bad a posture as at his own residence, he sent an embassy to the Mogul camp near Púna, to sue for peace, or rather pardon, from Aurangzib. The Emperor, who had nothing to gain by the war, was satisfied with the complete reimbursement of all losses to his subjects and a small payment into his own treasury. One condition of his forgiveness was the immediate removal

⁸ [Sidi (literally, my lord), was originally a form of address like the term Moolvi, and by the same process changed to an honorary appellation. The title Saïd or Syud, from which it was derived, was in frequent use in early Mahometan history as a title borne by sovereigns and men of high rank, and is familiar to us in the Cid of Spanish history. The title is still borne by the Sultan of Zanzibar.—ED.]

⁹ Bruce, ii. 635, &c.; Hamilton (who was in Bombay during the siege), i. 220-228.

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February,
A.D. 1690.

of Sir J. Child from India,¹ but the unfortunate Governor was saved from this mortification by his death, which took place before the return of the ambassadors.

Thus ended this ill-advised and worse-conducted war, but the evils it occasioned to the Company did not end with itself. They had been dispossessed of most of their factories in different parts of India; Madras, which had not suffered directly, was in a state of extreme weakness,² and Bombay, when evacuated by the Abyssinians, suffered from a pestilence which reduced the English part of the garrison to thirty-five soldiers. The interlopers also again appeared in the form of pirates, whose depredations on the Mogul vessels were the more alarming in proportion to the dread now entertained of any fresh displeasure on the part of Aurangzib.³ During a period so little creditable to the Company, they occasionally gave signs of good sense and good intentions. They encouraged their servants to fit themselves for communicating with the natives, and ordered some young men to be sent to Persia on purpose to acquire the language of that country. They also favoured the employment of the natives both among their troops and in civil offices, and issued the orders that have been mentioned for their forming the majority of the mayor's court at Madras.⁴

In the years next following their reconciliation to the Mogul, the Company had full employment in re-establishing their factories in Bengal and other places.

A.D. 1691-
1692.

At this time they procured a cession of a small territory

¹ Bruce, ii. 638; Hamilton, i. 228.

² Madras and the adjoining lands contained (according to Bruce), 300,000 inhabitants in the year 1687 (ii. 592), and in the same year there were only fifteen English soldiers in the garrison. (Bruce, ii. 582.)

³ Bruce, iii. 86.

⁴ Bruce, v. 111.

from the Rájá of Tanjore, on which they built Fort St. David. They were also occupied in watching the proceedings of other Europeans, the jealousy of whom had not at all diminished, notwithstanding the connection with the Dutch arising from the accession of William III. They were also engaged in endeavouring to put down the interlopers, whether pirates or illicit traders. The former they brought to trial in India, where several were condemned to death, subject to the King's confirmation of the sentence, and the others they attempted to get rid of by a new plan of purchasing their ships and making it worth their while to retire from the competition.

But it was difficult to maintain the checks imposed by their monopoly on the natural freedom of trade, and the arbitrary system required to enforce those restrictions was repugnant to the feelings of Englishmen both in India and at home. The Company's recent mismanagement of their affairs had increased the clamour against them, while they had lost a personal friend and patron in James II., and had to contend with the tide of free opinions that prevailed after the Revolution. Accordingly, in the early part of the year 1693, the House of Commons passed a vote 'that it was the right of all Englishmen to trade to the East Indies or to any other part of the world, unless prohibited by Act of Parliament.' This resolution struck directly at the Company's title, which was only derived from royal charters. Nevertheless, although the Company forfeited their charter during the same year by an error in form, having neglected to pay a certain tax on the precise day when it became due, yet it was renewed to them immediately, with a few additional regulations.

A.D. 1693

October
and No-
vember,
A.D. 1693.

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The detection of a widespread system of corruption by means of which this renewal was obtained⁵ did not tend to diminish the unpopularity of the Company, but as no less a sum than 40,000*l.* had been paid on the same occasion to Sir Basil Firebrass, the representative of the interlopers, the feeling so created was not pressed against them, and some years elapsed before their charter was again assailed.

During this interval the Indian Seas were overrun with pirates, chiefly English, and all under British colours. One of these corsairs plundered two ships conveying pilgrims to Mecca, and even captured a large vessel belonging to the Mogul, on which Aurangzib ordered all the English at Surat to be thrown into prison, and laid an embargo on the trade of all the European nations in his dominions until the pirate should be surrendered to him. It was not till the end of a twelvemonth that this difference was accommodated.⁶

⁵ The Duke of Leeds, President of the Council, was impeached by the Commons for receiving a bribe of 5,000*l.* on this occasion. It was proved before the same Committee of the House of Commons which inquired into the Company's affair (though on another investigation), that the Speaker himself took a bribe of 1,000*l.* to expedite the passing of a certain Bill through the House. In the midst of this general corruption, it is some satisfaction to find that the Earl of Portland indignantly refused to offer 50,000*l.* on the Company's part to King William, or to profit by the business himself; and declared he would ever be their enemy and opposer if such offers were repeated. (See Collection of the Debates and Proceedings in Parliament in 1694 and 1695, &c. Printed by H. Parker, 1773.)

⁶ This was the capture which led to Kháfí Khán's mission, described in ii. 555, Book xi. chap. iv. The silence of that historian regarding the preceding war in Bengal and at Bombay has been adverted to, but in fact those disturbances affected the Mogul as little as they did the King of Great Britain, and are therefore unnoticed in the annals of both Empires. The pirate was the *Panagy*, Captain Avery, fitted out by him in the West Indies, and carrying 46 guns and 130 men, among whom were 52 Frenchmen; the rest were English, Scotch, Irish, and Danes. She carried off all her plunder in safety, and sold it in the Bahama Islands. (Bruce, iii. 204.)

It was part of the arrangement, that the English should, for a fixed sum on each ship, undertake to afford convoy to all vessels conveying pilgrims to Mecca, a service which they for some time performed to the satisfaction of the Mogul Government. But the strength of the pirates continued to increase to such a degree that the Company became unable to afford effectual protection even to their own trade. Some of their ships were captured; the crews of two others mutinied and turned pirates themselves, and many individuals deserted from the Company's service to join those freebooters. One Captain Kidd, in particular, introduced a certain regularity among the pirates, who occupied ports in Madagascar and drew their stores from New York and the West Indies. To such perfection did he carry his system that in 1698-9 he was able to form two squadrons of sufficient force to blockade both coasts of India. On this occasion the Mogul seized the French, English, and Dutch agents, and compelled all three nations to enter into engagements to put down piracy, but their united efforts were still insufficient to restore the safe navigation of those seas.⁷

In 1698 a new attempt was made by the private merchants to procure a charter for a separate Company, and as they offered a loan of two millions to the Treasury, they soon obtained the support of the Government. The old Company were entitled by their charter to three years' notice before they were deprived of their exclusive privilege, and it was admitted that they should retain all their possessions and carry on their trade for that term, but their charter being only granted by the King was not thought to be a restraint on Parliament's constituting a new Company which might

⁷ Bruce, iii. 210, 213-214 and 219; also 236 7 and 271.

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II.

July 5,
A.D. 1698.

begin its operations without waiting till the rights conferred by that instrument should have expired.

Accordingly, an Act was passed incorporating a General Association with an exclusive trade to India,* and with no limitation as to time, except the liability to dissolution after three years' notice. As this measure had all along derived its chief support from the zeal throughout the nation for free trade, it would have been too bold at once to propose another joint stock; the members of the new Company were therefore allowed by the Act to trade individually, or to form different joint stocks among their own body, but the King was empowered to form the whole into a joint-stock Company on an application from the proprietors to that effect. It is probable that the framers of the new Company contemplated this arrangement from the first, for before the expiration of two months they applied in form, and in the King's charter, dated September 5, 1698, are forbidden to trade otherwise than on a joint stock.⁸ Between the passing of the Act and the issue of this charter some single merchants had entered on the trade, and these were still authorised to complete their voyages notwithstanding the above prohibition, and as in addition to these excepted persons there was the old Company, which retained all the forts and factories in India, it is easy to conceive the confusion that must have ensued.

The old Company, under all these discouragements, determined to defend itself to the last. The Directors wrote to their Governors in India that there could no more be two Companies at once than two kings; that one or other must soon give way; and that being veterans in the field they hoped, if their servants did

* Macpherson, p. 155, &c.

their duty, that they would still come off victorious.⁹ In prosecution of their plan they subscribed 300,000*l.* to the new Company, and soon after procured an Act of Parliament which continued them as a corporation for the purpose of managing this stock, even after their own three years should have expired. At the same time they increased their trade, they redoubled their attention to the internal affairs of India, and instead of contracting their forts and factories, they now built Fort William at Calcutta, which they erected into a Presidency.

Their rivals, with all the favour of the Government and the people, had no solid strength to oppose to them. The whole of their capital of two millions was absorbed in their loan to the Treasury, and they had to begin their operations with borrowed money.¹

Many of their subscribers were discouraged and withheld their payments, so that their stock was selling at a discount before they had entered on any commercial transaction.

They, however, entered on their business in India with the advantage of an ambassador, Sir H. Norris, who was paid by them and employed for their interests, but who was accredited to the Mogul by the King in his own name. Their Governors, for they appointed a separate one to each Presidency, were also invested with the office of consuls for the King. Many were old interlopers and dismissed servants of the former Company experienced in Indian business, and all were zealous for their employers, and disposed to carry with a high hand the powers which they derived from the King. The chief Governor was Sir N. Waite, a member of Parliament, and a man of some talent and resource,

⁹ Bruce, iii. 257.

¹ Mill's *History*, i. 84.

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II.

with an impetuous and overbearing temper, not ill suited to the task of overturning an old establishment and introducing another in its room. The old Company's Governors (of whom the chief was Sir John Gayer at Bombay, and the ablest Mr. Thomas Pitt at Madras) opposed a resistance more spirited than legal to the new comers. They refused them admittance or assistance at their ports, and set at nought their authority as consuls, which they truly said was inconsistent with their own exclusive charter not yet expired. The old Company had at first a decided advantage with the native courts, who could not understand the partial supersession of the persons to whom they were accustomed ; but the King's name and the high tone assumed by his representatives, by degrees threw the weight into the other scale, and Sir N. Waite, by dexterously imputing to the old Company the piracies which had so long subsisted while they held sway in India, prevailed on the Mogul governor of Surat to commit Sir John Gayer and his Council to prison. At the same time the new Company's consul on the coast of Coromandel stimulated the Mogul governor to put a stop to the collection of revenue and other assumptions of independence by the old Company at Fort St. George. The governor of the province was inclined to make this a pretext for extorting money, but Mr. Pitt, who seems to have possessed some of the energy of his descendants, decided that a concession would only lead to new demands, and, applying earnestly for reinforcements to Europe, offered, if they were supplied, to answer for resisting the Moguls even if they should be assisted by the French ; a contingency which at that early period did not escape his foresight. The new Company at home did not approve of these violent pro-

ceedings, but recommended their agents to endeavour to supplant their rivals by out-trading them, rather than to overturn them by force. This course, however, led to new difficulties, for the unnatural cheapness produced by a hostile competition first threw the home manufactures of the same kind out of the market, and then produced fluctuations ruinous to the retail traders who had before benefited by the glut. To protect the home manufactures from these evils, an Act of Parliament was passed prohibiting the importation of silks, calicoes, chintzes, and other stuffs that could be made in England, a measure which added extremely to the losses and embarrassments of both Companies.

The new Company early perceived the consequences of the struggle between the opposite interests, and made overtures for a union which were coldly received by the other party. But the public had all along taken an extraordinary interest in the discussions between the Company and the free traders, and a very general desire was now manifested that some compromise should be effected to remove the existing disorders. The King himself, at an audience which he gave to the Directors of both Companies, recommended a union to their serious consideration. Negotiations were in consequence commenced, but they were not brought to a settlement till soon after the accession of Queen Anne, when the two Companies were incorporated by a new charter, and thus was formed the United Company of Merchants trading to the East Indies which has subsisted to this day.²

July 22,
A.D. 1702.

² Their complete incorporation and assumption of their new name did not take place till 1708, the interval being employed in winding up their separate affairs. Sir Basil Firebrass was again the agent in negotiating this union, and received a present of 30,000*l.* for his good offices. The proceedings of the two Companies are taken from Macpherson, 154-162, and Bruce, under the years.

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Not long after this adjustment of their affairs at home, the Company were so fortunate as to acquire a similar security for their permanence in India.

A.D. 1715. Having been molested by the tyranny of Jáfer Khán, governor of Bengal, they sent an expensive mission to the Emperor Ferokhsir at Delhi, to solicit such a grant as might protect them from future vexation.

July, A.D. 1717. Their progress was very slow in attaining this object ; but Mr. Hamilton, the surgeon of the embassy, having cured the Emperor of a dangerous disease, and being desired to name his own reward, generously stipulated for a compliance with the solicitations of his employers. A considerable period was still consumed before the grant was passed, by force of money, through the hands of the ministers, and two years elapsed before it was finally delivered to the deputation.

The chief advantages acquired by this grant were an exemption from all duties and from search by custom-house officers, in consideration of the payment of a fixed sum annually ;³ the admission of rupees coined at the Company's mints to circulate in the Mogul's dominions ; the restoration of some territory of which they had been deprived near Madras and Masulipatam ; and the permission to purchase thirty-seven villages on both banks of the Húgli branch of the Ganges, in addition to Calcutta and two other villages of which they had before purchased the property.

From this time nearly to the middle of the century, there is nothing in the Indian history of the Company to record. The pirates cease to be mentioned after the

³ This had before been conceded by Aurangzib after the war which ended in 1690 ; but had probably been unsettled by the troubles after his death.

first quarter of the century. Three squadrons of men-of-war, two of them of considerable force, had been sent against them at different times from England. None of these were attended with any notable success at the time, but the increased attention that was now paid to the protection of the seas reduced the pirates by degrees and drove them into employments of less hazard.

The last of note was one Plantain, who established a piratical colony in Madagascar, and with his confederates possessed seven or eight vessels of war. Their depredations were chiefly confined to the African Seas, but on one occasion, in 1719, a squadron of three ships appeared on the Malabar coast, took the viceroy of Goa, who was on his return to Europe, prisoner, and beat off the Company's ships that came against them. At length, in 1721, when many had perished by war and sickness, when the seas were rendered dangerous from the number of King's and Company's ships employed against them, and their colony no less so in consequence of the enemies their tyranny had raised up among the natives, the greater part withdrew by degrees, and Plantain, with the last who remained, sailed to India and entered into the service of Angria, the Maratta chief, whose habits were as predatory as their own.⁴

The chief uneasiness of the Company during this period arose from a Company founded at Ostend for trade with India. Much of the capital and many of the officers and seamen were English, so that it was an incorporation of interlopers under a new name.

The establishment of this Company was an open infraction of the Emperor's treaty with the Dutch, and led to remonstrances from all quarters, as well as to

⁴ See Downing's *History of the Indian Wars*, London, 1737.

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— forcible opposition by the Dutch and English. At length, after evincing much obstinacy and holding out for several years, the Emperor gave way to the general clamour and abolished the company.⁵
A.D. 1730.

Renewed attempts were made in England to open the trade, or at least to set up a rival Company, but the only result was to induce the Company to advance fresh loans to the Crown, some at moderate interest and others without any. In 1744 the whole sum advanced amounted to 4,200,000*l*. In consideration of these payments the Company's charter was successively extended to 1732, 1768, and 1780. To meet these charges they borrowed nearly three millions at three per cent. The dividends (that is the profit divided among the members of the Company) fluctuated from eight to ten per cent.⁶

Note on the Legal Condition of Europeans in India.

Some account is necessary of the legal condition of Europeans in India, especially as an opinion prevails that they were all subject to martial law, or to the discretionary power of the Governors, unchecked by the forms of justice.

The first charter of Elizabeth (1601) empowers the Company to make laws and impose punishments on their own servants, provided they are not repugnant to the laws of England (Charters granted to the East India Company, page 13). A charter of James I. (1622) extends this power to all English persons, and adds that of martial law (list at the end of the above collection, page 6). But this right seems soon to have been lost, if ever exercised, for the charter of Charles II. in 1661,

⁵ Macpherson, 170, 294.

⁶ Macpherson, 166-176.

though favourable to the Company, only confers a right on the Governor and Council to try offences according to the laws of England ; even in the case of their own soldiers they are only empowered to punish for misdemeanours, or impose fines for breach of orders (Charters &c., pages 75 and 76). By a subsequent charter of the same King (1669), the Company's Governors are authorised to exercise all such powers in cases of rebellion, mutiny, and sedition, and likewise of forsaking colours and other military offences, as are lawful to one of the King's captains-general in virtue of his office (Charters &c., page 91). This is repeated in another form in the same King's charter of 1683, in which the power conferred is 'to use martial law for the defence of the said forts, places, and plantations against any foreign invasion or domestic insurrection or rebellion.'

This was the greatest extent to which the right to exercise martial law was ever granted, and it was confined to stations in a state of insurrection or of siege.

With regard to civil and criminal justice, Queen Elizabeth's authority to the Company to *make* laws not repugnant to those of England for their own servants, is changed in Charles II.'s charter of 1661 into a power to Governors in Council to judge *all* persons, *according to* the laws of England (Charters &c., page 75) : but in that King's charter of 1669, the power to make laws and ordinances not repugnant to the laws of England, and as nearly as may be agreeable to those laws (Charters &c., page 88) is restored, and the manner in which such laws and ordinances are to be administered is declared to be by 'courts, sessions, forms of judicature and manners of proceeding therein, like unto those established and used in this our realm of England' (Charters &c., page 90).

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In 1687 the Company granted a charter which had been previously approved by the King, constituting a corporation at Madras, to consist of a mayor and ten aldermen and 120 burgesses, with a town-clerk and a recorder; three of the aldermen are to be Company's servants and seven to be natives (Bruce, ii. 591). They are to form a mayor's court which is to try causes not capital, and send periodically to England a record of their proceedings (Charters &c., page 121). The constitution of the court seems not to have been fully acted up to in India, for in noticing the first appointments, the Directors object to the number of Englishmen, and order that in future there shall be among the aldermen one Armenian, one Mahometan, and one or two each of the Portuguese, Jews, and Hindús (Bruce, iii. 111). These courts were soon after extended to the other Presidencies, and with some modifications continued to be the principal tribunals until the Supreme Court was introduced in 1774. In Charles II.'s charter of 1683, a court is established, to consist of one person learned in the civil law and two merchants, with the requisite officers, to be appointed by the Directors of the Company, and to decide on all seizures and forfeitures, on all mercantile and maritime bargains, and on all trespasses, injuries, or wrongs on the high sea. The concurrence of the professional lawyer is necessary to every decision. There is no power to impose penalties, and the jurisdiction seems to be confined to civil causes.

The mayor's courts are asserted by travellers to have had the power of punishing piracy with death, but I can find no statute or charter giving such a power; on the contrary, the Governor-General in 1697-8 recommended to the Company to apply for authority to try

pirates in India, stating that the natives consider those marauders to be in league with the Company and think sending them to England for trial is a mere pretext (Bruce, iii. 23). In the next year a statute was passed (11 and 12 William III.), empowering the King to constitute courts of admiralty for the trial of pirates in the East and West Indies, and it is expressly stated in the preamble that previously to that statute, such offences could only be tried in England. The court is to be assembled by all or any admirals, &c. &c. (including judges of admiralty) or other persons as his Majesty may commission by name, and is to be composed of seven persons at least, who are to be known merchants, factors, or planters, or officers of the navy, or captains and mates of merchantmen. If therefore the mayor's court ever tried pirates, it must have been under the appointment of a special commission like that above described, which could only be subsequent to the year 1700.

The laws specially relating to interlopers were very simple. By Elizabeth's charter, any vessel trading within the Company's limits without the licence of that body was liable to forfeiture, and the traders to fine, imprisonment, or other punishment at her Majesty's pleasure. No ship could be condemned and no punishment imposed in India; the Company's power was confined to seizing the offenders and sending them to England.

This continued until the institution of a court of civil jurisdiction on the high seas in 1683, when the decision of all questions relating to forfeiture was entrusted to that tribunal. But the power of enforcing the penal part of the statute was still retained in England, and would seem to have been exercised by the

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Court of King's Bench. *The inquiry which led to forfeiture could not have been intricate, since the want of the Company's licence constituted the offence, and forfeiture was an indispensable part of the penalty fixed by the statute.

Yet if any irregularity took place in the seizure it was not without remedy at home ; for it appears from Captain Hamilton (who in this case is a good evidence) that in several instances damages sometimes exceeding the value of the vessels seized were given by the courts in England for irregular captures, both against King's and Company's officers (Captain Hamilton, i. 214). As far as enactments go, therefore, the Europeans in India appear to have been sufficiently protected, both in the substance of the law and the provisions for its administration. There is, however, good reason to think, from the character of the age and the distance of the scene, as well as from the little we learn from travellers (Lockyer's 'Trade in India,' page 6), that the protection really afforded was by no means complete. The judges must sometimes have been unjust, the lawyers ignorant, and the governors arbitrary and encroaching. But as all was done in public and according to legal forms, it seems impossible that any gross violations of justice could have been attempted. It may be observed in relation to the subject of Europeans, that many were licensed to reside in India, where they seem to have been chiefly engaged in the coasting trade. The Company at one time were anxious to encourage colonists to settle in India with their families.⁷

⁷ Bruce, ii. 358.

THE COROMANDEL COAST.



CHAPTER III.

Commencement of the struggle between the French and English—Dost Ali's succession to the government of the Carnatic—War with the Marattas—Anwar-u-din—Murder of Saïd Mohammed—Rise of the French East India Company—Its relations with the Government of France—War between France and England—Rise of Dupleix—Arrival of a fleet under La Bourdonnais—Siege and capture of Madras—Dispersion of the French fleet by a storm—Return of La Bourdonnais to France—His treatment by the ministry—Mahfúz Khán attacks Pondicherry—His encounter with the French—Dupleix violates the treaty with the English—His attack on Fort St. David—The English fleet bring reinforcements—Siege of Pondicherry—Its failure—Peace with France.

THIS long period of obscure tranquillity was brought to an end in 1744 by the commencement of the great struggle between the French and English in India which led to the ascendancy of the latter nation, and may be considered as the first step in the history of the present era.

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The great European powers did not at first carry on their operations in the interior on their own account, but appeared as the auxiliaries of some of the princes of the country, to whose history it therefore becomes necessary to advert.¹

¹ As I am entering on the period embraced by Orme's *History*, this seems the proper place to mention my obligations to that author. His excellent descriptions of the scenes of the events he relates, his clear explanations of national peculiarities, his able statement of the complicated causes which influenced the affairs of which he treats, make him an invaluable guide to one entering on the same inquiries; while his judgment and accuracy inspire a strong reliance on the general correctness of his facts, and lead to great hesitation in rejecting them even when opposed by superior testimony. It would be to no purpose to imitate the spirit and simplicity of

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When Zulfikár² Khán was called on to join Aurangzib after the taking of Jinjí,³ Dáúd Khán Panní, a Patán officer who had distinguished himself during the siege, was appointed to the government of the Carnatic below the Gháts, and when Dáúd Khán was placed in charge of the viceroyalty of the Deckan (A.D. 1708)⁴ he entrusted the charge of the Carnatic to one of his own officers, whose name was Saádat Ullah Khán. This appointment became permanent on the further promotion of Dáúd Khán, and was formally confirmed by his successor Asaf Jáh (in 1713),⁵ whose short and disturbed possession during his first government did not

his narrative, even if there were room for the minute particulars to the happy selection of which it owes so much of its attractiveness ; but I have availed myself of his own words as often as was in my power, and would have given them in the form of extracts, if that mode of reference would not have prevented the retrenchment and compression necessary to reduce so copious a work to the scale of this compilation. I may add that I have compared some parts of his narrative with his materials (which were deposited by himself at the India House) and found there was nothing, down to minute strokes such as seem introduced to give spirit to a story or a description, which was not borne out by some of his authorities.

² [After the fall of Raigüigh the capital of Sivají, in 1690, Rája Rám, Sivají's second son, fled to the fortress of Jinjí, on the Carnatic, where he withstood for three years the forces sent against him by Aurangzib. Zulfikár Khán, one of the Emperor's ablest generals, who was in the first instance sent to reduce the place, in resentment for his supersession by Prince Cámbakhsh, spun out the siege for this long term, but at length, under apprehension of his recall, made himself master of the fortress. The name Zulfikár is a curious illustration of the practice of the Mahometans in employing names hallowed by appearing in the history of the rise of their religion. Zulfikár (literally, to the middle) is the name of one of Mahomet's swords, with which Ali performed the feat of cleaving his antagonist from the crown to the waist.—Ed.]

³ See ii. 536. Book xi. chap. iv.


⁴ See i. 559.

⁵ [This viceroy was an officer of Turki descent, by name Chfn Kilich Khán, and is described by Mr. Elphinstone (*History*, book xii. chap. 1) as 'a man of much ability and more cunning.' He bore the titles at different periods of Asaf Jáh and Nizam-ul-Múlk. He is best known under the latter title, i.e. Regulator of the State. This change of title by royal and eminent persons at different periods of their lives causes some perplexity to the student of Mahometan history.—Ed.]

admit of his attempting any great changes. Saádat Ullah died in 1732, and left a will appointing his nephew, Dóst Ali, to succeed him in his government, but assigning the fort and territory of Vellór to Mortezza Ali (the son of another nephew and married to a daughter of Dóst Ali), and conferring the office of Diwán, or civil minister, to his successor on Gholám Hosén the nephew of his own favourite wife. His arrangements were executed as quietly as if he had been disposing of a private estate. Asof Jáh was at this time delivered from the active hostility of the Marattas by a secret understanding with the Peshwa Báji Ráo,⁶ but he felt

⁶ See ii. 604. Book xii. cap. ii.

[The following tables represent the members of the families who took a part in the struggle for the succession to the government of the Deekan and of the Carnatic.—ED.]



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too little confidence in a truce depending on an intrigue and too little security from the resentment of the Government of Delhi, to involve himself in a distant contest. He therefore forbore any immediate attempt to disturb the settlement of the Carnatic, but withheld his confirmation of Dósti Ali's assumption of the government in the hope of profiting in time by the defective title of this intruder.

The territory held by Dósti Ali was the Carnatic below the Gháts, since called Arcot. It lay between the mountains and the sea, extending from the Kishna to the Coleroon. On the north it was bounded by the province of Orissa, and on the south by the Maratta state of Tanjore and another Hindú principality at Trichinopoly. His title was Foujdár,⁷ his district being subordinate to the subah of Heiderábád, which with the other five subahs of the Deckan formed the viceroyalty of Asof Jáh, but he was usually called nabob, a word which was beginning to get into general use and is now applied by the English to a governor of a province.⁸

Dósti Ali had another daughter (besides the wife of Morteza Ali) who was married to Chanda⁹ Sáheb, a

⁷ [The military commander of a district.—ED.] See ii. 336, book ix. chap. iii.

⁸ It has, however, no reference to territory, and is applied to all men in high station much as 'Excellency' is in Europe. The word is 'nawáb,' and the original meaning is 'deputies.' Its application arises from the notions of respect peculiar to Asiatics. In mentioning a great man they seem to consider it improper to lift their eyes to his own person, but speak of 'his deputies,' 'his slaves,' or even 'his threshold.'

⁹ [The following note is quoted from Malcohn's *Life of Clive*, i. 12. The facts are said to have been communicated to the author by a friend. 'The appellation of Chunda Sáheb was only given to him in his family when a boy. Yet it has continued to be used in history in distinguishing him; although, besides his name above mentioned, the title of Shems-ud-dowlah was conferred on him by the Nizams in the French interest.

distant relation, and his daughter again was married to Gholám Husén the Díwán. The incapacity of this young man led him to permit the functions, and ultimately the title of his office, to devolve on his father-in-law; and Chanda Sáheb, being a man of abilities, soon became a principal actor in the government of Arcot. It was not long before Dóst Ali was tempted by the hopes of profiting by a disputed succession in the neighbouring principality of Trichinopoly to assemble an army at the head of which he placed his son-in-law under the nominal command of his own son, Safder Ali. Chanda Sáheb managed the affair committed to him with so much address and so much perfidy, that he was introduced into the capital as an ally of one of the parties, and soon after seized on that and the rest of the territory in the name of the Nabob of Arcot.

Safder Ali raised no objection to Chanda Sáheb's remaining in the government of his conquest, but he was not long allowed to overlook the danger of leaving so much power in such ambitious hands. His preceptor, Mír Asad, who succeeded to the vacant office of Díwán, so effectually roused his jealousy on that point that he spared no exertion to procure the removal of Chanda Sáheb from his government. But Dóst Ali demurred about adopting so harsh a measure, and the fact of its being under discussion did not long escape the shrewd politician against whom it was designed. He made every effort to strengthen Trichinopoly; he placed his two brothers in the principal sub-

It is not unlikely that his being known to the English only by the name of Chunda Sáheb was, in some measure, owing to his rival Mohammed Ali, supported by them, continually designating him by that appellation, and rather contemptuously, Chunda being a vulgar appellation, often that of menial servants.' His real name is said on the same authority to have been Hussein Dóst Khán.—ED.]

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ordinate commands, and before long was in such a state of preparation that all thoughts of dispossessing him were given up as hopeless. Things were in this state when Bájí Ráo, the Pésbwa, renewed his invasions of the territories under Asof Jáh. He himself marched against Násir Jang, who held the viceroyalty for his father then absent at Delhi, and at the same time he contrived to rid himself of a dangerous rival by prevailing on Ragojí Bósla of Berár to command an expedition into the Carnatic, to which Bájí Ráo contributed with a liberality proportioned to the interest he had in engaging Ragojí in the enterprise.¹

The whole force amounted to 50,000 men,² and such was the rapidity of its advance that Dóst Ali had only time to assemble a body of 4,000 horse and 6,000 foot, with which he occupied the principal pass from the Upper into the Lower Carnatic. The Marattas entered the province through an unfrequented pass, appeared suddenly on the nabob's defenceless rear, and soon dispersed his army.³ Dóst Ali was killed in the action, and his Díwán, Mír Asad, fell into the hands of the enemy. Safder Ali, now nabob, was advancing to his father's aid from Vellór, and Chanda Sáheb made a show of a similar intention from Trichinopoly, but no sooner did they hear of the result of the battle than each fell back with rapidity to the fortress from which he had marched, while the Marattas spread over the country and betook themselves as usual to the work of spoil and devastation. The presence of Mír Asad in the Maratta camp proved of signal advantage to Safder Ali. He not only purchased the retreat of Ragojí for a sum of money, but engaged him by a

¹ See ii. 635, xii. chap. iii., and Grant Duff, i. 555, 556.

² Grant Duff, ii. 3.

³ May 20, 1740, Orme.

secret agreement to return before long and to attack Trichinopoly, which Safder Ali consented to his retaining provided he should so dispose of Chanda Sáheb as to prevent his ever disturbing the Government of Arcot.⁴ No terms could be more acceptable to Ragojí, who was impatient to return to Sattára to take advantage of the death of Bájí Ráo which had just occurred. He failed in his object, which was to prevent the son of Bájí Ráo succeeding to his father's office,⁵ and he returned to his camp in the Mysore, reinforced by several of the chiefs of his party who withdrew from Sattára. A.D. 1740.

In the month of December he again invaded the Carnatic, and immediately invested Trichinopoly.⁶ The great strength of that place might have enabled such an officer as Chanda Sáheb to set his assailants at defiance, but not anticipating the return of the Marattas, and being in no immediate apprehensions from Safder Ali, he had imprudently sold a store of grain which he had provided against a siege and had now scarcely any provisions within the place. He, however, defended himself with spirit for three months, during which time his two brothers lost their lives in endeavouring to force their way with different convoys into the town. He was compelled at length, by the clamours of his troops, as well as the actual progress of famine, to open his gates and surrender himself as a prisoner to the Marattas.⁷ He was forthwith sent to the neighbour-

⁴ Orme attributes the first invasion to the instigation of Asof Jáh, and Wilks to an invitation from Safder Ali similar to that just mentioned in the text. But the first opinion is incompatible with the simultaneous invasion of Asof Jáh's own country, and the second with the fact that the attack was not made on Chanda Sáheb but on Dósti Ali, a circumstance very unsatisfactorily accounted for in Colonel Wilks's statement.

⁵ See ii. 638.

⁶ Grant Duff, ii. 3, 4, 5.

⁷ March 26, 1741, Orme.

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hood of Sattára, where he was detained in easy confinement,⁸ while Trichinopoly was entrusted to Morár Ráo Górpára, grand-nephew of the famous Santají Górpára, who was the chief of a small principality at Guti on the south of the Tumbadra.

Safder Ali enjoyed but little tranquillity after the removal of his formidable rival. The ravages of the Maratta invaders left a strong impression on his mind, and he began to look with anxiety to the proceedings of Asof Jáh who had about this time returned to the Deckan. He no longer considered himself safe in the open town of Arcot, but took up his residence in Vellór, which was a strong fortress, but belonged, as has been mentioned, to his cousin and brother-in-law, Mortezza Ali. From the same motives he deposited his family and treasures at Madras, relying on the strength of the fortifications and on the good faith of Europeans as well as their exemption from all native influence. He must at any time have been an uneasy guest to a chief so timid and distrustful as Mortezza Ali; and it was not long before he irritated and alarmed his host by advancing a claim to levy a contribution on him as his subordinate. On this Mortezza, who had other bad passions besides fear, indulged his revenge and ambition by procuring his assassination. An opportunity was taken when most of his personal servants were absent at some religious ceremony, and he was waited on by those of his cousin. Poison was administered to him in his food, and as his constitution seemed likely to resist its mortal effects, he was poignarded by some Abyssinian slaves, headed by a man whose wife he had debauched. The fury of the army excited by this atrocity was appeased by large payments and promises,

October 2,
A.D. 1742.

⁸ Grant Duff, ii. 5.

and two days after Safder Ali's death, his murderer was acknowledged as Nabob of Arcot and repaired to the capital to take possession of his dignity. But his dark and suspicious character was not suited to efface the memory of his crime, and he wanted the boldness which might have made fear supply the place of attachment. Before three months were over, his army mutinied; and he thought himself fortunate in being able to escape in disguise to Vellór.

Mohammed Saïd, the infant son of Safder Ali, who was then at Madras, was proclaimed nabob and removed to Vandewash, where his government was conducted by a Dîwán chosen by his family and partisans.

The disorders in the Carnatic were favourable to the views of Asof Jáh. A life prolonged beyond the usual limit had not diminished the activity of that ambitious statesman. He had been recalled from Delhi in 1741 by the rebellion of his eldest son Násir Jang, who maintained on that occasion the military reputation he had gained against the Marattas. But he was no match for the arts of his father; his troops were seduced; he was prevailed on by promises to give up his artillery; and though when roused by the disappointment of his expectations he had nearly obtained a complete victory in a desperate attack on the old viceroy, yet his personal courage did not compensate for his want of numbers, and he was made prisoner and sent to be confined in a hill fort.⁹ Asof Jáh, thus disengaged, lost no time in entering on the settlement of the southern part of his province. The portion of the Carnatic nearest to the rivers Tumbadra and Kishna was in the hands of the three great Patán chieftains of

July 23,
A.D. 1742.

⁹ Grant Duff, ii. 19, &c.

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Caddapa, Carnúl and Shanúr (or Savanore) who had probably held their possessions under the government of Bījapúr and had been allowed to retain them on tendering their allegiance to Aurangzīb. Contiguous to their districts was Morár Ráo Górpára's principality of Guti. The southern part of the Upper Carnatic was occupied by the Hindú state of Mysore, and all the rest formed the Government of Síra under a Foujdár appointed by Asof Jáh, but was now probably overrun by the Marattas or occupied by insurgent zemindars. It is not known precisely when Asof Jáh acquired an ascendancy over the Patán nabobs,¹ but he met with no opposition on his march to Arcot, and there also his authority was recognised without dispute by all the different parties among the Mussulmans. He next proceeded to lay siege to Trichinopoly; and Morár Ráo (whose family since the murder of Santají had never been very closely united to the other Marattas) was induced, by a recognition of his title to Guti, and perhaps some more immediate advantages, to surrender the territory which had been entrusted to him and to enter into a close connection with the viceroy.

Asof Jáh had now only to settle the future administration of the Carnatic, and his final arrangement was to commit it to Anwar-u-dín, a native of Hindostan who had before held subordinate governments in that country, in Guzerát, and in the districts north of the Kishna contiguous to his new charge.

The abilities of this officer justified his appointment, but the house of Saádat Ullah had established so good a character among their subjects that the introduction of a stranger gave general dissatisfaction; and although

¹ The nabobs themselves maintained that their connection with him did not include any acknowledgment of his sovereignty (Orme, ii. 164).

Asof Jáh, in consideration of this feeling, and probably not disinclined to favour the disposition to hereditary succession in governors, promised to restore the district to Mohammed Saíd when he should come of age, yet the new nabob continued to be regarded with an evil eye and to be looked on as the rival of the young favourite of the public.

While things were in this state Mohammed Saíd was assassinated at the marriage of one of his relations by a party of Patán soldiers who had been affronted by him or his attendants in consequence of their importunity in demanding some arrears of pay. Though the avowed motive seems sufficient to account for the act of the conspirators, it was at once assumed that they were secretly instigated by some person of consequence; and the suspicion was divided between Morteza Ali and Anwar-u-dín, while some were not content without imputing the guilt to them both. Morteza's former murder of Safder Ali suggested him as the assassin of that prince's son; and Anwar-u-dín was too great a gainer by the death of the future nabob to escape being pitched on as the contriver of that event.² Asof Jáh, however, took no notice of these reports, but immediately confirmed Anwar-u-dín in the permanent enjoyment of his government.³

June, A.D.
1744.

This was Asof Jáh's last interference in the affairs

² Morteza Ali's guilt was considered to be proved by two circumstances which it would seem ought to have led to an opposite conclusion; his trusting himself out of his fort to attend the marriage, and his immediate flight after the perpetration of the murder. His natural timidity accounts for his flight from a scene of danger, and makes it most improbable that he would have ventured into it if he had foreseen its approach. Against Anwar-u-dín there is no ground of surmise but that stated in the text; certainly not altogether an absurd one in the lax state of Mogul morality.

³ The account of the affairs in the Carnatic, when not otherwise specified, is from Orme and Wilks.

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of Arcot, though he survived it for five years and died in May 1748. He had by that time established his authority over all the part of the Mogul possessions in the Deckan which had not been previously seized on by the Marattas. He was also in the enjoyment of a temporary security from the attacks of those invaders whose ambition was for the time directed to conquests in Hindostan. But he was only reserved for the last victim ; and his successors would assuredly have been swallowed up by the Marattas if it had not been for the revolution occasioned by the interposition of the French and English.

The extent of Asof Jáh's territories may be assumed to be seven hundred and fifty or eight hundred miles in length and about four hundred in breadth ; the population may be guessed at 20,000,000.

It was before the death of Asof Jáh that a war broke out between the French and English, and soon extended to their establishments in India. The circumstance drew little attention even from that sagacious chief ; and we cannot wonder at his indifference when, even after the result is known, we are inclined to despise the humble instruments by which it was effected. When we read of engagements between armies of a few companies on each side, and sieges where a reinforcement of fifty Europeans would turn the scale, we can scarcely believe that the contest is for the dominion of India and the ascendancy over Asia ; and that these pigmy armies are destined to bring about more important consequences than ever were produced by the myriads of Chenghíz Khán.

The French after repeated failures had formed a Company in 1664. They soon obtained factories at Surat and other places on the Malabar coast. In 1672

they made an unsuccessful attempt to conquer some forts in Ceylon from the Dutch, and in 1674 they purchased from the King of Bījapūr the village and district of Pondicherry. At this place they established a town, which soon became very considerable. In 1693 it was taken by the Dutch ; at the peace of Ryswick it was restored, and the French then took precautions against a recurrence of their misfortune by completing and improving the fortifications that had been begun by the Dutch. Pondicherry now became one of the greatest European settlements in India, and is said (probably with the addition of its dependent villages) to have contained 70,000 inhabitants.⁴ The next in importance of the French settlements was Caricál. It was acquired, in 1738, by taking part in a dispute between two competitors for the principality of Tanjore ; and this, together with a fort at Máhé (about thirty miles from Cochin, on the Malabar coast) and a factory at Chandernagar in Bengal, formed their principal possessions in India.

This Company was not, like that in England, forced on the Government by a combination of merchants. It was a favourite project of the minister himself. Instead of sparing grants of privileges, generally purchased by pecuniary sacrifices, it received gratuitous encouragement of every description, and was liberally assisted by the Treasury, while in England the exactions of the State were the great drain on the Company's finances. Monopolies within France (as those of tobacco and of coffee) were bestowed on it on very favourable terms, and it was allowed to raise money by lotteries in aid of its other resources. Foreigners were naturalised on subscribing to it ; officers engaging in it were entitled

⁴ Macpherson's *Commerce of India*, 273.

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to leave of absence from their regiments ; and nobles were allowed to enter on this alone of all trading speculations, without prejudice to their nobility. The ministers also corresponded directly with the Indian governors, and took the same interest in the settlements they presided over as in the other possessions of the Crown. The administration formed on these principles was more enterprising than that of the English Company ; it acted on more enlarged views and was more liberal in furnishing the means of carrying them into effect ; it was more judicious in the choice of governors ; and gave more encouragement to the rising portion of its service ; even the language and tone of its letters to its servants were distinguished by a suavity and urbanity which formed a marked contrast to the rude reproofs and ungracious approbations of the English Company. It was the ordinary operation of this system that brought forth La Bourdonnais, Dupleix, and Bussy ; while it required the exigencies of an eventful war to give scope to the natural genius of Clive.

But this continual interference of the ministers was not suited to commerce, nor in the end even to politics. Their caprice produced unsteadiness and sometimes led to carelessness and neglect. At other times the best disposed ministers were so involved in the more pressing affairs of Europe that they were unable to give assistance or even attention to their Eastern possessions ; and in such cases the Directors, accustomed to receive instructions on all subjects, were incapable of acting for themselves, even if their unsuccessful trade and embarrassed finances had not rendered it impossible to carry on their operations without the usual supplies of money from the Crown ; and all these deficiencies were the more felt by a community which often had large enterprises in

hand and whose whole fortunes were at stake on the results. The English Company, on the other hand, was incapable of perceiving the brilliant objects which dazzled and misled the French. Their plodding attention to trade and economy often led them to overlook more important considerations, but it afforded the means of meeting the heavy demands of the Crown, and more than once preserved them from ruin during periods of great difficulty and danger. The narrow scale of their operations prevented any extensive ill-effects from their errors, while the jealousy of the public taught them caution and moderation, and the indifference of the King's Government made them look to their own exertions alone for the protection of their possessions.

The French Company, like most others in their country, had been swallowed up for a time in that of the Mississippi. It recovered its separate existence in 1723, and afterwards enjoyed a period of unusual tranquillity and success. One governor, M. Le Noir, introduced good management into its trade, and his successor, M. Dumas, afforded an asylum to the family of the Nabob Dósti Ali during the invasion of the Marattas, and was rewarded by Mogul titles and the rank of Mansabdár of 4500 ; and that circumstance as well as the turn of their nation for magnificence and display, combined with more solid qualities to procure them a good deal of respect among the natives. Notwithstanding this seeming prosperity, the Company's finances did not improve, and at the commencement of the war which we are about to describe they had incurred a considerable debt in India, and their expenditure continued to exceed their income.⁵

⁵ *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, 28. This sketch of the French Company is taken from the eleventh volume of the *Universal History*, Macpherson's

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War was declared in Europe in March 1744, and a fleet was soon after sent from England under the command of Commodore Barnet. They sailed first to the straits between India and China, where they took several French ships of value. In July 1745 they appeared upon the coast of Coromandel, and anchored off Fort St. David on the 20th of that month. Pondicherry was then ill-garrisoned and out of repair, and would have fallen an early sacrifice if the command had been in ordinary hands. But the governor was M. Dupleix, whose courage and resources in danger, no less than his genius and knowledge of mankind, render him one of the most conspicuous names in Indian history.⁶ Soon after he took charge of his government, the embarrassed

Commerce with India, and the *Memoir on the East India Company*, by the Abbé Morellet.

⁶ Joseph (afterwards Marquis) Dupleix was the son of a farmer-general who was also a Director of the India Company. In his youth he showed so strong an inclination for mathematics, especially fortification, that his father, who anxiously desired to bring him up to commerce, began to despair of prevailing on him to turn his thoughts that way. In this difficulty he resolved to employ the spirit of adventure against the love of study; he sent his son to sea, and at the end of several voyages to America and India, had the satisfaction to find him, not only disposed to commerce, but highly qualified to carry it on. He now placed him in the Company's service, and he was at once appointed First Member of the Supreme Council of Pondicherry. After ten years' service in that situation he was transferred as Director or Chief of the Factory to Chandernagar in Bengal. He there introduced the coasting trade of India, which the French had hitherto neglected, and the profits of a trade which he had carried on at Pondicherry, together with an inheritance that accrued to him at his father's death, enabled him to enter into it on a very extensive scale. His example was followed by the merchants under his authority, so that he not only realised an enormous fortune himself, but saw Chandernagar rise from an insignificant village to a rich and populous colony. These commercial pursuits so far from being thought inconsistent with his public character, procured him great applause from the Government, and contributed to his being selected in 1741 to fill the highest station under the crown of France in India, being appointed Governor of Pondicherry, with a control over all the other settlements of his nation.

state of the French Company's finances constrained them to give orders to reduce all their expenses by one half, and to discontinue all fortifications and public works. Dupleix carried the first order into effect with ability and decision. He wisely suspended the second, took the responsibility of continuing the repairs on himself, and even supplied from his own resources the funds which the Company's treasury was not in a state to provide. Threatened by the British squadron before his preparations were complete, his knowledge of the Indian character suggested an expedient to avert the present danger. He applied to the Nabob Anwar-u-dín, and by arguments addressed both to his pride and prudence, accompanied by a judicious expenditure of money, he persuaded him to forbid all military operations by foreign troops within his province. Next year a French fleet appeared on the coast under the command of M. de la Bourdonnais, the Governor of Mauritius; a man who though widely dissimilar in character, was scarcely inferior in abilities even to Dupleix.⁷

⁷ B. F. Mahe de la Bourdonnais first went to sea at the age of ten, and entered the service of the French East India Company while he was yet very young. He attracted notice by the improvements he suggested in naval architecture and machinery. Being left without employment by a long peace, he turned his attention to commerce and made a considerable fortune by trading in the Indian Seas. He was afterwards for two years in the service of Portugal; and in 1734 he was appointed by his own sovereign to the government of the islands of Mauritius and Bourbon. These islands had been taken possession of by the French after being abandoned by the Dutch and Portuguese. The interior of both was a forest, only inhabited by runaway slaves. The European inhabitants on the coast were pirates and adventurers, scarcely less savage than their neighbours. La Bourdonnais brought them all into order, and himself initiated them in the arts of agriculture and commerce; he raised fortifications, constructed docks, quays, mills, arsenals, barracks and hospitals; introduced the cultivation of sugar-cane, cotton and indigo, as well as of the magnioc root (now the chief support of the inhabitants) and by a combination of persuasion, example, and authority, he raised his islands to the rank they held immediately before the cession of Mauritius to the

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This fleet consisted of five Company's ships and a frigate, and had been sent from Europe half-equipped and half-manned. It had since met with many losses and disasters, and was at last in a manner the creation of the talents and resources of its commander.

Immediately on reaching the coast it fell in with the English fleet, greatly inferior in numbers, but superior in quality both of ships and men. Several indecisive actions followed, and the result was that the English were obliged to retire to Ceylon, leaving the French in possession of the coast. La Bourdonnais then repaired to Pondicherry, to concert with Dupleix an immediate attack on Madras; but Dupleix felt his consequence hurt by the employment of another officer within the limits usually entrusted to him, and La Bourdonnais being himself of an impatient temper, the two chiefs got into disputes and animosities that impeded their common object. La Bourdonnais, however, at length sailed, taking with him a reinforcement from Pondicherry.

Madras, with two villages within its territory, contained 250,000 inhabitants, but the Europeans, who alone could be relied on for its defence, did not exceed 300,

English. At that time they were flourishing colonies, the naval arsenal of the French in the East, and the greatest thorn in the side of the English, whose largest trading vessels were scarcely safe on the coast of India or in the mouth of the Ganges from the activity of the cruisers of Mauritius. The great qualities and attainments of La Bourdonnais are thus summed up by Orme: 'His knowledge in mechanics rendered him capable of building a ship from the keel; his skill in navigation, of conducting her to any part of the globe; and his courage, of defending her against any equal force. In the conduct of an expedition, he superintended all the details of the service, without being perplexed either with the variety or the number of them. His plans were simple, his orders precise, and both the best adapted to the service in which he was engaged. His application was incessant, and difficulties served only to heighten his activity, which always gave the example of zeal to those whom he commanded.' (*Memoirs of La Bourdonnais, and Orme.*)

of whom only 200 were soldiers even in name. Part only of the town was fortified, and that with a rampart which La Bourdonnais compares to a garden wall.

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III.

The French landed 1,400 Europeans and negroes, and 300 or 400 disciplined sepoys ; about 1,800 men remained in the ships. They bombarded the town with fourteen mortars, and battered it from their ships for three days, and were at last on the point of escalading, when the English capitulated and surrendered themselves prisoners, on condition that they should be allowed to ransom their town. On this stipulation they steadily insisted, and exacted repeated and solemn assurances that the ransom should be moderate. La Bourdonnais agreed to these terms the more readily as he was alarmed by a report of the return of the English fleet to the coast. He faithfully fulfilled them, and after some time executed a formal treaty of ransom, and consented to leave the English in possession of all their private property and half the military stores, and to restore the town to them for a sum equal to 440,000*l.*, for the payment of which they were to give hostages.

September
10, A.D.
1746.

October
20, A.D.
1746.

The fall of Madras was a severe blow to the reputation of the English, and might have been fatal to their interests if La Bourdonnais had been allowed to complete his plans against their other settlements. But long before the conclusion of the second agreement, Dupleix and his Council had protested against the capitulation. They maintained that Madras fell within their government from the moment that the French colours were hoisted on its walls, announced their having entered on an engagement to give the town to the nabob, and directed La Bourdonnais to dismantle it without delay, and reduce it to a condition which should prevent its affording any additional strength to

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the native prince. They also appointed a subordinate council to control La Bourdonnais, and issued an order to the military officers to obey no instructions but from them. La Bourdonnais resisted these measures, disclaimed the authority of the Government of Pondicherry, and put some of the persons employed to influence the troops under arrest. On the other hand (if we believe La Bourdonnais) Dupleix gave secret orders for seizing his person, and things proceeded so far as at one time to be on the verge of a civil conflict. All this violence was carried on in the name of the Council, over whom Dupleix, from his abilities, exercised an unlimited control; he himself all the time kept up a private correspondence with La Bourdonnais, assuring him of his esteem and regard, and endeavouring to attain by persuasion the same objects which in his public character he was seizing on with so high a hand.

The season was at this time approaching at which it becomes unsafe for vessels to remain at Madras, where there is only an open roadstead exposed to all the violence of the tempest with which the monsoon sets in, and which is the more dangerous because it blows almost directly on the shore. La Bourdonnais had therefore been busily employed in shipping the public part of the captured property, and would soon have been able to put out to sea. On October 2, the day after he had signed the treaty of ransom, the weather was still calm and clear; but at midnight the monsoon set in with more than usual fury. One French ship was swallowed up by the waves, four lost their masts and were filled with water so as to be in instant danger of going to the bottom; one only managed to escape by running to the southward; from twenty to thirty other

ships that were in the roads went down or were driven ashore.

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This disaster altered all La Bourdonnais' prospects. He was no longer able to face the English or even to continue on the coast of Coromandel, where there is no harbour to afford a shelter from the monsoon. He was therefore obliged to use all expedition in winding up his affairs at Madras. Having received repeated assurances from the Council of Pondicherry that his engagements should be faithfully fulfilled, and having obtained the consent of the English to postpone the restoration of Madras till the month of January, when the public property would have been entirely removed, he made over the government to the senior member of the Council sent by M. Dupleix, and sailed himself for the roads of Pondicherry. But fresh dissensions had arisen with the Council of that place, and an angry discussion ended in a reluctant acquiescence of La Bourdonnais in their desire that the whole fleet should proceed to Achin in Sumatra. For that port he accordingly set sail; four of the ships made good their destination in spite of a strong contrary wind; but the remainder, with himself, were forced to give way and sail before the wind to the Isle of France. On his arrival he found that the representations of M. Dupleix and the enmity of the Company had prevailed, and that the King's ministers had sent out another officer to supersede him in his government.

On reaching France he was imprisoned in the Bastille, and remained there for three years in the most rigorous confinement. He was charged, in addition to his political offences, with corruption, embezzlement, and extortion, but was at length acquitted by a committee of the Privy Council to whom his case was

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III.

referred, and was released with ruined fortunes and broken health, which before long brought him to the grave.

The departure of La Bourdonnais, or rather his previous disaster, lost the French the command of the sea and delivered the English settlements from imminent danger ; but the men he left at Pondicherry increased the French force ashore to 3,000 Europeans, and powerfully influenced all the subsequent operations.⁸

When the siege of Madras was threatened the English had applied to the nabob for aid ; and, although they were not successful, as their rivals had been, in obtaining prompt and effectual assistance, they had at length prevailed on the nabob to remonstrate. Dupleix pacified him by promising to give up Madras to him ; but when some time elapsed after the capture without any prospect of the transfer, the nabob was incensed at the deception practised on him, and sent a force under his son, Mahfúz Khán, to dispossess the French, in which he seems to have foreseen no difficulty. The force consisted of 8,000 or 10,000 men, of whom 4,000 were cavalry.⁹ The cavalry of the Carnatic were inferior even to those of the northern provinces. The infantry were also more puny men, but could scarcely be worse soldiers. There were likewise some guns, but old and utterly unserviceable. They began by investing the town, and did so without opposition, the French having orders not to commence hostilities. They next cut through a sandbank to let off a piece of water which covered the south face of the fort, and at the same time they took possession of a spring, three miles from the fort, on which the garrison

Middle of
October,
A.D. 1746.

⁸ Orme, i. 74.

⁹ *Histoire de la dernière Révolution des Indes.* Paris, 1757, i. 165.

principally depended for water. The besieged were thus forced on offensive operations, they opened a fire from their guns, and they prepared a detachment of between 300 and 400 men, with two field pieces, for the purpose of driving the enemy from the spring. This small detachment boldly advanced beyond the protection of the fort, and was met by a large body of the nabob's cavalry, who advanced in good order, and were on the point of charging the detachment, but were brought to a pause by the opening of the field pieces. As they did not know the number of those guns, and had no conception of the rapidity with which they were served, they stood several rounds in the expectation that when all were discharged there would be a long interval before they could be reloaded ; but finding the fire continue with unabated vivacity, and seeing seventy of their own number fall victims to its effects, they fell into confusion and finally fled from the field. The French took possession of their baggage and some of their guns (which last they did not think worth bringing away), and returned to the town without the loss of a man. This unexpected attack alarmed Mahfúz Khán, and as he was likewise informed of the approach of a reinforcement from Pondicherry, he concentrated the force employed in investing Madras, and moved to St. Thomé, a town about four miles further south. He took up his ground between the town and a river to the south of it, the banks of which he determined to defend. The French detachment consisted of 350 European soldiers, 100 sailors, and 200 sepoys,¹ and was commanded by M. Paradis, a brave officer, hitherto chiefly known as a violent partisan of M. Dupleix. It was determined that M. Paradis should

October
22, A.D.
1746.

¹ *Histoire de la dernière Révolution*, i. 168.

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attack the enemy at daybreak on the 24th, while a detachment of 400 men from Madras should at the same time fall on their rear. When Paradis reached the river, he found the nabob's army drawn up on the opposite bank, and saw no sign of the approach of the troops from Madras. He nevertheless crossed without hesitation, and after a sharp discharge of musketry fell upon the enemy with the bayonet. The boldness of the action, and the impetuosity of the charge, struck the Moguls with amazement; they at once gave way, and the horse and foot falling back promiscuously on each other in the narrow streets of the town, the confusion of the throng was so great that they remained for some time exposed to the fire of the French without making any resistance, and without being able to escape. When extricated from this difficulty, they retreated with precipitation to Arcot. This gallant exploit broke the charm by which the Europeans had still to a certain extent been kept in awe of the Moguls, and showed to both nations the vast superiority of spirit and discipline over numbers.

Paradis pursued his march to Madras, of which he took the government; and immediately proceeded, in execution of his orders, to annul the treaty with the English, to the observance of which the Government of Pondicherry was so recently and so solemnly pledged. All private property except clothes and furniture was now seized on as prize; all Englishmen who refused to give their parole not to serve against the French were to be prisoners of war; and all who would not take the oath of allegiance to King Lewis were to quit the town and territory of Madras. The English loudly exclaimed against this gross breach of faith, by which many of them were reduced to ruin; many refused to

October
30, A.D.
1746.

give their parole, and escaped as opportunities offered to Fort St. David. The Governor and principal inhabitants were sent to Pondicherry, and conducted into that place in an ostentatious procession, exposed to the gaze of 50,000 spectators.²

Dupleix's only excuse for his violation of the treaty with the English and his own solemn promise to La Bourdonnais, was the possession of secret orders which he rather insinuated than asserted. It has since, however, been established that, while La Bourdonnais had positive orders to retain no conquest he might make,³ Dupleix had as positive, but secret orders, on no account to part with Madras; and that the French Ministry and Company were so ashamed of these contradictions and the disgraceful transaction to which they led, that they condescended to entreat Dupleix to take the responsibility of the whole affair upon himself.⁴ Though this fact clears Dupleix of all suspicion of personal motives, it does nothing to remove the impression of his indifference to public faith, which he himself indeed does not seem anxious to deny.⁵

Fort St. David was now the only refuge for the English on the coast of Coromandel, and as it was only twelve miles south of Pondicherry, the possession of it by an enemy was a source of uneasiness as well as mortification to M. Dupleix, who took the earliest opportunity of endeavouring to reduce it. The fort was smaller but much stronger than Madras. The

² Orme; *Mémoire de La Bourdonnais. Suite de pièces justificatives*, p. 59.

³ *Mémoire pour La Bourdonnais*, p. 58.

⁴ *Biographie Universelle*, Article 'Dupleix.'

⁵ 'Oui, monsieur, je conseillerais à mon frère de manquer à sa parole quand elle peut faire tort à un tiers, quand elle est aussi avantageuse à un ennemi et aussi désavantageuse à la Compagnie et à la Nation' (Dupleix's letter to La Bourdonnais. *Pièces justificatives*, p. 186).

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III.

town lay on a river about a mile further south, and was called Cuddalore (Cadulúr), a name which the French apply to Fort St. David also. Cuddalore had a wall and bastions on all sides except that towards the sea; where a river, which, like all others on this coast, runs from west to east, after passing the northern face of the town, turns south and covers the east side, being separated from the sea by a narrow spit of sand.

Dupleix's first step in forming his detachment for this enterprise was to send for M. Paradis to command it. The English on their part applied to the nabob for assistance, and he readily granted it on their promising to pay a portion of the expense. M. Paradis left Madras with an escort of 300 Europeans, and availed himself of the opportunity to bring off a quantity of plundered property which was carried by a long train of *cúlis* or Indian porters. When he had marched upwards of thirty miles (a third of the distance to Pondicherry), he was attacked by a division of the nabob's army under Malfúz Khán, which hung on his flanks and rear; the infantry firing from the thickets and other cover, and the cavalry advancing from time to time, as if on the point of charging sword in hand. The French, embarrassed with their convoy, were obliged to act purely on the defensive, forming up when threatened by the horse, and resuming their march when they had checked the enemy. In this manner they made their way to Sadrás, a Dutch settlement forty-two miles from Madras. Their march had latterly been urged on with so little consideration, that the rear was separated from the advance, and did not reach Sadrás without difficulty. They had several men wounded during the march, and twelve or fourteen Europeans were made prisoners; and this misfortune,

joined to the appearance of retreat and pursuit, disheartened the French, and revived the spirits of the Mussulmans. At Sadrás Paradis was joined by a strong detachment sent out from Pondicherry to relieve him, and reached that town without further molestation.

His journey, however, had been to no purpose, for the officers protested against his being appointed to the command in preference to his seniors, and M. Dupleix felt himself constrained to confer it on M. Bury, the oldest officer on the spot. The garrison of Fort St. David was only 200 Europeans and 100 Indian Portuguese; 2,000 of the native irregular infantry had, however, been hired for the protection of Cuddalore and the rest of the territory. The French force amounted to 1,700 men (for the most part Europeans), with six field pieces and as many mortars. They marched from the neighbourhood of Pondicherry on December 8, and soon after crossed the river Panár and entered the British territory. Their plan was to halt at a country house belonging to the Governor, a mile and a half from the fort, which had a court-yard in front and a large walled garden in the rear. They had been misled by some false intelligence conveyed to Dupleix, and did not expect that the nabob would send any considerable body of troops to aid the besieged. In this belief (as Orme states⁶) they were dismissed as soon as they had occupied the house, and dispersed in quest of food and firewood and the other occupations natural after a march. While thus scattered they perceived that the whole of the nabob's army was coming down on them, and had already arrived within a mile. A sudden panic seized on them at the sight, and in-

December
8, A.D.
1746.

⁶ See i. p. 82.

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III.

stead of defending the garden, as seemed the obvious course, they fled with precipitation to the Panár, which they hastened to recross, and were only saved by the steadiness of their artillery from total destruction.⁷

But this protection did not restore the courage of the fugitives; they plunged into the river, which was scarcely fordable, leaving their ranks, wetting their ammunition, and in many cases throwing away their arms. On this occasion they again owed their safety to the steadiness of their artillery, who drew up their guns on the river, and gradually withdrew them to form a fresh battery on the opposite bank. In this manner the detachment returned to their post near Pondicherry, after a night and day of incessant exertion, with 122 men killed and wounded, and having lost all their baggage but such as had not come up when the action began.

This unexpected success of the nabob's troops gave M. Dupleix a higher impression of the importance of that prince as an ally. He commenced a negotiation to obtain his friendship, but did not slacken his operations during its progress. He made another unsuccessful attack on Fort St. David by sea, and to hasten the nabob's decision he sent a detachment from Madras to ravage the neighbouring part of the Carnatic; and the four ships of La Bourdonnais' squadron which had made their way to Achín returning about this time to the coast of Coromandel, he made so good a use of this apparent reinforcement that the nabob became con-

December
30, A.D.
1746.

⁷ A French artillery officer who was present gives a different account (La Bourdonnais, *Suite de pièces justificatives*, p. 68). By his statement the French were not surprised, but defended themselves until their ammunition was expended, and then retreated in good order to the Panár, where they fell into confusion as stated in the text.

vinced of the hopelessness of the English cause, and transferred his friendship to their rivals.

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III.

As a proof of his new attachment he sent his eldest son, Mahfúz Khán, to Pondicherry, where he was received with great respect and gratified by magnificent presents.

Could the French ships have co-operated in an attack on Fort St. David, their services would have been as important in reality as they had been represented by Dupleix, for the garrison had almost entirely exhausted its resources, and was only saved by the enterprise of an officer who ran his ship into the port and landed twenty recruits and 60,000*l*. But the fear of the return of the English fleet, now superior in force, obliged Dupleix to send his ships to the western coast, where they anchored in the Portuguese port of Goa. He did not, however, desist from his land operations ; and being now secure from the nabob he sent the same force as before under M. Paradis to renew the attack on Fort St. David, but when on the point of commencing its operations it was interrupted by the actual appearance of the English fleet, and compelled to retreat to Pondicherry.

March 2,
A.D. 1747.

The fleet landed 100 Europeans sent from Bengal, and lent 500 sailors and 150 marines as a temporary augmentation of the garrison. Not long after, 100 Europeans, 200 native Portuguese, and 100 sepoy arrived from Bombay, and 400 sepoy from Telli-cherry ; and in the course of the year the Company's ships brought out 150 Europeans from England.

June,
A.D. 1747.

In January Major Lawrence arrived from England, with a commission to command all the Company's forces in India. An attack being then expected from Pondicherry, he encamped near the Panár to oppose it ;

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III.

but it was not long before he detected a plot by the commander of the Tellicherry sepoys to carry over his party to the enemy, and further discovered that his interpreter was in the practice of sending regular intelligence to Madame Dupleix, who understood the Támul language, and who was as active-minded and as much interested in public affairs as her husband.⁸ The interpreter and one of his accomplices were hanged, and the Tellicherry commander with ten of his officers were banished to St. Helena, where several of them had recourse to the remedy of Hindús in despair, and assisted each other in putting an end to their lives. The failure of this conspiracy probably delayed the intended attack from Pondicherry; and soon after, the English squadron which had withdrawn during the monsoon, returned from Ceylon to Fort St. David, and put an end for the present to all designs on that place.

February
12, A.D.
1748.

June 9,
A.D. 1748.

But after the lapse of four months the four French ships that had been sent to Goa, and had since made a voyage to the Mauritius, returned with a reinforcement of three ships of the line from Europe. By judiciously availing himself of the land and sea breezes, which blow alternately during the day and night, and of a southerly wind which blows constantly at that season at a greater distance from the shore, M. Bouvet, the commander, succeeded in deceiving the English commodore, first offering battle, then affecting to make for Pondicherry, and at length pushing straight for Madras, which was the real object of his voyage. He there landed 400 soldiers and 200,000*l.*, and immediately returned to Mauritius. The English commodore (Griffin)

⁸ 'He was married to a woman endowed with as much spirit, art, and pride as himself, born in the country, mistress of all the low cunning peculiar to the natives, and well skilled in their language.' (*Lawrence's Narrative*, p. 31).

pursued him to Madras, but was too late to overtake him.

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M. Dupleix, thus relieved of the presence of the English fleet, and knowing that it would take some days to sail back against the southerly wind, determined to employ the interval in one more attempt on Fort St. David. The first attack was to be on Cuddalore, which was to be escaladed in the night. The plan having transpired, Lawrence had recourse to a stratagem. He withdrew the garrison and the guns from Cuddalore as a place incapable of resistance, and as soon as it was dark marched back both the guns and the garrison with such a reinforcement as seemed necessary for the perfect safety of the place. The French were ignorant of this second arrangement, and came on in the night as to an easy conquest. When they were fixing their scaling ladders, they were surprised by a discharge of musketry and grapeshot from all the ramparts within reach. The sudden discovery of the trap laid for them struck the whole body with a panic. They flung down their arms without firing a shot, and fled in a trepidation from which they did not recover until they were within the bounds of Pondicherry.

This was M. Dupleix's last enterprise against Fort St. David. He was now busily occupied in providing for his own defence. In addition to the strong squadron they already had in India, the English were fitting out a great expedition in Europe which there could be no doubt was ultimately designed against Pondicherry. It consisted of six ships of the line, a twenty-gun ship, and a bomb vessel, and was accompanied by eleven of the Company's ships conveying troops and stores. The troops amounted to 1,500 men, and with them the

whole number on board the fleet was 8,000 men. It was commanded by Admiral Boscawen.

The admiral had orders to attack Mauritius on his way to India, and he was assisted on that expedition by six Dutch Indiamen with 400 soldiers, which were going from the Cape of Good Hope to Batavia.

From the continual prevalence of the south-east monsoon, Mauritius can only be approached from one quarter, and from a reef of rocks with which it is surrounded it is only accessible at two points. These difficulties, great at any time, were nearly insurmountable to men without local knowledge, and Boscawen, after reconnoitring and endeavouring to obtain information by taking prisoners, gave up the enterprise and continued his course to India.

On July 29 he arrived at Fort St. David, and took the command of the ships in India. The combined squadrons formed the largest marine force ever yet seen in those seas. It consisted of thirty ships, thirteen of which were of the line, and none of less than 500 tons burden. The English were elated by the presence of so formidable an armament, and never doubted that the loss of Madras would be revenged by the capture of Pondicherry.

To this object Boscawen applied himself without delay. The land army was composed of 1,200 king's troops and 800 marines; a battalion of 750 men in the Company's service, among whom were 200 native Portuguese; 150 artillerymen; and 1,100 sepoys who as yet were almost entirely undisciplined. To these the Dutch added 120 men from their station at Negapatam. The nabob also, now again going over to the strongest, sent 2,000 of his own horse, and the admiral had 1,100 of his seamen trained to the use of the

musket, who were sent ashore to join the army as soon as the siege began.

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III.

The heavy guns and stores were sent by sea with the fleet, and the army marched on August 8.

A.D. 1748.

They entered the French territory at Ariocopang, a strong post with the state of which (though only nine miles from their frontier) they were quite unacquainted. A party of 700 Europeans was sent to storm a heap of ruins which was mistaken for the works. On their arrival they discovered, close in their front, the real post, a regular fortification with a glacis and ditch, and were received with a fire of grape and musketry that killed 150 men and officers. Among the latter was Major Goodere, an able and experienced engineer, who was relied on for conducting the siege of Pondicherry. Regular batteries were then erected, but so unskilfully that they had to be removed to another place. The French afterwards made a sally; some sailors, unaccustomed to the scene, ran off in alarm, the soldiers followed, and Major Lawrence, who scorned to quit his station, fell into the hands of the enemy. After three or four days a magazine within the place exploded and the French evacuated it. The English at length advanced with much diminished spirit, having lost two of their best officers and wasted many days which were rendered of the utmost value from the approach of the monsoon.

The town of Pondicherry was situated about seventy yards from the seashore. Its extent within the walls was about a mile from north to south, and 1,100 yards from east to west. The land sides were fortified in the modern manner with a wall and bastions, a ditch, and an imperfect glacis. Towards the sea there were 100 guns in low batteries which protected that face and

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III.

commanded the roads. The garrison consisted of 1,800 Europeans and 3,000 sepoys. Besides the regular fortifications Pondicherry had another defence which is common in the south of India and is called a bound hedge. It is a broad belt composed of aloes, cactuses, and other thorny plants peculiar to the country, which form an impenetrable thicket, and encloses a considerable space of ground about the fort. In this instance it combined with the lower part of a river to form a circuit of seven miles, and had five openings, each of which was secured by a redoubt. One of these redoubts being carried with unaccountable ease, the others were necessarily abandoned. The English were then enabled to commence their approaches. The spot they selected was on the north-west of the fort, two or three miles distant from the nearest point to which the ships could be brought, although it was on the ships they depended for all the guns and stores required for the siege. They broke ground during the night of August 20 at the extraordinary distance of 1,500 yards from the place, and threw up a first and second parallel. Before these works were completed the French made a sally in great force under M. Paradis. They attacked both parallels at once, and at the first discharge killed the commanding officer of the one most advanced, on which many of the English ran away and the rest would have followed had they not been inspired by the example and influence of Ensign Clive. This young man reproached them with their fears, pointed out the glory of victory, and led them on with such vigour that twenty Frenchmen fell at the first discharge, and the rest, surprised by the unexpected resistance, retired in haste. They might still have easily overpowered the handful of men opposed to them, but Paradis had

fallen early in the attack, and, his troops discouraged marched back to the fort.

The death of Paradis was severely felt by Dupleix, who lost in him not only a gallant officer and a devoted adherent, but an engineer familiar with the place he was to defend, and who had made the means of repelling attacks on it his particular study. Dupleix henceforward was himself the engineer, and shone as much in directing the operations of the troops as in providing for their wants and in animating their courage.⁹ Parties continually sallied to attack the stores and cannon passing from the ships to the camp, and kept as many men employed in escorting those convoys as had before been required for transporting them. On one occasion they took two battering guns, and a detachment being immediately sent to recover them was drawn into an ambuscade and obliged to return precipitately to the camp, allowing the cannon to be carried in triumph into the town. The garrison also kept up a constant fire on the working parties and killed many men, and, when at last the trenches had been advanced to within 800 yards of the works, it was found that the French had let in water to flood a natural morass which lay between the besiegers and the town, and had thus put a stop to all further approaches in that direction. At this distance therefore the English were compelled to erect their batteries. They had one of four and one of eight guns (all eighteen and twenty-four pounders), a third of five mortars and fifteen royals, and a fourth of fifteen cohorns; but the French opened new embrasures, established batteries on the crest of the glacis, and soon brought a fire

⁹ *Mémoire pour Dupleix; Biographie Universelle, Article Dupleix, xii.*

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on the point of contest which doubled that of the besiegers.

The admiral endeavoured to lessen this superiority by a diversion, and drew up all his ships abreast of the town. The depth of water would not allow him to get nearer than 1,000 yards off, and though the cannonade he opened was incessant and was terrible in appearance, it in fact did little injury, so that the French soon ceased to pay any attention to it; and Boscawen, finding he was wasting ammunition to no purpose, discontinued his fire. The fire from the batteries continued for three days longer, but from the distance could make but little impression, while that of the enemy increased, and dismounted nine pieces of cannon of the besiegers. Sick-ness prevailed to a great extent in the camp; the monsoon was rapidly approaching, and was preceded by heavy rain which threatened to shut up the roads and actually flooded the trenches. A council of war was held and a retreat resolved on; the batteries were abandoned, the guns and stores re-embarked, and on October 6 the army set out on its retreat.¹

The fort of Ariocopang was blown up as the army passed the site of it. The siege had lasted 42 days from the opening of the trenches. The loss by the English in action and by sickness amounted to 800 European soldiers and 265 seamen. Few of the sepoys were killed, owing to their own pusillanimity as well as the duties they were employed in.

It cost the French only 200 Europeans and 50 sepoys. The deliverance of Pondicherry was highly honourable to the abilities of the governor and the activity of the garrison; but the attack might have

¹ Orme. *Narrative of the Transactions of the British Squadrons in India, &c., by an Officer who served in those squadrons.* (London, 1751.)

'failed, even without such an opposition, from the want of skill on the part of the assailants, 'for,' as Orme very truly remarks, 'there are few instances since the use of battering cannon of a siege carried on by Europeans with more ignorance than this of Pondicherry.'

CHAPTER IV.

Peace with France—English expedition to Tanjore—Capture of Dévi Cóta and treaty with the Rája—Dupleix's ambitious schemes—Chanda Sáheb's adventures—Joins Mozaffer Jang—Their alliance with the French—Defeat and death of Anwar-u-*ddín*—Rejoicings at Pondicherry—Attack on Trichinopoly—The Rája applies to the English—Advance of Násir Jang—Joined by an English force under Lawrence—Mutiny in the French force and its retreat—Dupleix's intrigues with the Patán Nawabs—His enterprises—Capture of Jinjí—Attacks Násir Jang—Death of the Viceroy—Ascendancy of the French—Discontent of the Patán Nawabs—French acquisitions.

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IV.

November
A.D. 1748.

NOT long after the return of the troops from Pondicherry, intelligence was received of a suspension of arms between France and England preparatory to a general peace. This information put an end to hostilities between the two nations in India, but as they had still large military establishments, they could scarcely reconcile themselves to sitting down in a state of peace, and were thus easily induced to employ their superfluous forces in the internal wars of the native princes. The English were tempted by a small advantage, casually offered, to engage in the concerns of a petty state, but the French entered deliberately on an extensive and well-considered plan for permanently establishing the preponderance of their nation through all the southern part of India.

Seiajî, the grandson of Véncajî, and grand-nephew of Sivajî,¹ had succeeded to the principality of Tanjore, but had been dethroned by his natural brother Pertáb

¹ See ii. 406.

Sing. Having no hopes from any other quarter, he applied to the English for assistance. His cause seemed just, he was supposed to have a strong party in Tanjore, and he promised the cession of Dévi Cóta, a place at the mouth of the Coleroon, the possession of which was for many reasons thought desirable to the Company. He accordingly met with a favourable reception, and on his engaging to pay the expenses of the war if successful, his other terms were agreed to. The province of Tanjore is bounded on the north by the Coleroon, and extends seventy miles along the sea and sixty inland. It is crossed by many streams, and as every advantage is taken of them by means of mounds and canals, it is one of the best watered and most productive spots in India. Though the government was Maratta at the time we speak of, the people were Támul, but probably the military chiefs, especially those of the cavalry, were likewise Marattas.

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IV.
February
A.D. 1749.

The force sent to restore Seiaji consisted of 430 Europeans and 1,000 sepoy's commanded by Captain Cope, and its guns, provisions, and stores were conveyed in four ships, of which two were of the line. The distance the troops had to march was only twenty-five miles, but before it was accomplished the monsoon set in with a storm which destroyed their tents, injured their equipments, and killed many of their cattle. The flag ship (a seventy-four), a sixty-four, and various other ships were lost at sea on the same occasion.

April
A.D. 1749.

When Captain Cope was able to move, he advanced to the Coleroon, but instead of being joined by friends of Seiaji, he found the whole country against him. The English soldiers, who had never before encountered a native power, were dismayed at the formidable appearance of their enemies. They narrowly escaped falling

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into an ambuscade prepared for their destruction in the woods ; and when they reached Dévi Cóta, such was the hostility of the country and the want of information that they could hear nothing of their ships though anchored within four miles of them. They were therefore without provisions or guns. The walls of Dévi Cóta were too high to be escalated, a plan proposed by Ensign Clive to blow the gates open with six-pounders was judged too hazardous, and after throwing some shells from cohorns into the place without effect, the force fell back on Fort St. David.

June 8,
A.D. 1749.

It was now clear that the cause of Seiajî was hopeless, but the English had their own character to retrieve, and hoped by the acquisition of Dévi Cóta alone to indemnify themselves for the expense of the war. Their whole disposable force, 800 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys, was therefore embarked under Major Lawrence and sent by sea to the Coleroon. They landed on the side of a branch of that river opposite to Dévi Cóta, and from that side they determined to batter the town. The wall being of cut stone, and not of mud, was easily breached in three days, but the river was deep and rapid, and could not have been crossed if the carpenter of one of the ships had not volunteered to make a raft capable of carrying over a large part of the troops. To render the invention available it was necessary to have a rope fixed on the opposite side, and the same carpenter swam across in the night and fastened one to a tree near the bank. The rope was sunk under water to conceal it from the enemy. Next day 400 Europeans and three field pieces warped across against the stream, to the utter astonishment of the Tanjorines. They, however, manned the walls in multitudes, and lined the shore, keeping up a heavy fire on the troops as they

crossed. A footing once gained, the rest of the force crossed by degrees. It lost thirty Europeans and fifty sépoys in the passage.

• Major Lawrence determined to storm the breach without delay, and sent a platoon of 34 Europeans with 700 sepoy under Ensign (now Lieutenant) Clive, to occupy an unfinished entrenchment which had been thrown up in front of the breach. The Europeans advanced after losing four of their number, but they were not followed by the sepoy, and their rear was thus left entirely without protection. This want of co-operation did not escape the enemy, and when the Europeans had reached the entrenchment, and were actually presenting their muskets to fire, a party of horse which had been concealed behind a bastion, by a sudden and rapid evolution which manifested the excellence both of the horses and the riders, fell on the rear of the platoon with so much impetuosity that the men had no time to face about and defend themselves, and in an instant twenty-six of the platoon were cut to pieces. A horseman made a blow at Clive which he avoided, and succeeded in making his way to the sepoy with three others, who were all that survived the slaughter. Major Lawrence now advanced with the main body of the detachment. The Tanjorine horse repeated their charge and were allowed to approach within fourteen yards of the line, when a cool discharge from the troops (now fully prepared to receive them) caused such havoc among them that they fled with precipitation, and Lawrence advancing found the breach abandoned and had only to take possession of the place. A body of 10,000 Tanjorine horse who had been posted behind the town moved off at the same time and retired from the field of action.

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The English had now gained their own object by the taking of Dévi Cóta, and the rája had little prospect of obliging them to renounce their conquest ; and, as there could be no hopes of restoring Seiajî against the wishes of the whole of the Tanjorines, there was little difficulty in negotiating a peace. The rája ceded Dévi Cóta and a portion of territory round it, and paid a sum of money equal to the expenses of the war. He also agreed to pay an annual pension of 4,000 rupees to Seiajî, and the English engaged to prevent any further disturbance to the government of Tanjore on the part of the latter prince.

While the English were affording this example of interference in the affairs of native states, M. Dupleix was engaged in maturing the plan which he had long been meditating. The weakness of the Mogul empire had been much earlier remarked by every European in its dominions. An extravagant contempt for its means of resistance led to the crude attempts of Sir John Child and his contemporaries. The disgraceful failure of those enterprises produced humiliation, and combined with a vague notion of the greatness of Aurangzîb to lead men's minds into the opposite extreme of overrating the forces of the government. In the times of which we are writing, the Europeans despised the portions of the system which they themselves saw, but they still invested it as a whole with ideas of power and resources immeasurably superior to their own. Dupleix was the first to perceive the relative importance of the Europeans. He knew that the breaking up of the Mogul empire must produce civil contests, and he foresaw that the discipline and courage of the Europeans would be called in to the assistance of one or other of the competitors. The French and English in particular, he

thought, would necessarily engage in the disputes which were likely to follow on Asof Jáh's death ; the nation which had joined the successful party would doubtless employ its power to extirpate its European rival, and the only safe course for either was to be first in the field and to occupy a commanding position before the opposite party was aware of the crisis which had arrived.² He was likewise convinced that the circumstances of the times and the genius of his nation were alike unfavourable to commerce, and that if the French desired aggrandisement in India, they must enter on a more adventurous career.³ Fired by these views, so congenial to his natural ambition, Dupleix looked around for an opening through which he might enter into the midst of the struggle of which he foresaw the approach. Anwar-u-dín he saw in possession of power, with no temptation to pay dear for foreign aid ; he knew that he was not to be depended on as an ally, and believed him to be hostile to the French. Násir-u-dín, the destined successor of Asof Jáh, was equally independent of external support, and had used his influence with his father to favour the English in their late war with the French. The family of the last Nabobs of the Carnatic was still popular, and its connections retained the command of many strong places, of which Anwar-u-dín (though he had been for four years nabob) had not thought it prudent to dispossess them, but the surviving son of Safder Ali, who was their natural chief, was an infant, and Mortezza Ali, his nearest relation, was disqualified by his cowardice and the remembrance of his crimes from heading a party in any cause. In this review his eye rested on Chanda Sáheb, in whom he perceived an instrument every way suited to his

² *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 182.

³ Orme.

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designs. Though Chanda Sáheb had no claims to the Carnatic, either from descent or appointment, he was connected by marriage with the old family, and from his military reputation, his talents for business, his spirited character, and liberal expenditure, had long been the favourite of its partisans. He was therefore in a situation which made him a powerful confederate, but did not enable him to maintain himself independently of his ally. He had now been for nearly seven years in confinement at Sattára; his wife and family had remained at Pondicherry, and through them M. Dupleix kept up an intercourse with the prisoner. When his own plans assumed a distinct form, M. Dupleix became anxious to procure the liberation of his intended co-adjutor; he entered on negotiations for the purpose with the Marattas, and succeeded in consequence of his becoming security for the payment of an ample ransom.

A.D. 1748.

Chanda Sáheb left Sattára with eight or ten of his old adherents and a moderate retinue.⁴ Though he had already hopes of assistance from Dupleix, it was impossible to commence operations in the Carnatic without some army of his own. He had therefore recourse to such means of obtaining men and money as his reputation and the small body of followers attending him enabled him to command. He espoused the cause of the Rája of Chitaldurg in the north-west of the Mysore against the neighbouring Rája of Bednór, but he was unfortunate in his first adventure. A battle took place at Meia Conda (half-way between the residences of the contending rajas),

⁴ Chanda Sáheb's proceedings on his release are taken from Colonel Wilks, who had much better means of information on that point than the author of *La dernière Révolution des Indes* (1757), on which Orme seems to found his account. Except for the transactions of the French themselves, the work just mentioned is entitled to no attention on any subject.

in which Chanda Sáheb's ally was defeated, his own son killed, and himself taken prisoner. He was fortunately consigned to the custody of two Mahometan officers, and was able to gain them over to his side. By their means he procured his liberty, but was as far as ever from the means of invading the Carnatic.

At this juncture he heard of the death of Asof Jáh, an event which led to new combinations, and enabled him to pursue his enterprise under more favourable circumstances than he could possibly have anticipated.

Asof Jáh left six sons.⁵ The eldest, Gházi-u-dín, would naturally have succeeded to his usurped territory. He had, however, been for a long time acting as his father's deputy in the high office of Amír-ul-Omra at Delhi, where he was the head of a party ;⁶ and either from regard to his interests in that quarter, or from the want of means to assert his rights in any other, he brought forward no pretensions to the government of the Deckan, contenting himself with the succession to his father's station at the capital.⁷ The second son,

⁵ The account of Asof Jáh's sons is from the *Khezáneh-ul-Omra*. It has been repeated by many authors, and I believe disputed by none.

⁶ See ii. p. 649. Book xii. chap. iv.

⁷ *Khezáneh-ul-Omra*; *Seir-ul-Motákherín*.

[The *Seir-ul-Motákherín*, here for the first time quoted, is a work of deserved authority and frequently cited in the account of the affairs of Bengal. The author, Mir Gholám Hussein Khán, was a person of high family at the court of Delhi, and on the accession of Aly Verdi Khán to power they became actors in the revolutions which followed. The history bearing the above title (lit. Manners of the Moderns) commences with a brief narrative of the struggles that followed the death of Aurangzáib, including the invasion of Nadir Sháh, the rise of the Marattas, and the invasions of the Duránis. The chief interest of the narrative commences with the wars of Bengal, and is brought down to the close of Warren Hastings' administration. The work was translated in 1789 by a Frenchman resident in India, and the first volume of a revised translation was published by General Briggs in 1832.

Professor Cowel, in a note to Mr. Elphinstone's *History of India*,

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Násir Jang, had long been forgiven his rebellion.⁸ He had since resided with his father, and had again been entrusted with the command of armies and the administration of affairs.⁹ He was therefore looked on as the avowed successor to the government, and took possession without any difficulty or dispute; his four younger brothers who were on the spot immediately acknowledging his title. Asof Jáh had, however, a grandson by a daughter, who had always been a favourite with him, and on whom he had conferred the government of Bijapur. This young prince, whose title was Mozaffer Jang,¹ was absent from court when Asof Jáh died, and as his residence was in the strong fort of Adóni, he thought himself sufficiently secure from Násir Jang to

book xii. chap. i., refers shortly to the work and quotes from the preface to Briggs's translation some lines in high praise of the original, which the translator compares favourably with the historical memoirs of Europe, such as those of Sully, Clarendon, or Burnet. This is an exaggeration. The author enjoyed no such advantages as were possessed by these eminent writers. Its merit is that it introduces the reader to the life of a Mahometan in India during a time of revolution who was an actor in the scenes. The author in later life entered into the service of the English, and writes with some knowledge of the manners of the conquerors and conquered. The work is valuable as a picture of the times and of the modes of thinking of the natives. Like Burnet he is very fond of gossiping. The author's comparison between native (i.e. Mahometan) and English administration in his time, at the end of the work, is full of shrewd remarks.—*Ed.*]

⁸ See *ante*, p. 89.

⁹ *Khezándch-ul-Omra; Scir-ul-Motákherín*, iii. 114. See also Násir Jang's correspondence, in his father's lifetime, with Commodore Griffin, and the authority he exercised in the Carnatic. (*Rouse's Appendix*, No. II. pp. 14, 16, &c.)

¹ His name was Hedáyet Mohei-u-dín, by which he is often called. He has been said by some writers to have been the son of a barber, but he was certainly of an excellent family, and descended from the famous Vizír of Sháh Jehán, Sádullah Khán. A French historian, on the other hand, connects him through his grandmother with the Emperor Mohammed Sháh; but that author's account of the history of Mozaffer is founded on the most erroneous information. (*Dernière Révolution*, &c. i. 219.)

set up a claim on his own part, founded on an alleged will of his grandfather. The story, however, made little impression, for not an individual of the court or camp of Asof Jáh took part with the asserted heir of his choice ; and so little uneasiness did it give to Násir Jang that he assembled his army and set out for Delhi within a short time after his accession. He had been solicited to march to that capital in a letter, written with his own hand, by the new Emperor, Ahmed Sháh,² and found sufficient motives for compliance in his father's example on a similar occasion, and in the hope of aggrandising himself during the troubles of the government. The invitation was probably extorted by the fear of a second invasion by the Duránis, and it was withdrawn when that danger was removed.³

Násir Jang received this second notification after he had reached the river Nerbudda,⁴ and by this time he was, in all likelihood, well pleased to be left at leisure to watch the proceedings of Mozaffer Jang. He therefore returned to Aurangábád, where he passed the rainy season.

Chanda Sáheb was not long in perceiving the advantage that would result to both from a union between himself and Mozaffer Jang.⁵ Both were opposed to the established authority, and obliged to try the chance of bold and desperate enterprises ; Mozaffer Jang could bring forth the troops and treasures of his province, and, in his assumed character of viceroy, he might confer on

² *Khezáneh-ul-Omra*.

³ See ii. 658, xii.-iv. M. Dupleix, with his usual intrepidity, asserts that Násir Jang was summoned to Delhi to answer for his conduct, the government of the Deccan having previously been conferred on Mozaffer Jang. *Mémoires pour Dupleix*, p. 42.

⁴ *Khezáneh-ul-Omra* ; *Seir-ul-Motákherín*, iii. 114.

⁵ M. Dupleix states that this connection was first suggested by himself to Mozaffer, who had applied to him for advice, p. 43.

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Chanda Sáheb the pretext of a title to the government of Arcot. Chanda Sáheb could repay these obligations by means of his skill and experience, the friendship of the French, and his influence in the Carnatic.

The removal of the insurrection to that province was likewise as desirable to Mozaffer Jang as to him, for its long independence made it indifferent to the authority of the ruler of the Deckan, and its distance in some measure protected it from his power.

Some time may have been required to concert measures with M. Dupleix and with the malcontents of the Carnatic, and the rainy season, which prevented the march of Násir Jang from Aurangábád, must have been equally unfavourable to the movements of Mozaffer Jang; but it is difficult to account for the inactivity of both parties for several months after November 1748, at which period both the monsoons must have exhausted their fury. In March 1749 M. Dupleix acquainted the Company with the steps which he proposed to take in consequence of the reported approach of Chanda Sáheb, but it was not until July 2 that he informed his Council of the actual arrival of that chief in the neighbourhood of Ambúr. At the same time he announced to them that Ali Rezza, the son of Chanda Sáheb, who was at Pondicherry, had engaged to subsidise 2,000 of the French sepoys, whom it would otherwise have been expedient to discharge in consequence of the peace with England. M. Dupleix proposed that Chanda Sáheb should receive further assistance from the Company in his designs on the government of the Carnatic; that he should not be called on to pay his subsidy until in possession of the province, and that, in return for these sacrifices, he should immediately

sign a grant of forty villages in his future province to the Company.⁶

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Though Chanda Sáheb conducted the negotiation in his own name, the advancing army was under the command of Mozaffer Jang, and was said to amount to 40,000 men. Chanda Sáheb, with his followers, was enrolled in this army as an ordinary leader of volunteers, but he was in reality the director of all its proceedings. As soon as M. Dupleix heard of the approach of these chiefs, he sent the 2,000 sepoys, together with 400 Europeans, the whole under the command of M. d'Auteuil, to meet them, and this detachment was allowed to march unopposed past the city of Arcot and to form a junction with the invaders at no great distance from the nabob's army.⁷ Yet Anwar-u-dín had not been ignorant of the attack with which he was threatened. He had for some time been preparing his army, and was now encamped near Ambúr at the head of 20,000 men.

Like Dóst Ali on a former occasion, he had taken post at the mouth of a pass. His flanks were protected by hills, on one of which was the hill fort of Ambúr, and his front defended by an entrenchment furnished with artillery. He had further taken advantage of the neighbourhood of a lake to form a wet ditch and to flood the country in front of his entrenchment. It would have been easy for the invading chiefs to have rendered this preparation useless by entering the Carnatic at some other point, but they felt it necessary at any risk to bring matters to a speedy decision.

Their funds had already begun to fail ; the English

⁶ *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 43, and *Pièces justificatives*, No. I.

⁷ *Dupleix*, *Pièces justificatives*, No. II. p. 5.

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could not be expected to remain long insensible to the necessity of supporting the government in possession ; and above all they might daily look for intelligence of the approach of Násir Jang whom they could not withstand for a moment unless they could gain some reputation and stability before his arrival. They therefore determined to attack the nabob in his position, and M. d'Auteuil offered his services to storm the entrenchment with his own detachment alone.

The French moved forward with their accustomed valour, exalted by their sense of the conspicuous station which they occupied in the eyes of the native chiefs and army, but the difficulties of the approach and the heavy fire of the artillery (partly served by European deserters) compelled them to give up the attack. They soon renewed it with increased courage ; the struggle lasted for upwards of half an hour, and some of the French had actually mounted the breastwork, when they were again constrained to retire. M. d'Auteuil was wounded on this occasion, but such was the impression made on the enemy by the indefatigable spirit of the French, that on a third assault they found but a feeble resistance opposed to them, and quickly made themselves masters of the entrenchment. The road was now open for Mozaffer Jang and Chanda Sáheb, and on passing the entrenchment they discovered the nabob's army drawn up in order of battle. But the previous success of the French, and their continued advance on the enemy, soon decided the fortune of the day. The nabob was killed at the head of his best troops, his eldest son, Mahfúz Khán, was taken prisoner, and his youngest and illegitimate son, Mohammed Ali, fled with such troops as he could collect and made his way to Trichinopoly, of which place he was governor. The

French had seventy-two Europeans killed and wounded in this action, and about three hundred sepoys.⁸

The conquerors entered Arcot in triumph, and Ghanda Sáheb was formally invested by Mozaffer Jang with the government of the Carnatic. Some time was spent in arranging the administration and collecting money. A general spirit of submission displayed itself; it is even said that the governor of Fort St. David sent to compliment Chanda Sáheb on his accession, but this precipitation, though not inconsistent with the timid policy of the English, rests on the authority of the French alone, and is most positively denied by the English.⁹ The English, however, offered no opposition to the proceedings of the allies, and appear to have been lost in perplexity at the rapid progress of their rivals, to which they knew not on what ground to object.

News of a definitive peace had arrived from Europe, and the French, according to the treaty, had restored Madras, greatly strengthened and improved since the time when it fell into their hands; but as it was still much weaker than Fort St. David, the seat of the Presidency was continued at the latter place.

August,
A.D. 1749.

The English took advantage of the existing confusions to seize on St. Thomé, a small town about four miles south of Madras, which had formerly belonged to the Portuguese and now seemed without an owner, though doubtless situated within the territories of the nabob. The priests and many of the inhabitants, who were Catholics, were ill disposed to the English on account of their religion, and the latter people were not

⁸ Orme, i. 130. Wilks's *Mysore*, i. 259, 261.

⁹ For the French account see *Mémoire pour M. Dupleix*, p. 46, and the letter of the French deputies in Cambridge's *War in the Carnatic*, Appendix, p. 19; and for the denial and refutation pp. 23 and 30 of the same Appendix.

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without apprehension that if they omitted to occupy this vacant possession they might be anticipated by the French.¹

After the new nabob and the viceroy had settled their affairs at Arcot they repaired to Pondicherry, where M. Dupleix and the native princes vied with each other in the magnificence of their interview. They loaded M. Dupleix with every mark of gratitude and respect; they issued a liberal donation to the detachment which had assisted them. Chanda Sáheb gave eighty villages to the Company instead of forty which he had promised, and Mozaffer Jang declared his intention of granting the districts round Masulipatam to the French as soon as his authority should be established in that part of his territory. On one great occasion of ceremony M. Dupleix did homage to the viceroy, and the latter, after investing him with an honorary dress of the highest rank and of the richest materials, placed his own turban with all its valuable jewels on the head of Dupleix, while he himself put on the hat of the French governor.²

But though no man more enjoyed these pompous festivities than M. Dupleix, he saw with regret the loss of time which they occasioned, and repeatedly urged the native chiefs to move at once to Trichinopoly, and thus extinguish the last remains of internal opposition, before they were called on to encounter Násir Jang. They at length set off, accompanied by 800 French and 300 negroes and Portuguese, in addition to the sepoys

October
21, A.D.
1749.

¹ Orme, i. p. 133 *et seq.*

² Orme, and *Mémoire pour Dupleix*. What for want of a better term I have called homage is the presentation of certain pieces of money in a particular form. It is an acknowledgment of superiority, but not of any feudal relation. The exchange of turbans among the Indians is equivalent to mutual adoption as brothers.

who had all along been attached to them. But before they reached Trichinopoly they were induced by their want of funds to turn off to Tanjore where they expected to levy a contribution. Ever since the fall of Bijapúr the Mussulmans had claimed, and when strong enough had compelled, the payment of a tribute from this principality. Chanda Sáheb had been defeated in one of these military collections, and as the Rájá of Tanjore had kept up a correspondence with his countrymen during the Maratta invasion of which Chanda Sáheb was the victim, the highest resentment prevailed on the one side and the greatest dread and aversion on the other.

The rája therefore strained every nerve to obtain the means of resisting the threatened attack. He entered into correspondence with Mohammed Ali, and joined with him in earnestly soliciting Násir Jang's appearance in the Carnatic. He also applied to the English, but with little success;³ the heads of their Government were so distracted between the fear of incurring blame in Europe if they infringed the recent treaty with France, and that of being driven out of India if they allowed their inveterate enemies to aggrandise themselves unopposed, that their whole conduct was a tissue of weakness and inconsistency. They had refused to give effectual support to Mohammed Ali against Chanda Sáheb, yet they sent 120 sepoys to assist him in defending Trichinopoly; and although they now encouraged the Rájá of Tanjore to hold out to the last, the only assistance they gave him was that of twenty men detached from the small party whom they had sent to Mohammed Ali.⁴

Tanjore was ill prepared for a siege, but Chanda

³ Orme, i. 138.

⁴ Orme, i. 139.

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Sáheb's present object was money and not revenge, and the sack of the town would have enriched the soldiers without relieving the treasury. He was therefore easily led into negotiations, which were long protracted by the artful management of the rája, and when at last he began hostilities, the Maratta so well assumed the appearance of unfeigned alarm, that Chanda Sáheb renewed the negotiation in full confidence in his sincerity. More time was thus consumed, and when the rája had brought down the demand on him from forty millions of rupees to seven, he still affected difficulty in raising the money, and clogged the payment with so many obstructions, that ere the first instalment had been discharged, his enemies received intelligence of the long-dreaded approach of Násir Jang, on which they broke up their camp with precipitation, and marched back towards Pondicherry.⁵

Before they reached their destination, they were surprised by the sudden appearance of a large body of Maratta horse, who attacked them on the line of march, wheeling, firing, and charging individually, according to the loose manner of their nation. Their numbers and audacity would have made a serious impression on the undisciplined portion of the army, had they not been kept in check by the French field pieces until the whole force reached Velamír and took up a strong position within a short march of Pondicherry.

January,
A.D. 1750.

These Marattas had been assembled by Násir Jang to act as light troops with his army and had been detached by a southern pass to harass the enemy, while he himself was slowly advancing from the north. About three thousand of them were commanded by Morár Ráo of Guti, who has been mentioned before,⁶

⁵ Orme, i. 139, &c.

⁶ See *ante*, p. 88.

and were probably the best Maratta horse that ever took the field.⁷

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IV.

Násir Jang's march had been protracted by the necessity of allowing time for the feudatories and tributaries of the southern part of his territory to join his standard. Among these, besides Morár Ráo of Guti, were the three Patán Nabobs of Caddapa, Carnúl and Sháhnúr, and the troops of the Rája of Mysore, under his best general.⁸ The whole were reckoned, in the usual vague style of the Indians, at 300,000 men, with 1,300 elephants, and a prodigious park of artillery.⁹ With this great force Násir Jang advanced towards Pondicherry, making his general rendezvous at Jinjí.

Meanwhile, M. Dupleix, however he may have been chagrined by the misconduct of his allies, in no respect abated his exertions to support their cause. He had at first furnished them with money from the Company's treasury, and having exhausted the disposable part of its funds, he next advanced money on his own account, and in this manner he had paid them 200,000 rs., some time before the march to Tanjore. He now made further advances, and received in return an assignment on the revenue of the Carnatic to be paid directly by the collectors into his hands.¹

He likewise increased the Europeans with their army to 2,000. But, as he had ground for uneasiness about the conduct of these last troops, he thought it prudent to endeavour to bring about a pacification. He accordingly wrote to Násir Jang, who continued his operations without noticing the overture.

⁷ Orme, Lawrence.

⁸ Wilks, i. 262.

⁹ Colonel Lawrence in his narrative says 800, but that must be an error of the press.

¹ *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 49.

CHAP.
IV.March 22,
A.D. 1750.

That prince had summoned Mohammed Ali to join him at Jinjí, and had called on the English to send a body of their troops. Among the causes of the irresolution of the government of Fort St. David had been their uncertainty whether Mozaffer Jang was not the rightful viceroy of the Deckan, and whether by supporting Mohammed Ali they were not flying in the face of the Mogul's authority. The magnitude of Násir Jang's armament, and the general adherence of the feudatories and dependents, at length convinced them that he was the acknowledged viceroy. They therefore laid aside their scruples, ordered their detachment from Trichinopoly to join him, and sent 600 Europeans under the command of Major Lawrence from the Presidency itself. This last body joined the viceroy when he was already in sight of the enemy's lines at Vilnúr. Násir Jang received the major with great cordiality, and in the spirit of Oriental politeness offered him the command of the whole army; but when Lawrence suggested that, instead of making an attack in front on the strong position of the enemy, he should dislodge them by cutting off their communication with Pondicherry, he at once rejected the proposal as inconsistent with his dignity. The vast superiority of his numbers in some measure justified his confidence. Mozaffer Jang and Chanda Síheb must themselves have felt that no position could have enabled them to offer resistance with their own troops, and that all their hopes of victory lay in the valour and discipline of the French.

What, then, must have been their consternation when they discovered that they were on the eve of losing that support on which they so exclusively depended. The best officers of the French army had been employed on the expedition towards Trichinopoly,

some of them had suffered from sickness and fatigue, and all thought they were entitled to some repose before being sent on a new service. M. Duplex was obliged to replace them with officers on whom he had less reliance, and these were envious of their predecessors, who they said had been enriched by the contribution at Tanjore, while they were sent on a duty which promised nothing but danger. On this ground they applied for a donation to put them on a level with their fellows, and thought they were treated with gross injustice when their request was refused. Their discontent infected the private soldiers, and gave rise to groundless fears and suspicions. At one time it was said that they were too few to contend with the vast host of Násir Jang, at another that Mozaffer Jang was in league with his uncle, and was only leading on the French to betray them to their enemies; and these feelings produced a general demand to be marched back to Pondicherry. M. d'Auteuil, who commanded the French troops, endeavoured to keep down this mutinous spirit, and succeeded in retaining his troops in their position during the first action with the enemy. It was confined to a cannonade, and before it began M. d'Auteuil proposed that the two European nations should forbear firing on each other; Major Lawrence agreed, but a shot from the French coming near his men he thought it was done to try his temper, and fired three shots in return. None of them were fatal, and the whole cannonade produced little effect. That evening thirteen French officers shamefully threw up their commissions; and M. d'Auteuil, anticipating the effect of this desertion on the men, determined at once to march back to Pondicherry. This result of the discontents fell like a thunderbolt on Mozaffer Jang and

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Chanda Sáheb, and changed all their hopes of greatness into fears for their lives and liberty. The weaker mind of Mozaffer Jang remained undecided what course to pursue, but Chanda Sáheb at once determined to adhere to the French in all extremities, and joined M. d'Auteuil with a body of his most faithful retainers. As soon as the retreat of the French was known, Morár Ráo set off in pursuit of them. He came up with them about daybreak, and attacked them with a vigour and perseverance which is rare even with the best cavalry. He broke into a hollow square which M. d'Auteuil had found it necessary to form, and finding that he was only followed by fifteen horsemen he made another desperate effort, and forced a passage through the opposite side with the loss of nine of his companions.

The French would have found it difficult to make their way to the bound hedge had they not been assisted by the activity and resolution of Chanda Sáheb and the slender troop which still adhered to his fortunes.

Mozaffer Jang, separated from his friends, and hourly deserted by numbers of his followers, had no choice but to throw himself on the clemency of his uncle. He had been told, or had imagined, that he might be restored to his former government, but as soon as he reached the camp he was thrown into confinement. The remains of his army were attacked and dispersed in a moment, so that not a trace remained of the formidable confederacy which so lately aspired to the government of the Carnatic and the Deckan.²

² Mr. Orme alludes to a report that Mozaffer Jang's capture was the result of treachery on the part of Násir Jang, but Colonel Lawrence (who was present and no panegyrist of Násir Jang), as well as all the native historians, are silent on the subject.

Forty French gunners, who had unaccountably been left behind with eleven guns, were cut up by the horse on this occasion, and would all have been destroyed, but for the interposition of the English, who succeeded in rescuing a few.

It is easy to conceive the anguish with which M. Dupleix beheld the destruction of all his schemes of ambition, the ruin of his friends, and the disgrace of his nation. But these emotions were confined to his own breast ; those around him saw nothing but confidence and serenity. He directed M. d'Auteuil to be brought to trial for retreating without orders, and sent back the army to encamp beyond the bound hedge ; he placed the mutinous officers in arrest, restored order among the men, and soon inspired all with the same ardent desire as himself to efface by some brilliant action the stain brought on them by the misconduct of some of their fellow-soldiers.

At the same time he did not neglect the means of attaining his object by amicable arrangement. He made overtures to Násir Jang, and sent deputies to his camp to negotiate. His tone, however, was as high as before. After he had with reluctance waived a demand for the release and restoration of Mozaffer Jang, he insisted, as an indispensable condition, that the former government of that prince should be conferred on his infant son, that Chanda Sáheb should be Nabob of the Carnatic, and that none of the family of Anwar-u-dín should ever succeed to that office. This peremptory demand broke off the negotiation. Násir Jang was not disposed to foster a rival in his immediate dominions, and having already granted the government of the Carnatic to Mohammed Ali, he could not listen to applications from another quarter.

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But though M. Dupleix failed in his avowed negotiation, he succeeded in another which he had at least as much at heart. His long residence in India had endued him with a thorough knowledge of the character of the natives, and at the same time had given him a taste, as well as a talent, for their crooked policy and intrigue. The first of these qualities suggested the probability of disaffection among some of the numerous chiefs who accompanied Násir Jang, and by means of the second he established a communication with those who were most likely to contribute to his designs. The three Patán nabobs had joined the viceroy's standard rather as allies than dependents, and expected in return to be gratified in several claims which they had brought forward. Finding that after the defeat of Mozaffer Jang, they were treated as mere feudatories, who had done no more than their duty, they were filled with resentment and disposed to listen to any proposals that held out hopes of revenge. The embassy afforded an opportunity for coming to an understanding with these chiefs, but a long period was still required to settle the terms of their defection, as well as to arrange the time and manner in which it could be made most useful. M. Dupleix did not allow his hopes from their assistance to relax his own exertions during the interval. As soon as the negotiation with Násir Jang was broken off, 300 Europeans under M. de la Touche were detached from M. d'Auteuil's army to beat up the nabob's camp at night. They entered an exposed quarter, fired with severe effect on such of the enemy as were within reach, spread an alarm through the more distant parts to the encampment, and then retired, with scarcely any loss, to their own lines.

Three days after this exploit, the viceroy took the

resolution of returning to Arcot, a measure inexpedient in itself and fatal in its consequences, as occasioning the separation of the English. Major Lawrence had been employed in soliciting an addition to the Company's lands near Madras, and had been wearied out by the evasive answers which he received. He was now told that he should be gratified on that head if he would accompany the army to Arcot. This proposal was doubly objectionable, as being part of a plan for removing the viceroy from the point where his presence was required for his own interests, and as leaving the English territory exposed without protection to the French; and Lawrence, who, though a man of sound sense, and an excellent officer, had not the pliancy and address of his European rivals, saw no use in continuing his co-operation when it seemed so little valued. He had also received some intimation of the plots which were in agitation; and erroneously attributed the formation of them to the prime minister Sháh Nawáz Khán, whom he has unjustly suspected of secret opposition to his own views. He had attempted to warn Násir Jang of his danger, but found his own interpreter too much in awe of the minister to perform his part in the communication. He therefore lost all confidence in his confederates, and determined to return to Fort St. David as soon as the army should commence its march for Arcot.

Násir Jang is represented in very different lights by his own countrymen and by the European writers of this period. To the latter he appeared a worthless voluptuary, remarkable for nothing but sloth, caprice, and incapacity. The native authors, on the other hand, record the skill and activity by which he defeated and repressed the Marattas in the highest tide

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of their prosperity,³ and the personal courage he displayed in his more unfortunate resistance to his father. They expatiate on the quickness of his talents and the high cultivation of his understanding, and speak with affection of his amiable disposition and manners. He was himself a poet of considerable merit, and his prime minister Sháh Nawáz Khán, and his intimate friend and companion Gholám Ali Ázád, were the best Persian writers of their age. Even this last author, however, who was with him on the morning of his death, admits that he had fallen into habits of indulgence in his latter days, and countenances the statement of other writers, that he sacrificed his duties and interests to his propensity for the pleasures of the seraglio and of the chase.⁴

These last imputations are borne out by his conduct during the whole of this campaign. He should have availed himself of the aid of Lawrence's detachment to attack the French before they recovered from their late reverse and while they were destitute of native allies; he might then have shut them up in Pondicherry, cut off their communication with the country, and trusted to time and the pressure of those inconveniences for detaching them from their connection with Chanda Sáheb. Instead of this, after wasting time in negotiation, he remained in the enjoyment of his favourite pursuits at Arcot, and allowed his enemies to prosecute their plans undisturbed.

M. Dupleix did not fail to profit by this supineness; his vigour and enterprise seeming to increase with his difficulties. Násir Jang having ordered the French

³ See Book xii. chap. iii.

⁴ *Serri Ázád* (quoted by Wilks, i. 267). *Khezáneh-i-Omra*, Supplement to the *Modsir-ul-Omra*, *Seir-ul-Motákherín*.

factory at Masulipatam to be sequestered, he sent a detachment by sea and occupied that great city itself, near 400 miles in the rear of Násir Jang's position. This conquest, which from the nature of the ground was easily retained, gave the natives a conspicuous proof of his own strength and the weakness of his enemy.⁵ Even before this time, he sent 500 Europeans to throw a garrison into the strong pagoda and the town of Trivadi, and to collect the revenue from the adjoining districts. This first step towards the occupation of his territory alarmed Mohammed Ali, who pressed Násir Jang for leave to take the field in its defence. He received such a reinforcement from the viceroy as raised his whole force to 20,000 men, and he obtained 400 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys from Lawrence (who was then in charge of the civil government of Fort St. David), engaging to pay them regularly from his own resources.

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He then marched to Trivadi, but after being repulsed in an attack on the French position, in which both he and the English incurred loss, he got into disputes with Captain Cope, the commander of the latter force, and either from anger or necessity refused to issue the pay which had been promised to them. A reference was made to Fort St. David, and Lawrence, with the same spirit of indignation which had dictated to him the resolution of quitting Násir Jang, ordered the troops to leave the nabob and return to Fort St. David.⁶

August 19,
A.D. 1750.

Dupleix took immediate advantage of this hasty step. He sent a reinforcement which completed the detachment at Trivadi to 1,800 Europeans, 2,500 sepoys and 1,000 of Chanda Sáheb's horse. With these the

⁵ *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 56. Orme, i. 150.

⁶ Orme, i. 153 and 154.

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French attacked the nabob, and in a short time totally defeated and dispersed his army, with scarcely the loss of a man on their side. The nabob fled to Arcot with a few attendants. Animated by this success, M. Duplex determined to attempt the bold enterprise of an attack on Jinjí. This renowned fortress, which so long resisted all the power of Aurangzib,⁷ was unable to withstand the skill and valour of a French detachment. A force drawn up before the town was defeated and pursued within the walls. Three steep and carefully fortified mountains, which form the strength of the place, were attacked in the night. Redoubt after redoubt was carried with the bayonet, and neither the strength of the forts on the summits nor the difficulty of ascending the crags on which they stood could offer any obstruction to the impetuosity of the assailants; the gates were blown open with petards, the forts were stormed, and by daybreak the whole of Jinjí was in possession of the French.

These brilliant exploits restored the reputation of the French, and raised it to a higher pitch than ever. They at length roused Násir Jang from his dream of security. Considering the rebellion to be crushed by the captivity of Mozaffer Jang, he had sent back a large portion of his own troops and allowed many chiefs to return to their possessions. He now endeavoured to reassemble those forces, but the rains which were at their height above the gháts, and were impending in the Carnatic, were unfavourable to that operation.

September,
A.D. 1750.

At length he moved from Arcot and slowly advanced towards Jinjí. While he was yet sixteen miles from that place his progress was arrested by the setting in of the monsoon, which completely inundated the country,

⁷ See ii. Book xi. chap. iii.

and after the first burst, he found himself shut up between two swollen rivers. In this situation he remained for two months. His army was nearly as great as ever in numbers, though much diminished in fighting men; and it was not long before it began to suffer from scarcity as well as from sickness and the inclemency of the weather. In these circumstances, Násir Jang made overtures in his turn to the French; on which M. Dupleix raised his terms, requiring the cession of Masulipatam, and the temporary occupation of Jinjí, in addition to his former demands. This led to a protracted negotiation; and M. Dupleix had full time to carry on his intrigues with the disaffected chiefs. He had now gained a body of Marattas in addition to the Patán nabobs, and by the beginning of December the plot was ripe for execution. The French were to make a night attack on the camp, and their confederates were to change sides during the action, when the suddenness of their defection could not fail to decide the fate of the battle. Just at this time Násir Jang made new proposals, and such as M. Dupleix was well disposed to accept; but the order had already gone to strike the blow, and it was too late to suspend its effects.

M. d'Auteuil being disabled by illness, the command fell on M. de la Touche, who marched from Jinjí with 800 Europeans, 3,000 sepoy, and ten field pieces. He set out at night, and being furnished with guides by the confederates he reached the skirts of the Mogul camp before morning. The army was scattered over eighteen miles of ground, and as it was completely taken by surprise different parties came without concert to the point attacked; they were encountered in succession and easily driven off by the French field pieces. The park, with a strong body of irregular infantry

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ber 4,
A.D. 1750.

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attached to it, was passed without a conflict. By this time the day broke : half the viceroy's army had not been engaged, and M. de la Touche might still have been overpowered when the smallness of his force was observed. He had occupied three hours in making his way for three miles into the encampment, and as yet he had heard nothing of his allies. While in the midst of these reflections he saw before him a vast body of horse and foot drawn up in order, extending as far as the eye could reach, and his troops were on the point of losing courage at the idea of having still to contend with this formidable host when they perceived in the centre of it an elephant bearing a large white flag. This was the concerted signal of the confederates, and was welcomed with repeated shouts by the soldiers. More white flags were seen to rise amidst other bodies of troops, and M. de la Touche was soon informed of an event which of itself was more important than any victory he could have gained. When Násir Jang first learned that his army was seriously attacked he rose and prepared to move to the point assailed. His manner was cheerful and composed, but he did not mount his elephant until he had performed his devotions and solemnly commended himself to the protection of Providence. Warning was given to him of the intended perfidy of the Afgháns, but from his unsuspecting temper he refused to credit it and went straight to their part of the line to satisfy himself of their fidelity. The first chief he came to was Himmat Khán, Nabob of Caddapa, and as he drew near he saluted him by raising his hand to his head. The compliment was not returned, and as it was not broad daylight Násir Jang thought it might not have been observed. He therefore raised himself in his howdah to repeat the salutation,

when he received two shots through his body, one fired by the nabob himself and another by an attendant who was behind him on his elephant. He immediately fell down dead, and Himmat Khán ordered his head to be cut off and stuck on a spear. This assassination was certainly unpremeditated. The nabobs would have joined the French and would not have scrupled to take the viceroy's life in battle, but they could never have anticipated that it would be placed within their power by a spontaneous act of the victim.⁸

Mozaffer Jang was forthwith released from prison and saluted master of all the dominions of Asaf Jáh. The whole of Násir Jang's army hastened to submit to him, and by nine in the morning tranquillity was restored throughout the encampment.

Sháh Náwáz Khán, the minister, fled to a fort, and Mohammed Ali mounted his fleetest horse and set off with two or three attendants for Trichinopoly. Three of the late viceroy's younger brothers were in the camp, but without adherents and unprepared for a crisis they could offer no resistance to their nephew. News of this revolution was soon brought to Chanda Sáheb at Pondicherry, and he ran overjoyed to the Government House to give the first intelligence to M. Dupleix. They embraced like two friends escaped from a shipwreck. The event was announced to the town by a general discharge of the artillery, and in the evening M. Dupleix held a court and received the congratulations of all the inhabitants.

⁸ Orme (i. 155 to 161), Wilks, Dupleix. Many passages in the account of the storm of Jinjí and in the succeeding narrative are copied verbatim from Orme; but others vary considerably from his statements, and in them I have chiefly been guided by Dupleix and Wilks. The circumstances of the death of Násir Jang are entirely from the *Serri Ázád* (quoted by Wilks, i. 267) and the *Moásir-ul-Omra*.

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Decem-
ber 15,
A.D. 1750.

M. Dupleix had now attained the summit of his ambitious wishes. The Carnatic was in a manner his own, the Deckan was at his feet; and it was no extravagant imagination to suppose that the influence of his nation might ere long be extended over Hindostan. Ten days after the battle Mozaffer Jang appeared at Pondicherry and was received with every mark of joy and of respect. Shows and processions were repeated with as much eagerness as before, but with an increase of magnificence proportioned to the occasion, which was not now the occupation of a province but the undisputed acquisition of a great kingdom. But Mozaffer Jang's share in all the rejoicings of which he was the object was embittered by his situation in reference to the Patán nabobs. While still a prisoner he had agreed to all their demands, and they were not men either to be persuaded out of solid advantages or to be provoked with impunity by neglect of their acknowledged claims. They had called for a confirmation of the concessions made to them on the very day of Násir Jang's death, and had been put off for the time on the plea of the necessity for consulting M. Dupleix. To him they now applied as the common arbiter of the affairs of all the confederates.

Their expectations were excessive in themselves, and if acquiesced in would have authorised pretensions on the part of the other chiefs which the whole of the viceroy's territory would have been insufficient to satisfy. M. Dupleix therefore employed all his skill to induce the nabobs to agree to more moderate terms. He pointed out the necessity of leaving the viceroy in a fit condition to maintain his government, and declared that although he himself had as large a share as any one in that prince's restoration, he should expect no advantage that might tend to embarrass his affairs.

These arguments made no impression on the Patáns, but they were well aware that it was useless to press their demands if the French chief declared against them. They therefore agreed among themselves to seem satisfied with what was allowed to them, and even submitted to swear fidelity to Mozaffer Jang, an acknowledgment of superiority never before yielded by themselves or their ancestors to anyone under a crowned head.

They acted their part so well that M. Dupleix himself was deceived, and thought that he had succeeded in reconciling them to his decision ; but their feelings of shame for their unprofitable treachery and of revenge against the authors of their humiliation were only the more inflamed by the necessity for concealment.

This pressing demand being to appearance adjusted, the claims of others came to be considered. Some part of Násir Jang's treasures had been plundered, the rest was divided among the conspirators—one-half to the three nabobs, and a sixth each to Chanda Sáheb, Mozaffer Jang himself, and the French. The jewels, however, which were of great value, remained with the new viceroy.

The acquisitions of the French were very moderate with reference either to their merits or their power. Their share of the treasure was 100,000*l.* ; half of which was a donation to the troops, and the rest went to pay the expenses incurred by the Company. The territorial cessions (including the confirmation of a previous grant of 9,000*l.*) amounted to no more than 38,000*l.* a year ; and the liberality to individuals^o was

^o Orme mentions it as the common report that M. Dupleix received 200,000*l.*, besides many valuable jewels from the treasures of Násir Jang ; and a similar charge seems to have been brought forward by the French Company ; but it is expressly denied, and to appearance disproved by

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not greater than might have been dictated by the gratitude of the prince whom they had placed upon the throne.

Chanda Sáheb received the government of Arcot. The best authorities¹ state that he was to hold it under M. Dupleix, who was to govern all the countries below the Gháts, to the south of the river Kishna, as vicergerent for Mozaffer Jang. The French commissioners also in 1754 appear to have produced a patent from Mozaffer Jang to the above effect.² But it is difficult to reconcile this part of the arrangement with the silence of M. Dupleix himself, and with the manner in which his appointment is treated when really conferred by Salábat Jang in 1753. It was then spoken of as a new transaction, and was confined to the province of Arcot.³

All that was wanting to complete the settlement of the Carnatic was the possession of Trichinopoly, and that seemed to be on the point of attainment, Mohammed Ali having all but engaged to surrender the fort and to give up his claim to the province of Arcot, provided a government were assigned to him in another part of the viceroy's territory. It was therefore determined that Mozaffer Jang should proceed to take possession of his capital; and that, for his greater security, he should be accompanied by a French detachment, under the command of M. Bussy.

January 4,
A.D. 1751.

Mozaffer Jang appears himself to have been sincerely

M. Dupleix (Pièces du Sieur Dupleix, Paris, 1763, especially the letter from M. De Larche, p. 23). He himself states (*Mémoire*, p. 61) that he received a personal jagír of 10,000*l.* a year, not more than has at other times been given both in Europe and Asia for similar services.

¹ Orme, Wilks, &c.

² Cambridge's *War in India*, Appendix, p. 2.

³ *Mémoire pour Dupleix*, p. 232.

attached to the French, and conscious that his only hopes of power or even safety depended on their support. While with M. Dupleix, he was implicitly guided by the advice of that statesman, and, after his march, the same influence was maintained by M. Bussy with the aid of Ragonát Ráo, a Brahmin in the French interest, who had been appointed prime minister to the viceroy.⁴

This was probably the time of the highest ascendancy of the French in India. They afterwards extended their possessions and increased their military fame, but what they gained in greatness they lost in stability. The English also had by that time begun to rise from the depressed state in which they had hitherto remained, and to show themselves the formidable rivals they afterwards proved. The passion of the French for military glory, combined with the natural quickness and versatility of their talents, enabled them to enter warmly into new designs, and at once to apply the whole of their abilities to their object, but even long success did something to relax their exertions, and repeated failures produced weariness and depression. The English were averse to entering on wars which they thought did not concern them, and had no readiness at adapting themselves to new situations. It was not until they were roused by opposition and by national rivalry that they engaged heartily in the contest and exerted all their faculties to succeed. When this was once done, they showed a stubborn and determined spirit which carried them, through good and bad fortune, to the final establishment of their empire in the East.

⁴ *Seir-ul-Motákherín*, iii. 117.

CHAPTER V.

Alarm of the English—Despatch of a force to Trichinopoly—Struggle for the possession of Volconda—Operations before Trichinopoly—Clive's early career—Recommends an attack on Arcot—Gallant defence of Arcot by Clive—French attack on Trichinopoly—The Rájá is assisted by the Dalwái of Mysore—Clive's victory over Rezza Sáheb—The advance of the English force under Lawrence and retreat of the French—Operations against Seringham—Clive's personal adventures—Total destruction of French detachments—Desperate circumstances of the French—Chanda Sáheb deserted by his chiefs—Surrender of d'Autenil's detachment—Negotiations for the surrender of Chanda Sáheb—His fate—Capitulation of Law.

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AT this juncture the fate of India hung on the transactions at Trichinopoly. If that place were surrendered or taken, the cause of Mohammed Ali was extinguished for ever: the expulsion of the English must speedily have followed, and all the great changes that have since taken place must have been stopped in the commencement, or accomplished in some other form through the agency of the French. The importance of the crisis had become evident to the most obtuse, and as Mr. Saunders, the new Governor of Fort St. David, was a man of sound sense and firmness, the English henceforth laid aside their desultory operations, and pursued with steadiness a plan adopted on an enlarged view of the politics of the Deckan. Their first measure was to strengthen and encourage Mohammed Ali. Major Lawrence had sailed for Europe, but they detached 280 Europeans and 300 sepoy to Trichinopoly under the command of Captain Cope. This sign of vigour, to-

gether with the death of Mozaffer Jang, which happened about the same time, determined Mohammed Ali to break off his negotiations. His situation was still full of danger. Chanda Sáheb had repaired to Arcot, and had received the submission of all the chiefs and territories to the north of the Coleroon. The possession of Trichinopoly retained the southern countries in nominal obedience to Mohammed Ali, but to make his authority practically useful, he was obliged to detach a force of 6,000 of his own troops with 30 Europeans into Tinavelly. While they were there, his own officer in Madura, the chief town of the country between that and Trichinopoly, revolted and declared for Chanda Sáheb. The greater part of the English troops were sent to reduce him and were joined by those from Tinavelly. A breach was made, but although the Europeans and disciplined sepoys vied with each other in the spirit with which they attempted to storm, they were repulsed with heavy loss and constrained to retreat to Trichinopoly. On this occasion more than half of the nabob's troops went over to the enemy, and about the same time Mohammed Ali received intelligence that Chanda Sáheb was preparing to come against him without delay. On this he addressed fresh entreaties to the English Government for further supplies of troops, and promised cessions near Madras in return for their assistance. The English had before made up their minds to support him, and at this moment they had just been provoked and alarmed by an ostentatious manifestation of the superiority of the French, who in the course of a revenue survey surrounded the narrow territory of the English with their white flags, and even advanced those marks of their own pretensions within the hitherto admitted boundary. Animated by these feelings, they strained every nerve to

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meet the exigency. They immediately prepared a detachment consisting of 500 Europeans (of whom 50 were cavalry), 100 negroes, and 1,000 sepoy, with eight field pieces, under Captain Gingen, a Swiss officer in their service, and only delayed its march until it should be countenanced by the junction of a small party belonging to Mohammed Ali, whom they studiously put forward as the principal in the war. As these troops advanced, they dislodged a garrison of Chanda Sáheb's from Verdachelam, a strong pagoda about forty miles from Fort St. David, the possession of which was necessary to secure the communication between that place and Trichinopoly. At an equal distance further on, and a little to the right of the direct road to Trichinopoly, they came in sight of Chanda Sáheb's army encamped near Volconda. This is a very strong hill fort, and from its situation it was of great importance to both parties to possess it. Before they reached Volconda the English had been joined by a reinforcement sent to meet them from Trichinopoly, and now amounted to 600 Europeans, 1,000 Sepoys, and 5,000 of the nabob's troops. Chanda Sáheb had a more numerous body of the same undisciplined soldiery, and the French mustered about 600 Europeans and 5,000 sepoy.¹

M. d'Auteuil, who commanded the French, was endeavouring to prevail on the Mogul governor to admit him into the fort when the English arrived, and these last immediately entered on a similar negotiation. The governor amused both parties for a fortnight, till the English commander got impatient, and determined to

¹ There are different accounts of this force. Dupleix states the Europeans at 400, *La Dernière Révolution* at near 1,000, Major Lawrence at 600.

take the place by force. He failed in an attempt at a sudden escalade, and the governor called in the French. This was foreseen, and the English were drawn up to oppose the entrance of any troops into the place. Yet when the French appeared, instead of at once attacking them, the English commander assembled his principal officers to consult what was to be done. The hesitation of the officers begot distrust among the soldiers. While they were deliberating, the French approached the fort, and the action began, too late to intercept them. At this moment one of those incidents took place which show how easily fear infects small bodies even of brave men. A tumbril in the French column was struck by a shot and blew up, on which (says Orme) about 100 of the Europeans, with M. d'Auteuil at their head, ran away to the fort of Volconda, where they were admitted. If this flight had been a deliberate stratagem it could not have been more successful. It put an end to the neutrality of the fort. A heavy fire opened from the walls, and the English, struck with a panic in their turn, fled most shamefully from the field, accompanied by some of their officers. The other officers endeavoured in vain to rally them. Abdul Waháb, the nabob's brother, rode up to them and upbraided them with their cowardice, and, to complete their disgrace, the nabob's troops stood their ground, and their own negroes remained in perfect order, and brought off the dead and wounded after they had been abandoned by the Europeans. All accounts agree, that the destruction of the English army was inevitable if the victory had been followed up ; but no pursuit was attempted, and we are left to wonder at the misconduct of both parties throughout the whole affair. Next day the English retreated twenty-five miles to the pass of Uttatoor on

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the direct road to Trichinopoly. They maintained this post for three days, during which the same men whose behaviour had been so dastardly just before, conducted themselves with the greatest steadiness and courage. They repelled an attack by the whole of the enemy's army; but fearful of being cut off from Trichinopoly, they retreated on the fourth night, and after a march of eighteen miles, arrived on the river Coleroon, within sight of that fortress.

The city of Trichinopoly forms a parallelogram of two miles in length and one in breadth. It is surrounded by a double rampart of solid stone, with a wet ditch thirty feet broad. It stands on an extensive plain, on which are several detached rocks affording advantageous posts, and which is cut by ravines and hollow ways capable of concealing and covering troops. The town is 500 yards from the Cáveri, which bounds the plain on the north.

This river rises in the Western Gháts and flows through the Mysore. It falls over a cascade 150 feet high on its upper course, and is so rapid even at Trichinopoly that when swelled by the rains it can scarcely be crossed even in boats. The Cáveri divides into two branches about three miles above Trichinopoly and to the north-west of that city. The southern stream retains its name; the northern is called the Coleroon. The two branches are separated by a slip of land two miles broad at first, but soon getting narrower and continuing to contract until, at the end of thirteen miles, it would, if left to nature, have come to a point and formed an island. Had this taken place the two rivers, reunited, would have flowed straight to the sea through the channel of the Coleroon, and the kingdom of Tanjore would have been deprived of the Cáveri, to

the numerous branches of which it owes its great fertility. To obviate this calamity the Tanjorines raised a strong and broad mound a mile long, which prevents the encroachment of the rivers on the isthmus until the nature of the ground causes them again to diverge, and widens the interval between them. As the destruction of this embankment by an enemy would be disastrous to Tanjore, the mud fort of Coiládi is erected for its protection at a distance of a mile.

In the western part of the island (where it is broadest) and nearly opposite to Trichinopoly at a distance of two miles stands the great pagoda of Seringham, celebrated for its sanctity, and important in a military view from its extent and the solidity of its materials. It has seven walls, the outermost of which is four miles in circumference. Half a mile eastward of Seringham is another pagoda called Jambu Kishna, remarkable for nothing but the extent of its enclosure.

The operations now about to commence occupied three years, and the country just described became the scene of manœuvres, stratagems, ambuscades, and adventures which we read with unabated interest through half a quarto volume of Orme, but of which only the most important can be touched on here.

The English crossed the Coleroon on to the island in boats during the night. They first occupied the pagoda of Seringham, but finally withdrew under the walls of Trichinopoly, the greater part of them encamping on the south-western side. Chanda Sáheb and the French occupied the pagodas, and leaving a garrison, proceeded across the island to the Cáveri. They drove the English out of Coiládi (of which they had possessed themselves), and afterwards crossed the Cáveri, and

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encamped on the south bank to the east of Trichinopoly.²

The English were afterwards twice reinforced from Fort St. David, but after all had only 600 Europeans, while the French had 900, and were still more superior in the number of their sepoys. Chanda Sáheb's troops had been constantly increasing, and were ten times more numerous than those of the nabob, which moreover were useless and inefficient.³

The reinforcements had been commanded by Clive, who had returned to the civil service after the siege of Dévi Cóta, but in the present active times had again joined the army, and was now made a captain for the skill and gallantry with which he conducted these parties through many perils to their destination. He was struck with the disparity between the assailants and defenders of Trichinopoly, and to restore the balance he proposed to the Government of Fort St. David to lead a detachment against Arcot itself, which had been exhausted of troops, and which the enemy might be expected to sacrifice all other objects to protect.

Fort St. David and Madras were nearly stripped of their garrisons to form this detachment, and after all it only amounted to 200 Europeans and 300 sepoys, with three field pieces. The officers were eight in number, and all but two were writers and others never before employed in a military capacity. Their whole strength

² Orme, Lawrence, Dupleix, *La Dernière Révolution*.

³ There are great discrepancies in the accounts of the numbers of the French. M. Law flatly contradicts M. Dupleix, and the latter is inconsistent with himself. Of the two I should give most credit to M. Law, but I have preferred that of Orme (though more nearly approaching to Dupleix's), because he had seen both accounts and had access to other materials besides.

lay in their commander and in the confidence with which he inspired them.

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Captain Clive was the son of a Shropshire gentleman of ancient family but moderate estate. He had given many proofs of a bold and decided character in his youth, though he made little progress in his studies. At eighteen he went out as a writer to Madras. For some time after his arrival he was not known to a single family in the place, and was too shy or too proud to court acquaintance.⁴ He pined for home, and fell into one of those fits of depression to which he was liable through life. All this gloom was dispelled by the first appearance of military operations. After the capture of Madras he escaped in the disguise of a native. He afterwards obtained permission to serve with the army, and showed himself the first in every danger and the coolest and clearest in every deliberation. Before this time he had been restless and insubordinate, but being now in his natural element, all his irregularities disappeared. He showed no impatience of the yoke of military discipline, and early became the favourite of his commanding officer.⁵ He was twenty-six years of age when he marched for Arcot, and his character has never been better described than it was in reference to that period by his friend and patron Major Lawrence. 'He was,' says this gallant veteran, 'a man of undaunted resolution, of a cool temper, and a presence of mind which never left him in the greatest danger. Born a soldier ; for without a military education of any sort, or much conversing with any of the profession, from his judgment and good sense he led an army like

⁴ See a letter to his cousin dated February, 1745. *Malcolm's Life of Clive*, i. 41.

⁵ *Malcolm's Life of Clive* ; *Biographia Britannica*.

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August 26,
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an experienced officer and a brave soldier, with a prudence that certainly warranted success.'

He marched from Madras on August 26, and reached Arcot on the 31st. The garrison, though more than double Clive's numbers, evacuated the place, and he marched in amidst the wonder of 100,000 spectators. The town being open, he took up his quarters in the fort. He there found goods belonging to merchants to the value of five lacs of rupees, all of which was immediately restored to the owners, and the inhabitants of the space within the walls were left undisturbed in their dwellings. His first care was to lay in provisions, and to prevent active obstruction from the garrison, which remained within a few miles of the town, he repeatedly beat up their quarters, and kept them on the defensive until they had increased their strength by recruits from the country and till Clive was obliged to send out part of his small force to escort two eighteen-pounders which had been sent to him from Madras. They then ventured on an attempt to recover the fort. This attack, though persevered in for a whole night, was at last repelled, but a much more serious contest was now impending.

The occupation of Arcot had produced the desired impression at Trichinopoly. Four thousand of Chanda Sáheb's best troops were sent to recover it; they were joined on their march by 150 Europeans from Pondicherry and, after they reached Arcot, by the former garrison and by Morteza Ali with 2,000 horse from Vellór. The whole were under Chanda Sáheb's son, Rezza Sáheb. They entered Arcot on September 23. On the 24th Clive made a sally at noonday and penetrated to the gates of the nabob's palace, where Rezza Sáheb had fixed his head-quarters. This bold attack

September 23,
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was unsuccessful, but it left both parties impressed with a high opinion of the English. Clive's force was now reduced to 120 Europeans and 200 sepoy, with four officers in all for duty ; and the enemy had 150 Europeans, 2,000 sepoy, 3,000 horse, and 5,000 irregular infantry. The fort was a mile in circumference ; the wall was in many places ruinous, the rampart too narrow to admit of artillery, the parapet low and slightly built ; several of the towers were decayed, and none of them capable of receiving more than one piece of cannon ; the ditch was in most places fordable, in others dry, and it was crossed at each of the two gates by a solid causeway. As the garrison had but a small stock of provisions, it was necessary to send away all the inhabitants except a few artificers. The enemy at first had no battering guns, but they threw shells into the fort and kept up such a fire from the surrounding houses that they killed and wounded several of the garrison notwithstanding the care taken to keep them concealed. On three different occasions they killed the sergeants who singly accompanied Clive in going the rounds. At the end of a fortnight the battering guns arrived ; they consisted of two eighteen-pounders and seven guns of smaller calibre. They soon dismounted or disabled the guns in the fort except one eighteen-pounder and three field-pieces, and these were obliged to be kept out of fire and reserved for great occasions.

The enemy were thus left to carry on their operations unopposed, and in six days made a practicable breach fifty feet wide in the north-west part of the fort. The garrison were indefatigable in counteracting this damage, men and officers labouring indiscriminately, and they so far succeeded in cutting off the breach that the enemy thought it advisable to begin a new one in

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an opposite quarter. Other measures of attack and defence were undertaken by both parties, and at one time Morteza Ali, affecting to have quarrelled with Rezza Sáheb, tried to tempt Clive into a sally by a promise of co-operation.

During these proceedings the besieged had the mortification to learn that a reinforcement which they expected from Madras had been constrained to fall back ; the failure of provisions began also to be severely felt,⁶ and the new breach, in spite of all opposition, increased every day. In this desperate state of the garrison, Rezza Sáheb offered honourable terms to all and a large sum of money to Clive, adding that in case of further resistance he would storm immediately and put every man to the sword. His proposals were scornfully rejected, and the motives which led to them were soon after disclosed. Morár Ráo of Guti had engaged in a confederacy in favour of Mohammed Ali, and was now within thirty miles of Arcot, and the reinforcement from Madras, increased in numbers, was again on its march under Captain Kilpatrick. It therefore became evident that no time was to be lost in attempting to carry the fort by storm. The new breach was now thirty yards wide, but the ditch at its foot was not fordable, and the garrison had counterworked this breach as they had before done the other. Nevertheless an assault was ordered on all parts of the walls at once, to take place at daybreak next morning. This hap-

⁶ This circumstance drew forth a proof of generous self-devotion on the part of the sepoys, which showed how much they were already attached to their leader and to the English cause. The rice (the only food left) was insufficient to allow above half a meal for each man, and they requested that the whole might be given to the Europeans (whose labour as well as their habits required solid food), and that they might receive nothing but the gruel in which it had been boiled.—*Malcolm's Life of Clive*, i. 96.

pened to be one of the great days of the festival of Moharrem, when the Mussulmans commemorate the murder of the two sons of Ali, and are inflamed by mental and physical excitement to the highest pitch of religious frenzy. In this spirit they advanced to the attack. Besides multitudes that came with ladders to all the accessible parts of the wall, there were four principal columns directed against the two breaches and the gates. Clive had lain down to take a moment's sleep, when he was awakened by the tumult which arose on every side. The attacks on the gateways were preceded by elephants, whose foreheads were protected by strong iron plates to enable them to burst open the gates, but these animals, terrified by the noise of the musketry and galled by the bullets, soon turned and trampled down the troops that followed them. A raft was launched on the ditch under the south-east breach; seventy men embarked on it, and in spite of opposition from the musketry, and from two field-pieces in the breach (which were probably kept under by the fire of the storming-party on the bank), they had nearly made good their landing, when Clive, observing the bad aim of the artillerymen, pointed one gun himself, and struck down several of the assailants; the rest were thrown into such confusion that they upset the raft, and those thought themselves fortunate who were able to escape by swimming. But the most desperate attack was on the breach to the north-west. There the ditch offered no obstruction, and the storming-party poured at once into the breach, which they mounted with a mad impetuosity, while many of those who could not find room to ascend, sat down under the wall to be at hand to relieve those in advance. These last passed the breach, and some were within all the defences before the

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ber 15,
A.D. 1751.

English gave fire. They at length opened their guns, and kept up an incessant discharge of musketry, those behind handing loaded muskets to the soldiers in the front rank. Every shot told, and shells with short fuses being thrown (like grenades) among the crowd, increased the general confusion. The first assailants gave way, and were succeeded by another and then another body, until, after the assault had continued on all parts for an hour, the enemy relinquished their attacks at once, and soon after retreated and disappeared. This attack had been repulsed by no more than eighty Europeans and 120 sepoys (the rest being disabled by wounds and sickness), and this small party, besides serving five guns, fired 12,000 musket-cartridges during the storm. At daybreak the whole army had abandoned the town, and the garrison joyfully issued out and took possession of four pieces of artillery, four mortars, and a large quantity of ammunition which had been left behind.

This defence made a strong impression on the country, and was the first step to retrieve the British character in the East.⁷

After Clive had been joined by his own reinforcements and a body of Morár Ráo's horse, he set out in pursuit of Rezza Sáheb, whom he before long defeated and constrained to take refuge in Jinjí; 600 of the

⁷ [Orme (i. 200) concludes his narrative of this remarkable defence with the following encomium on the heroic band: 'Thus ended this siege, maintained fifty days, under every disadvantage of situation and force by a handful of men in their first campaign, with a spirit worthy of the most veteran troops; and conducted by their young commander with indefatigable activity, unshaken constancy, and undaunted courage; and, notwithstanding he had at this time neither read books nor conversed with men capable of giving him much instruction in the military art, all the resources which he employed in the defence of Arcot were such as are dictated by the best masters in the science of war.'—Ed.]

French sepoys of his army deserted and came over to the English.

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The great pagoda of Conjeveram, between Arcot and the coast, was still in possession of the French ; and Clive's next operation was to dislodge them. He summoned the garrison, and as none of them understood English, they employed two officers whom they had made prisoners to interpret for them. Their names were Revell and Glass. To them the French commanding officer dictated an answer to Clive, in which he warned him that if the pagoda was attacked, he would expose those prisoners on the walls. They wrote this, but added their entreaties that no regard to their safety should be allowed to interfere with the operations. Guns were brought from Madras and a breach begun, and the English lost an officer and several men before the enemy evacuated the pagoda.⁸

December,
A.D. 1751,

At the time when Clive marched for Arcot, the French at Trichinopoly were waiting for battering guns from Caricál. They arrived a few days after, and the French began their operations : but they constructed their batteries at such a distance, and showed so much more care to defend themselves than attack their opponents, that the English began to treat their attack with contempt, and became ashamed of the awe in which they had stood of so unskilful an enemy. But though secure in a military view, the situation of the garrison was by no means encouraging. Mohammed Ali had no territory left from which he could draw resources for the pay and provision of his own troops or his allies. The French were much stronger in regular troops than the English ; and the great superiority of Chanda Sáheb's irregulars made him formidable from

August 26,
A.D. 1751.

September 23,
A.D. 1751:

⁸ The account of the siege of Arcot is entirely from Orme.

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the power it gave him of cutting off communications. Mohammed Ali's chief dependence was on a negotiation which he for some time had been carrying on with the Rájá of Mysore. The territory of this prince lay on the tableland between the Eastern and Western Gháts. It was about 200 miles in length and 150 in breadth, and the southern part of it extended to within thirty miles of Trichinopoly on the east. The ancient line of its princes had lately been set aside, and the present rájá was a pageant in the hands of his minister called in that country 'the Dalwái.' The name of the present Dalwái was Nanj Ráj, a man of great presumption and little judgment. He was prevailed upon by extravagant promises on the part of Mohammed Ali, to afford his zealous assistance in the defence of Trichinopoly, and even to subsidise Morár Ráo with 6,000 men for the same service. While the siege of Arcot was still going on, Nanj Ráj assembled an army at Carúr, a place within his frontier, about forty miles from Trichinopoly, and about the same time, Morár Ráo entered the Carnatic at a point further to the north, from whence he sent assistance to Clive, as has been related. The Dalwái's force consisted of 5,000 horse and 10,000 infantry. Among these last was a body of a few hundreds, partially disciplined, through the means of French deserters, by Heider Naík⁹ or Heider Ali, afterwards the most formidable enemy ever opposed to the British power in India. The rest of the Mysore troops were more inexperienced and unskilful than those of any other native prince. Morár Ráo's cavalry were chosen men, Mussulmans and Rájputs as well as Marattas, well mounted and armed, and habituated to

⁹ [A title of honour in the Deccan equivalent to that of chief or commander. It is now employed for non-commissioned officers of sepoys, corresponding with that of corporal. (*Yules' Glossary of Indian Terms.*)—Ed.]

war under their active leader, one of the ablest officers India ever produced, and unceasingly engaged in hostilities on his own account, or as a subsidised auxiliary.

The Dalwái on his approach gave signs of his irresolution and military ignorance. A French detachment being sent to oppose him he did not venture to move until joined by a similar party from Trichinopoly, and even then he proposed that the English should make a false attack on the enemy during the night, while he prosecuted his march under cover of the darkness. The English complied, and while engaged in the proposed diversion, they perceived the Mysoreans, whose retreat was to be so secret, passing across the plain with ten thousand lights, as if they had been marching in procession at an Indian wedding.¹

Febru-
ary 6,
A.D. 1752.

The accession of Mysore to the party of Mohammed Ali had induced the Rájá of Tanjore to engage in the same cause. He sent his general, Mánikjí, with 3,000 horse and 2,000 foot to join the camp at Trichinopoly, and his example was followed by Tondiman, the Poligár or chief of a territory situated to the southward of the rája's country, whose force was composed of 400 horse and 3,000 cúlis, or coleris, a forest tribe of predatory habits.

These reinforcements made Mohammed Ali's army more numerous than Chanda Sáheb's, for he had in all 20,000 horse and 20,000 foot, while Chanda Sáheb's force, though likewise increased by contingents from the southward, amounted to no more than 15,000 horse and 20,000 foot.

The increase of numbers, however, was of little avail as long as the French remained superior in regular infantry. The Government of Fort St. David made every exertion to remove this disadvantage, but before

¹ Orme, i. 211.

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their preparations were completed, they were disturbed by the reappearance of Rezza Sáheb, who had assembled a force of 400 Europeans, 2,000 sepoy, and 2,500 horse, with a large park of artillery, and invaded the Company's territory to the south-west of Madras. Clive marched against him with 380 Europeans, 1,300 sepoy, and six field-pieces. His plan was to beat up the enemy's camp, but as he approached he found it evacuated. Rezza Sáheb had marched with a view to surprise Arcot, where he had bought over some native officers of the garrison. The plot was discovered before he arrived, and he was already on his return, when Clive set off to prevent his design, and was hastening towards Arcot, when he came unexpectedly on Rezza Sáheb's army in the neighbourhood of Coveripák. It was growing dark at the time, and Clive's first notice of his situation was given by a battery of nine pieces of cannon, which opened on him within 250 yards. The battle thus begun was continued by moonlight, with all the alarms and vicissitudes natural to so extraordinary a circumstance. It ended towards morning in the defeat of Rezza Sáheb, who left fifty Europeans and 300 sepoy dead on the field. The English had forty Europeans and thirty sepoy killed, and more of each wounded. They took nine guns, three cohorns, and sixty European prisoners, and as Rezza Sáheb's force soon after dispersed, they recovered for the nabob a country yielding 400,000 pagodas of annual revenue.

After this Clive went to Fort St. David and was appointed to conduct a great convoy, escorted by 400 Europeans, 1,100 sepoy, and eight field-pieces, to Trinopolis, an operation which was to decide the fate of the siege and of the war.

When he was on the point of marching, Major

Lawrence arrived from England and took the command as senior officer. Clive evinced no disappointment at this unexpected supersession. He cheerfully put himself under his old commander, who on his part showed him all his former kindness and confidence, without the smallest jealousy of a reputation which was already eclipsing his own. The speedy arrival of the detachment was rendered more necessary than ever by the increased dissensions among the European officers and the discontents of the native allies, which threatened to break up the force. Lawrence marched from Fort St. David on March 17, and arrived within ten miles of Trichinopoly on the 27th.

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March 15,
A.D. 1752.

Dupleix, who was fully sensible of the importance of this convoy, had issued positive orders to M. Law, who commanded the French force, to intercept it at all hazards. M. Law drew up his force for the purpose, but Lawrence, by a mixture of dexterity and boldness, distracted his attention by manœuvres of the troops from the town, while he himself advanced by an unexpected road, and after a partial engagement brought his whole convoy into Trichinopoly.

March 28,
A.D. 1752.

The English and their allies were now in a state to cope with the enemy in the field, and they soon after made an attack on his camp which though unsuccessful induced M. Law to retire to the island, where he should be out of the reach of similar disturbance. Chanda Sáheb strenuously opposed this intention, but when he found he could not prevail with M. Law, he had no choice but to join him in his retreat. They marched on the same night; the French took up their quarters in the pagoda of Jambu Kishna, and Chanda Sáheb in that of Seringham, his horse and many of his other troops being encamped close by.

April 1,
A.D. 1752.

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This retreat was a fatal measure. When they could no longer carry on the siege, they should have retired towards Pondicherry, so as to allow their reinforcements to join them at a distance from Lawrence's force, but they probably conceived that this junction might be effected at Seringham, and that they would lose less reputation if they appeared to maintain their ground.

It is possible they might not have been disappointed if they had had to deal with a less enterprising enemy. They could not be attacked in their present position, and the road was still open for their reinforcements and supplies. To deprive them of this advantage required a bold and hazardous step. If a part of the British force were stationed to the north of the Coleroon, while the rest remained on the south of the Cáveri, the enemy's communications would be entirely cut off and he would be constrained either to fight at a disadvantage or to surrender; but, on the other hand, the least deficiency of skill or vigilance on the part of the commander of either division would expose him to be overwhelmed singly by the whole power of the French. The plan nevertheless occurred to Clive, who suggested it to the commanding officer; Lawrence entered into it with his usual frankness and cordiality, and so far was he from envying the author that he determined to give the command of the separate detachment to Clive himself, at the hazard of offending all the senior officers.

April 6,
A.D. 1752.

On the night of April 6, Clive began his march with 400 Europeans, 700 sepoys, 1,000 Tanjore horse, and 3,000 of Morár Ráo's under Eufas Khán. He had with him two battering guns and six field-pieces.

With this force he took up a position at Samiaveram, ten miles from Seringham and fifteen from Uttatoor, the pass already mentioned on the great road from Pondi-

cherry. There were two pagodas in this village, a quarter of a mile from each other ; these he strengthened by works, and allotted one to the sepoys and another to the Europeans ; the irregulars encamped around them. Immediately after this he took Lalgudy, a village on the Coleroon, where the enemy had collected a great supply of grain. He was preparing to besiege Pitchanda, a fort commanding the ford opposite Seringham, when he was called off by intelligence from the northward. M. Dupleix, though deeply wounded by what he thought the misconduct of M. Law, applied himself with unbroken spirit to repair the evils it had occasioned. His repeated applications for recruits and reinforcements from France had been neglected, and it was with difficulty he could assemble 120 Europeans and 500 sepoys, to escort a great convoy of provisions and stores which he prepared to despatch for Seringham. He sent M. d'Auteuil in command, with orders to supersede M. Law on his arrival. M. d'Auteuil, having reached Uttatoor on April 14, resolved immediately to push on to Seringham in the night, leaving Clive's detachment at some distance on his left. It was this news that called off Clive from his intended siege. He marched to intercept d'Auteuil, and that officer being informed of his movement, fell back on Uttatoor. Clive finding no signs of the convoy where he expected it, suspected some stratagem of the enemy, and hastened back to his own camp. Meanwhile M. Law, having heard of Clive's march, and being ignorant of his return, ordered eighty Europeans and 700 sepoys to march at nightfall and attack the small body which he imagined to be left at Samiaveram. Forty of the Europeans were English deserters. They reached the skirts of the camp about midnight, and

April 14,
A.D. 1752.

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were challenged by the advanced guard of English sepoy, on which the officer of the deserters stepped out and told them he was sent by Major Lawrence to reinforce Captain Clive. The sepoy receiving his answer in English, and hearing the other deserters speak the same language, admitted the detachment without suspicion, and sent one of their number to conduct it to head-quarters. They passed unquestioned through the Maratta camp, until they reached the lower pagoda, when they were challenged by the sentinel. They replied by a volley into the pagoda, and into an adjoining choultry,² where Clive lay asleep. The Europeans then rushed into the pagoda, and put all they met to the bayonet. Clive started out of his sleep, and, imputing the firing to his own sepoy, alarmed at some attack on the skirts of the camp, ran to the upper pagoda to bring down the Europeans. He found them already under arms, and returned with 200 of them to the choultry. He there found a large body of sepoy facing in the direction of Seringham, and firing at random. Their position confirmed his impression that they were his own sepoy, and, leaving the Europeans about twenty yards in their rear, he went among them and ordered them to cease firing, reproaching them with their unnecessary alarm, and even striking some of them. At last one of the sepoy who understood a little French, discovering that he was an Englishman, attacked and wounded him in two places with his sword, but, finding himself on the point of being overpowered, ran off to the lower pagoda. Clive, exasperated at such insolence from one (as he supposed) of his own men, pursued him to the gate ; where to his

² A building for the accommodation of travellers. In the Carnatic, they are generally of stone and supported by pillars.

great surprise he was accosted by six Frenchmen. His usual presence of mind did not fail him in this critical situation ; he told the Frenchmen that he was come to offer them terms, that if they would look out they would see they were surrounded, and that they must expect no quarter unless they immediately submitted. Three of the number ran into the pagoda with this intelligence, and the other three gave up their arms and followed Clive to the place where he had left his Europeans, when with eight more, who had been made prisoners as they were reconnoitring, they were sent off in the custody of a sercant's guard. The sercant, not knowing that the lower pagoda was in possession of the enemy, carried them thither ; and on delivering them over to the guard, found out his error, but such was the confusion among the French, that he was allowed to retire unmolested. By this time Clive had assembled his troops, and his first object was to recover the pagoda. The French and the deserters defended it desperately, and killed an officer and fifteen men. The attack was then suspended till daybreak, at which time the French commanding officer made a sally, with the intention of forcing his way through the enemy ; but he was himself killed with twelve of his men by a volley from the English, and the rest were obliged to return to the pagoda. Clive then advanced to parley, and being weak with loss of blood, leaned stooping forward on the shoulders of two sercants. The deserters had nothing to hope from a surrender, and their officer, to cut off all treaty, came forward, and addressing Clive with abusive language, fired his musket at him. The ball missed him, but went through the bodies of the sergeants, and both fell mortally wounded. Alarmed at the probable consequence of this outrage, the French

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V.

immediately surrendered. Their sepoys had marched off as soon as they were aware of the numbers of the English, and were allowed to pass the camp as quietly as when they entered. Eunus Khán was now sent in pursuit of them. When overtaken, they flung away their arms and dispersed, and in this defenceless state they were inhumanly cut off to a man. Besides the escapes already mentioned, Clive had another, which was not discovered till the hurry of the day was over, when it was found that the volley which the enemy had fired into the choultry where he was sleeping had shattered a box that lay under his feet, and killed a servant who slept close by him.³

The total loss of this detachment was a severe blow to the French, and the subsequent operations of the English greatly straitened their supplies.

Their hopes now rested on the junction of d'Auteuil and his convoy, and it was the object of the English to cut it off while beyond reach of their support. For this purpose Captain Dalton (who had returned from Europe) was sent with a strong detachment, and, though he did not fully succeed, he drove d'Auteuil to a distance, and forced him to take refuge under the walls of Volconda. On his return Dalton found that the Coleroon had risen so as to cut off all communication both with the island and the town, and that Clive had seized the opportunity to renew his attack on Pitchanda. To forward this service, he put the whole of his detachment under Clive (his junior officer) and declared his own intention to serve as a volunteer. During the movements prepara-

May 9,
A.D. 1752.

³ Though I have carefully retained Orme's words as far as my space allowed, yet to do justice to his narrative, I must refer my reader to the original, i. 226.

tory to the siege, the English took possession of a mound close to the Coleroon, and saw the whole of Chanda Sáheb's camp spread out beneath them, within gunshot. They immediately opened a cannonade, and produced all the alarm and disorder that might be expected in a native camp. Men and women, elephants, camels, horses and oxen, were all mingled together in the midst of uproar and confusion. The pressure of the crowd for a time retarded their flight, but in two hours they were all out of reach of the guns on the mound. They hurried towards the opposite side of the pagodas, but before they could settle there, they were fired on from the town of Trichinopoly, and obliged to renew their flight to the part of the island east of the pagodas, where they at length found themselves in safety.

Next day the breach at Pitchanda was practicable, and as the storming party was advancing, the garrison made signs of surrender. Unfortunately they were misunderstood by the sepoys, who rushed to the assault, and before they could be stopped by the exertions of the officers and the discipline of the Europeans they killed several of the garrison and drove fifteen into the Coleroon, where they were drowned. The garrison consisted of seventy Europeans and 200 sepoys.

May 15,
A.D. 1752.

The communications of the French were now completely cut off and their encampment again exposed to a cannonade. This circumstance and the straits to which they were otherwise reduced determined most of Chanda Sáheb's chiefs to quit him. He received the intimation with temper and firmness, lamented that he could not discharge what was due to the troops, but promised them full satisfaction when his better fortune should return, and in the mean time gave up the greater part

CHAP.
V.

of his elephants, camels, and other effects as a part of their arrears.

The best of these troops joined the English, others went to the Mysoreans, very few to the nabob. Those belonging to dependent chiefs returned to their own countries. On the fourth day not a tent was standing in the island. Only 2,000 horse and 3,000 foot remained with Chanda Sáheb, and these took refuge in Scringham. The French also drew all their sepoy, now reduced to 2,000, into the other pagoda.

May 18,
A.D. 1752.

On the same day Lawrence crossed into the island, and the rest of the allied army closed in on the enemy ; but they had still so large a space to surround that a spirited exertion on the part of M. Law might easily have enabled him to force his way through the circle. He preferred waiting for his reinforcement, and d'Auteuil determined on a desperate effort to relieve him ; but his plan, though well concerted, was frustrated by Clive, who interposed between him and the island and forced him to retire on Volconda. He was pursued to that place by Clive, and was driven from one line of defence to another until he had no retreat left but the hill fort, and this also was precluded by the perfidy of the Mussulman governor, who had secretly submitted to Mohammed Ali and threatened to fire on his former allies. There was now no alternative but to surrender : the capitulation was made out in the name of Mohammed Ali, and 100 Europeans, 300 sepoy, and 350 horse laid down their arms and gave up the convoy they were escorting for M. Law. The horsemen and sepoy were as usual disarmed and set at liberty.

May 28,
A.D. 1752.

Before he received intelligence of this disaster M. Law was distressed for provisions, and was fully sensible of his desperate situation. He had nothing to

fear for himself beyond the mortification of being made prisoner ; but another fate he thought awaited Chanda Sáheb if he should fall into the hands of his exasperated enemies. Chanda Sáheb had continually urged M. Law to join with him in a vigorous effort to extricate themselves ; but, finding his opinion disregarded, he became a prey to anxiety and dejection which destroyed his spirit and undermined his health. On a consultation between him and M. Law it was agreed to attempt to gain over some one of the confederates, who might allow Chanda Sáheb to escape through his lines. Mánikjí, the Tanjore general, being on ill terms with the prime minister in his own country, was thought to be the most accessible to such solicitations. A negotiation was opened ; Mánikjí entered on it with every appearance of sincerity ; a large sum of money was paid to him, and much more was promised on condition of his engaging to favour Chanda Sáheb's escape to Caricál. The English had hitherto been prevented attacking the pagodas for want of battering guns. At this time their train arrived from Dévi Cóta, and they immediately summoned M. Law to surrender. The occurrence of this crisis left Chanda Sáheb no more time for reflection, and he agreed with Mánikjí to come over to him that very night. When he drew near to the Tanjore lines his anxiety about his probable treatment revived ; he sent on an officer to require further assurances, and especially the delivery of a hostage for his safety. His emissary was blinded by the plausible arguments and calm manner of Mánikjí, and, the further to deceive him, he was shown the palankeen and the escort which were to convey Chanda Sáheb to Caricál. His report, and the necessity of his own situation, induced Chanda Sáheb to proceed without further hesi-

May 31, •
A.D. 1752.

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V.

tation ; but he had no sooner passed the Tanjorine guard than he was rudely seized, carried to a tent, and put in irons.

The native allies were immediately apprised of Chanda Sáheb's seizure, and spent the night in deliberating on his fate. Each insisted on having the custody of the prisoner. Mohammed Ali felt that he could never be secure while his rival was in any hands but his own ; the Mysoreans expected a great addition to their influence from having the disposal of so important a person ; Morár Ráo was intent on the profits of a ransom ; and each of these considerations had some share in influencing the Tanjorines. In the morning they all assembled at Lawrence's tent, where the debate of the night was renewed. Lawrence took no part in the discussion till, finding that they would never come to an agreement, he proposed that the prisoner should be entrusted to the English. This plan, as might be expected, was equally unacceptable to all the claimants, and the conference broke up without coming to a decision.

Mánikjí was now assailed by threats and promises from the other native powers ; and, though the English remained silent, he did not feel secure that they might not also insist on compliance with their own proposal. He therefore paid a visit to Lawrence to sound him on the subject, and soon found that he meant to interfere no further. After this Mánikjí returned to his own encampment and ordered the head of his prisoner to be struck off. Orme is of opinion that he resorted to this enormity as the only way of freeing himself from the importunity of the allies ; but Wilks (with much greater probability and with the support of native authority) relates that he committed it at the instigation of

June 3,
A.D. 1752.

Mohammed Ali. Though the others might be desirous of having him in their custody, the nabob alone could profit by his death ; and no bribe would be too considerable for him to pay for the removal of so dangerous a rival. His head was sent to Mohammed Ali, and, after being exposed to every insult, was formally despatched as if to the Emperor at Delhi ; but this ceremony was only to deceive the populace, and the head was really made over to the Rájá of Mysore and hung as a trophy on the walls of his capital.⁴

Lawrence's first summons to M. Law was sent on the day preceding Chanda Sáheb's flight, and was replied to in such a strain as should prevent any suspicion that he was reduced to so desperate a resource. Next day the demand was renewed more peremptorily, and M. Law was only given till the succeeding day at noon to decide. M. Law pleaded the peace between the French and the English, and Lawrence replied that he was only mediator between the former and the nabob.

⁴ [Such was the animosity with which this struggle was distinguished, that Dupleix, quoted by Mill, does not hesitate to affirm that Chanda Sáheb was murdered by Lawrence's express command, and the accusation was repeated by Lally. Orme in his narrative says that Law, from the prejudices of national animosity, concluded that if the English got him into their power they would not withhold him from the nabob, and therefore suggested the expedient named in the text. It must be admitted that Lawrence's exertions in Chanda Sáheb's favour were very feeble, and confined to the suggestion that he might be handed over to the English ; but when this was rejected by the confederates he interfered no further. It is true, as remarked by H. H. Wilson in a note to this passage in Mill's History, that the English at this period were not so well assured of their power as to be prepared to dictate to the native powers with whom they co-operated. It may be added they were auxiliaries in this war and did not feel their honour deeply concerned in the acts of their allies, witness their conduct in supporting the Rájá of Tanjore in his breach of faith with Mysore. If Lawrence's position was such as to enable him to insist on Chanda Sáheb's good treatment, why did not the unfortunate prince surrender to him ?—ED.]

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V.

June 3,
A.D. 1762.

In this prince's name a capitulation was signed. The French gave up their guns, stores, and ammunition. The officers were released on their parole. It may be presumed that the sepoys were dismissed as usual, but the Europeans, negroes, and native Portuguese remained prisoners of war.

CHAPTER VI.

March of Mozaffer Jang and Bussy to Heiderábád—Conflict with the Patán Nabobs—Death of Mozaffer Jang and accession of Salábat Jang—Storm of Carnúl—Ascendancy of Bussy, and cessions to the French—Dupleix's exertions to raise a new field force—Mohammed Ali's engagements with Mysore—New conflicts with the French and English—Clive returns to Europe—Ghází-u-dín invades the Deckan—His death—Crisis at Trichinopoly—Operations of Lawrence—Confusion in the north of the Carnatic—Superiority of the French and their allies—Lawrence's gallant attack on the French position—His success—Renewed difficulties—Second attack, and retreat of the French—Success of the Nabob in the North—The attack on Trichinopoly—Its failure.

THE disastrous issue of the siege of Trichinopoly struck the French with consternation, but it only served to stimulate the exertions of their governor and to call forth fresh proofs of his abilities and firmness. His pride; which had alienated the minds of all his countrymen, enabled him to stand up alone against the dangers which environed him, and to rely on the resources of his own genius for finally triumphing over all his enemies. His confidence was justified by his success in other quarters, where his plans had at times seemed as near to failure as they now were in the Carnatic.

When Mozaffer Jang marched from Pondicherry in the beginning of January 1751, the detachments which accompanied him under M. Bussy consisted of 300 Europeans and 2,000 sepoys, with ten field-pieces, and his own army was the same which had so lately served under Násir Jang. He proceeded towards Heiderábád

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VI.

January 4,
A.D. 1751.

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through a friendly country until the end of the month, when he reached the possessions of the Nabob of Caddapa. So well had the Patán princes dissembled their animosity that he entered their territory as securely as he would his own. Some skirmishes which immediately took place between his troops and those of the country were ascribed to accidental disputes ; nor was premeditated hostility suspected even when the Caddapa troops got engaged with Mozaffer Jang's rearguard ; but on this occasion they happened to attack the part of the line of march which was allotted to the viceroy's harem, and Mozaffer Jang was so incensed at this insult that he halted his army, and could scarcely be dissuaded by M. Bussy from leading it against the nabob. A messenger was despatched on his part and another on Bussy's to demand an explanation ; to the former the nabob replied in terms of defiance, but sent a respectful answer to Bussy, offering to accept of his mediation. The difference of the language stung the viceroy to the quick, and filled him with impatience to show that he could enforce his own authority independently of his ally. It was by this time ascertained that the three nabobs were fully prepared for war, and that they were drawn up in the mouth of a defile on the road to Heiderábád. The whole army was immediately put in motion against them, and Mozaffer Jang hurried on to the attack without waiting for the French auxiliaries. The troops of the nabobs, though very inferior in number, were mostly Patáns, and defended themselves with so much bravery that the viceroy's impetuosity availed him nothing, and the repulse of his troops was complete. The arrival of the French changed the fortune of the day, and compelled the Patáns to retreat, when Mozaffer Jang once more separated from the

French and pushed on eagerly in the pursuit. It seemed easy now to revenge himself on his broken enemies. The Nabob of Shúnúr was overtaken and cut to pieces ; the Nabob of Caddapa fled desperately wounded from the field ; and the Nabob of Carnúl, being hotly pressed by Mozaffer Jang in person, turned with the handful of troops that surrounded him and charged the elephant of his pursuer. Mozaffer Jang met him with equal spirit, and had raised his sword to make a blow, when his antagonist struck him in the forehead with a javelin and drove it through his skull into the brain. He fell dead, but the nabob with his small band was instantly overpowered and cut to pieces.¹ It made a strong impression on the natives to see the murder of Násir Jang so soon avenged on the principal actors by each other's hands.

The death of the viceroy dissolved the only tie that held his army together, and destroyed the charm by which the French gave to their military ascendancy the colour of a legal government. Mozaffer Jang's title rested on his success alone ; and his only son, a mere infant, could not afford even the sanction of a name to those in the exercise of power. The troops mutinied for their arrears ; each chief was busied in his own projects and suspicions of all his neighbours. It seemed likely that the army would break up or declare for the legal heirs of Asof Jáh, whom the French had been the means of supplanting.

M. Bussy lost not a moment in seizing the crisis. The three younger brothers of Násir Jang were prisoners in the camp, and he determined to secure for himself the merit of placing one of them on the throne. He chose Salábat Jang, the eldest, who, while Gházi-udín's pretensions remained in abeyance, was the legal

¹ Orme.

CHAP.
VI.March 15,
A.D. 1751.

representative of his family. A title so well founded and so promptly asserted was immediately acquiesced in by the chiefs and army,² the administration continued to be carried on by Rágonát Dás, and the influence of the French was placed on as firm a basis as ever. All these events succeeded each other in the course of one day, and the army some time after resumed its march towards the capital. They passed through the Caddapa territory unopposed, but when they reached Carnúl they found the town garrisoned by 4,000 Patáns prepared to defend the widow and family of the late nabob. It was determined to make a severe example of this place, as well in revenge for the death of Mozaffer as for the purpose of inspiring a terror of the French arms. The Patáns of Carnúl are of a tribe very long settled in India. They belong to a small community of Mahometan fanatics called Gheir Mehdís, and their sectarian spirit gives them a peculiar character distinguished from the other descendants of the Afghans. One of the tenets of their sect, which sanctions the murder of heretics, makes them familiar with assassination ; the practice of this crime, joined to their love of money and their usurious dealings, render them dreaded as well as disliked ; and from this circumstance, together with their bravery, they are generally the great actors in every scene of treachery and bloodshed throughout the Deckan. The same character applies in many particulars to their neighbours at Caddapa. Such a people might have been expected to make a desperate defence ; but, though their town was strong, the fortifications were in ruins, and they were unable to withstand the powerful artillery and the discipline of the French. The place was stormed at several points, the

² *Mémoire pour Bussy.*

March 15,
A.D. 1751.

whole of the garrison was put to the sword, and many of the inhabitants shared the same fate. Carnúl and Caddapa were annexed to Adóni, the former jagír of Mozaffer Jang, and the whole united was conferred on the son of that usurper.

The extirpation of the conspirators against Mozaffer Jang was only the prelude to a more serious contest that threatened his successor. Salábat Jang had scarcely crossed the Kishna when he was met by 25,000 Marattas under the personal command of the Pésbwa, Bálají Ráo. This prince had entered into a league with Gházi-u-dín, had levied a contribution of 150,000*l.* from Aurangábád (the chief authority of which place was secretly disposed to Gházi-u-dín), and now appeared as the ally of the lawful viceroy and as the precursor of his appearance in the territories of his father. The Maratta army, however, disappeared as suddenly as it had presented itself. Domestic troubles of the utmost importance compelled Bálají to retrace his steps without delay,³ and left the viceroy at liberty to pursue his march to Heiderábád.

He made his entry in great pomp, and took formal possession of the government. His first attention was directed to rewarding his allies. Gratuities were bestowed on the officers according to their rank, from 100,000*l.* to the commander-in-chief, to 5,000*l.* to each ensign. The future pay of the troops was settled with equal liberality. A captain, besides being furnished with carriage for his baggage, had 100*l.* a month, a lieutenant 50*l.*, an ensign 30*l.*, a serjeant 9*l.*, and a private soldier 6*l.* A communication was opened with Masulipatam, and from that port (only 220 miles distant) the French were supplied with recruits of men,

April 2,
A.D. 1751.

³ See ii. 647. Book xii. chap. iii.

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stores, and ammunition. Bussy was thus enabled afterwards to increase his Europeans to 500 and to arm new sepoys, whom he recruited in the country, making with the old ones 5,000 sepoys.

May
A.D. 1751.

Salábat Jang did not remain long at his capital. The threatened appearance of Gházi-u-dín, the disaffection of Aurangábád and the prospect of renewed invasion by the Marattas, required his presence on his northern frontier, and he set off for Aurangábád within a month after his arrival.

To give the greater weight to his authority, he had recourse to a practice not unusual in the remote provinces of Asiatic empires. He forged a patent from the Great Mogul, appointing him viceroy of the Deckan, and caused it to be delivered to him by a pretended messenger from Delhi, whom he went out in person to meet and received with all the respect and honours which he could have shown to the Emperor himself.⁴

June 18,
A.D. 1751.

Salábat Jang reached Aurangábád on June 18 ; and in the month of August, Bálaji Ráo, having settled his internal disorders, again invaded and ravaged the Mogul territory at the head of 40,000 men. The character of the French auxiliaries acquired fresh lustre on this occasion. While at Aurangábád, their discipline and orderly conduct had commanded the respect of the natives ; and they now established the superiority of the viceroy over an enemy with whom he had seldom on

⁴ Gházi-u-dín's relation to the court of Delhi at this period makes the issue of this patent improbable, but is not conclusive against its authenticity. No such patent, however, is mentioned by any writer as among the obstacles to Gházi-u-dín's investiture ; and no former patent was cancelled at the time when the vicereignty was actually conferred on him. The native writers also inform us that Salábat Jang received a patent in 1754, yet say nothing of one in 1751. We may therefore safely conclude that this last was a forgery.

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VI.December
A.D. 1751.

former occasions been able to contend. The Marattas were driven back to within twenty miles of Puná, and were reduced to make overtures for peace. They were relieved in consequence of the disorders of the viceroy's Indian troops, by which he was compelled to commence a retreat towards his own frontier. An invasion of his territory of Berár by Ragují Bósá occurring at the same time, he was glad to conclude an armistice with the Péswha and return to his capital of Heiderábád. During this period, the viceroy's government was entirely in the hands of the French. M. Bussy personally commanded the army, and controlled the civil administration, through his agent Rágonát Dás. The native princes are in general more tenacious of the forms of power than of the substance ; yet Salábat Jang did not hesitate to address M. Dupleix as his protector, and to acknowledge that himself and his states were entirely at his disposal. We cannot therefore be surprised that, about the same time, the viceroy ceded a territory round Masulipatam to the French and conferred the government of the Carnatic on M. Dupleix and his successors.⁵

But the French system of government received a serious shock from the death of Rágonát Dás, who was assassinated by a body of mutinous troops in April 1752. In him Bussy lost an able adviser, and, what was of greater consequence, he lost a safe and efficient instrument through which to carry on the ostensible government of the viceroy. He was provided with another councillor, in whom he had even more confidence than

⁵ These transactions took place between September 1751 and February 1752. See Salábut Jang's letter in Dupleix, p. 233. It was probably not intended by M. Dupleix to displace Chanda Sáheb (who was yet alive), but to let him retain his dignity under an appointment from the French.

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in the deceased. This was Heider Jang, a native of Masulipatam, of low origin, who had early entered into the service of the French and learned their language. His abilities attracted the notice of Dupleix, and his judgment and fidelity, while with Bussy, had raised him to great power and high honours. But to fill the part of minister it was necessary to find a man of rank, who should be able to regulate the mutinous army and embarrassed finances, and willing at the same time to be entirely subservient to the French.

The predominance of a body of foreigners, and the elevation of their upstart dependents, had unavoidably proved disgusting to the nobility of the viceroy's court, and was felt most by those who but for them would have been at the head of the state.

The two most distinguished men of this class were Sháh Náváz Khán and Seiad Lashkar Khán (better known in the Deckan by his title of Rokan-ud-dowlah). Sháh Náváz had been minister of Násir Jang while governing the Deckan as his father's deputy. He joined the prince in his rebellion in 1741, and although his life was spared after the victory of Asof Jáh he remained for some years in disgrace. He employed that period in writing a biography of the principal nobles of the preceding age, which has contributed more than his political transactions to preserve his reputation in India. On the accession of Násir Jang, he became prime minister to that prince; and on his death he fled to a hill fort in the Carnatic. He was pardoned and reconciled to Mozaffer Jang through the intervention of M. Dupleix, and probably expected to be restored to his former power. Finding the whole administration committed to Rágonát Dás, he became discontented and obtained permission to retire to Aurangábád, where he

became the head of a party opposed to the French, and was the principal mover of the intrigues in that city in favour of Gházi-u-dín. M. Bussy was too well aware of his hostility to trust him with the office of prime minister ; but thought it expedient to disarm his opposition by appointing him governor of the province of Heiderábád. Seiad Lashkar Khán had also held a high office under Násir Jang, and was no less inimical than Sháh Náváz to the French ascendancy : but he had concealed his sentiments with more care, had always been employed under Salábat Jang's government, and now appeared to M. Bussy to be a suitable person to place at the head of the administration. He was accordingly made minister, and the French influence seemed as great as ever.

M. Dupleix employed these distant successes, with the greatest address, to the relief of his difficulties in the Carnatic. He made a great parade of his appointment to be nabob of that province ; and gave it full effect among the natives, by maintaining all the forms usual with their own rulers.⁶ He wore rich native dresses, with the jewels and other decorations appropriate to his rank ; he was surrounded with flags and emblems of dignity peculiar to the East, and in this form he held darbars like an Indian prince, and obliged even the French themselves to present nazars to him on their knees. He was still more alive to the restoration of his military force. The arrival of the annual fleet from France brought him a strong reinforcement of Europeans, which he increased by taking the sailors out of the ships, and substituting native mariners to navigate them ; and by his indefatigable exertions, he was before long in a condition to send a force into the field. Circumstances which could

⁶ See page 132.

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scarcely have been foreseen occurred at this period to favour his views and to prevent his antagonists from taking advantage of his misfortunes.

The surrender of M. Law and the death of Chanda Sáheb had left the English masters of the field, and delivered Mohammed Ali from his long-dreaded rival. Major Lawrence imagined that he had nothing left to do but to put the nabob in possession of the northern part of his territory ; where, although the French still possessed several places, there was none likely to give any trouble except Jinjí. But when he pressed the nabob to put his own force and that of his allies in motion, he found a backwardness on the nabob's part for which he was unable to account. At length, to his great astonishment, the Dalwái explained the mystery by refusing to march until the nabob should have fulfilled a promise made to him to deliver up Trichinopoly, and all its dependencies down to Cape Comorin, to the government of Mysore.

This it appeared was the price at which the assistance of Mysore had been purchased, and it had been agreed for in a solemn treaty, to the observance of which Mohammed Ali had taken an oath. In addition to some frivolous objections to fulfilling this engagement at all, the only effect of which was to prove the nabob's infidelity, he brought forward one argument which did not seem void of reason. It was absurd, he said, to suppose that he would purchase protection for a portion of his dominions by the cession of the whole tract defended, when by doing so he would deprive himself of the only part that was actually in his possession ; and he proposed that the rája should assist in reducing the rest of his dominions, when he should be prepared faithfully to pay the stipulated price of the aid afforded. The

English determined to take no part in the dispute unless actual violence was offered to the nabob. In that case they seem to have thought their situation as auxiliaries entitled them to interpose, without any strict inquiry into the grounds of the quarrel ; and they were sensible that by allowing the nabob to be deprived of the disputed country, they would expose both themselves and him to great dangers, and would lose all the advantages for which they had so long been struggling.

If the difference had not been irreconcilable from the first, it would soon have become so in the hands of Morár Ráo. That expert intriguer had contrived to gain the confidence of both parties ; and, under the show of mediating, he made each more obstinate in his pretensions. He had some hopes that their disputes might afford him an opening for once more getting the town into his own possession, and he felt that the establishment of peace would diminish his consequence and his profit as a mercenary leader. At one time things seemed so near an adjustment that Lawrence marched to Uttatoor, expecting the native princes to follow him ; but he was obliged to return in two days, by finding that the Dalwái refused to allow the nabob to move till his claims were satisfied. After this an agreement took place. The nabob was immediately to assign Sreringham and certain districts round it to Mysore, and was to give up Trichinopoly at the end of two months ; 700 Mysore troops were to be admitted immediately into the garrison. The Dalwái was to march along with the rest of the combined army, and to afford his aid in recovering the whole of the nabob's country.

June 16,
A.D. 1752.

These engagements were insincere on both sides, and did not even deceive the opposite parties. The nabob only wanted to gain time, and was determined not to

CHAP.
VI.June 28,
A.D. 1752.

give up Trichinopoly. The Dalwái wished the English to march, being satisfied that if they were once gone, he would easily get possession of the city either by force or fraud. To guard against this, Captain Dalton was left in charge with a garrison of 200 Europeans and 1,500 sepoy. Lawrence then set out with his remaining troops ⁷ for Trivadi, a place about fifteen miles from Fort St. David.

The Tanjorines and Poligars returned home. The Mysoreans and Morár Ráo remained on their old ground, the Dalwái making the best excuse he could for delaying to fulfil his engagement.

July,
A.D. 1752.

It was Lawrence's plan to have employed his forces in occupying the open country and levying the revenue, but the Governor of Madras (to which place the Presidency had recently been transferred from Fort St. David) was induced by the earnest persuasion of the nabob to send a detachment to lay siege to Jinjí, which was held by a French garrison. The detachment, though large in proportion to the English army, was by no means sufficient for the attack of so strong a fortress, and was compelled to retreat with little credit before an inferior French force from Pondicherry. Animated by this success, M. Dupleix fitted out a body of 2,000 infantry and 500 horse, with which he threatened Fort St. David. The English troops at Trivadi moved to cover that place, and Lawrence, who was then ill at Madras, hastened to join them by sea. He was accompanied by one of two companies of Swiss who had just arrived from Europe; the other had been previously despatched in open boats, under an impression that their acts as auxiliaries on shore would not

⁷ 500 Europeans, 2,500 Sepoys, and 2,000 wretched troops who still adhered to the nabob.

disturb the peace between the French and English at sea, but M. Dupleix had no scruple in making them prisoners, and seems to have been justified by the circumstances. Lawrence's force was now superior to that of the French, and they retreated within their own boundary, where they were secured by the peace between the nations. But Lawrence, by ingenious manœuvres, tempted them to come out and attack him at a village called Bahúr, and the result was their total defeat and the capture of their commander with 100 Europeans and all their guns and stores.

August 26
A.D. 1752.

The enemy being driven out of the field, Lawrence proceeded to occupy the country immediately to the north of Pondicherry, and as the French had garrisons in Covelong and Chingliput, two strong forts still further to the north, a detachment was prepared at Madras for the purpose of reducing them. Clive, who was about to leave India from severe illness, undertook this difficult command. His detachment was composed of 200 Europeans and 500 sepoy, all raw recruits. They repeatedly ran away when a fire was opened on them, and Clive had the greatest difficulty in getting them to put on the appearance of attacking the enemy. But the French were disheartened or ill-commanded, and, although they were reinforced by the indefatigable Dupleix, some bold and skilful movements of Clive, with the aid of such exertions as his personal example could draw from his men, enabled him at length to accomplish his arduous undertaking. After this brilliant operation Clive immediately embarked for Europe, and about the same time Lawrence retired to Fort St. David for the monsoon, while the nabob's troops broke up and returned to their homes.

October,
A.D. 1752.

The north-east monsoon, which suspended all

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operations in the Carnatic, did not extend to the high country of the Deckan, where military movements of great magnitude and importance were at this moment being carried on. Gházi-u-dín had at length appeared in person to claim his inheritance, and had assembled one of the largest armies that had of late been seen in that country.

The motives which led to his acquiescence in the accession of Násir Jang ceased with that prince's life. The weakness of Mozaffer Jang's title invited him to assert his own, and the ascendancy of Safder Jang in the Mogul's court had put an end to his views in remaining at the capital. He therefore solicited the Emperor's nomination to the viceroyalty of the Deckan, and at the same time entered on negotiations with the Peshwa for the purpose of obtaining his support. His promises, and the hopes of profiting by the distractions of the Moguls, led Bálají to give a ready ear to his proposals. He wrote to the Emperor recommending the appointment of Gházi-u-dín,⁸ and took the field in person on his behalf, as has already been related. Gházi-u-dín's investiture did not go on so rapidly. His patent had been made out soon after the death of Násir Jang, but the ministers, though well pleased to remove a competitor from court, were unwilling to issue so important a document without deriving pecuniary advantages from it,⁹ and Gházi-u-dín, if he possessed the means, must have seen the folly of making any solid sacrifice for so unsubstantial a favour. But at length the court of Delhi, being importuned for the subsidy of the Maratta army which Safder Jang had called in for the purpose of resisting an invasion by the Durráni Sháh,¹

⁸ Grant Duff, from Maratta MSS., ii. 44.

⁹ *Seir-ul-Mutakherin*, iii. 120, 123; *Khezánch-ul-Omra*.

¹ See ii. 639. Book xii. chap. 4.

consented to grant investiture to Gházi-u-dín, provided he would deliver them from the presence of these troublesome allies.² The Maratta chiefs (Holcar and Sindia) had already received their instructions from the Peshwa, and professed their readiness to move with Gházi-u-dín on the payment of a sum of money for their present expenses. Gházi-u-dín received his commission, was formally invested on Rajab 3, and marched from Delhi about two months after that ceremony.³

May,
A.D. 1752.

He was acknowledged at Burhánpúr by the vice-roy's troops on that frontier. He was afterwards joined by the Peshwa in person, and when he arrived at Aurangábád (on Zí Cáda 20, 1165), his force was computed to amount to 150,000 men. He paid the price of the Maratta succours by a cession of Cándesh and part of Berár to that nation.⁴ He appears to have been prepared to offer terms to M. Dupleix, on condition of his withdrawing his assistance from Salábat Jang,⁵ but his overtures must have been ill-received, as he now granted a formal commission to Mohammed Ali, appointing him Nabob of the Carnatic.⁶

October,
A.D. 1752.

The contest between Násir Jang and Mozaffer Jang seemed now about to be reacted, with different persons and on a larger scale. Whether it would have led to the defeat of the French party, as in the first stage of that conflict, or to their success, as in the second, it is not easy to say. The presence of the French troops would in all probability have made up for the inferiority of Salábat Jang's numbers, but the question was not destined to be so decided. On Zí Haj 7, 1765, seventeen

October,
A.D. 1752.

² *Seir-ul-Mutakherín.*

³ *Khezáneh-ul-Omra.*

⁴ Grant Duff, iii. 61; *Khezáneh-ul-Omra.*

⁵ Orme, i. 277.

⁶ The commission is dated Zí Cáda 16, 1165, four days before his arrival at Aurangábád. A translation is given in Rous, Appendix I. p. 6.

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days after his entry into Aurangábád, Gházi-u-dín died suddenly :⁷ his army dispersed, and Salábat Jang remained the uncontested representative of Asof Jáh. Gházi-u-dín left a son of the same name, but he was acting as his father's deputy at Delhi ; he was deeply involved in the politics of that court, and was soon too much engaged in making and deposing emperors to prosecute his claims on the Deccan.

The death of Gházi-u-dín took place within a few days of that on which Major Lawrence retired to his winter quarters. Affairs at Trichinopoly were at that time hastening to a crisis.

June 28,
A.D. 1752.

No sooner were the nabob and the English gone than the Dalwái began his machinations for gaining possession of the city. He made repeated attempts to corrupt the nabob's troops and the English sepoys, and to procure the assassination of Dalton and the nabob's brother, Kheir-u-dín, who commanded on his part. His conspiracies were all discovered, and, after those concerned had repeatedly been pardoned, his two last emissaries were condemned to be blown away from guns.

In this last case he had written tempting promises under his own seal, which were immediately brought to Dalton by the native officer to whom they were addressed. A Neapolitan named Poverio was next assailed, who, by concert with Dalton, affected to enter into the proposed design. Dalton was to be murdered, the French prisoners released, and the Dalwái admitted into the town. Preparations were made for his recep-

⁷ It is commonly believed that he was poisoned in a dish sent to him according to the custom of India by the mother of Salábat Jang, his own step-mother ; but imputations of this sort are so common that they deserve no attention unless supported by better proof than has been brought forward in this instance.

tion which would have brought him to signal punishment if the whole plan had not been frustrated by the cowardice of Kheir-u-dín.

• On hearing of this atrocious project, Lawrence (as he himself tells us in his memoirs) recommended that advantage should be taken of the friendly interviews with which the Dalwái still endeavoured to throw Dalton off his guard, and that he and Morár Ráo should be seized at one of those hypocritical ceremonies. The Madras Government disapproved of the proposal, but its occurring at all to so honest and downright an Englishman shows the false notions then entertained with respect to the right to retaliate on native princes the want of faith they practised towards us.

At the end of the two stipulated months, the Dalwái formally demanded possession of the city, though he had scarcely made a show of performing his part of the engagement. Kheir-u-dín replied by returning to him his intercepted letters, and told him that he had forfeited all claim to the cession, but should still be paid the expenses he had incurred, though in fact employed against a common enemy. The Dalwái at first affected great indignation, but afterwards pretended to close with the proposal, and brought a claim to the amount of 8,500,000 rupees, a sum which he knew that it was utterly impossible for the nabob to pay.

August,
A.D. 1752.

During this time he was carrying on a treaty with M. Dupleix, and his negotiations, which had slackened after the defeat of the French at Bahúr, became more earnest as he lost the hope of getting possession of Trichinopoly by his own contrivances.

He had drawn off his camp from the neighbourhood of the city to Seringham after the detection of his intrigues with Poverio, and when he heard that

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VI.November
A.D. 1752.

Lawrence had retired into winter quarters, he began to intercept the supplies of the garrison, and soon after sent Morár Ráo, under pretence of a quarrel with himself, to join the French with all his troops, including a detachment which had been sent to Lawrence after his victory at Báhur.

Decem-
ber 23,
A.D. 1752.

The English Government, who had hitherto refused all active interference between the nabob and the Mysoreans, thought they were now justified in treating the latter power as an enemy. By their order Dalton made a night attack on the Dalwái's camp, and compelled him to take refuge within the walls of the great pagoda. He determined to drive him from this position by a bombardment, and, preparatory to that operation, he detached a large portion of his force to occupy a defensible choultry within the island. They were attacked next day by the Mysore army, and, a party of the nabob's troops who had imprudently exposed themselves, being routed by a body of 300 Rájput's in the Mysore service, the English detachment was seized with a panic, abandoned the choultry, and were almost entirely destroyed before they could recross the river. Of seventy Europeans and 300 Sepoys, only fifteen escaped unhurt: the officers remained at their post and were cut off to a man.

After this Dalton had scarcely troops enough to defend his garrison. He ordered out the 700 Mysoreans who had hitherto been allowed to remain within the place, and having restored the confidence of his men by a successful sally, he remained entirely on the defensive, while the Mysoreans kept up a strict blockade around the town.

January,
A.D. 1753.

Up to this time Lawrence had remained in his winter quarters at Fort St. David. In the beginning of

the new year the French sent a detachment of 500 Europeans, sixty dragoons, 2,000 sepoys, and 4,000 of Morár Ráo's horse, to the immediate neighbourhood of Trivadi, which was held by part of Lawrence's force. On this the major marched to the same place, with 700 Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, and 1,500 of the nabob's horse, if such a rabble deserve to be counted. A partial action took place, in consequence of an attack of the French on the village of Trivadi ; but Duplex, whose object it was to protract the war in the Carnatic, and make it subservient to the siege of Trichinopoly, had sent orders to avoid a general action, and the French, while they secured their camp from attack by surrounding it with strong works, availed themselves with such effect of their great superiority in cavalry, that Lawrence had no means of subsisting his troops except by marching his whole force to Fort St. David and back whenever a supply was required. These marches were always harassing, and sometimes dangerous. After one of them, to which the opposition was unusually serious, Lawrence determined to bring things to a decision by an attack on the French camp, but on arriving at a distance from which it could be clearly seen, it was found to be so regular a fortification, and so well defended by ordnance, that any hope to carry it by assault was vain, and Lawrence was constrained to return to his own camp without having been able to strike a blow.

Three months had elapsed in these discouraging labours, and Lawrence was deliberating on the removal of his force to some point where it might be more useful, when intelligence received from Trichinopoly at once determined his movement and left him no choice in what direction it should be made.

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January 3,
A.D. 1653.

Beginning
of April,
A.D. 1753.

April 20,
A.D. 1753.

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The Mysoreans had so effectually succeeded, by means of their numerous cavalry, in preventing the entry of provisions into Trichinopoly that the resources of the city were nearly exhausted. The shops were shut, the inhabitants began to suffer famine, and the troops were only maintained from the stores laid in against such an emergency. In these circumstances Dalton thought it necessary to examine the magazines, which were reckoned to contain provisions for four months, when to his dismay he discovered that, from the imprudence or corruption of the nabob's brother, the greater part had been allowed to be sold, and that the stock remaining was only sufficient for fifteen days, a period too short to admit of the army at Trivadi marching to his relief.

This news reached Lawrence at ten on the night of April 20, and at daybreak he was in motion for Trichinopoly, after leaving a strong garrison in Trivadi.

As one great cause of the embarrassments of the English was their want of cavalry, Lawrence took the route of Tanjore in hopes of prevailing on the rāja to contribute a body of horse to the common cause, but though received with great respect and overloaded with promises, he did not succeed in getting the aid of a single horseman.

Notwithstanding some spirited sallies of Captain Dalton's, the blockade of Trichinopoly was strictly maintained till May 6, when Lawrence entered the place. His troops had suffered severely from the violence of the hot winds on their march. Several died, others were sent back sick to Fort St. David, many (especially of the Swiss) deserted, and 100 men were sent into hospital as soon as they arrived at Trichinopoly. The force

disposable for the field, including such portion as could be spared of the garrison, amounted to no more than 500 Europeans and 2,000 sepoy, with the nominal aid of 3,000 of the nabob's ill-paid and mutinous horse.

A French detachment of 200 Europeans and 500 sepoy, sent by Dupleix, under M. Astruc, joined the Mysore army on the same day. Lawrence determined to take advantage of his superiority in regular troops while it lasted, and marched, three days after his arrival, intending to bombard the pagoda of Seringham. The nabob's troops to a man refused to accompany him. The Mysoreans fled when the English crossed the Cáveri, but a gallant charge of the Rájputs gave time for M. Astruc to come up, and his able disposition of his small force effectually checked the English, and compelled them to give up their attack after twenty hours of marching and cannonade, and the loss of two officers killed and three wounded. The hope of any decisive success being thus frustrated, Lawrence applied himself to collecting provisions for the garrison, but in this he failed from the lukewarmness of the Rája of Tanjore and Tondiman, from whose countries his supplies were to be drawn. The rája's minister was bribed by the enemy, and Tondiman, though a faithful friend, was apprehensive that if Trichinopoly were rendered secure, the army to which he looked for protection would be withdrawn to some other service. Thus, at the end of five weeks, Lawrence had been able to obtain no more provisions than were required to maintain his troops from day to day.

The French at Trivadi lost no time in profiting by the removal of Lawrence to Trichinopoly. They forth-

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with attacked the fort, which they took, after several failures, and sent the survivors of the garrison prisoners to Pondicherry. The whole of the northern part of the Carnatic was at this time a scene of confusion, filled with freebooters acting in the name of one or other of the parties, and sometimes in their own.

Mohammed Ali's present rival was Mortezza Ali of Vellór. M. Dupleix had at first named Chanda Sáheb's son, Rezza Sáheb, to succeed his father as subordinate nabob. He found him of little use, and as, after spending 140,000*l.* of his private fortune on the service of the state, he was at a loss for money to carry on the war, he removed Rezza Sáheb, and offered the nabobship to Mortezza, whose reputed wealth promised to supply the deficiency. Mortezza Ali accepted the office, and paid 50,000*l.* on receiving investiture, but finding that he would be expected to continue pecuniary supplies, and even to take the field in person, he became entirely disgusted with his elevation, and was glad to be allowed to return to Vellór. The present success of the French, however, so raised his spirits, that he issued from his fort with fifty Europeans, 2,000 sepoys, and his own irregular force, defeated the nabob's troops at Arcot, destroyed the English garrison of fifty Europeans and 200 sepoys, and took possession of that capital and the surrounding country. So much was he encouraged by this success that he laid siege to Trinomalie, a place of importance between Arcot and Trichinopoly, and at a considerable distance from his retreat of Vellór. Morár Ráo joined him in this undertaking with part of his horse, but 3,000 of the number, under Eunas Khán, marched with a detachment of Europeans and sepoys sent by Dupleix to Trichinopoly.

After this reinforcement the allies outnumbered Lawrence beyond all proportion, and of his small body 700 sepoys were detached into Tondiman's country to collect and escort supplies.⁸

With this superiority they forced Lawrence to fall back to the neighbourhood of the town, and took up ground near him in such a manner as to stop the supplies from the southward, and cut off all communication with the 700 detached sepoys. The fall of Trichinopoly seemed to be inevitable. The most sanguine of its defenders began to lose hope, the rest sunk into despondency, and a strong spirit of desertion arose among the men.

To increase the difficulties of the English army, M. Astruc determined to seize on a small rock situated between his camp and that of the enemy. Lawrence, aware of the importance of this rock (the loss of which would have rendered his position untenable), had stationed 200 sepoys to defend it, and moved out in person when he perceived that it was threatened. He was obliged to leave 100 Europeans to defend his camp, and most of his sepoys were in the city endeavouring to procure food; his whole force therefore only amounted to 380 Europeans and 500 sepoys.

June 26,
A.D. 1753.

⁸ The allies had :

Europeans	450
French sepoys	1,500
Morár Rao's horse	3,000
Rájput horse	500
Mysore regulars	1,200
Mysore irregular infantry	15,000
Mysore cavalry	8,000

Lawrence had :

Europeans	500
Sepoys (including the 700 detached)	2,000

He had also 100 of the nabob's horse, the rest peremptorily refusing to move from under the walls.

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The extremity of their danger roused the spirit of this little band, and made them willing to run any risk in the field rather than allow themselves to be worn out by famine. Their first efforts, however, were of no avail. Their approach stimulated the exertions of the French, and before they had got more than half way to the post, the 200 sepoy were killed or made prisoners, and the French colours were flying on the top of the rock. They were now in the open plain, in presence of the whole French force ; the Mysoreans were drawn up within cannon shot, and the Marattas were already skirmishing on their flanks. Retreat seemed hopeless, and, in a hasty consultation which Lawrence held with his officers, they declared with one voice in favour of a gallant push against the enemy. The order was given to the troops, who received it with three huzzas. The grenadiers advanced at a rapid pace, and ran up the rock without a pause, driving their startled enemies before them, and followed by some of the most active of the sepoy. On reaching the summit, they saw the French line beneath them within the distance of a pistol shot. They immediately opened a hot fire, and the advance of Lawrence, who wheeled round the rock on the left of the French, compelled M. Astruc to change front to oppose him. This movement brought the right flank of the French immediately under the fire of the troops on the rock, and by the time it was accomplished, they saw the English opposite, at the distance of twenty yards. The French were astonished at this daring attack on them by such a handful of men, in the midst of the hosts of their allies. Lawrence left them no time to recover their presence of mind, and the vivacity of his fire on their front, with that on their flank from the hill, threw them

into irrecoverable confusion, and they fled with the utmost precipitation.

They were saved from destruction by the gallantry of the Maratta horse, who threw themselves between the fugitives and pursuers, and charged the latter with a vigour that compelled them to look to their own defence.

Bálappa, the brother-in-law of Morár Ráo, fell in fighting hand to hand with the grenadiers, and the rest retreated, but not till they had secured the safety of their allies. The body of Bálappa was afterwards sent to his friends in Lawrence's own palankeen, a mark of sympathy which was gratefully received.

This exploit (perhaps the most brilliant in the whole contest between the French and English), could alone have averted the reduction of Trichinopoly. The 700 sepoy from the south were enabled to join, and brought in provisions for fifty days' consumption. To husband this supply, Lawrence withdrew his field force to Tanjore, at which time all the nabob's cavalry except fifty men went over to the enemy. At Tanjore he was joined by 170 Europeans and 300 sepoy, with a convoy of several thousand loaded bullocks from Fort St. David. He also prevailed on the Rájá of Tanjore to send 3,000 horse and 2,000 matchlockmen along with him to Trichinopoly.

He was greatly embarrassed by his convoy, and received no support from his new allies, but by a tactical skill which might have guided the largest army, he frustrated all attempts to stop his progress, and, after a whole day of manœuvres and partial actions, he brought his charge undiminished into the town.

August 7,
A.D. 1753.

But he had soon the mortification to find that the object of so much care was in fact of little value. The

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provision of the grain was necessarily under the nabob's officers, who purloined the purchase-money, and allowed their followers to load with their own trumpery the bullocks which were supposed to carry this important supply. The whole actually produced amounted to but ten days' stock.

August 23,
A.D. 1753.

The old difficulties were now to be encountered anew, and while Lawrence was occupied in dislodging the Mysoreans from a post which gave them the command of one road into the town, he was surprised by the arrival of a body of French troops equal to the whole of his own detachment.⁹

September 20,
A.D. 1753.

This reinforcement was received by its own party with every display of rejoicing. Lawrence was again reduced to the defensive, and his utmost skill and care were called forth in contriving the means of passing escorts with provisions through the enemy's posts, and above all in protecting the entrance of a reinforcement sent from Madras.¹ Its arrival left him still greatly inferior in force to the enemy, but he had no further assistance to expect, and was reduced to three days' grain, with a still greater scarcity of fuel and every other necessary. He therefore determined to bring on a general action. He first drew up his line in the plain and offered battle. When the French refused this challenge, he resolved to attack them in their position, which they had already strengthened, and were still continuing to improve.

The Marattas were on the right of the enemy's camp, then the French, and the Mysoreans on the left of all. The right of the camp was entrenched, and

⁹ It consisted of 400 Europeans lately arrived from Mauritius, 2,000 sepoy, and 3,000 of Morár Ráo's horse, with many matchlockmen under his own command.

¹ 237 Europeans and 300 sepoy.

though the fortification was incomplete on the left, that flank was defended by a strong hill called the Golden Rock garrisoned by 100 Frenchmen and 800 sepoy. The success of this desperate enterprise depended on its secrecy, and Lawrence disguised his intention so well that he took up ground not far from the French left without exciting any apprehension. At four in the morning he commenced his march in dead silence. As he drew near the Golden Rock, the moon, which till then had shone brightly, was suddenly obscured by a cloud, so that the English got within pistol shot of the rock before they were discovered. They mounted it in three places at once, and so complete was the surprise, that the enemy ran off without even discharging their field pieces, which were found loaded with grape-shot. Lawrence now formed his line, and at the same time sent the Tanjorine troops to make a show of attacking the French entrenchment in front. The English soldiers received the order to advance with loud huzzas, the drums struck up the Grenadier's march, and the sepoy sounded all their instruments of military music. This completed the rout of the Mysoreans, among whom the fugitives from the hill had already spread terror ; all crowded back on the French, communicating their fears and increasing the general disorder. Finding his entrenchment no longer of any use, M. Astruc changed his front towards his former left and prepared for the attack, but his troops were too unsteady to fulfil his expectations ; they were soon put to flight, and the battle irretrievably lost. Eleven guns were taken. M. Astruc himself with nine officers and near 100 soldiers were made prisoners, and about an equal number were killed. Eighty-five more European fugitives were picked up straggling in the country,

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VI.Octo-
ber 15,
A.D. 1753.

forty English soldiers were killed, Lawrence himself was slightly wounded, and Captain Kilpatrick desperately.

After that the French and their allies withdrew into the island, and provisions poured into the English camp in the utmost abundance. Six months' supply was laid up for the garrison, and Dalton, seeing all immediate danger at an end, gave up his command and went away to Europe. Soon after, Lawrence went into quarters for the monsoon at Coiládi; and the Tanjorines set out for their own country. They promised to return at the end of the rains, but the rája relapsed into his system of inaction, and before long was led by the influence of Sacca Rám, who had been gained by M. Dupleix, to displace Mánikjí, his general (who was a partisan of the English) and to enter into negotiations for an alliance with the French.

While these events were passing in the south, Mohammed Ali's affairs were as prosperous in the other part of the Carnatic. The siege of Trinomali was raised by a detachment from Arcot, and Mohammed Kemál, a powerful freebooter who had seized on the rich pagoda of Tripeti and appropriated the large revenue derived from the pilgrims, was defeated and put to death.

Beginning
of No-
vember
A.D. 1753.

But M. Dupleix was not a man to be cast down by ill-success. He set to without delay to repair the misfortune at Trichinopoly, and, by entrusting the defence of Pondicherry to the inhabitants, and sending every regular soldier into the field, he contrived, before the monsoon was half over, to reinforce the troops at Seringham with 300 Europeans, 200 native Christians, 1,000 sepoy, and some cannon.

The arrival of this detachment did not disturb the previous inaction, and both sides lived in as much

tranquillity as if they had concluded a regular suspension of arms.

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But the French were at that time projecting no less an enterprise than the storm of Trichinopoly. They had some months before sent a spy into the town, who was detected, but encouraged to hope for pardon if he would write such a report as would lead his employers to attack a particularly strong part of the works, where the garrison was for some nights kept ready to receive them. They never came; the spy was suspected of collusion. Lawrence, who had been absent during the previous transactions, ordered him to be hanged, and the affair was ere long forgotten. But the spy had not been guilty of this second deception, and it was against the place pointed out by him that the present attack was directed. It was an old gateway which projected from the outer wall into the ditch and communicated with the entrance in the inner rampart by a winding passage between high walls. The outer gate had been built up, and a battery was constructed on the terrace over it. The inner rampart overlooked the gateway and commanded the battery. Eight hundred Europeans and a large body of sepoy marched on this attack. They took advantage of a very dark night, and completely surprised the garrison. They crossed the ditch (which at this point was fordable), escalated the gateway, put the guard in the battery to the bayonet, and drawing up their ladders, proceeded to apply them to the inner rampart; while another party carried two petards through the winding passage to blow open the inner gate. At this juncture an accidental noise gave the alarm to some of the English troops, and the French, finding they were discovered, turned the guns of the battery on the town, and commenced an open

Novem-
ber 23,
A.D. 1753.

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attack with loud shouts of 'Vive le Roi!' Captain Kilpatrick, who commanded the town, lay wounded in his bed, but he issued his orders with promptitude and judgment. Lieutenant Harrison, whom he sent to the point attacked, behaved with equal coolness. The French were dislodged from the inner rampart, their ladders were thrown down and broken, and they were forced to take refuge in the battery, where they remained exposed to the fire of the garrison, unable to retreat from the loss of their ladders, and only protected by the extreme darkness of the night. At the same time Harrison, with a wise precaution, ordered a fire to be kept up on the passage, though no sign of an enemy was discovered in that direction. This fire killed the men carrying the petards and dispersed the party, so that this most dangerous part of the attack was frustrated before it was perceived.

Nearly 100 of the French threw themselves from the gateway, and were all either killed or disabled; the rest sheltered themselves as they could till daybreak, when they threw down their arms and surrendered. 360 Europeans (including the wounded) were made prisoners, 37 were found dead, so that near 500 of the French were either taken, killed, or disabled, and those alone who had remained in reserve beyond the ditch returned uninjured to the island.

So great was the impression made by this misfortune that the Rájá of Tanjore broke off a negotiation which he had nearly finished with the French, and even ordered 1,500 horse to join the English; but he was speedily obliged to withdraw them by an incursion made into his country by Morár Ráo, who took that way of punishing his tergiversation.

About the same time a French detachment from Pondicherry failed in an attempt to besiege Palamcota.

CHAPTER VII.

Affairs of Heiderábád—Difficulties of Bussy's position—His vigorous measures—Important cessions of territory to the French—Negotiations between the French and English—State of the Mogul Empire—Operations before Trichinopoly—Opinion in France on the war in India—Negotiations with England for peace—Supersession of Dupleix—Suspension of hostilities—Character of Dupleix—His treatment on his return to France—Terms of the treaty—English invasion of Madura and Tinivelly—Operations of the English fleet against pirates on the Malabar coast—Differences arising in carrying out the truce—Bussy's operations in the Northern cessions—His invasion of Mysore—Attacks the Rája of Savanore—His successes—Intrigues at Heiderábád—Dismissal of the French and their retreat—Bussy occupies Heiderábád—March of reinforcements from Pondicherry—Their conflicts with the enemy and entry into Heiderábád—Triumph of Bussy—Alarming news from the English settlements in Bengal—Account of the rise of the Sepoy force—Improvement in the Company's troops—On the manners of the French and English in India—Note on the titles of the native princes.

DURING the period occupied by the transactions at Trichinopoly, important events had taken place in the Deekan.

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The death of Gházi-u-dín did not put an end to the war with the Marattas. They no longer disputed Salábat Jang's title, but they insisted on his confirming the cessions made to them by his elder brother. After some time their demands were agreed to, and a peace was concluded at Bidr, by the intervention of M. Bussy, who treated with the Peshwa Bálájí Ráo in person. Ragují Bosla pretended to accede to this treaty, and promised to withdraw to his own territory, but as soon as the Peshwa was gone, he returned and renewed his ravages in the country about Culberga. Though he

Middle of
November
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VII.

endeavoured to avoid the French, he found his designs frustrated by their activity, and was glad to make peace in earnest and to evacuate the territories which he had taken from the viceroy. In the last battle, which decided this contest, M. Bussy headed the Nizam's cavalry. His services during these wars with the Marattas were compensated by a fictitious grant of a high honour from Delhi, and, as it was usual to allot lands for the purpose of maintaining such dignities, M. Bussy took the opportunity of procuring a grant of Condavír on this pretence, and disinterestedly made it over to his nation. Condavír is a very extensive district on the right bank of the Kishna, near the mouth. It is at no great distance from Masulipatam, and M. Dupleix had been very anxious to obtain it, even as a farm.

Decem-
ber 24,
A.D. 1753.

It was M. Bussy's wish to have carried the viceroy to the Carnatic, where his presence would have restored the French affairs, then at rather a low ebb. He had advanced as far as Culberga with this intention, when a mutiny of the viceroy's troops, and the embarrassed state of his finances, obliged him to give up the design.

M. Bussy's situation indeed was materially altered since the death of Ragonát Dás. That minister, from a wish to please, or from a temper really sanguine, had buoyed him up with a notion of the inexhaustible resources of the viceroy; but no sooner was Seiad Lashkar Khán raised to power, than he disclosed to Bussy the true state of the finances, impoverished by the plunder of treasures and devastation of provinces during so many revolutions, and since weighed down by the expense of armies and subsidies. These real difficulties were increased by the artifices of the new minister, who threw every possible obstruction in the way of finding funds

for the French, and hoped that by wearing them out in that way, he would induce them to withdraw their troops. M. Bussy indeed seems seriously to have considered such a measure, and before marching from Culberga he held a council of his officers on the subject. He set before them on one hand the certain failure of their pay, and possibility of their not being able to procure supplies, and on the other, the loss of all the advantages they had gained, if they were to withdraw from the service. The officers decided that the honour of the nation required them to remain. On this Bussy gave his whole attention to securing a fund for his expenses, and proposed that the four Sircárs, or districts contiguous to Condavír on the north, should be given up to the French, to be administered by their officers, under the management of the Government of Pondicherry. But the time was past when he had only to speak his will. The minister made difficulties and interposed delays, until M. Bussy was taken so ill that he was under the necessity of retiring to the sea-coast. It was then that the full value of his services became manifest. He had maintained discipline among his troops ; he had preserved them from want by private loans ; he had kept on terms of friendship and equality with the great men of the court ; and had so completely gained the viceroy's confidence as partially to reconcile him to the state of pupilage in which he was kept, and fully to convince him that neither his power nor his person would be safe if he had not the French to protect him against foreign and domestic enemies.

No sooner was he gone than the general dislike to the French broke out. Their own troops, no longer restrained by so vigorous a hand, began to clamour and

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desert, and were only kept within bounds by the firmness and zeal of their officers, who contributed from their own funds to relieve their immediate wants. Seiad Lashkar Khán inspired the viceroy with a sense of his dependence, and began to take direct measures for effecting his emancipation. The presence of the French troops made this a dangerous task, but an ingenious contrivance of Seiad Lashkar Khán's delivered him from this embarrassment. After bringing the pressure of their pecuniary difficulties to the highest pitch, he proposed to give assignments on particular districts to the French, and authorised them to go themselves and enforce the collections. This proposal had every appearance of sincerity, and was agreeable to the officers, who saw a good chance of private advantage from a share in the administration of the revenue. In pursuance of this arrangement, the French troops were scattered about the country, only a small body remaining at Heiderábád with M. Goupil, the commanding officer. To remove him still further from the French, Seiad Lashkar suggested that the viceroy should find a pretext for a journey to Aurangábád, and should take only a small detachment of French troops as a body-guard. M. Goupil, who thought his own place was with the main body, allowed the guard to go under an officer of inferior rank, and made no provision for the political duties so much called for at the court. Seiad Lashkar, set free from restraint, pushed on his plans with greater boldness than before. He had always been much connected with the Marattas, and about this time he entered on a correspondence with the English, whom he hoped to make use of against their common enemy.¹

¹ Dupleix, 91 and 94. M. Dupleix is not a safe authority, but the story is probable in itself.

M. Dupleix saw all these proceedings with well-grounded alarm, and perceived that the only remedy lay in the return of Bussy. That officer was slowly recovering his health at Masulipatam, but had made up his mind to retire from the service. He had long seen the insecurity of the French power in the Deckan, and the little hope of assistance from the Carnatic, where the whole resources of the nation were swallowed up by the local war. He, from the first, recommended peace with Mohammed Ali and the English, and afterwards began to perceive that even such a relief would be insufficient, that the Mogul power was going rapidly to decay, and, instead of affording any strength to its allies, would require all their exertions to uphold it against the Marattas. In addition to the discouragement occasioned by these reflections, it is probable that he also felt the danger of acting under M. Dupleix, who was in the habit of exacting impossibilities from his officers, and throwing the blame of any failure of his schemes on their want of energy in carrying his orders into effect.² Dupleix strained every nerve to induce him to change his resolution. He declared that the talents of M. Bussy alone could retrieve the ascendancy of his nation ; gave him full powers to conduct the affairs of the Deckan at his discretion ; authorised him to contract loans on the Company's behalf ; and promised him further assistance from Pondicherry. To his own entreaties he joined the influence of a common friend whom he sent on purpose from Pondicherry, and added the weight of his authority, by expressly ordering Bussy to return, and charging him with the responsibility of any consequences that might result from his disobedience. Bussy likewise received an

² See Bussy's letter to Dupleix in his *Mémoire*, 37.

CHAP.
VII.June 20,
A.D. 1753.

address signed by the principal officers of his own force, remonstrating against his purpose of leaving them, and earnestly entreating his return. Led by all these considerations, Bussy determined to set out, though but imperfectly recovered, and ordered his troops to concentrate at Heiderábád, where he meant to join them. Before his departure he wrote to Dupleix, setting forth the difficulties of his situation, and explicitly declaring that, unless he had the means of paying his troops, he would assuredly withdraw them from the country. He reached Heiderábád on June 20. He assembled his army at that city, but found it nearly ninety thousand pounds in arrears, the sepoys in a state bordering on mutiny, and the governor of Heiderábád hostile, and disposed as far as possible to withhold supplies. It was also the rainy season, when it was impossible to move to Aurangábád. He contrived, however, to borrow money for the payment of part of the arrears, and forced the governor to find subsistence for his force during the time that it remained at Heiderábád ; even with these aids, he still found it difficult to appease the dissatisfaction of his troops or to prevent their bursting into open tumult and violence.

In November he marched for Aurangábád, where his appearance was sufficient to overawe all his enemies. He halted at some distance from the town, and several days were spent in negotiations before he made his entry. Seiad Lashkar's first thought was to fly to a hill fort, but on consideration he resolved on unqualified submission, and sent the seals of his office to M. Bussy as an acknowledgment that his power depended on the pleasure of that commander. In these circumstances the parties soon came to terms, and about

the end of November, Bussy made his entry in great pomp, and was met before he reached the walls by the viceroy and all his court, with every mark of respect and honour. On the same day he had a private interview with Seiad Lashkar Khán, at which it was agreed that the four provinces near Masulipatam should be assigned to the French as a fund for their pay; that the protection of the viceroy's person should be entrusted to the French troops; that the viceroy should in no respect interfere with the government of the Carnatic; and that *all other* affairs should be carried on with M. Bussy's concurrence. On these conditions M. Bussy engaged to support Seiad Lashkar Khán in his office of Diwán. This agreement was solemnly sworn to by the parties on the Bible and the Korán. It is not improbable that Seiad Lashkar continued his secret opposition, but all that is certain is, that he was removed by Bussy almost immediately after this agreement,³ and that Sháh Náwáz Khán was appointed his successor. M. Bussy hoped that this statesman had learned from experience the necessity of uniting with the French, and, after he had made some other changes in the court, he fancied that he had left none near the viceroy but partisans of that nation.

December,
A.D. 1753.

The provinces ceded, together with those before possessed by the French (now comprehended under the name of the Northern Sircars), extend from the Carnatic to the district of Cattac in Orissa. Their length is about 450 miles, and their breadth from fifty to eighty. Their situation made them very convenient to a European power, as they lay along the sea-coast,

³ Bussy (41) boasts in plain terms of having removed the partisans of the enemy, and replaced them with friends of France; but Dupleix (99) speaks of Seiad Lashkar's retirement as voluntary and unaccountable.

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VII.

and were protected from the interior by woods and mountains.

They are rich in natural productions and manufactures, and contain about three millions of inhabitants. The annual revenue was estimated at 535,000*l.* It yielded while held by the French about 600,000*l.*, and now amounts to upwards of 800,000*l.*

December,
A.D. 1753.

During all M. Bussy's successes, he had recommended to M. Dupleix to make peace with the English, and such had long been the wish of the Company and Ministers in France. M. Dupleix had been induced, about the middle of 1753, to open a correspondence with Mr. Saunders. The negotiation went on very slowly, and it was not till the end of the year that it was agreed that commissioners from each party should meet at Sadrás, between Pondicherry and Madras, to settle the terms of a treaty.

It was obvious at the commencement of this negotiation that it would lead to no adjustment, the English insisting that Mohammed Ali should be acknowledged as Nabob of the Carnatic, and the French that Salábat Jang should be left without restraint to dispose of that province as he pleased. Nevertheless, the commissioners entered into an examination of the royal patents on which each party founded its claim, and affected to regard the whole question as turning on the titles of those princes.⁴ After the production of various documents, and several references to the respective Presidencies, the conferences broke up without having advanced a single step. The real difficulty in the way of an agreement was never avowed nor discussed. It was that, if the French acknowledged Mohammed Ali, even under an appointment from

⁴ [See note at the end of this chapter.—ED.]

Salábat Jang, his connection with the English would give to that nation a decided preponderance in the Carnatic ; and on the other hand, if Salábat Jang were left to appoint a nabob at his own discretion, he would confirm his appointment of M. Dupleix, or keep the French in possession under some other form.

The justice of the proceedings of the European nations depended but little on the rights of the native princes ; which in fact had assumed no definite form since the dissolution of the empire. The real question was, which of the two compelled the other to embark in these quarrels. The first interference was made by M. Dupleix, but he justified it on the ground that if he had not seized the opportunity, the English would have anticipated him. Their support of a claimant to Tanjore gave some foundation to the assertion, but that enterprise was on a small scale, and for a small object. It was unlikely, from the timid and unwarlike character of the English Government in India, that they would ever aggrandise themselves to such an extent as to be dangerous to the French. Had the latter nation left Násir Jang and Anwar-u-dín undisturbed, there is no reason to think that those rulers would ever have called in the English ; and it would have depended on some remote contingency whether that people ever took part in the politics of the peninsula.

The first interference therefore may be charged on the French. But it need lay no great burden on the conscience of either nation. They overthrew no established government, and disturbed no tranquil population. The Mogul empire was in anarchy and confusion from end to end. The supremacy was falling rapidly into the hands of the Marattas, more destructive conquerors than ever the Europeans have proved, and

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VII.

incapable of repaying the evils of their first settlement by any subsequent improvement in government or civilisation.

Hostilities were not suspended during these negotiations, and the contest at Trichinopoly went on without interruption. The inroad of Morár Ráo's horse had at first rather strengthened the Rája of Tanjore's connection with the English. He had appointed Mánikjí, their partisan, to command his army, but although that general soon gratified him by taking signal vengeance on Morár Ráo's party, he was unable to stand against Saccarám, on whose accession to power the rája's disposition towards the French revived.

The number of French prisoners in Trichinopoly had obliged Lawrence to make a large addition to the garrison, and left his field force inferior to that of the French. Each party had about 600 Europeans, but the French had four companies of native Christians and 6,000 sepoys, besides the Mysoreans and Marattas, while Lawrence had about 1,800 sepoys, with no native ally.

He was therefore confined to the defensive, and obliged, as before, to give his whole attention to supplies. He was seven times successful in introducing convoys under strong escorts, but on the eighth, when he had detached a third of his whole force to protect a very important supply of provisions, stores, and treasure, the French made so good a use of their superior numbers that the whole convoy fell into their hands, and the escort to a man were either killed or taken prisoners. Much of the slaughter, as well as of the success, was owing to the spirit and activity of Morár Ráo ; and the French had a glorious opportunity of displaying their humanity by protecting the survivors from the fury of his troops.

Febru-
ary 12,
A.D. 1754.

Lawrence's movements were now more restricted than ever. He, however, contrived to obtain supplies by stealth and in small quantities, but at the end of three months this resource began to fail him, and he had no alternative but to risk a large portion of his remaining force, or to retreat to Tanjore and leave the garrison to its fate.

He determined on the former experiment, and sent out a strong detachment under Captain Caillaud to cover a convoy which he had ordered to attempt an entrance. The French were aware of this intention, and placed a force of double its strength in ambuscade in a dry tank near the spot where the detachment was to await the convoy. The detachment made an unexpected resistance ; the whole French army moved out to secure the capture of it, and the English were compelled to make a similar movement to endeavour to save it.

May 12,
A.D. 1754.

The French had 750 Europeans, 5,000 sepoys, and 10,000 Mysore horse. The English were much less than half the number of regular troops, and with only eleven mounted men, and their last chance was staked on this unequal contest. Lawrence, who was confined to the town by illness, had himself carried to the top of a gateway, where he watched the struggle, and trembled for the issue. But his anxiety was ere long relieved, for the English, though forced to take post and to form a hollow square, repelled every assault with so much firmness that the enemy at length desisted, and allowed them to march back to the town. During this engagement, the convoy had passed in unmolested, and the danger of the crisis was at once dispelled:

Having failed in stopping the English convoys, the enemy determined to strike at the source of their supply; they marched into Tondiman's country, where they

CHAP.
VII.May 24,
A.D. 1754.

burned the villages and drove the inhabitants into the woods. They next invaded Tanjore, though the rája had long discouraged the exportation of provisions to Trichinopoly, and the more effectually to destroy that country they took Coiládi, and broke down the famous embankment which that place was constructed to protect. This mortal injury threw the Tanjorines for ever into the arms of the English. About the same time Morár Ráo, who had long before ceased to act with the French, marched off to his own country loaded with contributions which he had exacted from all parties. The English also began to be joined by detachments, and had every prospect of soon being powerfully reinforced.

Immediately on hearing of the destruction of the convoy in February, the Government of Madras had exerted itself to repair the disaster, but it unluckily made the march of the troops it had collected depend on the movements of the nabob's brother, Mahfúz Khán. This man had been taken prisoner at the battle of Ambúr, in which his father was killed, and had since inclined to the party of Mozaffer Jang, but he now came with 2,000 horse and as many infantry, whom he had collected with the professed intention of joining his brother. His wants, his laziness, and his timidity occasioned continual interruptions to his proceedings, and retarded the march of the reinforcement for nearly six months.

August 14,
A.D. 1754.

At length Lawrence ordered them not to wait for Mahfúz Khán, and they joined his force in the neighbourhood of Tanjore.

All these changes had brought the English to a level with the French, and a severe struggle was expected to have been the result of their equality, but

causes little influenced by their contest had already given a new direction to the course of events. The French declined an engagement, military operations became of secondary importance, and the approach of the rains constrained Lawrence to retire into winter quarters at Coiládi. About the same time the English fleet under Admiral Watson reached Madras. It brought out the King's forty-ninth regiment, 700 strong, under Colonel Adlercron, and a small party of the Royal Artillery, with 200 recruits for the Company; the French also at about the same time received a reinforcement of 1,200 men, of whom 600 were hussars, but circumstances had taken away the interest which would have been produced by these additions to the strength of the belligerents.

Septem-
ber 13,
A.D. 1754.

M. Dupleix's first successes filled all France with delight and admiration. The King's ministers and the Company concurred in their applauses of the Governor who had so much extended their territories and increased the reputation of their arms; but they early expressed an anxious wish that he would secure all the great advantages he had gained by concluding peace, and when they heard of the march of Bussy's detachment into the interior of the Deckan, they evinced the liveliest alarm at the possible consequences of such an undertaking, and positively ordered the detachment to be recalled to their own possessions. But during all this time they did not abate their commendations of M. Dupleix, who was created a marquis as late as the end of 1752, and whose calls for troops and stores were met by liberal promises of support.

The failure of the siege of Trichinopoly in 1752 seems first to have shaken their confidence in Dupleix. The derangement of their commerce during these exten-

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VII.

sive wars, and the disappointment of their hopes of immediate profit from their acquisitions, had a tendency to increase their dissatisfaction,⁵ and about the same time they began to receive frequent representations from the court of England on the continuance of hostilities in India during profound peace in Europe. The French were probably unwilling to purchase peace in India by great sacrifices, and they protracted the discussions regarding it for more than a year without any result, but they were desirous of avoiding a general war until they had time to restore their navy, and their views of aggrandisement were more directed to America than to the East.⁶ It was owing to these pacific influences that the negotiations at Sadrás took place, and these afterwards acquired additional strength from the firmness of the British Government, which was preparing a naval squadron and some king's troops for India.

Having once made up their mind to peace, the French saw the obstructions that would be opposed to it from the character of M. Dupleix, and they determined to remove him and send out M. Godeheu, a Director of the Company, in his room.

⁵ [Lally Tollendal, in an elaborate review of Dupleix's career prepared for the *Biographie Universelle*, says that matters were brought to a crisis between the Company and Dupleix by the abrupt disclosure of the state of the finances of the Indian settlement. During the latter part of his administration he had disregarded their instructions, even in the disposal of the troops they sent out, and in the end declared that the King alone had the right to judge of his actions. When his policy was successful he held out extravagant hopes of advantages, and when he met with reverses he concealed or extenuated their losses. On June 20, 1752, the Company were informed that they had a clear surplus of 24,110,418 liv. Seven months later, Feb. 19, 1753, the Council of Pondicherry wrote, 'Far from having any surplus, we owe nearly two millions. The deficit has exhausted our resources,' &c. This last despatch overwhelmed the Directors of the Company and the Council of the King, and they decided on an immediate change in the administration.—Ed.]

⁶ Orme; Dupleix.

M. Godeheu arrived at Pondicherry on August 1. He had brought with him a powerful reinforcement of French troops, and, as the English fleet had not then arrived, he might, by a vigorous application of his means, have gained so decided an advantage over Lawrence as would have materially influenced the terms of the peace.⁷ But his inclination, and probably his instructions, were to avoid fresh causes of irritation. He opened an immediate communication with Mr. Saunders, and, as a proof of his favourable intentions, released the Swiss company which had been made prisoners at sea.⁸

The impression made by this change of Governors was as great as could have been effected by any revolution. The French considered the system they had been pursuing as extinguished with the government of M. Duplex. They regarded the change as the result of an unqualified submission to the English, and saw with indignation the vast acquisitions which had cost them so many labours on the point of being sacrificed by the pusillanimity of their own Government. Bussy and Moracin (the Lieutenant-Governor of the recent sessions), declared their intention of withdrawing from the service. The troops at Trichinopoly, thinking themselves no longer secure of their pay and arrears, began to mutiny. The native princes viewed the transaction with the same eyes. The Dalwái of Mysore deplored the change with tears, and Sháh Nawáz Khán, on the part of Salábat Jang, announced that he saw no resource but in entering on terms with the English.⁹ M. Duplex himself received the notice of his removal with the same composure which he had displayed in all

⁷ Duplex, 103.⁸ Orme, i. 369.⁹ Duplex, 105 &c., with the documents there quoted.

CHAP.
VII.Octo-
ber 11,
A.D. 1764

his former reverses. He professed his readiness to afford every assistance to M. Godeheu. He wrote to entreat Bussy and Moracin to allow no change to diminish their zeal for the public service, and he pointed out to his successor the means which he conceived the best for obtaining on honourable terms the peace which was so much desired.¹ His plans, which were influenced by his own previous views, did not meet with the concurrence of M. Godeheu, and were rendered less practicable by the arrival of the English fleet and troops. A suspension of arms for three months was concluded between the Governors, and the negotiations for a permanent adjustment were renewed with fresh spirit.²

Three days after the signing of the suspension, M. Dupleix sailed for Europe. The pride and haughty demeanour of this great Governor, with his rigour in exacting duty, and the toils which his ambition imposed on all his officers, had made him many enemies among those subject to his authority. But these feelings were extinguished on his removal. The glory attained under his government was remembered, and every Frenchman agreed in considering his dismissal as the greatest misfortune that could have fallen on their nation. Later times have confirmed their judgment. We look with admiration on the founder of the European ascendancy in India, to whose genius the mighty changes which are now working in Asia owe their being; the first who made an extensive use of disciplined sepoys; the first who quitted the ports on the sea and marched an army into the heart of the continent; the first, above all, who discovered the illusion of the Mogul greatness, and turned to his own purposes

¹ Dupleix, 111.² Orme; Dupleix.

the awe with which weaker minds still regarded that gigantic phantom.

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VII.

His many great qualities were not without alloy. Though free from any act of atrocity, he showed in his official conduct a total disregard of the principles of morality and public law, with an insincerity and love of artifice degrading even to a character less elevated than his. It is said by Orme that he could not preserve his coolness when in the tumult of instant danger, but this deficiency (if it can be believed) was amply compensated by the courage with which he contemplated dangers of other descriptions at which the stoutest soldier might have trembled.³

By his accounts which he delivered to M. Godeheu, it appeared that he had expended for the public 300,000*l.* more than he had received. These funds were supplied from his private fortune, or from loans on his personal credit. The repayment was basely withheld by the Company; his services were forgotten by the Crown. The most he could obtain was a protection from the legal claims of his creditors, and, after nine years of soliciting and of litigation, he died, a memorable example of the ingratitude of a court and nation to whose glory his whole life had been devoted.

About the same time Lawrence quitted Trichinopoly, leaving Captain Kilpatrick in command of the garrison.

Middle of
October,
A D. 1754.

M. Godeheu and Mr. Saunders made so good a use of the time granted for a suspension of arms, that before the end of the year they had come to a settlement, as far as their powers allowed, and on January 11, 1755, when the suspension expired, they published a

January 11,
A D. 1755.

³ Dupleix, Appendices. For Orme's estimate of Dupleix's character, see i. 379.

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VII.

provisional treaty, to take effect if approved by the two Governments in Europe, and a truce to be observed until the decision of both their Governments was received.

The terms of the treaty were that the two Companies should renounce all Moorish⁴ government and dignity, and should never interfere in the disputes of native states ; and that all places in their possession not specified in the treaty should be given up to the Moors. In Tanjore the English were to retain Dévi Cóta, and the French Caricál. In the Carnatic the English were to retain Madras and Fort St. David, and the French Pondicherry, with a territory equal to that of the other two.

In the Northern Sircars the French had the option of retaining Masulipatam and giving up Divy to the English, or keeping Divy and giving up Masulipatam. In the other northern districts each party was to have an equal number of factories at spots fixed in the treaty. While the treaty remained under reference, neither nation was to procure any new grant or cession. The old fortifications of their establishments were to be kept from falling into decay, but no new ones were to be erected. The indemnities due to each nation for the expenses of the war were to be settled in the definitive treaty.

The truce provided that until a decision on the treaty was received from Europe, the French and English should not act against each other as principals or auxiliaries ; that they should restrain their native allies from carrying on hostilities against each other, and that both nations should unite against any of them, or any other power that should disturb the public tranquillity. Free communication for troops and mer-

⁴ [Mahometan, see ante, p. 7, note. — Ed.]

chandise was to be allowed throughout the Carnatic : commissaries to be appointed to settle disputes between the nations. All the English prisoners, and an equal number of the French, were to be released. By this last article the English retained 650 prisoners. But the territory in their possession was only valued at 100,000*l.* annual revenue, while that left to the French amounted to 855,000*l.*

If M. Dupleix had been properly supported from the first, it is not improbable that he would have placed his nation in the position since occupied by the English, and would have made good his threat to reduce Madras and Calcutta to their original state of fishing towns. But before this truce was concluded the prospects of the parties had materially altered. The English troops had acquired a great confidence in their own superiority. They had also many good officers ; while, except Bussy, the French had none of merit. M. Dupleix changed the commander of his field force six times in two years ; a proof of the defect alluded to, and not the way to remove it. The English, or Mohammed Ali, had nominal possession of almost the whole Carnatic, while the French were employed in the remote dominions of the viceroy, and were there endangered by internal discontents and powerful foreign enemies.

M. Godeheu and Mr. Saunders left India as soon as they had accomplished their task of peacemaking.

The Dalwái of Mysore refused to be bound by a truce to which he had never consented. He first endeavoured, by the offer of an immense bribe, to induce M. de Saussay, the French officer at Trichinopoly, to leave him to carry on hostilities, and afterwards returned to his old plans of getting possession of the town by intrigues with the garrison, but M. de Saussay,

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A.D. 1755.

with the same spirit of honour as before, gave immediate notice of his plots to Captain Kilpatrick. At length news reached him that his country was invaded at once by the Peshwa and Salabat Jang, each of whom came to claim tribute on his own account, on which he broke up his camp and returned to his own country after a fruitless labour of upwards of three years. He made over the island of Seringham to the French, with whom he kept up his alliance notwithstanding his retreat from the Carnatic.

February,
A.D. 1755.

So little had the English apprehended from the unassisted attacks of the Dalwái, that almost immediately after the proclamation of the truce, they had allowed the greater part of their field force at Trichinopoly to march with Mahfúz Khán, the nabob's brother, to reduce the countries of Madura and Tinivelly. The English force consisted of 500 Europeans and 2,000 natives, under the command of a Lieutenant-Colonel Heron who had just arrived from Europe, a man not wanting in courage, but as destitute of ability as of honour. Madura was still in the hands of the officer who had revolted in 1751, and fell without opposition. Tinivelly was afterwards occupied with equal ease. The principal duty remaining was to levy the arrears of tribute from the various Poligárs, or hill chiefs, of the country. These are the heads of forest tribes, comprehended under the name of Coleri, and resembling that class of the aborigines in other parts of India. They live by plunder, and are famous for the secrecy of their night attacks. By day they creep along the woods with a spear eighteen or twenty feet long trailing on the ground, and rush out on their enemy as he is marching off his guard, or harass him with firearms and missiles from under cover, taking all the advantages

which a woody and rocky country affords to a nimble body and cunning head.

Some of these tribes paid their tribute voluntarily and some by compulsion, but such was the corruption of Heron himself, and the licentious conduct of his men, infected by his example, that all classes were united in hatred of the invaders and in desire to revenge the injuries and insults they had suffered. Heron's force was at length recalled by the Madras Government, but before it reached Trichinopoly it had to pass through a long and narrow defile with steep sides clothed with thick woods. Here the Coleris had concealed themselves to await the arrival of the detachment. Heron, though apprised of their design, failed to profit by the warning; a portion of his line, with the baggage and rearguard, having been stopped by the breaking down of a tumbril, he allowed it to be separated from the rest of the column, which pursued its march without attending to the accident. The Coleris remained perfectly quiet until the main body was out of sight and hearing, when they started at once from the woods, and rushed on the rearguard with horrible screams and yells. Though repulsed on the attack, they continued to annoy the troops from under cover with arrows, matchlocks, rockets, javelins, and pikes. At length, after a momentary lull, the whole body made a rush at the baggage, stabbing the cattle with their long spears, and sparing neither age nor sex among the followers. The terrified crowd, driven back on the fighting men, prevented their using their arms in their defence, and the officer commanding had some difficulty in extricating them from the defile, with the loss of all the baggage and great part of the stores of the army. They reached Trichinopoly on June 5, when Colonel Heron was brought to trial

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and dismissed the service by the sentence of a court martial.

July 9,
A.D. 1755.

Notwithstanding this disgraceful termination of the campaign, Mahfúz Khán remained in possession of the open part of the two provinces, and probably continued to receive some portion of the tribute from the Poligárs. He was supported by a detachment of 1,000 English sepoy's under the command of a native officer. The northern part of the Carnatic, though not in revolt, was far from being in perfect obedience ; the nabob himself, accompanied by a British detachment, now marched from Trichinopoly for the purpose of restoring it to order. He first went to Arcot, which he had not visited since the death of Násir Jang, and made his entry in great pomp. He then repaired to Madras, and after some discussions with the Governor, he granted assignments on the revenue for the gradual payment of his debt to the Company, and as he still required assistance against some Poligárs in the north, it was settled that whatever tribute was recovered from them should be equally divided. A member of council accompanied the camp, to concert means for conducting this affair and such others as might arise.

October 10,
A.D. 1755.

When the monsoon drew near, Admiral Watson retired with his squadron, as he had done in the preceding year, to the coast of Malabar.

November 10,
A.D. 1755.

When he reached Bombay he found several ships, with a considerable body of troops arrived from England under the command of Colonel Clive. The troops were intended for an expedition to the Deccan.

The progress of M. Bussy had excited just alarm in England, and there seemed to be no better way of checking it than to assist the Marattas in their war against the viceroy. The plan was well conceived,

and the point for commencing it well chosen, as Bombay was contiguous to the Maratta territory and within less than 200 miles of Aurangábád. Before the expedition reached India, the truce had been concluded, and the Government of Bombay judged it necessary to suspend this hostile operation. The Government of Madras took a different view of the terms of the pacification, and strongly recommended proceeding with the original design, but before this opinion was received the Government of Bombay had employed the troops on another enterprise in their own neighbourhood.

The coast of Malabar had been celebrated from the time of the ancients for its piratical inhabitants. When Sévají took possession of the Concan, he employed this disposition of his new subjects against the Moguls and his other enemies. He built forts all along the coast, and sent out fleets which captured vessels at sea and made descents on the parts of the coast subject to Bījapúr. The forts were commanded by Marattas, and about twenty years after Sévají's death, the chief naval authority of the district was Cánojí Angria. The contest between Sévají's descendants which was raging at that period enabled Angria to disregard their authority, and although he continued to profess himself a servant of the state, he became in fact independent, and plundered on his own account without confining his depredations to the enemies of his nation. His head station, Colába, was within less than twenty miles of Bombay, and he had forts all down the coast of the Concan. He used to send out squadrons of eight or ten frigates of a peculiar construction, and forty or fifty galliots which carried light guns and could row as well as sail. With these vessels crowded with men, he surrounded and overpowered single ships of

A D. 1698.

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whatever size, and even on one occasion destroyed a Dutch squadron of three men-of-war, taking one and burning the others. The European nations, thus harassed by Angria, made several strenuous but unsuccessful attempts to put him down.

A.D. 1721. The most considerable in which the English engaged was an attack by land and sea on Ali Bágh, near Colába. It was made by four King's ships and several belonging to the Company, with a land force and a train of artillery from Bombay, to which was united a Portuguese army under the Viceroy of Goa in person. The confederates were repulsed in an attempt to take the place by escalade, fell out among themselves, and finally gave up the enterprise.

A.D. 1740. The Peshwa took advantage of some dissensions that followed the death of Cáoji, and secured the succession to one of that usurper's sons on condition of obedience to the Maratta Government.⁶ The chief thus set up was driven out after some years, and the Peshwa proposed to join with the English in an attack on his brother who had expelled him. The expedition went on well till the death of the Peshwa compelled the Marattas to withdraw.

These repeated failures discouraged the Bombay Government, and brought it to believe that Angria's strongholds were impregnable.

Their terror was first dissipated by Commodore James, of the Company's marine service, who was sent in 1755 to co-operate with a Maratta fleet and army in an attack on Severndrúg, but was specially instructed to confine his operations to the sea and not risk his ships by approaching any of the forts. James had only a forty-four-gun ship, a ketch of sixteen guns,

⁶ Vol. ii. 636.

and two bomb-vessels, but, finding the Maratta fleet useless, and the army little better, he took the responsibility of attacking Severndrúg himself, and by a severe cannonade and bombardment, which luckily set fire to the huts of the soldiers and blew up a magazine, he compelled the garrison to surrender, and frightened Angria's other governors into the evacuation of some places of less consequence. He returned to Bombay for the monsoon, and by the time the season was again opened, the Government found itself so strengthened by the arrival of Clive's detachment and the fleet under Admiral Watson, that they resolved to besiege Ghéria (or Vijeidrúg), which was now Angria's residence and his chief arsenal. The English had been twice defeated in attempts on this place in former times, and were cautious in attacking it even with the present great force. The expedition consisted of fourteen vessels, of which three were of the line and one a forty-four, with 800 Europeans and 1,000 sepoys under Clive.

When they reached Ghéria, they found the Maratta army had already arrived, after reducing most of Angria's other places.

Febru-
ary 11,
A.D. 1756.

As soon as the English fleet appeared, Túlají Angria, then head of the family, repaired to the Maratta camp, in the hopes of obtaining tolerable terms from his countrymen, but the commander immediately made him prisoner, and compelled him to give an order for the surrender of the fort to the Peshwa. The English, who had already agreed to divide the property in the place among themselves, were much dissatisfied with this proceeding, by which they would have been anticipated in their intended appropriation. To prevent its accomplishment, they sent ashore their land force, and distributed it in such a manner as to allow no

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intercourse between the camp and the garrison. Ghéria stands on a rock connected by a slip of sand with the mainland, and protects a large harbour in which Angria's fleet then lay. The ships drew close up to the place and commenced a furious cannonade and bombardment. The Maratta general, perceiving the design of the English to exclude him, endeavoured by a great bribe to induce a member of the Bombay Council (who accompanied the expedition) to suspend their operations, and afterwards tempted the fidelity of Captain Buchanan, who commanded the picket, by an offer of 8,000*l.* if he would allow him with a party to pass into the fort. Both offers were rejected with disdain; the English pressed their operations, and on the 13th the place surrendered. The fleet, together with two ships (one of forty guns) which were on the stocks, was burned during the attack. The English troops divided the captured property, amounting to 120,000*l.*, among themselves, reserving nothing for their own Government or their allies;⁷ and the Government of Bombay took advantage of some evasions by the Marattas of the terms agreed to at the time of the attack on Severndrúg, and insisted on retaining Ghéria,

⁷ The self-interest shown by these officers in their treatment of their allies did not influence their conduct among themselves. In settling the division of prize-money at Bombay, Clive was only assigned the share of a post-captain. When this was communicated to the military officers, they were offended at the little regard shown to their profession in the person of their commander, and urged Clive to insist on a more suitable share. Admiral Watson, to avoid further irritation, agreed to make up Clive's share to the amount demanded from his own prize money. When the division afterwards took place, he sent him the requisite sum, but Clive immediately returned it, with warm acknowledgments, and an assurance that, although he had deemed it necessary for preserving unanimity to acquiesce in the proposal, he had never entertained a thought of profiting by the admiral's disinterestedness. (*Ives's Voyage*; *Lord Clive's Evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, 1772, 146*).

which they had expressly promised to give up to the Peshwa.

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Túlají died in confinement many years after. Some member of his family had been set up in his place by the Peshwa, and enjoyed part of the possessions of the family, but no longer infested the seas as before.⁸

After this expedition, the fleet returned to Madras, accompanied by Clive and his force. Nothing very material had occurred in the Carnatic since the truce, but there had been disputes about the interpretation to be put on that convention which at one time ran so high as to threaten a renewal of hostilities. The aggression was chiefly on the part of the English; the principal instances were their attack on Madura and Tinivelly, which had at one time declared for Chanda Sáheb, and which had never recognised Mohammed Ali, and an attempt to besiege Vellór, the capital of Morteza Ali, whom the French still acknowledged as Nabob of the Carnatic.

March 12,
A.D. 1758.

These differences were accommodated, but the most irreconcilable differences relating to the observance of the truce arose from the nature of M. Bussy's situation in the Deckan.⁹

The occupation of the territory ceded in December 1753 did not prove a peaceful undertaking. Jfiár Ali Khán, the Mogul governor of part of the districts, and Vijeí Rám Ráz, a dependent zemindar of another portion, combined to resist the entrance of the new claimant. M. Moracin adroitly brought over Vijeí Rám by granting the farm of the whole of the cessions to him, and Jáfir Ali, thus deserted, called in the

⁸ Grant Duff's *History of the Marattas*, ii. 85-92. See also Orme, and Ives's *Voyage*.

⁹ Orme, i. 372.

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Berár Marattas, of whom Jánojí, the son of Ragují, was now chief. These invaders, after ravaging the country for some time, were driven out by M. Moracin with his small force of regulars joined to the troops of Vijei Rám. Jáfir Ali, on this, threw himself on the viceroy's clemency, was pardoned, and allowed to retain a jagir in the Upper Deckan.

During this time M. Bussy had been employed against the Náik (or Poligár) of Nírmal, a wild tract in the south-east of Berár inhabited by forest tribes, but as soon as that duty was performed, he set out for Masulipatam, and arrived there in July 1754. He found full occupation in reducing the half independent zemindars and levying tribute on the hill chiefs, until, in January 1755, he was summoned to join Salábat Jang on an expedition which he contemplated to recover his arrears of tribute from Mysore. This design involved M. Bussy in great embarrassment. The Rája of Mysore was in close alliance with the French, and yet M. Bussy was bound by the conditions on which he received the cessions to assist the viceroy against all enemies. His desire to preserve the reputation of a faithful ally to the viceroy did not (as he says) allow him to hesitate in joining his army, but he did so with the firm resolution of preserving the same reputation with the Rája of Mysore.¹ His expedient was to injure the Mysoreans as little as he could, and to use all his influence to bring about an accommodation. His double game was disturbed by the obstinacy of the Mysoreans. Several of their forts only surrendered on the appearance of the French ; others held out, and were not taken without bloodshed ; and when the invaders approached Seringapatam, the brother and

¹ *Mémoire pour Bussy*, 53.

colleague of the Dalwái, who resided there, announced his intention of defending the place to the last. All this time M. Bussy continued his endeavours to bring about a peace, and enforced his arguments by the rapidity with which he urged on the operations of the siege. It is probable he would have taken the town by assault in a few days, when the invasion of Mysore by the Peshwa brought a new motive for the submission of the besieged. M. Bussy engaged to procure the retreat of the Marattas, if the Mysoreans would satisfy the claims of Salábat Jang ; and the Mysoreans, pressed on all sides, agreed to pay arrears to the amount of fifty-six lacs of rupees. This was exactly double the amount due at the most liberal calculation, and a large portion was required to be paid immediately. The payment could only be made by giving up the jewels and plate belonging to the rája (including the ornaments of his women), as well as the same description of property belonging to the temples ; hostages were taken for the second payment, most of whom died in prison ; and M. Bussy speaks with more than usual complacency of the applause and gratitude expressed by both parties for this conciliatory arrangement.¹ By this time the Marattas were in some measure satiated with plunder, and the fear of a quarrel with the viceroy, added perhaps to some share of the money received at Seringapatam, induced the Peshwa to retire to his own frontier.²

The viceroy also returned to Heiderábád, where he arrived in July 1755.

The attack on Mysore by the French was contrary

¹ *Mémoire pour Bussy*, 54. The account of his proceedings is from Orme, i. 403, and Wilks, i. 346.

² Orme, i. 404, and for the pecuniary payment Grant Duff, ii. 66.

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to the spirit of the truce, and it so much alarmed the Madras Government that they called in the troops from Madura (as has been stated) for the defence of their own possessions. When they remonstrated with M. de Leyrit, the French Governor, they were told that the truce did not stipulate for the recall of M. Bussy, and in fact was only intended to provide for the tranquillity of the province of Arcot. The time soon came when this view of the question was favourable to the interests of the English, and the Government of Madras made it their chief argument in the discussion with that of Bombay, whether the troops sent from England under Clive could justly be employed in the Deckan during the existence of the truce. But though the exemption of the French army in the Deckan from the truce was insisted on at different times by both parties, it is difficult to find the least ground for the position. No exception is made in its favour in the truce, and the treaty plainly extends to it, since it assigns an equal number of factories to the French and English in the Northern Sircars, the whole of which were at this time in exclusive possession of the French.

In February 1755, Salábat Jang and M. Bussy marched against the Nabob of Sháhnúr (or Savanore) one of the three Patán nabobs, who had probably been left unmolested after the death of Mozaffer Jang, and now affected independence. His country is detached from that of the two other nabobs, and lies near the southern frontier of the Marattas, about 260 miles from Púna. Morár Ráo's fort of Guti lies 150 miles east of Sháhnúr, but his original seat of Són dúr is about half-way between those places. About the time when the viceroy marched against the Nabob of

Sháhnúr, the Peshwa Bálají Ráo moved from Púna to reduce Morár Ráo ; and as neither of the refractory chiefs was without apprehension on his own account from the enemy of the other, they formed a close connection, and Morár Ráo threw himself with a select body of troops into the town of Sháhnúr.

The viceroy and the Peshwa, on the other hand, united their armies, and supported as they were by the French, must soon have made themselves masters of the place. But Morár Ráo had a claim for about 150,000*l.* on the French Government, and had often applied for it to the Council at Pondicherry in a tone of menace which made them very anxious that it should be settled. He now offered to cancel this debt if M. Bussy would obtain for him the protection, or at least the neutrality, of the viceroi. Bussy closed with the offer, and the bonds were deposited with a common friend. On the other hand (says M. Bussy), Bálají Ráo appealed to the faith of treaties and his alliance with the French nation : it was necessary to serve one party in affecting to serve the other, while the viceroy (by whom M. Bussy was subsidised) wished that no service should be done to either.⁴ The boldness with which M. Bussy managed these conflicting engagements would have been admirable in an honest cause. Instead of retarding hostilities, he pushed them on with the greatest vigour, and exulted when he saw the siege of Sháhnúr about to open, and all parties reduced to dependence on his military skill and resources. He was then chosen arbiter by all ; he dictated the conditions of the peace,

⁴ ' D'un autre côté, Balajírao réclamoit la foi des traités et l'alliance de la nation Française. Il falloit servir l'un et affecter de servir l'autre. Des vœux du dordar étoient de ne servir aucun des deux.' (*Mémoire*, 57.)

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and it was concluded (says he), to the glory of the French name and the satisfaction of all parties.⁵

This satisfaction was not quite so general as M. Bussy describes it, and an opposite feeling almost immediately led to a rupture of the French connection with the viceroy.

Sháh Náwáz Khán had watched the whole of the preceding negotiations, but abstained from all interference, and saw with pleasure M. Bussy involving himself in transactions which must destroy all reliance on his fidelity. Not long before the present campaign, M. Bussy had undertaken to exert his irresistible influence in procuring the government of Burhánpúr for one of the French Company's creditors on his renouncing his debt of 12,000*l.* or 13,000*l.* M. Bussy (as he truly observes) might have sold this patronage on his own account, and the use he made of it was a proof of his public zeal; but, admitting the most perfect personal integrity on his part, he had many parties to conciliate for his nation, and it is not to be supposed that all his native agents were as disinterested as himself. We may therefore imagine how burdensome his ascendancy was to the minister, and how general must have been the hatred borne to him by all who looked to promotion from the court. A strong party was thus formed against the French, the real heads of which were Sháh Náwáz Khán and Jáfir Ali Khán, the displaced governor of the Northern Sircars. By their means the viceroy was impressed with a conviction that his interests both in the Deckan and the Carnatic were sacrificed to the separate views of the French, and he was induced to give his consent to the removal of the troops of that nation from his service. Bálahí was also

⁵ *Mémoire*, 57.

applied to for assistance in expelling these intruders from the Deckan, and joyfully agreed to a measure which would have left the viceroy at his mercy. He even entertained hopes of engaging the dismissed French to take service in his own army.

After this co-operation had been settled, and the additional precaution of assassinating M. Bussy had been considered and laid aside, the dismissal of the French was announced to them, together with an order for their immediate departure from the viceroy's territories. M. Bussy, though astonished at this sudden revolution, took a calm view of his situation. Threatened by so great a force, and at such a distance from his resources, he saw that his only safe course was to yield to circumstances and to wait for some favourable change. He therefore affected ready acquiescence, and marched off with his army, professedly for Masulipatam. He had been promised in the viceroy's name to be allowed to retire unmolested, but found himself followed by a body of 6,000 Marattas belonging to the viceroy's *jágírdárs* of that nation,⁶ and as the zemindars of the country were ordered to obstruct his passage, he was harassed during the whole of a month's march which he was obliged to make before he found a ford over the Kishna. A greater danger now awaited him in the approach of Jáfir Ali, who had been despatched in pursuit of him with 25,000 horse and foot, and who came up just as he had crossed the Kishna. But the river rose soon after the

May,
A.D. 1756.

⁶ Orme supposes these horse to have been the Peshwa's, and sent by Bálají, from a high chivalrous feeling, to protect Bussy's retreat. Wilks believes the fact, but tries to find more probable motives. But Bussy mentions no such allies; on the contrary, he expressly states that Bálají joined in the confederacy against him; and Grant Duff, from the family names of the chiefs, proves beyond doubt that they were the viceroy's *jágírdárs*, the same who soon after attacked M. Bussy at Heiderábád.

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French had forded, and it was fifteen days before Jáfir Ali could effect his passage. M. Bussy's force consisted of 200 European cavalry, 600 European infantry, and 5,000 well-disciplined sepoys, with a well-appointed train of artillery. With such troops he could easily have gained a battle over any force that could be brought against him, but there were still upwards of 200 miles of poor country between him and Masulipatam, and it would be easy for the enemy to cut off his provisions, which already began to fail. This last circumstance, and the want of money to pay the troops, produced sickness among the Europeans and discontent and desertion among the sepoys. On the whole it appeared to M. Bussy to be the most prudent course to prosecute his retreat no further, but to adopt the bold measure of seizing on Heiderábád, and standing on the defensive in the viceroy's own capital. He encamped near that city in the middle of June, and as the garrison was too weak to resist him, he was allowed a friendly communication with the town, and enabled to raise some money among the bankers to relieve his immediate wants. But the governor was son-in-law to Jáfir Ali, and animated with the same hostility to the European intruders. All danger from him was removed by his assassination at an interview with Rúmi Khán, one of M. Bussy's principal interpreters; Rúmi Khán was killed on the same occasion, and the whole catastrophe is ascribed by Orme to a sudden quarrel. It is alleged with much greater probability by a native historian⁷ to have been the contrivance of Heider Jang, M. Bussy's Díwán, who sent four assassins to the conference unknown to the unfortunate interpreter, on whom this act of perfidy was avenged. After this M. Bussy remained master of the

⁷ Translated in Hollingberry's *History of Nizám Ali Khán*, 4.

town. The next event of consequence was the arrival of the Maratta jágirdárs, whose numbers were now doubled. They summoned Bussy to give up such of his guns as belonged to the viceroy, together with the emblems of his Mogul dignities. On these conditions they promised to allow him to proceed to Masulipatam. Bussy rejected their demand, and some success against a reconnoitring party having encouraged them to raise their terms, he broke off all negotiation and thought only of defence. He occupied the garden of the last king of Golconda, an extensive enclosure with high walls, containing a large reservoir of water, and palaces which afforded quarters for the troops. It was separated from the city by the river Músi, but M. Bussy stationed a strong party at a near point within the city walls, in an ancient and substantial building, the terrace of which was so solid as to allow four eighteen-pounders to be mounted on it. At the same time he seized on all the viceroy's magazines, and removed the cannon from the walls to his own quarters.

CHAP.
VII.June 26,
A.D. 1756.July 5,
A.D. 1756.

At length Jáfir Ali came up, and his first design was to attack the city, but M. Bussy mounted some guns of small calibre on the terrace of an archway that overlooked the town, and not only threatened to cannonade the surrounding houses, but to set fire to the whole if any attempt was made by the viceroy's troops to pass the gates. This menace succeeded ; the attack on the town was given up, and the operations continued in the open country by a succession of surprises, skirmishes, and field actions at which the romantic adventures of Trichinopoly seem to be renewed.

A great change took place in M. Bussy's situation when 4,000 sepoy's in the viceroy's service arrived in Jáfir Ali's camp. They were raised, disciplined, and

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commanded by Mozaffer Khán, a native officer of French sepoys who had gone over to the Peshwa in 1751, and had since successively transferred his services and those of his corps to the Rájá of Mysore, the Nabob of Sháhnúr, and after the quarrel with the French, to the viceroy. He still retained great influence with the French sepoys, and had kept up a correspondence with some of their officers. On the very day of his arrival near Heiderábád, a whole company went out on pretence of exercising, and marched straight with shouldered arms to his camp; and a continuance of his intrigues, joined to the previous distress and discontent of the sepoys, produced a spirit of defection of the most alarming character. The knowledge of this feeling emboldened the Moguls, and determined M. Bussy to keep within his walls until he should be joined by reinforcements which were now near at hand. He had earnestly applied for additional troops from the time of his march from Sháhnúr, and had likewise employed the French agent at Surat to entertain 600 Arabs and Abyssinians for his service. The latter body was destroyed by the viceroy's troops while on its way to join him, but a force of 480 Europeans and 1,100 sepoys, with eleven pieces of cannon, from Pondicherry and Masulipatam, were assembled at the latter place and marched about the end of July, under the command of M. Law. On August 10 this detachment had arrived within fifteen leagues of Heiderábád, and on the 11th they renewed their march through a woody and rocky country which obliged them to narrow their front and confine themselves to the beaten road. While advancing in this manner, they perceived signs of the approach of an enemy. Sixteen thousand horse (12,000 of whom were Maratta jágirdárs), and 10,000 infantry commanded by

Mozaffer Khán, had been sent out to intercept them, and it was their parties which were now descried. The advanced guard of the French consisted of 400 sepoy, commanded by a native officer named Mahmúd Khán. He no sooner came in sight of the enemy than he quickened his pace as if impatient to engage them, and was soon seen to join their ranks and unite in the attack on his old masters. Nothing of much consequence was attempted during the rest of that day. Next morning the French found the enemy in possession of a village which they proceeded to attack. The whole of the enemy's cavalry surrounded them, and presented a very threatening aspect to troops about to be engaged in front. But M. Bussy had opened a negotiation with the two greatest of the Maratta jágirdárs. He had had a secret interview with them the night before they marched, and, by means not ascertained, prevailed on them to promise that they would not act against the detachment further than was required to save appearances. Favoured by this understanding, the French carried the village and halted there for the rest of the day. But that part of the cavalry which remained faithful to its duty had in the meantime attacked their baggage and seized or dispersed the oxen by which it was carried. In consequence of this misfortune, the French lost all their provisions and were obliged to kill some of the draught bullocks of their artillery before they could get a meal. They marched at night, and before morning made out fifteen miles to Meliapúr. The road was peculiarly difficult, and they were harassed by the infantry during the whole march, so that, although they had sustained scarcely any loss, they were fatigued and exhausted by the time they reached Meliapúr. At this village they halted to refresh, but the leisure thus afforded left time

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for gloomy reflections. The loss of their baggage ; the uncertain attachment of their sepoys ; the difficulty of the country which they had still to traverse, and the neighbourhood of the enemy's main body indicated by the increasing number of their opponents, disheartened both men and officers. They thought it impossible to proceed unless assisted from Heiderábád, and prevailed on M. Law to represent their danger to M. Bussy.

M. Bussy had that day made a diversion in their favour by a partial attack on the grand camp made with Europeans alone, but he was afraid to divide his force in present circumstances or to trust his sepoys in the neighbourhood of Mozaffer Khán. He never showed greater decision than in this critical juncture. He sent positive orders in the King's name to M. Law to march at all events on the receipt of his letter, and he crossed the Músi with all the troops he could trust, so as to alarm the enemy with the prospect of a general attack.

August 14,
A.D. 1756.

M. Law had gained little rest for his troops by the halt at Meliapúr, having been harassed night and day by the attacks of the enemy. As soon as he received M. Bussy's letter, he issued orders for marching at nightfall. He had a narrow defile to pass, which was lined with scattered infantry, and he was assailed by the cavalry wherever there was an opening for them to charge. His troops were thrown into some confusion, but their flanks were in some degree protected by the defile, and, as they had no baggage, they continued to move on at a rapid pace. When they reached the mouth of the defile, they found twenty pieces of cannon drawn up to bear on them. They were, however, ill-pointed and ill-served, and were soon silenced by

the French artillery. In the open country they had to fear the charges of the cavalry, but the backwardness of the friendly *jágírdárs* discouraged the rest, and at five in the afternoon they reached *Heiátnagar*, within six miles of *Heiderábád*, after eighteen hours of incessant marching and fighting. Here M. Bussy sent a detachment to reinforce them, and what was still more acceptable, a supply of provisions ready dressed. On the next day they entered *Heiderábád*, having lost in the last day ninety Europeans killed and wounded, and a greater number of *sepoys*. The whole march from the frontier did great honour to M. Law, and gives an unfavourable impression of the *Nizam's* troops, even when supported by disciplined *sepoys*. *Salábat Jang* and *Sháh Náwáz Khán* had arrived in camp about a fortnight before this crisis, and on the same day on which the reinforcement entered, they sent proposals of peace to M. Bussy.

August 15,
A.D. 1756.

Both parties were disposed to an accommodation. M. Bussy did not require the removal of *Sháh Náwáz*; *Jáfir Ali* came to Bussy of his own accord, and was reconciled after frankly acknowledging his error. *Mozaffer Khán* and *Mahmúd Khán* were ordered to separate from the viceroy's camp. *Mahmúd* soon after was taken prisoner by the French, but was pardoned in consideration of his former services. *Mozaffer* entered the service of *Bálají Ráo*, and was afterwards put to death for his share in a conspiracy.

Thus ended a long train of dangers from which M. Bussy owed his deliverance to his admirable resolution and ability. He had an interview with *Salábat Jang*, and was received, if possible, with more respect and apparent affection than ever. His rank and honours were fixed as high as they ever had been,

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but he no longer attempted to exercise the complete control which he formerly possessed over the government of the Deckan.

The sudden submission of Salábat Jang must doubtless have been in part occasioned by his own irresolution, and the failure of all the expectations held out by his minister, but it is probable that it was chiefly produced by events which were taking place in a distant quarter. From the first moment of the rupture with M. Bussy, Sháh Náwáz Khán had been soliciting assistance from the Madras Presidency. It was only by the aid of English troops that he could hope finally to expel the French, or to make head against the Marattas after this separation from his former protectors.

The English had entered into these views, and had prepared a detachment for the support of their new ally, when the intelligence of the total subversion of their establishment in Bengal compelled them to renounce all other objects, and turn their whole power to revenge the disgrace of their nation, and to afford immediate protection to the survivors of their countrymen.

July 15,
A.D. 1756.

The news of this calamity reached Madras a month before the viceroy's overtures to the French, and must have been still earlier known at Heiderábád by direct communications from Bengal. It at once destroyed all hope from the English, and scarcely left an alternative for the viceroy but to renew his alliance with the French.

The war with the French in the Carnatic has been described with more minuteness than will henceforward be required. It was the contest which decided the fate of India, and the school in which the system of

war and policy pursued by European nations in that country was formed.

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The military establishment of each Presidency at first consisted of a very small number of Europeans, who were reinforced in times of danger by native matchlockmen hired for the occasion, and by the inhabitants serving as militia. It soon became the practice to arm these men with European firelocks, but when they were first taught to move and act together, and by word of command, has not been recorded.⁸

In 1682 (as has been mentioned) the Bombay Government had repeatedly pressed on the Court of Directors the necessity of sending out European officers to train up and exercise the militia, but it does not appear that their request was complied with. The common opinion is, that disciplined sepoy were first introduced by the French ; it was certainly the French that soonest employed them extensively, and made them an important part of every army. Four hundred men of this description served at the siege of Madras in 1746, while the English had only irregulars to oppose them. In 1747 a detachment of 100 sepoy arrived from Bombay, together with 400 from Telicherry ; which would lead us to conclude that such troops had already been trained on the coast of Malabar, but we do not know to what extent these sepoy were disciplined. At the siege of Pondicherry in 1749 the English had 1,100 sepoy, scarcely better disciplined than the common foot soldiers of the country. The English sepoy made little figure until the rise of Clive. They first distinguished themselves in the defence of Arcot, up to which time they appear to have been very inferior to

⁸ iii. 145.

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the French sepoys. Even at the close of the first siege of Trichinopoly, the best sepoys in the English service were those who had come over from the French.⁹

But about this time the English sepoys began to assume a superiority which they afterwards retained, and to be favourably contrasted with their rivals both in spirit and fidelity.

The earliest sepoys probably wore the native dress, with turbans of a uniform colour. The progress was very gradual, until they assumed the red jacket and a glazed cap on the model of a turban, and, after many changes, arrived at the close resemblance in dress to European soldiers which they now exhibit.¹

The command of large bodies of sepoys was at first entrusted to natives, and they seem to have had corresponding rank. Mohammed Eusof was second in command to Colonel Heron, though many European officers must have been present. The trust seems to have been too great a trial for the natives at that time. Mozaffer Khán and Mahmúd Khán carried off their troops from the French army in the Deccan. Ibrahim Khán (known by the name of Gárdi, a corruption from the French 'Garde') deserted in like manner about 1758, gained great reputation under the Marattas, and was killed at

⁹ Orme, i. 234.

¹ The translator of the *Seir ul Motakherin* (a French convert to the Mahometan religion), who wrote in 1789, gives the following account of the French sepoys of early times, who, he says, scarcely bore a resemblance to the English sepoys of his own day. 'The French could neither change their dress, or clothe them uniformly, or keep their arms in order, or punish them, or prevent their firing away their ammunition at the new moon, or pay them themselves, or bring them under the least restraint or discipline. They were a rabble with immense turbans and immense trousers; with muskets so ill-used that not one in twenty was in order.' (*Seir ul Motakherin*, iii. 152, note.)

Pániput. Mohammed Eusof himself revolted from the English, as will appear hereafter, but no sepoy under the exclusive command of natives ever seem to have approached the efficiency of those commanded by Europeans. Intermediate between the sepoy and the Europeans, were at one time a class called To passes. They were mixed descendants or converts of the Portuguese ; they did not object to wear the European dress or submit to discipline, and though not superior to other natives, were classed with Europeans.² They were employed in Bombay as early as 1683.³

We can imagine the degraded state of the early Europeans, employed on low wages, as watchmen rather than soldiers, in small and scattered factories. When their numbers increased, they were still the lowest or most desperate of the population of the capital,⁴ until the exploits of the Company's army and the reports of the wealth of India drew young men of adventurous disposition into their ranks. The recruits had little or no training until they were sent on board ship, and

² Orme, i. 80.

³ Orme's *Fragments*, 130.

⁴ [In the early days of the Company they are said to have gladly accepted for service felons who were respited from capital punishment on condition of their being sent to the East Indies, but after the middle of the last century they resolutely refused to accept them, though much pressed by the Treasury. There is much correspondence in the India Office relating to the respiting of convicts in former days, which is noticed in the first of a series of papers lately published on 'Some of the India Office Records.' A letter of St. John is quoted showing how strongly the Government of the day insisted on convicts being sent to the East Indies. It is dated January 1, 1711 : 'Gentlemen,—Having last night in Cabinet Council acquainted y^e Queen with your desire that she would be pleased to permit Thomas Abraham to be transported to the West Indies, Her Majesty has commanded me to let you know she was induced by your former application to spare his life provided he was sent to y^e East Indies and sufficient security given y^t he shall never return into her dominions, but y^t she will not consent to pardon him on any other condition.—I am, gentlemen, &c., H. ST. JOHN.'—ED.]

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probably marched off into the field before they had ever manœuvred even on a parade. Some of the officers sent from England had seen service in the British or foreign armies, but others were inexperienced ; and many young civil servants joined the troops in India. Their frequent panics, interspersed with instances of romantic courage, show the unsteadiness of raw troops combined with the ardour of early conquerors. As they acquired experience their bad qualities disappeared, and they became models of spirit and intrepidity. In these respects they were probably not surpassed, if equalled, by any soldiers more regularly disciplined and acting with great armies.

As the war advanced, an improvement took place in the members of the civil government. They were obliged to learn something of the state of the native powers ; some of the councillors had served with the troops, and the Commander-in-Chief always formed one of the number. If they still retained a portion of the narrow views of mere traders, they were incomparably superior to their predecessors in the time of the Childs, or to their contemporaries in the peaceful factories of Bengal. Scarcely any of either service spoke the native languages. The confined use of Hindostani, and the number and difficulty of the local languages, discouraged this sort of knowledge, and till the beginning of the present century it was not unusual on the Madras establishment to communicate with the natives through interpreters.

It does not appear that the French were much more advanced. Madame Dupleix's knowledge of the native language is mentioned as an important qualification,⁵ and Bussy did not begin to learn that language until he

⁵ *Lawrence's Narrative.*

was established in the Deckan.⁶ But the disposition of M. Dupleix individually, and perhaps that of his countrymen, combined with the number as well as the power and magnificence of the princes with whom they were connected to promote a greater taste for Indian manners among the French than the English had any opportunity of acquiring from the fugitive adherents of Mohammed Ali.

The Oriental splendour of M. Dupleix has been often mentioned.⁷ That of M. Bussy was at least as conspicuous. This able officer maintained a constant intercourse with the natives of rank, and might be reckoned among the greatest of the noblemen of the court of Heiderábád. He entered into the intrigues and transactions of those around, and seemed as great a master of their peculiar sort of policy as if he had been brought up at an Indian darbár.

The English in general maintained their natural reserve, with the plainness of their manners, and seem to have had little acquaintance and taken very little interest in any natives except their own sepoys.⁸

⁶ *Mémoire pour Bussy*, 17.

⁷ [This he maintained to the last. Orme says that on his supercession by M. Godeheu, that gentleman 'permitted him to continue the exhibition of those marks of Moorish dignity, which both Muzaffér Jang and Salábat Jang had permitted him to display when they appointed him Nabob of the Carnatic. These were of various flags and ensigns, various instruments of military music, particular ornaments for his palankeen, a Moorish dress distinguished likewise with ornaments peculiar to the nabobship; and in this equipage he went with great solemnity to dine with M. Godeheu on the feast of St. Louis,' i. 368.—Ed.]

⁸ The contrast of manners asserted in the text is well described by the French translator of the *Seir ul Motakherín*, iii. 150. 'If any one,' says he, 'had seen M. de Bussy and Colonel Clive or Mr. Hastings in the height of their power and influence, he may have taken from those two or three individuals a pretty good idea of the different geniuses of the French and English nations. M. de Bussy always wore (in 1750 and 1755) embroidered clothes or brocade, with an embroi-

*NOTE ON THE DOCUMENTS PRODUCED BY THE
NATIVE PRINCES IN SUPPORT OF THEIR
TITLES.*

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The following is an account of the pretensions of the native princes, and the documents by which they were supported.

The Mogul was at one time absolute master of all the countries under discussion, but the destruction of his power, and the successful rebellion of Asaf Jah, made the latter in many respects an independent power, and entitled his family to succeed, under a certain form, to his newly acquired dominions. The form was a confirmation by the Emperor, which all

dered hat, and on days of ceremony embroidered shoes of black velvet. He was seen in an immense tent, full sufficient for six hundred men, of about thirty feet in elevation; at one end of this tent he sat on an arm-chair, embroidered with his king's arms, placed upon an elevation, which last was covered by a crimson carpet of embroidered velvet. At his right and left, but upon back chairs only, sat a dozen of his officers. Over against him, his French guard on horseback, and behind these his Turkish guards. His table, always in plate, was served with three, often with four, services. To this French magnificence he added all the parade and pageant of Hindoostany manners and customs. A numerous set of tents; a pish-ghana;* always on an elephant himself, as were all his officers. He was preceded by chopdars on horseback, and by a set of musicians singing his feats of chivalry, with always two head chopdars reciting his eulogium. Colonel Clive always wore his regimentals in the field, was always on horseback, and never rode in a palanquin; he had a plentiful table, but no ways delicate, and never more than two services. He used to march mostly at the head of the column, with his aide-de-camps, or was hunting, at the right and left. He never wore silks but in town. Governor Hastings always wore a plain coat of English broadcloth, and never anything like lace or embroidery. His whole retinue a dozen of horse-guards; his throne a plain chair of mahogany, with plenty of such thrones in the hall; his table sometimes neglected; his diet sparing, and always abstemious; his address and deportment very distant from pride, and still more so from familiarity.'

* [Pesh khana, tents and retinue sent in advance.—ED.]

parties admitted to be essential to their title, resting their claims more on that confirmation than on their relationship to Asof Jáh. Considering the matter in this view, the first in descent was Gházi-u-dín Khán ; but he did not at first receive an appointment from the Mogul, and the title passed to his next brother, Násir Jang, who had the Emperor's authority as well as actual possession. When Násir Jang was killed, Gházi-u-dín Khán procured a regular patent and investiture, and became in all respects the legal viceroy. His natural rights descended on his death to his son, Gházi-u-dín the younger, but they formed an imperfect title unless they were confirmed by the Mogul. The next in succession was Salábat Jang, and after him, his three surviving brothers. If Mozaffer Jang had survived all these princes, he would have had the next claim to consideration, as representing their sister, his mother. At the time of the negotiation at Sadrás, Gházi-u-dín the younger had not been confirmed, and although Salábat Jang produced an alleged appointment from the Mogul, yet the authenticity of it was very doubtful,⁹ and until that was proved there was no legal viceroy. Salábat Jang, however, was in full possession.

The claims of the Nabobs of the Carnatic depended on those of the viceroys. The family of Saádat Ullah, having been forty years in possession, had an hereditary hold on public opinion, but they never pretended to be independent of the viceroy, and the last of them that held the office was removed by Asof Jáh in person. Whatever claim they possessed was now vested in Ali Dóst Khán, the only surviving son of Safder Khán, for Morteza Ali (though the nephew of Saádat Ullah) was not in the direct line, and had only inherited his appa-

⁹ See ii. 612.

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nage of Vellór ; the title now put forward by him rested entirely on a patent from Salábat Jang appointing him nabob in subordination to M. Dupleix. Chanda Sáheb and his son, as well as M. Dupleix, claimed solely on the ground of patents from Mozaffer Jang and Salábat Jang, confirmed, it was said, in M. Dupleix's case, by the Great Mogul.

Mohammed Ali had not the shadow of an hereditary claim. His father, Anwar-u-dín, only held the office of nabob for four years, and had besides a lawful son, Mahfúz Khán, older than Mohammed Ali, who was illegitimate. His title rested on an alleged promise from Asof Jáh, and on patents which he professed to possess from Násir Jang, Gházi-u-dín, and finally from the Emperor himself. We are next to examine the patents on which so much stress is laid.

Of the seven documents produced by the French in support of their party, six were copies, and their authenticity was disputed on that account. There can be no doubt, however, that they were genuine, for they were all from Mozaffer Jang and Salábat Jang, who would have granted anything the French desired. The real objection to these documents was the want of right in the grantor.

The seventh was said to be an original letter from the Great Mogul to M. Dupleix, recommending Salábat Jang to his favour and protection.

This letter had neither seal nor signature, except a small signet attached by a string to the bag in which the letter was contained. On this seal were the words 'The kingdom is God's, 3, 1133.' The first number is the king's reign and the second the Hijra, which fixes the date of the seal in the third year of Mohammed Sháh, Hij. 1133, A.D. 1721, many years before the death of

Asof Jáh. It may therefore fairly be inferred that the signet had been transferred from some old letter and attached to a recent forgery. When called to account for this inconsistency, he coolly replied that the letter he had sent was only a duplicate and might have had an old seal attached to it owing to some negligence in the Great Mogul's secretaries, but that he was ready to exhibit the original, which bore the date of the fifth year of the reign of the present Emperor and 1163 of the Hijra.

Even here was another mistake, for the fifth year of the reign of Ahmed Sháh was in 1166 Hij.

Mohammed Ali's papers were not produced, but by his own account they consisted of a patent from Násir Jang, another from Gházi-u-dín the elder, together with a letter from the Great Mogul procured by Gházi-u-dín the younger. The two first were probably authentic, but were liable to be set aside by Salábat Jang if he should succeed in proving his own appointment, and it is most probable that Mohammed Ali fabricated the royal letter as a precaution against such a contingency. In the then state of Delhi, it is not likely that such a document would be issued without a considerable payment which Mohammed Ali had not the means of procuring, and his delay in exhibiting his documents affords further ground of suspicion.

CHAPTER VIII.

WAR IN BENGAL. PLASSY.

Affairs of Bengal—Rise of Ali Verdi Khán—Succession of Suráj-u-Doula—His character—His dispute with the English authorities at Calcutta—Attacks the settlement—Abandonment of the place by the Governor and principal inhabitants—Surrender of the garrison—The Black Hole—Expedition from Madras under Clive—Recovery of Calcutta—War with France—Chandernagór—Clive attacks the Nabob's camp—Alarm of Suráj-u-Doula—Agrees to terms of peace—Negotiations with the French—Capture of Chandernagór—The Nabob threatens war—Some of his chiefs make overtures to the English—Decision of the Council to support Mír Jáfir—Battle of Plassy—Mír Jáfir assumes the Government of Bengal—Large payments of money—Remarks on the conduct of Clive—Weakness of the new Government at Murshidábád—Affairs on the coast of Coromandel—Expedition to the French possessions—Appearance of Prince Ali Gohan on the frontier—Advance of Clive and retreat of the prince—Clive's jágírs—Dutch expedition from Batavia arrives in the Hughli—Attacked by English troops—Clive returns to England.

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
AT the time of the war with the English in 1688, the Viceroy of Bengal was Sháista Khán, maternal uncle of Aurangzib.¹ He was succeeded by Azím-u-Shán, grandson of the same monarch. On the death of his father, Buhádur Sháh, Azím-u-Shán contested the crown with his brothers and was killed in battle.² The successful competitor conferred the government of Bengal on Jáfir Khán who was already in charge of the province as deputy to Azím-u-Shán. Farokhsir, the son of the last-named prince, fled to Behár and was afterwards raised to the throne.³ One of his first acts was to appoint a viceroy on his own part to Bengal. Jáfir Khán

¹ See Book xi. chap. ii. of former history.

² See ii. 567.

³ See ii. 569.

PART OF BENGAL & BEHAR.



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resisted and defeated the new viceroy, but did not abate in his professions of respect to the Emperor. By these means he obtained a confirmation of his appointment, and continued to send tribute and to profess the usual obedience. The confusions which ensued on the murder of Fârokhsîr left him at leisure to consolidate his power, and every day rendered it more difficult to dispossess him. But his province was contiguous to those still in reality attached to the court of Delhi, and was not influenced by the neighbourhood of foreign enemies. He did not therefore openly throw off his allegiance, like the Viceroy of the Deckan, but was contented to enjoy his independence subject to the usual payments and the usual relation to the Emperor.

He was a vigorous and able ruler, but tyrannical, bigoted, and rapacious. His exactions and his exclusion of the zemindars from all share in collecting the revenue had great effects on the administration of Bengal down to modern times. Jâfir Ali wished to have left his power to Sirâfrâz Khân (the son of his daughter who was married to Shujâ Khân, a native of the Deckan), but Shujâ Khân seized on the government for himself, procured a patent from Delhi, and afterwards obtained the annexation of the province of Behâr to those of Bengal and Orissa. These patents were probably obtained by money; they only gave to the possessor a sanction to use his own means for occupying the so-called office.

Shujâ Khân, though a better governor than his father-in-law, had not the same energy. He took little share in the details of the administration, and was guided by the counsels of Hâji Ahmed and Ali Verdi Khân, and of two Hindûs, the Râi Râiân and Jaggat Sét. The two first of these advisers were brothers, natives of Delhi, of a Persian family. Both were bold

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intriguers and able ministers, but Ali Verdi joined to the talents of his brother a greater fitness for military command. The Rái Ráin had been accountant to Shujá Khán's household, and was raised on his accession to the charge of the finances of Bengal. Jaggat Sét⁴ was a banker of a wealthy family, who had long been the chief of the profession in Murshidábád, and had for two generations been bankers to the viceroy, an office of much importance with states which are obliged so frequently to anticipate their revenue.

A.D. 1739.

When Shujá Khán obtained the government of Behár he appointed Ali Verdi his deputy, and procured him honours from Delhi which gave him some pretensions to a direct connection with the Emperor. On Shujá Khán's death, Siráfráz Khán obtained the inheritance so long ago designed for him. He seems to have been a man of slender capacity, and wasted his time between the society of his women and the devotional observances of his religion. He contracted a natural jealousy of his father's ministers, whose power prevented his attempting to throw off their control, but did not restrain him from irritating them by personal offences and alarming them by his ill-concealed enmity.

A.D. 1740.

In these circumstances, Ali Verdi contrived to obtain patents in his own name from Delhi, and marched with an army to dispossess his master. Siráfráz showed no want of spirit, and was zealously supported by the army of his province. He was killed in action, at a time when the battle seemed to lean to his side, and his fall placed Ali Verdi in undisturbed possession of the vice-royalty.

⁴ Jaggat Sét is a title. The name of the first who bore it was Manik Chand. He held the office of *Nagar Sét*, or head banker of the city, and received from the Emperor the title of *Jaggat Sét*, head banker of the world.

The first attention of the new prince was directed to obtaining the confirmation of the court of Delhi. The sums he is said to have paid on the occasion are evidently exaggerated :⁵ that he made any payment at all, at a time when Nádir Sháh had just quitted the capital, is explained by the fact that most of the money went to the Púna Marattas to purchase their aid against those of Berár. Some present to the Emperor and some bribes to his ministers were the price of their mediation with the Marattas.⁶

Ali Verdi (better known in Bengal by his title of Mohábat Jang) was the last Nabob of Bengal who maintained for any length of time the semblance of power and independence. For this reason his memory is still highly respected in the province, where a strong impression is maintained of his military and political abilities; but in war he showed more activity than talent, and in politics his chief reliance was on the vulgar expedients of fraud and assassination. His great enemy was Ragojí Bósla,⁷ and as that prince was engaged in important contests and remote expeditions in the Deckan, and had to send his armies through 500 or 600 miles of almost uninhabited forest into Bengal, a province of which a large portion was protected by the Ganges, and the rest ill-fitted for the operations of cavalry, it is much more to be wondered at that he should be able to persevere in his enterprise than that Ali Verdi should oppose a long resistance to his designs. For the first ten years of the government of the latter, scarcely a year passed without a visit from the Marattas,

⁵ *The Persian History of Bengal*, translated by M. Gladwin, makes the amount 540,000*l.* (175). *The Seir ul Motalcherín* says a million sterling in money and 700,000*l.* in jewels, besides other sums, making in all about two millions.

⁶ See ii. Book xii. chap. iii. 641. ⁷ See ii. Book xii. chap. iii. 641-2.

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who sometimes settled for more than one season within Bengal, and who ravaged the country far and wide, multiplying their apparent numbers by the celerity of their motions. At length Ali Verdi gave way. He ceded the province of Cattac to Ragojí, and consented to pay 120,000*l.* a year under the name of the *Chout* of Bengal. During his war with the Marattas he had been engaged in other disturbances, proceeding from a quarrel with the Afghán troops, the only efficient part of his army, in which he was at length successful after a contest carried on with equal perfidy and ferocity on both sides.

From his peace with Ragojí in 1751 to his death in 1756 he enjoyed a period of tranquillity and had no difficulty in transmitting his power to his favourite grand-nephew, Suráj-u-Doula. His reputation with posterity was no doubt increased by the comparative gravity of his manners and purity of his life. He was indefatigable in business, abstinent in pleasures, and had only one wife, to whom he was strictly faithful.

The example of Ali Verdi did not extend its influence to his court ; even the members of his own family, both male and female, furnished instances of licentiousness and depravity surpassing the worst of preceding times. Brought up in this society, indulging his vicious propensities in private and dissembling them before his grand-uncle like the rest, Suráj-u-Doula learned to despise his species and to fix all his thoughts on himself. He lived among buffoons and profligates in low debauchery, and soon came to think his own pleasures insipid unless they were accompanied with insult or injury to others. The weakness of his understanding and irritability of his temper were increased by the excessive use of spirituous liquors. His distrust of

those around him, and his ignorance of all beyond, made him timid as well as presumptuous, and exposed those in his power to danger from his apprehensions no less than from his violence. Though he was always the object of Ali Verdi's doting fondness, he was never free from jealousy of his other relations, and on one occasion was so much discontented with the attention shown to them, that he rebelled against his grand-uncle, and endeavoured to make himself master of the city of Patna. He was then only nineteen years old, and showed himself as deficient in courage as prudence. This temporary alienation only served to increase his influence. He was relieved from the most formidable of his rivals by their natural deaths, and he removed by assassination some other persons whom he looked on as dangerous enemies. By these means he was able on Ali Verdi's demise to take quiet possession of the government. But, notwithstanding the hopelessness of opposition, a cousin of the new nabob revolted in Purniá, and the daughter of Ali Verdi Khán, now a widow, set up another relation of the family (an infant) and assembled troops at her residence close to the capital. She was, however, deceived into a mock reconciliation, and was seized and imprisoned.⁸ Her principal adviser, Ráj Balab Dás, a Hindú, foreseeing the troubles that would follow the death of Ali Verdi, had instructed his son Kishen Dás, who was at Dacca, to set out as if on a pilgrimage to Jaganát, and to find some pretext for halting at Calcutta until the crisis should have passed. Kishen Dás, being the son of a person of consequence, and recommended by the Company's agent at Murshidábád,

A D. 1750.

⁸ The account of the native governments is chiefly drawn from Orme and the *Seir ul Motakherin*; but Scott's and Stewart's and Gladwin's histories, with Holwell's *Historical Events*, have likewise been consulted.

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was admitted into Calcutta, and took up his residence with Omi Chand, a banker of great wealth, who was much connected with the court of Murshidábád. Omi Chand was supposed to be discontented with some recent proceeding of the Company, and the Government of Calcutta, much in the dark about Indian politics, entertained a vague dread of his intrigues and influence. The reception of Kishen Dás roused the suspicions of Suráj-u-Doula, and on his accession he sent a written order to Mr. Drake, the Governor of Calcutta, to deliver him up with his property and followers. The messenger entered Calcutta in disguise, and went straight to the house of Omi Chand, from whence he proceeded to deliver his letter. Mr. Drake, suspecting some trick of Omi Chand's, set down the messenger for an impostor, and ordered him to be turned out of the town.

The nabob showed no resentment at this indignity, but soon afterwards the English received intelligence that war with France was inevitable, and began to put their fort in order against any attack from that nation, whose principal settlement, Chandernagór, was only sixteen miles from Calcutta. This measure, following the ill-treatment of his messenger, increased the displeasure of Suráj-u-Doula, who sent orders to the English to discontinue their fortifications, and to throw down any recent additions that had been made to them. Mr. Drake replied by pointing out the small extent to which the fortifications had been carried, and explaining that they were only designed against the French, who had disregarded the neutrality of the Mogul's territory in attacking Madras, and might be as little scrupulous in Bengal.

This answer threw Suráj-u-Doula into a paroxysm of rage which astonished even his own courtiers.

Though he despised the power of the English at Calcutta, he was no stranger to the revolutions produced by their struggle with the French in the Carnatic, or to the ascendancy of the French at the court of the Viceroy of the Deckan. He looked with terror to a transfer of the war into his own province, and was no less alarmed than offended by the assumption implied in Mr. Drake's letter, that his power was insufficient to restrain the violence of either of the parties. Passion and policy seemed to concur in urging him to anticipate the coming evil by the extirpation of the English. He expected little difficulty in the execution of this design, and was further invited to it by the hopes of plundering a commercial establishment of the wealth of which he had formed an exaggerated notion.

He therefore at once changed the direction of his march, and proceeded towards Calcutta at the head of an army of 50,000 men.

May 17,
A.D. 1756.

He surrounded the factory of Casimbázár near Murshidábád, treacherously seized Mr. Watts, the chief, at a conference, and compelled the remaining servants of the Company to surrender the place, which was immediately given up to plunder. The ensign commanding a small guard that was stationed there shot himself from despair and indignation.

The nabob then pressed on for Calcutta with all the speed that his train of artillery would allow.

June 9,
A.D. 1756.

As soon as the Government heard of his return, they sent repeated orders to Mr. Watts to announce their acquiescence in his demands. Their despatches were intercepted by the nabob's troops, and though doubtless conveyed to him, they only served to stimulate his advance by showing the weakness of his enemies. Up to this time the English had forborne to

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prepare for defence, from the fear of increasing the nabob's displeasure. They now wrote to Madras for succours, applied to the French and Dutch for their assistance, and began to strengthen their position by such means as were in their power. Madras was very distant, and the European colonies naturally refused to interfere. The Presidency of Calcutta was therefore left to its own resources. It had 264 soldiers and 250 inhabitants who took up arms as militia; of both descriptions only 174 were Europeans, the rest being native Portuguese and Armenians. Not ten of the whole number had ever seen a shot fired.

The fort, a brick enclosure, around the interior of which run warehouses with terraced roofs, was found not to be defensible, and it was determined to make a stand in the adjoining portion of the town. Three batteries were placed across the principal streets, and the smaller entrances within the same circuit were closed by barricades; 1,500 native matchlockmen were hired to assist in the defence of this enclosure, on which all the hopes of the garrison were to rest. During the terror of the nabob's approach, a letter was intercepted from the chief of his spies and messengers to Omi Chand. Though no treason was discovered, all the old suspicions of Omi Chand were aroused; both he and Kishen Dás were made prisoners, and on an attempt to pursue his brother who had fled into the female apartments, his armed retainers resisted, and their chief, a man of high caste, determined to save the honour of the women, killed the principal ones with his own hand,* set fire to the house, and finally stabbed himself, though the blow did not prove mortal.

June 16.

The works were scarcely completed when the nabob's army arrived. He had marched on with such impetuo-

sity that several of his men died from heat and fatigue, and so impatient was he to begin his operations that he fell without inquiry on the only point beyond the barricades where he could have met with resistance. It was a redoubt constructed at the point of junction between the river and a broad trench covering the north and north-east faces of the town and suburbs, which had formerly been dug as a defence against the Marattas, and was called the Maratta ditch. Ensign Pischard, who commanded this redoubt, had served on the coast of Coromandel, and now showed himself a thorough soldier in circumstances that might have justified despair. Though incessantly assailed by infantry and cannon, he kept the nabob's army at bay till dark, and at midnight he made a sally, crossed the Maratta ditch, spiked four guns, and put all that part of the encampment to flight. Next morning the nabob discovered his error. He marched round to a point where there was no obstacle to oppose him, and took up his ground near the town. On the third day the army advanced to the attack. A multitude of some thousands poured down the avenue that led to the eastern battery; they drove in the outposts, and when checked by the fire of the battery, spread through the town and filled the nearest houses with innumerable matchlockmen. The worst natives are bold and active when they are sure of success, and they now kept up so hot a fire, especially on the eastern battery, that all the men except those actually working the guns were forced to retire into shelter. They held out, however, for many hours but the fire was incessant and insupportable, and the assailants, who pressed their attack on all sides, at last forced one of the barricades. The troops in the batteries and other entrances were then recalled, and the

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enemy rushed in with shouts of joy and exultation; while the English fell back on the fort which had already been pronounced untenable. At this moment the boldest seemed to despair. The native troops and militia were stupified with fear; the hired matchlockmen had disappeared to a man; the town had been deserted before the attack; and a helpless crowd of native Portuguese, with their women and children, occupied every spot that promised shelter within the fort, and filled the place with uproar and confusion. The English preserved their courage, but they were exhausted by their unremitting exertions under a burning sun, and almost lost amidst the general disorder. Small parties, however, were got to the points most important to protect, and others continued to defend the rampart. But the enemy now brought cannon against the walls and kept up such a fire from the surrounding houses that it was almost impossible to stir within the place. Nevertheless the Europeans kept their ground till dark, when the enemy's fire necessarily ceased. The European women were embarked in the evening on seven or eight ships which lay at anchor not far from the fort; two of the councillors went on board to escort them, and did not return to the garrison. This was the first example of desertion. In the night, a general council was held on the question whether they should embark immediately or send off the Portuguese women next day, and retire with less tumult and disorder in the evening. They broke up without coming to a decision, so that every man was left under the impression that he was to provide for his own safety. In the morning the attack was renewed. The English took possession of some of the houses that had most annoyed the garrison during the preceding evening, but they were pressed by so

incessant a fire from the enemy that many were killed, and more, with their gallant commander Ensign Pischard, were wounded. At last they were fairly driven in, and their retreat augmented the terror of the besieged and the audacity of the assailants. Meanwhile the Portuguese women had been embarking, but with so much hurry and confusion that several boats sank and many lives were lost. Some of the principal English were endeavouring to keep order, and to retain the native boatmen, who were anxious to make their escape, but the enemy had ere this spread along the bank of the river and began to throw rockets at the ships. Those on board were seized with alarm, and one of the fugitive councillors, in heedless terror, gave the order to drop down the river out of reach. This happened exactly as the party from the houses was driven in, and the beholders thought themselves overpowered and deserted and gave up all for lost. Among those on the beach was the Governor, Mr. Drake. He had as yet shown no want of personal courage, and had freely exposed himself wherever his presence was required, but he was exhausted by fatigue and want of sleep. He understood better than the rest the state to which the garrison was reduced, and he knew that the nabob had always fixed on him as the special object of his vengeance. The last boat was leaving the shore, some of his friends were among the passengers, and in an unhappy moment he threw himself on board, followed by the military commander.

The astonishment and indignation of the garrison at this desertion passed all bounds, but amidst their execrations against the fugitives, they persevered in their own defence. They chose Mr. Holwell, a member of council, to command, and under his cool and resolute directions, they pursued such measures as their hopeless

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situation allowed. They endeavoured to shelter themselves from the musketry by piling packages of cloth on the rampart, and to deaden the effect of the cannon shot by placing bales of cotton against the walls. During this time they indulged the hope that the fugitives on the ships, when out of all fear for themselves, would have thought of their former companions, and they attempted to excite their sympathy by flags and other signals of distress, but no appeal could kindle a spark of generous or manly feeling. A single sloop might, with little risk, have prevented all the horrors that were to come, but this aid was basely withheld. One hope yet remained. A vessel which had been stationed off the northern redoubt still continued at her anchorage. She now dropped down towards the fort, and every eye was fixed on her with fervent hopes of deliverance; but the spot was dangerous, the pilot lost his presence of mind, the vessel struck on a bank, and was before long abandoned by the crew. Another night, however, wore away, and when the attacks of the next day began, Mr. Holwell was often urged to endeavour to capitulate. He made overtures in various forms, and among others presented himself on the ramparts with a flag of truce. At length the firing ceased and a person stepped forward and made signs of a desire to parley, but while this was passing, numbers crowded up to the walls on other sides, and some found an entrance at a neglected door, others mounted the walls in different parts, and in an instant the place was filled with the besiegers. Mr. Holwell immediately gave up his sword to a man who seemed to be a commander, the rest of the garrison threw down their arms, and the enemy meeting with no opposition, shed no more blood. They rifled the prisoners of their articles of value, and dispersed to plunder the goods and merchandise. In the afternoon the nabob

entered the fort. He was carried in on a sort of litter, and expressed his astonishment when he saw the smallness of the garrison. He released Kishen Dás and Qmí Chand, to whom he gave an honourable reception. At the same time he received the congratulations of his chiefs on his victory. Even in the complacency of triumph, he asked eagerly for Mr. Drake, but when Mr. Holwell was brought to him, with his hands tied, he ordered him to be unbound, and promised the English, on the faith of a soldier, that not a hair of their heads should be touched. It was now near evening, and the prisoners were assembled under an arcade where they were closely surrounded by guards. Many of them were wounded, and some mortally, but the rest felt assured of their safety, and some even began to joke on the oddity of their situation. But the buildings round them had been set fire to, they were threatened by the approach of the flames, and were again in doubt about the fate designed for them, when they received an order to move into a barrack close to which they had been standing. Beyond this barrack was a place used for the confinement of military delinquents, which, as was then usual in garrisons in England, was called the Black Hole.⁹ It was a room about twenty feet square.

⁹ [Mill, in his history, assumes that the place of confinement was 'a small, ill-aired, and unwholesome dungeon,' adding that 'the English had only their own practice to thank for suggesting it to the officers of the Subahdar as a fit place of confinement.' Mr. H. H. Wilson, in his edition of Mill's history, comments on this and other remarks by the historian, used in palliation of the acts of Suráj-u-Doula. He thus describes the place which tradition assigned as the scene of these horrors:—'In 1808 a chamber was shown in the old fort of Calcutta, then standing, said to be the Black Hole of 1756. Its situation did not correspond exactly with Mr. Holwell's description of it, but, if not the same, it was a room of the same description and size, such as is very common among the offices of both public and private buildings in Calcutta, and no doubt accurately represented the kind of place which was the scene of this

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with only two small grated windows, and even they only opened on a covered arcade. Into this place they were desired to enter. The few who knew the size of the apartment hesitated, and those who did enter were soon stopped by want of room to advance. On this the guard levelled their matchlocks and pressed on with their swords ; the prisoners, taken by surprise, crowded into the room and the door was closed before they were well aware of their situation. The prison was a place of penance for a single offender, but to a mass of 146 persons who were now crushed into it, it was a scene of death and horror. Earnest demands, entreaties, and supplications were addressed to the guards at the window, to divide the prisoners into different apartments ; furious efforts were made to force the door. The heat and suffocation were beyond endurance from the first, and were increased by the exertions that were made to obtain relief ; intolerable thirst succeeded, and its pangs were augmented by a supply of water which it was attempted to convey through the windows. Little passed those whom it first reached, and to them it only made the thirst more tormenting ; those behind struggled for a share, and the desperate contest excited the laughter of some of the guards, who now dashed in water for amusement, as the others had done from humanity. The most cutting reproaches were addressed to the guard to provoke them to fire into the prison. The cry of ' Air, air ! ' burst from every quarter, groans and lamentations were succeeded by the wildest ravings

occurrence. It bore by no means the character of a prison. It was much more light, airy, and spacious than most of the rooms used formerly by the London watch, or at present by the police for purposes of temporary duration. Had a dozen or twenty people been immured within such limits for a night there would have been no hardship whatever in their imprisonment, and in all probability no such number of persons ever were confined in it.'—ED.]

of delirium, everyone pressed madly towards the windows, many fell down never more to rise ; and, as their strength and fury were exhausted, the survivors sunk into silence and stupor. Fresh efforts brought fresh accessions of misery, and the most enviable, next to the dead, were those who lost all consciousness of their sufferings in insensibility. Before this horrible night was closed, but twenty-three of the 146 remained alive ; among these, one was a woman.

As long as the influence of reason remained, great respect was shown for Mr. Holwell. He was placed with some wounded officers near one of the windows, and owed his preservation to the strength he retained from this circumstance. In the fierce struggles that ensued, he was at last worn out, and retired into the back part of the prison to die in quiet. He was again brought forward, in the hope that he might prevail on the guard to procure some mitigation of the general calamity, but after an interval he again retired, and at length sunk into total insensibility. About six in the morning an officer of the nabob's came to the window and inquired if the chief was still alive ; he was then drawn out from under several dead bodies, and on being lifted to the air discovered signs of life. The prison was soon after opened, but it was long before the removal of the corpses made room for the release of the living. Mr. Holwell was laid on the wet grass, and when he came to himself was in a high putrid fever, unable to stand and scarcely able to speak. When he was in some degree restored he was carried to the nabob, by whose order he had been sought for. Up to this time, Suráj-u-Doula had no direct share in the barbarity of which he was the original cause ; he had thought of nothing but the safe custody of the prisoners, and their

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protracted sufferings arose from the fear of awakening him, while without his sanction the door of the prison could not be opened. He now made himself a party to all the guilt he had occasioned, for, without evincing the smallest regret for the past, he inflicted new severities on the remaining victims. As Mr. Holwell was being conveyed to the nabob, an officer told him that if he did not disclose where the treasure was concealed he would be blown from a gun. In his present state he heard the menace with indifference, or rather with satisfaction. The nabob entered on the same inquiry with equal harshness. He cut short Mr. Holwell's recital of the dismal fate of his companions, by telling him that he knew there was a large treasure hidden in the fort, and that if he expected favour he must discover it. Mr. Holwell's protestations that there was no such treasure only led to more peremptory commands, while his appeals to the nabob's former promises were treated with even less regard. He and three of his principal fellow-sufferers were loaded with fetters, and were afterwards sent off to Murshidábád in boats. During this voyage, which lasted fourteen days, they lay on the hard deck exposed to the burning sun and the intense rain of the monsoon; their food was rice and water, and they were covered from head to foot with large and painful boils, which deprived them of the use of their hands, and rendered the weight of their fetters intolerably galling. At Murshidábád they were dragged through the city, a spectacle to the assembled population, and were lodged in a stable, where they were deprived of all repose, and crowded nearly to suffocation by the vast throngs of people whom curiosity drew to look at them. The other English were set at liberty, many at the intercession of the French and

Dutch, who behaved throughout with the utmost humanity, offering their own security for some, granting an asylum to others, and sparing no expense nor exertions in relieving the wants of all. Those nations had been called on by the nabob to join him against the English, but maintained a strict neutrality in spite of threats and intimidation.

Mr. Holwell and his companions had not been long at Murshidábád before the nabob returned to his capital. Their deplorable condition had excited the compassion of the mother of Suráj-u-Doula, who interceded with her son for their release. One day the nabob had to pass by the place of their confinement on his way to a garden, and they prevailed on their guards to let them stand close to the road. When the nabob approached, they made him the usual salute, on which he stopped his litter, and Mr. Holwell seized the opportunity to petition for their liberty ; their ghastly countenances and miserable appearance would have touched any heart ; the Nabob made no reply, but immediately ordered them to be released, and is said to have expressed displeasure at the cruel usage they had undergone. They immediately repaired to the Dutch factory, where they were joyfully received.¹ July 16.

The ships had been prevented leaving the Ganges in consequence of the prevalence of the monsoon. They anchored at Falta, about twenty miles of direct distance below Calcutta, where the fugitives from that city

¹ The transactions down to this period are from the evidence and appendices in the First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons in 1772 ; the numerous controversial letters between Messrs Holwell, Drake, Becher, &c. at the India House (of which Mr. Holwell's part is published in a pamphlet called *Important Facts*, printed in 1764) ; Mr. Holwell's narrative of the deplorable deaths in the Black Hole ; Orme ; and the *Seir ul Mutakherin*.

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erected hovels and were found by the expedition that afterwards came to their relief in a wretched condition, more like shipwrecked sailors than men accustomed to ease and luxury.² They now paid the price of their dastardly abandonment of their companions ; their recollections of the past were worse than their present sufferings, and both were embittered by mutual reproaches and recrimination.³

The agents from the other factories likewise in time found their way to Falta, where they were left unmolested by the contemptuous supineness of the native government.

The nabob had treated the unoffending factories of the other powers with so little justice or consideration as made it appear how little any real provocation was required to produce his violence towards the English ; he extorted 45,000*l.* from the Dutch, and 35,000*l.* from the French, besides a smaller sum from the Danes.

A.D. 1756. The first notification of Suráj-u-Doula's march against the English reached Madras on July 15, and within five days from that time the Government despatched the Company's trading ship Delaware, with two hundred and thirty soldiers under Major Kilpatrick, to their assistance.

The intelligence of the completion of the disaster arrived on August 5, and struck the settlement with horror and indignation. Reflection added perplexity and alarm. The fears of the Madras Government had hitherto been directed to the ascendancy of the French at Heiderábád, from which a favourable combination of circumstances had just given them hopes of deliverance.⁴

² Ives's *Voyage*.

³ Orme; and evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons.

⁴ See ante, chap. vii.

To profit by the occasion, they were preparing an expedition to send into the Deckan, but their means were scarcely adequate to the exertion it required. The arrival of the reinforcement under Colonel Clive had done no more than bring them to an equality with the French in the province of Arcot alone, where each nation had about 2,000 Europeans and 10,000 sepoy. Admiral Watson's fleet gave the English the temporary command of the sea ; but they heard from Europe that war with France was certain, and that the French were about to despatch a fleet of nineteen ships, with 3,000 soldiers, to Pondicherry.

Unless they could dislodge the French from the Deckan before this force arrived, they must themselves be driven out of the Carnatic ; on the other hand the urgent interests of the Company and the honour of the nation required an immediate display of force in Bengal. The two courses were debated in council, and a middle one proposed of sending a small force to Bengal ; but this was overruled by the wisdom and firmness of Orme the historian, who foresaw that such a measure would ruin both expeditions, and prevailed on the council to apply their whole strength to Bengal. It was chiefly owing to the zealous support of the same councillor that the command was committed to Clive. Mr. Pigott, the Governor, proposed to go himself with full powers. Colonel Adlercron, the commander of the forces, but inexperienced and incompetent, refused to allow the King's troops to embark under any command but his own ; Lawrence was disabled by sickness, and gave his voice for Clive. Mr. Manningham, one of the fugitive members of council, who had been deputed from Bengal, thought it became him to protest against an arrangement likely to deprive the heads of that Presidency of any portion of

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the powers which they had shown themselves so incompetent to exercise.

The appointment of Clive gave general satisfaction to the troops. He was instructed to acknowledge Mr. Drake as Governor in civil and commercial business, but to retain the complete control of the military and political part of the expedition, and the funds for its supply were placed in his hands. The plan was submitted to Admiral Watson, who consented to take his share in the execution. The squadron consisted (besides transports) of three ships of the line, one fifty-gun ship, one twenty gun ship, and one fireship, but the land force obtained with so much difficulty amounted only to 900 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys. Of the Europeans, 250 were men of Colonel Adlercron's regiment whom he had at length allowed to go as marines under the admiral. They had no prospect of a single friend among the natives, and their opinion of the power of their enemies was raised by the recent display of it, as well as by the impression that they were to encounter the Rájputés and Patáns of Hindostan instead of the puny soldiery of the Carnatic.

The fleet sailed on October 10. It had to contend with the north-west monsoon, and met with great delay and obstruction. The fireship was driven to Ceylon; the Marlborough, a Company's ship, was obliged to part company, and it was not until November 16 that the admiral, with the rest of the fleet, approached the mouth of the Húgli. The navigation of this branch of the Ganges is peculiarly difficult. It brings down quantities of soil along with it, which form dangerous banks at its mouth, extending far out into the sea. Its own channel also is choked with banks of mud and sand, and is so intricate that in the latest

times, with a regular pilot service and all the advantage of buoys and lighthouses, the Company's ships never went higher than Diamond Harbour, thirty-five miles below Calcutta. Admiral Watson's determination to sail up this then almost unknown river, was therefore one of the most gallant parts of the whole enterprise. The commencement was not auspicious. Before they got sight of the shores of the Húgli, two of the ships struck on a bank, and though both ultimately got off, one was driven to leeward, and was obliged to sail for Vizagapatam on the coast of Coromandel. This was the Cumberland of seventy guns, having on board Admiral Pococke and 250 European soldiers. The rest of the fleet remained at anchor until they were joined by two European pilots from Falta, and then made their way to that anchorage. They there found the remains of the English of Bengal, together with Major Kilpatrick and his detachment, which had already lost half its number from the unhealthiness of the climate. In the meantime Mr. Drake had received despatches from England, appointing him and three of his former council a committee for the conduct of the Company's affairs in Bengal. They had already called in Major Kilpatrick to their board, and now added Watson and Clive to the number.

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They, however, protested against the powers entrusted to Clive, and required him to be guided in all his operations and negotiations by their orders. This Clive refused, but said he never would act contrary to their wishes unless they forced him. Accordingly he never failed to attend the committee when within reach, and never took a step of importance without its previous sanction. The admiral attended the first meetings, which were held on board his ship ; after the taking

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of Calcutta, he acted as a separate authority, but was treated with great deference by all parties. He kept up a correspondence of his own with the nabob, but always in the spirit of that of Clive and the committee. He was frank, honourable, and disinterested, capable of sacrificing even his prejudices to the public service, good-hearted, and no less beloved than respected by all connected with him ; but his opinions were strong, his disposition somewhat warm, and he entertained a jealousy of the land service and a high sense of the dignity of his own station which might have produced inconvenience if his military colleague had not possessed the complete command of at least as warm a temper.

After the destruction of Calcutta, Suráj-u-Doula had returned to his capital and had marched against his rival at Purniá, who was defeated and killed in a battle with the nabob's troops under Mír Jáfir. All his apprehensions from the interior were therefore at an end, and such was his impression of the insignificance of his foreign enemies, that he declared he did not believe there were ten thousand men in all Europe.

Mánik Chand, a Hindú, had been appointed Governor of Calcutta, and had taken measures to strengthen the place as well as the neighbouring forts on the river. Boats loaded with bricks were also prepared to be sunk in a narrow channel of the stream.

On the arrival of the armament, letters from the Government of Madras, from the Viceroy of the Deckan, and the Nabob of the Carnatic, were forwarded to Suráj-u-Doula, with peremptory letters from Watson and Clive. As no answer was deigned to this communication, the English authorities declared war, and published a manifesto giving their reasons.

They then set sail for Falta, and next day approached the fort of Bujbuj, ten miles from Calcutta. To cut off the escape of the garrison, Clive landed some miles below the place, with 500 Europeans and all the sepoys, and marched in the night to a point on the road to Calcutta. His march was through a tract full of swamps and rivulets, and the troops did not reach their destination till morning, when they lay down exhausted, without order or precaution, and in a few minutes were all asleep.

In this situation they were surprised by Mánik Chand, who had come to Bujbuj the day before, with 1,500 horse and 2,000 foot. He at first caused confusion and loss. In time, however, the English recovered their order and compelled the assailants to withdraw to Calcutta. In the meantime the fire of Bujbuj had been silenced by the ships, and next morning the fort was found evacuated.

On December 30 the fleet proceeded to Calcutta, and on January 7, 1757, anchored before that place. Mánik Chand had retired to Húgli, leaving a garrison of 500 men in the English fort. These men returned the cannonade of the English ships, and killed seventeen sailors before their fire was silenced. They then quitted the place, which was taken possession of at eleven o'clock. The admiral sent Captain (afterwards Sir Eyre) Coote, of Adlercron's regiment, ashore, with a commission as Governor, but Clive, who arrived soon after, took the command as general of the land force. The admiral was much incensed, and on Clive's perseverance, threatened to drive him out with his cannon. Clive replied that the responsibility of such a proceeding would rest with the admiral, but that he was determined never to give up the command to a

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subordinate. The matter at length was compromised ; Clive gave up the keys to the admiral, who landed to receive them, and immediately made them over to Mr. Drake, the civil Governor.

As it was found that the Nabob was not yet prepared to move from Murshidábád, a strong detachment was sent by water to attack Húgli, the seat of the government of that division of Bengal, which it was of obvious political importance to reduce. An imperfect breach was made from the ships, and the troops carried the place by storm with little loss. During this expedition news arrived through private channels of the breaking out of war with France. There were at Chandernagór 600 Europeans, of whom 300 were soldiers. They were well supplied with artillery. One of Bussy's stations was within 200 miles of the nearest part of Bengal, and he was himself not far from the frontier. It was therefore expected that the French would join the nabob, which would at once have turned the scale against the English. Even a protracted struggle would have been a great gain to the French, since a small detachment of theirs, aided by the nabob, would employ so large an English force as would leave the Carnatic nearly defenceless.

On no one did these considerations fall with more weight than on Clive. He for the first time saw the safety of his army and of the British interests in India depend on his conduct, and the effect was such as could only have been produced on a mind of which the strongest passions were forgotten in the public cause.

To the daring spirit which had ever characterised him were now added the stimulants of wealth and glory to be attained by military exploits, and by them alone. Every motive combined to urge him to an immediate

appeal to arms, yet his prudence during all the subsequent transactions in Bengal, his caution in his movements, and his anxiety to effect a settlement without the risk of hostilities, were such as in another man could scarcely have escaped the reproach of timidity.

Soon after the recapture of Calcutta, the nabob had sounded the English, through the French deputies then treating with them on their own account, as to the terms on which they were willing to make peace. The terms which they proposed, though even more moderate than those afterwards obtained, remained unnoticed, but a channel of communication was kept up through the great bankers of the house of Jaggat Sét, of which Clive took advantage to endeavour to open a negotiation. The nabob was not yet convinced of the power of his enemies, and was rather irritated than intimidated by the success that had attended them. He refused to listen to their overtures, but the Sét, foreseeing the possibility of a change in his counsels, sent an able agent, named Ranjít Rái, to accompany his army, which now began its march towards Calcutta. Omi Chand continued to be the object of a sort of superstitious dread to the English. To him Mr. Holwell ascribed his own ill-treatment, and observed that the three gentlemen pitched on to be his companions in captivity were all personal enemies of Omi Chand's. He was now more formidable than ever from his having gained the confidence of Suráj-u-Doula, but his interest was involved in the restoration of peace and the revival of the trade of Calcutta, and from this motive he also accompanied the army, and was ready to do all in his power to promote an accommodation.

Colonel Clive had taken up and fortified a position

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ary 30,
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which covered the only accessible part of the Company's territory, the rest being protected by an extensive lake of salt water. It was about a mile to the northward of the town, and half a mile inland from a point on the river not far beyond the redoubt which had formerly resisted the nabob's attack. As the nabob drew near, the villagers ceased to send in supplies to camp, and the whole of the native followers deserted. No cattle had yet been collected, and there was only one horse in camp. The nabob therefore had only to avoid an engagement, and he might have destroyed the force landed or have compelled it to reembark. In these circumstances Clive wrote to him through Ranjít Rái to propose peace. The nabob gave a friendly answer and kept up the negotiations, but continued his march. Three days after, his advanced guard was descried from the British lines. Unwilling to take any step that might interrupt his negotiations, Clive allowed them to pass within sight of his camp, when a swarm of plunderers spread over the Company's territory, and one regular body, with nine heavy guns, took up and fortified a position about a mile and a half to the south-east of that of Clive. This seemed too threatening a movement, and Clive set out in the evening to dislodge the party ; but he was unable to effect his purpose, and returned after a cannonade in which both sides lost some men. Next day the main body passed on by the same route. The sight was disheartening to the troops, and the result was to place the nabob's army nearer to Calcutta than Clive's. The nabob himself halted for some time at a village in the rear of his army, and sent to Clive to request that he would depute commissioners to treat. Mr. Walsh and Mr. Scrafton were immediately despatched, but before they arrived the nabob had

marched, and they overtook him late in the evening at a garden of Omi Chand's within the Maratta ditch, where he had fixed his head-quarters. After they had been searched for concealed weapons, and an attempt had been made to deprive them of their swords, they were presented to the nabob. He received them in a full darbár, surrounded by armed chiefs, who seemed to scowl defiance on the deputies. They nevertheless remonstrated with the nabob on the inconsistency between his acts and his professions, and afterwards presented a paper containing their proposals. The nabob looked over the paper and said something in a low voice to his attendants ; he then referred the deputies to his minister, to whose tent they were ordered to repair. Their experience of the nabob's treachery of itself suggested the probability of a design to seize them, and, as they were leaving the darbár, Omi Chand drew near and whispered to them to take care of themselves. On this the deputies ordered their lights to be extinguished, and instead of proceeding to the prime minister, made the best of their way to their own camp.

On hearing their report, Clive resumed all his usual energy and decision. He received the deputies at eleven ; before midnight he was on board the admiral's ship ; by one o'clock a body of sailors was landed, and by two the troops were under arms ready to attack the nabob's camp.⁵ There were 600 sailors armed with firelocks, 750 Europeans, 800 sepoys, and six field-pieces which were drawn by the sailors. The choicest part of the nabob's army was round his own station at Omi Chand's garden, but the rest were scattered over a great extent

⁵ Clive's evidence, First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 1772, 147.

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to the eastward of the Maratta ditch. The column began its march at four o'clock. It was intended to move straight on the head-quarters and the park of artillery, but, as the day dawned, one of those fogs came on which in their intensity are peculiar to Bengal. No guides were of use in such impenetrable darkness; the column left Omi Chand's garden and the Maratta ditch on their right, and marched on to the southward, through the midst of the camp, firing by platoons to the right and left, and discharging their field-pieces obliquely towards the front. When they came in a line with Omi Chand's garden, but without knowing where they were, they heard the sound of cavalry approaching at full gallop. They opened a heavy fire in the direction of the noise, which soon after ceased. It proved to have been a body of Persians excellently mounted, who charged with great spirit, but were brought to a stand by the sharpness of the fire when within thirty yards of the line. When the column had advanced about a mile, it came to a high causeway running at right angles to its line of march, and forming the road from the country on the east to the fort of Calcutta. The head of the column was ordered to direct its march to the right, so as to cross the Maratta ditch by the causeway and then turn back on Omi Chand's garden, but when they had proceeded a short way in their new direction, they came within the range of their own guns which continued firing from the rear. This threw them into confusion, and the troops ran down from the road and took shelter behind the causeway. As the next part of the column pressed on, the whole were crowded into a disorderly mass, and at this moment they received a discharge of grape from some heavy guns of the enemy's in a position close at hand. When order was restored, they marched

on to another road parallel to the first, where they at length crossed the ditch, but before this the fog began to clear away, other guns were opened on them from fresh quarters, a body of cavalry appeared in their front, and larger bodies pressed hard on their flanks and rear. The troops were exhausted with their march, which had latterly been through ricefields, two of their field-pieces had stuck in the mire of those enclosures, and, when they had repulsed the enemy, Clive found them too much fatigued for the attack on the garden, and marched them along the road to the fort of Calcutta, from whence, after some rest, they returned to their camp. They had only lost 174 men killed and wounded, but had failed in their main object, and were much more dispirited than encouraged by the general result. But the loss in the native camp had been a great deal more severe, and the nabob himself had been so terrified at the near approach of danger, that he was with difficulty prevented from ordering an immediate retreat. The utmost vigilance was kept up in his camp next night, cannon and musketry being fired on every idle alarm. He immediately revived the negotiation, and as if to show his sincerity, he moved to a safe distance from the English camp. The terms offered were such as he was not likely to refuse. They were that he should restore the Company's factories and confirm all their former privileges to the fullest extent ; that they should receive the villages, thirty-eight in number, which they had been allowed to purchase by the Emperor Farokhsir, but of which they had never obtained possession ; that they should be permitted to fortify Calcutta and to coin money ; and that all goods under their permits should pass duty free throughout the country.⁶ A demand had

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⁶ This article is modified by an agreement on the part of the Company,

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been made for compensation for all the property plundered, but the nabob would only agree to pay for that seized by his order and brought to account in his treasury.

The Company on their part engaged to conduct themselves within the nabob's jurisdiction as formerly, to do violence to no one, and to give up defaulters and offenders.

In a letter returning his ratification of the treaty, the nabob solemnly promised to esteem the enemies of the English as his enemies, and to assist the latter to the utmost of his power, and he solicited a corresponding assurance on the part of the English Government. Separate engagements, expressed with equal solemnity, were sent to him by Clive and Watson, but no formal treaty of alliance was drawn up.

The treaty concluded was neither honourable nor secure. It did little more than replace the parties where they stood before the war, and did not punish the nabob for the outrage by which that war was occasioned, or indemnify the Company for the expense at which it had been carried on. It afforded no security against the nabob's renewing hostilities as soon as the British forces were withdrawn, and did not make the least provision against a combination between the nabob and the French, or even against the operations of the French themselves.

Nevertheless, in the weak state of the British land force, it was thought highly advantageous. Watson, however, could not be persuaded that the nabob would sign it, and, while it was yet pending, he sent his flag

in which they engage that the business of their factories shall be carried on agreeably to former practice; and the nabob's orders for carrying this article into effect direct their goods to be passed duty free according to the king's grant and to previous usage.

captain to urge Clive to strike another blow at the enemy, and even suggested his consulting his officers if he himself had any hesitation about the measure.

Some time previous to these last transactions, there had been hopes of maintaining a local peace with the French in Bengal notwithstanding the war between the nations. Soon after the recovery of Calcutta, they had sent deputies to propose a treaty, but it had been broken off apparently from the English insisting that they should take part against Suráj-u-Doula.

The peace with the nabob now dictated a speedy settlement of the question with them. Clive had received repeated and urgent calls from the Government of Madras, who were themselves in great danger from the French, and was ardently desirous of returning to the coast, but durst not leave the government of Chandernagór unfettered behind him. An overture for a neutrality unclogged with the former stipulations had been made at his suggestion, but, as no answer had been returned, he concurred with Watson in the expediency of an immediate attack on Chandernagór, provided the nabob's consent could be obtained; without that, both parties agreed that no offensive operations could be thought of.⁷ The nabob was accordingly applied to, on the ground of his engagement to regard the enemies of the English as his own.⁸ He gave no direct answer, but announced that Bussy was about to march into Bengal, and that a large French fleet would soon be in the Ganges, and called on the British officers to assist him in repelling the invasion.⁹

Febru-
ary 11.

⁷ His letter of February 1 to the Court of Directors. (India House.)

⁸ Clive's letter to the Court of Directors, dated February 22. (India House.) The date is from Orme, ii. 136.

⁹ Orme, ii. 136. Watson's letter in Ives, 117. Clive's letter of February 22. (India House.)

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ary 18.

Though this seemed an indirect attempt at intimidation, it was resolved to construe it into a consent, and to force the nabob to an explicit declaration by acting upon it without delay. With this view Clive crossed the river. But the nabob had previously made up his mind. He had sent a supply of 10,000*l.* to the French, and had ordered his governor of Hugli (to whom he despatched a reinforcement) to support them to the utmost of his power. On hearing of Clive's march, he sent a peremptory prohibition to his advance, and threatened to join the French if the attack were persevered in. On this Clive returned to Calcutta, and solemn assurances were sent to the nabob that no attack should be made without his consent.¹

March 3.

The negotiations for a local peace with the French were renewed at the same time, and terms which were to be guaranteed by the nabob were agreed on and drawn out for signature. So much was the question looked on as settled, that Clive made ready to embark with part of his troops for Madras.² But when the terms were sent to Watson for his confirmation, he positively refused to accede to them until they should have been sanctioned by the Supreme Government at Pondicherry. He pointed out that without such a confirmation they would not be binding even on the subordinate government, still less on the superior one, or on any French commander, naval or military, who might enter Bengal under a separate authority; he ridiculed the guarantee of the nabob, who he said had not performed one article of his own treaty, and ought himself

¹ Watson's letter, Ives, 121. Orme, ii. 137, 138. Clive's letter to Watts, dated March 1, in Malcolm's *Life*, i. 185.

² Sraffon, 69. See also Clive's letter dated February 22. (India House.)

to be treated as an enemy if he did not fulfil his engagements within ten days. These objections were perfectly well founded, but they ought to have been brought forward before the terms were agreed to. In insisting on them now, Watson showed little regard to the honour of his colleagues, and made an ill return for the fidelity with which the French had acted in the preceding period. On these grounds they were indignantly repelled by Clive. He further urged that before a ratification could be expected to arrive from Pondicherry, the season for the departure of the British troops would have passed, and he insisted that the treaty should either be signed immediately and unconditionally, or that it should be broken off at once, and an attack made on Chandernagór. If neither of these plans was adopted, he announced his intention of immediately returning to Madras.³

March 4.

At this juncture Watson received official notice of the war with France, together with suitable orders from the Admiralty, and thought it became his duty to engage the French wherever he found them, unless he should be restrained by a protest on the part of the Company's Government.⁴ He therefore agreed to an immediate attack, provided the nabob's consent could be obtained. Strong remonstrances had been addressed to that prince on his non-performance of the treaty; and Watson in particular had threatened war if the execution were delayed.⁵ At the same time the nabob

March 6.

³ In this remonstrance Clive notices the arrival of the missing ships and of a reinforcement from Bombay, but declares that those circumstances do not diminish the necessity of immediately concluding the treaty. These letters are given at full length in the appendix to the First Report of the Committee &c. of the House of Commons, 1772, 122.

⁴ See his letter in Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 186.

⁵ Watson's letter in Ives, 124.

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received intelligence, which he believed, that Ahmed Sháh Duráni had marched from Delhi with the intention of conquering Bengal, and under the influence of this new alarm he had applied to the English for assistance and offered them 10,000*l.* a month for the co-operation of their army. In such circumstances it seemed probable that the nabob would at length give his consent, and the majority of the committee determined to make one more effort to obtain it before they signed the neutrality. They resolved that their force should in the meantime advance on Chandernagór, but that if the nabob should still object to hostilities, the treaty with the French should be signed without further delay.⁶ The nabob, thus pressed by fears on all sides, told Mr. Watts in plain terms that he should no longer interfere with any attempt on Chandernagór, and on the same day, March 10, he wrote to Watson, consenting, though in ambiguous language, to the attack.

On the 16th he again changed his mind, and again issued a positive prohibition. But hostilities had commenced on the 14th, and on the 23rd the garrison was compelled to surrender, chiefly by the gallantry of the naval force. The defence had been maintained with great bravery, and had occasioned heavy loss on both sides.⁷

⁶ Records at the India House; Orme; Sraffton. It appears from the records that Mr. Becher was for signing the neutrality at once, that Mr. Drake thought it would be nugatory without Watson's consent, and otherwise gave an indistinct opinion; but Olive and Kilpatrick were for the line stated in text. From Olive's evidence it appears that Kilpatrick was at first for an immediate neutrality, but changed on Olive assuring him that the British force was sufficient to encounter the nabob and the French together. It was never proposed to attack the French without the nabob's consent; but it was probably anticipated, as happened in effect, that the nabob might change his mind after the siege had begun under his sanction.

⁷ Watts's Letters at the India House; Ives; Sraffton. Olive's own

The success of the English was promoted by Nancomár, governor of Húgli (afterwards so celebrated from the circumstances of his death). He had been corrupted by Omi Chand at the time of Clive's first march, and not only withheld the aid he was ordered to afford to the French, but continually misled the nabob with false intelligence.

During the siege the nabob had been alternately ordering and countermanding preparations for marching to the relief of Chandernagór. But when the place fell he warmly congratulated Clive and Watson on their victory; he set about fulfilling the articles of his treaty, and, before the end of the next month, except the restoration of the guns he had taken at Casimbázár, the sanction necessary for the transfer of the thirty-eight villages, and the settlement of some pecuniary payments which he might in reality have thought doubtful, he had nearly accomplished the whole of his engagements.⁸ But he used every means to prevent any further reduction of the power of the French, he secretly took into his service a body of their troops which had escaped from Chandernagór under M. Law, he redoubled his applications to Bussy to advance, and he formed an entrenched camp under his Díwán Rái Dúláb at Plassy, between his capital and Chandernagór. Copies of some of his letters to Bussy were found after the taking of Murshidábád.⁹ The first is supposed to be written about the end of February, and presses Bussy to move to the defence of Chandernagór; but this letter refers to an earlier one, in which the nabob had applied

account in his evidence, though correct in the main, is, as might be expected, inaccurate in particulars.

⁸ Watts's letters, April 9, also April 26 or 28.

⁹ These letters are printed in Ap. V. to the First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 1772.

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for an auxiliary force of 2,000 men, without any reference to Chandernagór being threatened. As M. Bussy, in the very beginning of the year, gave out that he was marching to settle Bengal, it is probable this letter was written soon after the arrival of the English armament in the Ganges. These invitations were continued (with increased expressions of bitterness against the English) after the fall of Chandernagór; orders to his own officers, and recommendations to foreign states to assist M. Bussy in his march, were forwarded during the time when the nabob was professing the greatest friendship for the English and offering the aid of all his forces to repel Bussy's invasion.¹ Bussy had been induced by them to march to the point in his territory nearest to Bengal, and would probably have continued his advance if he had not been discouraged by the fall of Chandernagór and the irresolution exhibited by the nabob.²

These particulars had not yet come to the knowledge of the admiral and the committee, but they were well aware that a continual correspondence was kept up with Bussy, and they were apprised by their friends at Murshidábád, that the nabob was only waiting his opportunity to gratify his favourite wish of rooting them out of Bengal.³

The knowledge of these projects made them more eager to complete the extinction of the French power in the province, and likewise more indifferent to the offence that their proceedings might give to the nabob. They pressed that prince to allow them to attack the French factories at Casimbázár and other places, and

¹ Nabob's letters to Admiral Watson of April 2 and April 14. Ives, 140 and 142.

² Orme, ii. 261.

³ Letters from Watts of February 25, 26, and April 28.

insisted on his withdrawing his protection from M. Law. The nabob at first affected to agree to their demands, but stipulated that the English should indemnify him for the loss of the duties paid by the French, and should become bound for the debts owed by that nation to his subjects. Contrary to his expectation, the British immediately agreed ; on which he retracted his offer and more openly showed his resolution to protect the French interests. As the demands were continued he became more and more irritated, but wavered in his conduct according to his humours and expectations ; actuated alternately by his hopes from Bussy and his fears of Clive, and scarcely less by the reports which he continued to receive of the advance or retreat of the Dúránis. At one time he professed the utmost cordiality towards the British, and ordered M. Law to march out of Murshidábád, but supplied him with money and ammunition, and stationed him within call ; at another time he drove the English vakíl⁴ with ignominy from his presence, threatened to impale Mr. Watts,⁵ and avowed his determination never to rest till he had extirpated the British.

April 13.

The committee by this time began to see the impossibility of depending on the nabob, and to contemplate a renewal of the war which hitherto they certainly had been desirous to avoid. The admiral wrote a strong remonstrance to the nabob, insisting on his fulfilling his engagements, and calling on him, as a proof of his sincerity, to desist from protecting the enemies of the British nation ; he declares that while there is a Frenchman in the country he will never cease pursuing him, but ends by conjuring the nabob to preserve the peace

April 19.

⁴ Native agent.⁵ Watts's letter of April 14 in Malcolm's *Clive*, 229.

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by a faithful adherence to his engagements. Clive appears to have written in still stronger terms.⁶

April 20.

But these letters had no effect either in soothing or intimidating the nabob. He publicly tore a letter from Clive; declared that he could bear no more, but saw he should be obliged again to march down against the English; and ordered Mír Jáfir to reinforce Rái Dúlab, promising him ten lacs of rupees if he would destroy the objects of his displeasure.⁷

These violent measures were ascribed by Clive to some intelligence the nabob had received of the advance of Bussy or the retreat of the Durránis. They convinced the disaffected chiefs of the nabob's court that war with the English was become inevitable, and on the same day a principal member of their body made overtures to Mr. Watts for a secret alliance with that nation.

The insolence and cruelty of Suráj-u-Doula had long since disgusted those about him. He struck Jaggat Sét on the face not long after his conquest of Calcutta,⁸ and he afterwards often threatened to have him circumcised.⁹ He insulted his Mahometan chiefs by taunts and scurrilous language, and kept them in constant fear of their lives from his suspicions, his treachery, and his violence.¹ There was hardly a man among them whom

⁶ The admiral's letter is in Ives, 143. For Clive's remonstrance see the *Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal* (anonymous, but apparently written from Mr. Watts's information). The records at the India House are incomplete at this period, and no letter from Clive appears in them.

⁷ Letter from Watts, dated April 20 (*Malcolm's Clive*, i. 232); Letter from Clive to Watson (*Malcolm's Clive*, 234); Letter from Scrafton dated April 20. (India House.)

⁸ Letter from a Dutch agent at Casimbázár in September 1756. (India House.)

⁹ *Seir ul Mutakherín*, i. pt. 2, 759.

¹ *Seir ul Mutakherín*, 719, 724, 727, 762.

he had not menaced with death ;² and Mír Jáfir told Mr. Watts that he never went to the palace without expecting assassination.³ The discontent of the old chiefs and ministers was increased by the ascendancy of two upstart favourites, Móhon Láal and Mír Madan ; one a Hindú and one a Mussulman—one assuming the control of civil business, and the other of the army.⁴

The first to apply to the English (April 20) was Khuda Yár Khán Latti, an officer of some consequence connected with Jaggat Sét.⁵ He made great offers through that powerful financier on condition of being placed on Suráj-u-Doula's masnad, but a few days afterwards (probably April 24), a similar proposal was received from Mír Jáfir, who was married to Ali Verdi's sister, and was one of the principal commanders in the army. He proposed that himself, Rái Dúláb, and some other chiefs whom he named should join the English, and set up as nabob whatever person should be thought most suitable.⁶ On receiving the first of these overtures the committee came to a resolution that, as they might be forced into a war owing to the fickle and uncertain temper of the nabob, they should authorise Clive to sound the dispositions of the great men at court, and learn how they stood affected in respect to a revolution.

At the same time they resolved to withdraw the public property from Murshidábád, and to send agents to the southward to watch Bussy and endeavour to prevail on the local chiefs to oppose his advance.⁷

On a subsequent day the committee received Mír

² Scrafton, 175 and 176^o

³ Watts's letter to the Committee, May 26 or 28. (India House.)

⁴ *Seir ul Mutakherin*, 720.

⁵ Scrafton, letter of April 20. (India House.)

⁶ Watt's letters, May 26 and 28; Scrafton's letter, May 28. (India House.)

⁷ Consultation of April 23. (India House.)

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May 1.

Jáfir's proposal, along with letters from Mr. Watts of April 26 and 28, and from Mr. Scrafton of April 28, acquainting them that certain accounts had been received of the retreat of the Durránis, and that the nabob had broken out into fresh excesses. It had been determined to withdraw the garrison along with the property from Casimbázár, but as the men at that place were chiefly French deserters and unarmed, it was not thought prudent to entrust the escort of the treasure to them alone ; twenty sepoy, with some spare arms and ammunition, were therefore sent from Húgli about April 24.⁸ This party had been stopped on its march by Rái Dúlab, on which the nabob caught up the idea that Clive was secretly despatching a powerful force to the neighbourhood of the capital. He sent a body of troops to enter and search the factory, and issued orders to cut off the ears and noses of any soldiers or other persons belonging to the English who should be on board of boats in which ammunition should be discovered. He at the same time directed a reinforcement estimated at 15,000 men to march to Plassy, ordered out his own tents with the intention of following, and sent instructions to M. Law to suspend his march and prepare to return when summoned. On the same evening a letter from Clive led him to countermand the latter part of his orders,⁹ but next day the reinforcement actually marched under Mír Jáfir.¹

All these subjects were fully discussed in the committee of May 1, on which occasion Clive was present. They came to a resolution that no dependence could be placed on the friendship or honour of the nabob, and

⁸ Letter from Clive to Casimbázár. *Malcolm's Clive*, i. 232.

⁹ Scrafton's letter of April 28. (India House.)

¹ Orme, ii. 150.

that a revolution in the government would be extremely advantageous to the Company's affairs.

They assign their reasons for promoting such an event at length, under three heads. 1. The nabob's original insincerity in his engagement; proved by his non-fulfilment of the conditions, especially in the inadequacy of his pecuniary payments.² 2. His evident intention to break it now; proved by his favour to the French, his invitations to Bussy, his preparations against an attack, and the opinion of all men that he was resolved upon a rupture. 3. The general discontent, and the probability that a revolution would be effected without their aid, in which case they would lose all the advantage that might be obtained by taking a share in it.

On these grounds they determined to support Mír Jáfir, and fixed the terms on which they were to promise their alliance.³

At this time all correspondence with Murshidábád was carried on through Clive, who usually resided in camp, but went to Calcutta when anything of importance came before the council. At other times he kept them acquainted with the proceedings at the nabob's court, and communicated their instructions and such as he himself thought expedient to Mr. Watts. It was therefore by Clive that the above resolutions were notified to Watts. His letter is dated May 2, and gives authority to Watts to modify the terms in such manner as his

² For one instance, he would only allow 67,830*l.* for the whole amount of property taken at Calcutta, while the committee alleged that the private losses of the Europeans alone amounted to ten times that value. He denied that he was responsible for money embezzled by the governor whom he placed in the town.

³ Proceedings of the Committee at the India House, and the letter of the Select Committee to the Directors, September 1, 216.

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knowledge of the state of affairs on the spot may suggest to him.

The nature of the transactions with Mír Jáfir required profound secrecy, and his proposals when first transmitted by Mr. Watts were accompanied by suggestions that if the committee should determine on a rupture they should put off the appearance of it; they should withdraw their troops, and amuse the nabob with discussions about commercial matters and the fulfilment of the treaty, while they removed their property and perfected their plans. Accordingly, in his letter of May 2 Clive informed Mr. Watts that he had addressed a soothing letter to the nabob, and should retire to Calcutta next day; and in the same letter he sent a message to assure Mír Jáfir that he would stand by him while he had a man left, and that he had no doubt of being able to seize the nabob's person or to drive him out of the country.⁴

This system of double-dealing was kept up to the end. The English continued to press the nabob to remove all fears about peace by withdrawing his troops and fulfilling his agreement, when they had resolved, and had engaged to Mír Jáfir, that no act of the nabob's should prevent their making war. The nabob, however, was not deceived; his fears kept him more than awake to the designs of his enemies. He kept his army in the field, retained M. Law in his pay, continued his correspondence with M. Bussy, and looked impatiently to the time when he should be an object of terror in his turn.⁵

Meanwhile the arrangement of the terms was going on. Mír Jáfir on his departure for Plassy had left a confidential servant at Murshidábád, with whom Mr. Watts continued to consult. He also kept up a cor-

⁴ Malcolin's *Clive*, i. 240.

⁵ Letter from Watts, May 11. (India House.)

respondence with Clive, and by these means he had modified the terms sent from Calcutta in such a manner as to render them more advantageous to the Company, at the same time that several of the articles which were not acceptable to Mír Jáfir were struck out. But when things seemed tending rapidly to a conclusion, an unexpected obstruction arose which brought the whole plot to the very brink of discovery.

Omi Chand, though vindictive and implacable, was still more avaricious ; and after he found his interests involved with those of the English, he cast aside the remembrance of the injuries he had received from them, and took an active part in promoting their views at the native court, not, however, without occasionally injuring their interests by petty frauds for his own profit. It was through him that overtures had been received from Jaggat Sét and Latti⁶ ; and, although he was an object of distrust and aversion to Mír Jáfir, who insisted that he should have no share in the negotiation or knowledge of its existence, yet Watts, judging it impossible to elude his suspicions, thought it best to entrust him with the secret, and admitted him without reserve into his counsels. So fully did Clive partake in this confidence, that in his instructions to Watts he desired him to consult with Omi Chand on any modifications that might be required in the treaty ; and so well was he disposed to reward his services that he suggested the insertion of a separate article in the treaty to provide a compensation for his losses at Calcutta,⁷ and afterwards authorised a promise to him of five per cent. 'on whatever money he might receive on the new contract.'⁸

The nature and extent of this last grant are not clear,

⁶ Scrafton's letter of May 20. (India House.)

⁷ Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 240.

⁸ Mr. Watts's letter of May 14 ; First Report, 219. I have retained

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and it is not certain that the intention of conferring it was communicated to Omi Chand; but if it had been offered to him at the largest interpretation, it would have fallen far short of the expectations he had already formed. The demand he made on Watts was for five per cent. on all Suráj-u-Doula's treasure, and one-fourth of all his jewels; and to give a colour of public zeal to his own rapacity, he also required that the taxes should henceforth be limited to the rates at which they were levied under Jáfir Khán. Suráj-u-Doula's treasure was estimated by Mr. Watts and the best informed English, as well as by the generality of the natives, at forty millions sterling,⁹ an amount which it seems extraordinary that people of common sense should have believed, but which would have raised Omi Chand's expected receipts to two millions sterling,¹ independent of the jewels. Whatever his receipts might have proved in reality, the lowest estimate formed of them at the time would, with the jewels, have fallen little short of one million sterling.² Of these demands he could not be

Mr. Watts's words, being in doubt as to the meaning. If the promise implied five per cent. on the money to be received under the new treaty, the amount would have been equal to that of the same commission afterwards granted to Rái Dúláb, which was 596,998 rupees (upwards of 60,000*l.*). First Report, 262.

⁹ Mr. Watts's letter of May 14, First Report, 219; Scrafton's reflections, 91.

¹ Watts in the letter above referred to, 219.

² Orme says that the common people rated the nabob's treasures at forty-five millions sterling, but that better inquirers supposed them to be four millions and a half sterling, on which, he adds, 'Omi Chand's share would have been 675,000*l.* sterling' (ii. 151). It is not clear how this sum is computed, but it may be taken as that at which those who, like Orme, took the most moderate view of the nabob's treasure, fixed the share of Omi Chand. The jewels were supposed by the English, after they had opportunities of ascertaining their value, to have been worth one million sterling (Clive's evidence, First Report, 155), of which Omi Chand's fourth would be 250,000*l.* Thus his demand at the lowest was for 925,000*l.* It is possible, however, though certainly not reconcilable to his expressions, that Orme may have included the fourth of the jewels in the

prevailed on to abate one tittle, and he threatened that if they were not complied with he would reveal the whole conspiracy to the nabob. Habituated as he was to the risk of discovery, Watts was dismayed at this new danger, which seemed about to involve himself and his friends in common destruction. The agitation of his mind may be inferred by his sending three hundred notes to Clive on the day when the threat was held out to him ;³ and the nature of his alarm is shown in a conversation of the same day with Mr. Sykes.⁴ But fearful as was his situation, he did not lose his energy and decision. Finding Omi Chand inflexible, he determined to conclude the negotiation without further consulting him. At an interview with Mír Jáfir's confidential agent, he drew up eleven articles which comprised all the objects desired for the Company, and to which the agent assured him Mír Jáfir would agree. Among those stipulations was one for 300,000*l.* to Omi Chand. Watts probably found that this sum was the utmost Mír Jáfir would have admitted, and took his

* 675,000*l.*, which would occasion a reduction of 250,000*l.* in the total amount.

³ Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, i. 295-6.

⁴ Watts's correspondence with Clive has never been published, but the substance of it appears in Clive's evidence (First Report, 149), where he states that Watts wrote to him 'that Omi Chand had insisted on five per cent. on the nabob's treasure and thirty lacs of rupees in money, and that if he did not comply with that demand, he would immediately acquaint Serájah Dowla with what was going on, and Mr. Watts should be put to death.' Mr. Sykes's evidence gives more particulars. He says (First Report, 145), that 'in the year 1757 he was stationed at the subordinate factory called Cassimbázár, in council; that he does not know particularly the terms demanded by Omi Chand; but, being on a visit to Mr. Watts, he found him under great anxiety; that he took him aside and told him that Omi Chand had been threatening to betray them to Serájah Dowla, and would have them all murdered that night unless he would give him some assurances that the sum promised him (by Mr. Watts) should be made good,' and, 'that he was under the greatest anxiety how to counteract the designs of Omi Chand.'

chance of Omi Chand's acquiescing, or of Clive's finding out some other way of averting the danger.

These terms accompanied his despatch of May 14, and reached the council on the 17th. The treachery of Omi Chand excited equal surprise and indignation. They immediately struck out the article giving him 300,000*l.*, declaring that his behaviour rather merited disgrace and punishment at their hands than such a stipulation in his favour. They then agreed to the other terms with some modifications, and afterwards proceeded to consider 'how to deceive Omi Chand and prevent the disclosure of the whole project.' For this purpose they adopted a plan suggested by Clive, that they should prepare two treaties, one containing all the stipulations demanded by Omi Chand, and the other omitting all mention of his name.⁵ Both treaties were to be signed by the contracting parties, but that without the stipulations was to be the only one really binding; the other was only to be made use of to deceive Omi Chand, and was to be written on red paper to distinguish it from the true one. Admiral Watson refused to sign the false treaty, declaring that 'he would have nothing to do with it; he was a stranger to deception; they might do as they pleased.'⁶ It is doubtful whether anything else ever passed on the subject, but the gentleman who had carried the treaty to Watson understood him to mean, that though he would not sign the false treaty himself, he had no objection to his name being put to it by some other person. Clive, on

⁵ Proceedings of the Committee. First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 1772, 220. Clive's suggestion is in Orme, and in his own evidence.

⁶ Captain Brereton's evidence (First Report, 151). Much of his evidence is at second hand, and a good deal of it is inaccurate; but the words quoted he says he heard from Watson himself.

this, ordered his signature to be affixed, and afterwards, in his evidence before Parliament, declared that he understood the admiral to have given his consent, but that he would have ordered his name to be put there, whether he had consented or not.⁷

While the answer from Calcutta was still in suspense, May 16. Omi Chand was contriving how he might make the most of the nabob. In spite of the remonstrances of Watts, to whom he imparted his design, he alarmed Suráj-u-Doula by dark hints of an impending evil, which it might cost him his life to make known. When the nabob was blinded by fear and curiosity, he revealed to him that the English had sent two gentlemen to Bussy, and that the French and English had agreed to unite their forces and divide Bengal between them. The nabob was thunderstruck at this intelligence, and Omi Chand so artfully worked on his gratitude and his anxiety for further information, that he prevailed on him to give orders for the immediate restoration of all the money found in his house at Calcutta (which Orme fixes at 40,000*l.*), for reimbursement for his losses in merchandise and effects, and for the discharge of a debt^a of 40,000*l.* owed him by the Rájá of Bardwán.⁸ The first sum he received that very night, the second he set to work to ascertain and recover without a moment's delay, the third was equally secure to him whether the allies effected their purpose or not.⁹

⁷ Evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, 1772; and Orme.

⁸ Watts's letter of May 17 in Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 245; Orme, i. 156. He had before received some compensation; Orme, 128. The *Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal* (the materials of which appear to have been furnished by Mr. Watts), give the particulars of this transaction and the date, May 16 (94) which agrees with Watts's letter, but is totally silent on the subject of Omi Chand's demands and the double treaty.

⁹ The extent of the concession made to Omi Chand in the false treaty

When the treaties arrived it was evident that the precautions against detection were no more than were

has been thrown into obscurity by a statement of Orme's, which has been followed by other writers, but which I find it difficult to reconcile with the printed documents. He states (ii. 153), that in the articles drawn up by Watts, three millions of rupees (300,000*l.*) were mentioned for Omi Chand, of which he supposes Mr. Watts had informed him; and (in page 154) he says that in the fictitious treaty the sum allotted to him was two millions of rupees. Why a fictitious treaty drawn up for the express purpose of satisfying Omi Chand should fall a million of rupees short of what had been promised him, is not apparent. Indeed, if Omi Chand had so far receded from his extravagant pretensions as to come down to the comparatively moderate sum of two, or even three millions of rupees, which Mír Jáfír also had agreed to pay, there hardly seems a sufficient motive for incurring the danger and discredit of forming a fictitious treaty at all. Most of the writers who have followed Orme in other respects fix the sum stipulated for in the fictitious treaty at 300,000*l.*, and appear to regard it as the sum agreed on between Omi Chand and Watts. But the papers laid before Parliament show incontestably that Omi Chand never came to any compromise with Watts, and never receded from his original demand of five per cent. on the nabob's treasures; and that the stipulation in the false treaty went to the full extent of that demand. The following is Mr. Watts's account of the transaction, as communicated in his despatch to Clive dated May 14 (First Report, 219). 'I showed the articles you sent up to Omi Chand, who did not approve of them, but insisted on my demanding for him five per cent. on all the nabob's treasure, which would amount to two crore of rupees, besides a quarter of all his wealth; and that Mír Jáfír should oblige himself to take from the zemindars no more than they paid in Jáfír Cawn's time. . . . These and many other articles, in which his own ambition, cunning, and avaricious views were the chief motives, he positively insisted on, and would not be prevailed upon to recede from one article. Perceiving his obstinacy would only ruin our affairs, and that we should alarm the jealousy and lose the good opinion of all people, and that the accomplishment of his treaty (if agreed to) would take some years—Mír Jáfír likewise having expressed an utter distrust and disgust at his being anyways concerned in the treaty, and as delays are dangerous—I therefore, with Petrose, had a meeting with Mír Jáfír's confidant, who sets out to-day with the accompanying articles which, he says, he is sure Mír Jáfír will comply with.' Of the articles just mentioned, the eighth stipulates for thirty lacs of rupees in favour of Omi Chand. From this narrative it is evident that there had been no concert with Omi Chand in preparing the article in his favour, which is confirmed by Clive's statement that Watts never promised him any specific sum (First Report, 149). That Watts was far from thinking that he had come to an adjustment with Omi Chand is also manifest from his earnest entreaties at the close of his despatch, that the part relating

rendered necessary by the wary temper of Omi Chand. He continued to doubt and scrutinise to the last, and it was not till afterwards, when he had returned to Calcutta, and had bribed the native secretary who copied the treaty to let him know if there was anything wrong in the ratification, that he at length rested satisfied.

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About
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Watts, who still thought his life and those of his associates insecure as long as Omi Chand remained at Murshidábád, used every argument to convince him that it was for his own interest to withdraw to Calcutta ; but, as the insatiable extortioner had money to collect in the city, it was difficult to draw his attention to any other consideration, and when he was at length persuaded, all his skill was necessary to induce the nabob to part with him. He at length set out in company with Mr. Scrafton, then returning to Calcutta from a

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to that individual may be kept inviolably secret, 'the critical situation of our affairs rendering such a precaution indispensable.' We possess no copy of the false treaty, but the evidence of Lord Clive, who framed it, shows the extent of the stipulation in favour of Omi Chand. He says (First Report, 150), that 'the fictitious treaty, to the best of his remembrance, stated thirty lacs and five per cent. upon the treasures,' and in answer to a question added, 'it might be fifty lacs for ought he knows.' The statement regarding the thirty or fifty lacs is obscure (it may perhaps have been Clive's own estimate of the value of Omi Chand's share of the jewels), but that relating to the five per cent. is clear and positive, and shows that the lowest sum which Omi Chand would have accepted was still, according to the most moderate estimate at the time, about one million sterling. Sir John Malcolm, who had access to all Clive's correspondence, speaks of the limitation to 300,000*l.* as a thing certain ; and on one occasion (i. 295-6) seems to quote three unpublished notes of Watts's as proofs that such was the sum insisted on. But the real intention of his quotation is only to prove the fact of Omi Chand's threats, for in another place (247) he says expressly that he finds 'no details of what passed with Omi Chand in any of Mr. Watts's letters ;' and his other proofs quoted along with the three notes, refer to the danger alone, and not the amount demanded. In other places relating to Omi Chand, Sir John confines his references to authorities already printed ; and it is probable that the whole narrative would have been more clear and consistent if it had undergone the last revision of its distinguished author.

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mission which he had just accomplished, and, after alarming his fellow-traveller by several disappearances, which however were prompted by avarice and unconnected with any treacherous design, he at last reached Calcutta. He was received with every appearance of cordiality by Clive and the select committee, and continued to be treated as a friend and confederate until the fall of Suráj-u-Doula rendered all further dissimulation unnecessary.¹

The object of Scrafton's journey to Murshidábád deserves mention.

A letter had been received by Mr. Drake, purporting to be from Bálají, the Pésbwa, offering the alliance of the Marattas and proposing a confederacy against the nabob. The sagacity of Clive suggested at once the probability of this being a contrivance of the nabob's, and the best means of defeating it. It was determined to communicate the letter to the nabob himself, who, if he had sent it to try the sincerity of the English, would be deceived by his own stratagem.

At the same time the committee were at a loss how to explain the circumstance of the double treaty to Mír Jáfir. They therefore resolved to despatch Mr. Scrafton on a special mission, as if to communicate Bálají's letter in the most secret and solemn manner to the nabob, 'by which,' they say, 'we may gain the nabob's confidence and incline him to think us sincere in our friendship for him,' but in reality to visit the camp at Plassy and procure Mír Jáfir's signature to the real and fictitious treaties.² This avowal, without hesitation, softening, or apology, is a plain proof of the conviction of the committee that they were perfectly justified in employing

¹ Orme, ii. 157.

² Proceedings of the Committee, May 17; First Report, 220.

against Suráj-u-Doula the same deception that he had attempted to practise on them ; as if, by degrading themselves to the level of a barbarian, they could shake off the responsibility imposed on them by their superior knowledge.

They were disappointed in both their objects. The nabob's vigilance prevented the interview with Mír Jáfir, and the letter from Bálají made no great impression. The only effect of their proof of confidence was to induce the nabob to withdraw his troops from Plassy.³ The return of Mír Jáfir, who arrived before the rest, afforded an opportunity for consulting him through his native agent, when he declared his approbation of the draft submitted to him, and Scrafton set off with it for Calcutta, as has been mentioned.

But the treaty, though accepted, had not been signed, nor was there any proof of Mír Jáfir's consent to it except the word of his confidential agent. It was therefore indispensable for Mr. Watts to have a meeting with him, and such intercourse was now become nearly impossible from the new or revived suspicions of the nabob. Though he had received no information of the plot against him, it is not unlikely that vague surmises were afloat of what was going on underhand, and from these or some caprice of his own, he had received Mír Jáfir on his return with marked distrust and displeasure. A few days after, Mír Jáfir was removed from his office and command. • Mutual jealousy was now avowed. Jáfir ceased to go to court, and assembled his retainers in his palace, while the nabob surrounded him with spies, and secretly posted guards on all the communications with his residence.

Such was the state of things in which Watts had to

³ Scrafton's letter of May 25. (India House.)

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attempt an interview. Trusting his life to the fidelity of some of his servants, he set out in a close litter, such as is commonly used by women, passed the guards and spies unsuspected, and reached the apartment where he was expected by his confederate. A full conference then took place; Mír Jáfir signed the treaty, swore on the Koran to observe it, and, laying his hand on his son's head, devoted him to the divine vengeance if he himself proved unfaithful to his engagement.⁴

The terms of the treaty were—

1. The articles agreed to by Suráj-u-Doula to remain in force.

2. The enemies of the English, European or Indian, to be the enemies of the nabob.

3. The French factories to be transferred to the English, and the French never to be allowed to return to Bengal.

4 to 7. Compensation to be granted for losses at Calcutta &c.—

To the Company	£1,000,000
To the European inhabitants	500,000
To the native inhabitants	200,000
To the Armenians	70,000

8. The tract within the Maratta ditch and 600 yards beyond to be ceded.

9. The country to the south of Calcutta as far as Calpi to be granted to the Company as a zemindári, subject to the usual payment of revenue to the nabob.

10. The nabob to pay for any assistance he may require from the English.

11. To erect no new fortifications on the river below Húgli.

⁴ Orme, ii. 161; *Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal*, 98. I have preferred the date in the latter to Orme's, which is probably calculated from that in the treaty.

12. The above sums to be paid as soon as Mír Jáfir is established in the government.

These engagements are all on the part of Mír Jáfir ; on the part of the Company there is only one—

13. The Company to aid Mír Jáfir in acquiring the government, and to assist him to the utmost against all enemies.⁵

Along with the treaty a private engagement was obtained from Mír Jáfir, by which he promised to give 200,000*l.* as a donation to the army, 200,000*l.* to the navy, and from 120,000*l.* to 150,000*l.* to the Governor and members of the committee. In addition to which, after his accession he gave 160,000*l.* to Clive, 10,000*l.* each to such of the councillors as were not of the committee, and considerable sums to other persons, the particulars of which have never been made public.⁶

⁵ *Treaties and Grants to the East India Company*, 73.

⁶ The history of the pecuniary demands is curious, as showing their progress and the individuals in whom each originated. The draft of May 1 merely stipulated for compensation to the Company and the Europeans (India House records, and *Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal*, 88). On May 2 Clive wrote that any gratuity the nabob might bestow on the troops must be left to his generosity and to the management of Mr. Watts and Omi Chand. (Malcolm's *Clive*, 239.) Mr. Watts, desirous of introducing some precision into the articles, appears to have consulted Clive regarding the sums to be demanded, for on May 5 Clive writes to him suggesting 500,000*l.* for all private losses except Omi Chand's, for whom he recommends a separate stipulation and 'ten lacs' of rupees, equal to 100,000*l.* (*quære* 100 lacs, equal to 1,000,000*l.* ?) to the Company for the expenses of the war, including a donation to the troops (Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 241). The specification of the sums in the treaty was made by Mr. Watts after ascertaining Mír Jáfir's disposition (*Memoirs*, 86). They were in his draft as follows :

To the Company	£1,000,000
To the European sufferers	300,000
To the native sufferers	300,000
To the Armenians	150,000
To Omi Chand	300,000

(First Report, 219). The proportions were afterwards altered in the final draft by the committee ; and in the treaty itself, which was made out

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The whole of this private agreement was highly reprehensible. Whatever gratuity was proper for the troops should have been inserted in the treaty; the other demands should never have been made at all. Clive and Watts, perhaps Kilpatrick (who alone had any claims), should have trusted to Mír Jáfir's gratitude, which his subsequent liberality to Clive shows to have been a solid ground to rely on. The stipulations for the members of the committee and the council were warranted by no merit, and set an example which afterwards led to still more disgraceful exactions. The only palliation lies in the sordid economy of the Court of Directors, by which their servants, deprived of honourable means of subsistence, were compelled to look to indirect ones. Trade on their own account was

under Clive's directions, a blank was left in the demand for the Company which Watts was authorised to reduce to 500,000*l.* if Mír Jáfir objected to the larger amount. (Proceedings of the Committee, May 19; First Report, House of Commons, 1772, 220.) As in Watts's draft the 100,000*l.* for expenses and donations to the troops was omitted, it was probably he who suggested a separate arrangement for the latter object. Whether he also indicated the amount does not appear; but at the same meeting of the committee at which the final draft was prepared (May 17), the grants to the troops inserted in the private agreement were decided on, and Mr. Becher, one of the members, observing that it was but reasonable that the committee who had set the whole machine in motion should also share in the reward, it was at once resolved that a donation for them should be stipulated for along with the rest. (Mr. Becher's evidence, Report, 145.) No notice is taken of these gratuities in the recorded proceedings of the committee; but two days after (May 19) Clive writes to Watts to get a private engagement for 200,000*l.* each to the army and navy, and 120,000*l.* to the committee. (Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 253.) It does not appear how this last sum came to be increased, but the actual payments are stated in Mr. Becher's evidence to have been 28,000*l.* each to Mr. Drake and Colonel Clive, and 24,000*l.* to each of the other four members, which would make the whole amount to 152,000*l.* This was all that was stipulated for in the agreement. The other presents made after the nabob's accession were not in consequence of that engagement. Some of them are stated by Clive in his evidence from imperfect recollection: 80,000*l.* to Mr. Watts; 50,000*l.* to Mr. Walsh; 30 or 40,000*l.* to Major Kilpatrick; 20,000*l.* to Mr. Scrafton, besides smaller sums.

the usual source of their emoluments, but no source was forbidden that did not interfere with the interests of the Company.⁷ In such circumstances some allowance may be made for needy men, disposing of wealth which they thought inexhaustible, and which at the moment had no recognised owner.⁸

After the signing of the treaty there was no call for Mr. Watts's services or presence at Murshidábád, but, as his flight would have opened the nabob's eyes, he continued his residence notwithstanding the urgent advice of Mír Jáfir, and, even after reports of an English plot began to circulate, he still maintained his

⁷ Major Kilpatrick, one of the best officers in their service, was appointed Commander-in-Chief in Bengal and third in council, with a salary, in full of all demands, of 250*l.* a year. Yet he had an important trust to execute and some dignity to maintain, and he had no other emoluments, avowed or secret. Sir John Malcolm justly observes that a person in Clive's situation in later times would have had 30,000*l.* a year for his salary and a grant from the Company for his services equal to that which Clive received from the nabob.

[Clive, when his conduct was assailed in the House of Commons years later, defended his conduct on the ground that presents were authorised by the practice of the service at the time, and justifiable under the conditions of a service whose emoluments were so poor. (*Life of Clive*, iii. 351.) The same line of defence was taken in his letter to the Court of Proprietors when his rights were called in question. (*Ibid.*, i. 308.) Malcolm, in his *Political India* (ii. 245), while vindicating Clive's conduct on this occasion, gives a remarkable instance of similar payments so late as in 1792, when, on the conclusion of the peace with Tippoo, thirty lacs of rupees were demanded and given as *darbár khurutch*, or darbár expenses, to be distributed among the officers concerned in settling the treaty. It seems from the same author that the usage was recognised by the Court of Directors in their letter of March 1758, when they direct that the surplus of the sums received, after the reimbursement of losses, should be paid into the Company's treasury. They add, 'We do not intend by this to break in upon any sums of money which have been given by the nabob to particular persons by way of free gift or in reward of their services.' (*Life of Clive*, i. 308.) The defence would be complete were the sums stipulated for under the so-called treaty with Mír Jáfir, then only commander of the nuwab's forces, presents in any sense of the word. They were moneys bargained for the sale of a province under a transaction stained with falsehood and treachery throughout.—Ed.]

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ground, resolving not to leave his station till he learned from Clive that all was ripe for a disclosure. When such a notice reached him, he went out in the cool of the evening on pretence of hunting. Three English gentlemen, who formed his suite, had previously repaired to a country residence from whence they joined him, and all four set off for camp accompanied by an old Tartar soldier who had long been in the service of Mr. Watts. They had about seventy miles to ride without guides, and had to pass the nabob's guards and to find boats for crossing the river, but they got through their journey with few adventures, and next afternoon reached Clive's camp at Calna, fifteen miles north of Húgli.¹

June 13.

Clive had marched from Chandernagór on the day when Watts joined him, and at the same time had despatched a letter to the nabob, stating all the grievances of the British, and in fact declaring war.⁹

On the 19th he took Catwa, a town which the nabob had been strengthening since his alarm from the English, but up to this time he had received no accounts from Mír Jáfir, who had promised to join him at that place.¹

When Mr. Watts left Murshidábád, the nabob had gone to such extremities against Mír Jáfir as showed that henceforth his hostility could only be restrained by his fears. He had brought cannon against the residence of his refractory subject, and might probably have soon obliged him to surrender, when he was arrested by the intelligence of Watts's flight. This event changed his resentment into alarm and trepidation. He saw that he was to be attacked by the English, and feared that they might be joined by the malcontents in his own army. He immediately opened a negotiation.

⁹ Orme, ii. 165.

with Mír Jáfir, and, as that experienced intriguer was afraid to trust himself in his power, he went himself, almost unattended, to Mír Jáfir's palace, and, by his entreaties and professions, brought about a seeming reconciliation.² This took place on the 15th, and so elated the nabob that he wrote a letter of defiance to Clive, and a few days after marched towards Plassy with at least 15,000 horse, 35,000 infantry, and upwards of forty heavy guns. Clive's force was 750 European soldiers and 50 seamen, 2,100 sepoy, and eight field-pieces.³

Mír Jáfir had written to Clive to explain the real nature of his reconciliation, but his letter was long in arriving, and before it was received, a messenger who had been sent by Watts returned from Murshidábád, and reported that he had seen Mír Jáfir and his son; that the first admitted him alone, and expressed good hopes and wishes but promised no assistance, while the son received him before witnesses, disclaimed all connection with the English, and spoke the language of an open enemy. Intelligence had also been received through Omi Chand that the reconciliation with the nabob was cordial, and that the whole plot was at an end.⁴ Clive was perplexed by these accounts and by his own situation. It had never been intended that he should engage the nabob unsupported; the rains were setting in; his next march would carry him across the river into the presence of the enemy. If he once crossed he

⁰ It is given at large in Scafton's *Reflections*, 82.

¹ Clive's evidence, First Report, 149.

² Orme, ii. 167.

³ The nabob's force was ascertained by Clive after the taking of Murshidábád (Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 264). Orme and Scafton make it much more considerable. Clive's numbers are stated, seemingly from official returns, in Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 256.

⁴ Clive's evidence, First Report, 149. Letters from Clive. (India House.)

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would not be able to return, and he would soon be equally unable to advance or to procure subsistence for his army. Urged by these considerations, he wrote to consult the committee. He first proposed the alternative of a halt till after the rains, during which interval the British might strengthen themselves by certain alliances, and, after the report of the messenger, he again wrote suggesting the possibility of an honourable peace with the nabob. The committee answered the first letter like men not called on to act; they boldly decided for an immediate action in their first paragraph, but neutralised the decision by a qualification in the second. The other letter they submitted to the admiral and his captains, and concurred in the opinion they gave, that a decisive action was the only expedient left.⁵ But before either of these answers arrived, Clive had won his victory.

After writing to the committee he had received Mír Jáfir's letter, but though assured of his sincerity, he still saw the strongest reason to doubt both his courage and his power. On the 21st he summoned a council of war to decide between an immediate attack, and delay till reinforced by some of the native states. He himself gave his opinion for delay, and was supported by eight officers, among whom was Kilpatrick; but seven others, headed by Coote, were for an immediate attack.⁶ The minority saw only the military question, but Clive knew that a defeat would be ruinous to the English Government, and was the only thing that could preserve the nabob's from dissolution. At the breaking up of the council he retired into a neighbouring grove, and walked about for an hour reviewing

⁵ This correspondence is on the records at the India House.

⁶ Sir Eyre Coote's evidence, First Report, 153; Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 258.

the question in all its bearings. At the end of that time he returned to the lines, and, without further discussion or explanation, gave orders for a march.⁷

The army crossed the river next morning, and a little after midnight they arrived at Plassy, and could hear the music of the nabob's band which played, as is usual, at the commencement of every watch. The British occupied an extensive grove or orchard of thickly planted mango-trees, surrounded, as is common in Bengal, by a bank of earth instead of a wall.

The nabob was in the entrenched camp formerly occupied by Rái Dúlab. At daybreak his army issued out, and drew up in a long line, with the guns and elephants at regular intervals. In this order it advanced, and presented a splendid and formidable appearance, sufficient of itself to awe all but experienced soldiers. Clive, probably to encourage his confederates, drew up outside of the enclosure, but seeing no signs of support, and suffering from the fire of the enemy's guns, he after some time withdrew into the grove, where the heavy shot, though they crashed among the trees and scattered the branches, did little damage to the men, who were protected by the bank. The greatest annoyance they suffered was from a small party of forty Frenchmen, who took up a position, at a distance of 300 yards, behind the high bank of a tank, and kept up a sharp and well-directed fire from four field-pieces. This post could not be attacked without exposing the flank of the assailants to the nabob's whole army, and the other guns were so scattered that no attempt to storm them could have been decisive, while any disorder among Clive's own men, such as he had experienced on a recent occasion, would have placed him at the mercy

⁷ Orme, ii. 171; Sir Eyre Coote's evidence as above.

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of an overwhelming cavalry. He saw therefore no resource, when abandoned by Mír Jáfir, but to maintain his position during the day and attack the enemy after dark.

About noon there was a heavy fall of rain, which wetted the priming of the enemy's guns and compelled them to slacken their fire. The English field-pieces had been actively employed, and with great effect for their number, but the damage told little in so disproportioned a body. About this time, however, a shot struck Mír Madan, the favourite and military adviser of Suráj-u-Doula. He was carried to a tent, where the nabob sat out of danger, and expired in his presence. The nabob had passed the morning and the preceding night in despondency and perturbation, and this sight quite overthrew all remains of firmness. He sent for Mír Jáfir, who came reluctantly and strongly guarded, laid his turban at his feet (the most abject manner of Indian supplication), and entreated him to protect the grandson of Ali Verdi. Mír Jáfir answered him by unmeaning promises, and either he or Rái Dúláb advised him to withdraw his troops within the entrenchment. This advice proved fatal. The first sight of a retreat was perceived by Kilpatrick, who instantly sallied out with two companies of Europeans to attack the French post at the tank. Clive, worn out with fatigue and watching, had lain down and perhaps fallen asleep. He started up on hearing what was passing and sharply censured Kilpatrick for deranging his plan, but he no sooner perceived the extent of the enemy's movement than he determined on a general and decisive effort, and ordered his own line to advance. After driving the French from the tank, he moved on against two eminences nearer to the camp. This new aspect of the battle

drew the enemy's army back into the field. Notwithstanding the want of a leader, and the distrust pervading both the chiefs and soldiers, the cavalry exposed themselves with great spirit and lost many men, the infantry also were returning to their stations, and attempts were made to bring back the guns, but the long train of white oxen by which each was drawn afforded an excellent mark to the field-pieces, by which they were soon either disabled or dispersed. Beyond the eminences which had been carried was a place where the two faces of the nabob's entrenchment formed an angle. This was the most important point in the whole line ; it was defended by a redoubt with a battery of guns, and was occupied among others by the Frenchmen who had retreated from the tank. Against this work Clive directed all his efforts. He advanced in three columns, and expected a resolute opposition, but when he gained the redoubt he found it had just been evacuated, and entered the camp about five in the afternoon. The evacuation was occasioned by the sudden flight of the nabob, who, struck with a panic, leaped on a running camel and fled with precipitation in the direction of Murshidábád. His disappearance led to the dispersion of his army. The rout was complete. The English pursued ; they found the plain strewn with tents, carriages, arms, and baggage of all descriptions, and they took immediate possession of forty pieces of cannon. The troops, being promised a donation, showed no disposition to plunder, and after yoking some of the nabob's oxen to their own field-pieces, they continued their march for six miles further to a village called Dáudpur. During the advance of the English towards the camp, they perceived large bodies of horse hanging on their flank ; these were Mír Jáfir and his confederates, but as they neither

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assisted the English nor hung out white flags as had been concerted, they were taken for enemies and were kept at a distance by the fire of the field-pieces.⁸ The loss of the English was insignificant; only twenty Europeans and fifty-two sepoys killed and wounded. The bank which had covered them from the cannon had also prevented their being charged by the cavalry until the fate of the action had been decided.

June 23,
A.D. 1757.

On the morning after the battle, Mír Jáfir joined the victors; his consciousness of demerit made him doubtful of his reception, and he started at the clash of arms as the guard saluted him. But Clive received him with a cordiality that speedily reassured him. He congratulated him on his accession to the government of Bengal, and hurried him off to the capital to secure the treasures and prevent the escape of his rival.⁹

June 24.

Mír Jáfir reached Murshidábád on the evening of

June 25.

the next day, and found the city in a state of confusion and anarchy. On the following day the English army marched to within six miles of the city, when Mr. Watts and Mr. Walsh were sent on to confer with the intended viceroy. Whether Mír Jáfir, when no longer under the excitement of hope, was really alarmed at the embarrassments before him, or whether he merely affected modesty and forbearance, it was some time before the two deputies could prevail on him to assume the dignity which he had so anxiously desired. He at length consented, and was proclaimed Viceroy of Bengal, Behár, and Orissa.¹

June 29.

Clive allowed things to settle before he himself made his entry into Murshidábád. He was joyfully welcomed

⁸ Clive's letter to the Court of Directors (*Malcolm's Clive*, i. 263); Orme, i. 172; *Scrafton's Reflections*, 87; *Memoirs*, 109.

⁹ Scrafton, 89.

¹ Scrafton, 91.

by the population of that great city, who crowded every avenue to catch a glimpse of him and his army. Accompanied by the nabob's son, who had met him on entering the city, he proceeded to the palace, and was there received with the utmost respect by Mír Jáfir, and conducted by him to the hall of audience. Here all the nobles of the court and army were arranged in a full darbár, and between their ranks the two principal actors advanced to the upper end of the hall. Mír Jáfir affecting to decline the seat of dignity, Clive led him up to it, placed him on the masnad, and presented a salver of gold coin as an acknowledgment of his authority. His example was followed by the other persons present, and Mír Jáfir's government was recognised throughout the three provinces.

The next step was to fulfil the obligations of the treaty, and those of a pecuniary nature came first in order.

At the time of the discussion of the first agreement with Mír Jáfir, Rái Dúlab declared that the whole wealth of the government was inadequate to supply the sums demanded, and proposed that the new nabob and the English should share equally in whatever was found in the treasury. To this Mr. Watts, who believed in the alleged extent of the nabob's hoard, immediately gave his consent. But when Rái Dúlab recollected, that from his office he was entitled to five per cent. on all the money issued in the usual manner from the treasury, and that he would get nothing in a summary division of this kind, he retracted his objection and agreed to the stipulated payments. His first statement proved true; the whole amount to be paid was 2,340,000*l.*, and the money in the treasury was not sufficient to meet even a moiety of the demand.²

² Lord Clive, in his letter to the Court of Directors, reckons it about

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It was therefore settled that the English should for the present forego one half of the sum due to them ; that, of the half which they were to receive, two-thirds should be in money and one-third in jewels, and that the remaining half should be discharged within three years by three equal payments. This adjustment was made by the mediation of Jaggat Sét, whom Clive had strongly recommended to Jáfir, and who was now admitted to a share in the administration ; Mir Jáfir, Clive, Rái Dúlab, and he entering into mutual engagements on oath to support one another. Omi Chand was present on this occasion, but as he was not invited to join the conference, he sat down in a distant part of the apartment. When the party rose Clive moved towards him, and said to Scrafton that "it was now time to undeceive Omi Chand, on which Scrafton abruptly told him that the red treaty was a trick, and that he was to have nothing. Omi Chand sank down fainting, and was obliged to be supported by those around him. He was conveyed to his own house, where he remained for some hours in a state of stupor ; he afterwards betrayed signs of derangement, and died at the end of a year and a half in a state of imbecility.³

During the first uncertainty caused by the revolution the great men and rich merchants, anxious about their fate, sent messages to Clive tendering their submission, and made offers of large presents, all which he refused,

one million and a half pounds (Malcolm's *Clive*, i. 269). This would have been more than half the avowed demands ; but Jáfir had donations to his confederates and his own troops to make, with many other expenses absolutely indispensable to a new government.

³ Orme, ii. 182. This account of the effect of his disappointment on Omi Chand has been disputed on the ground that Clive, more than six weeks later, speaks of Omi Chand as a man still capable of being of use to the Company. This shows that Clive was not aware of his hopeless condition, but does nothing to shake a fact so emphatically asserted by Orme.

assuring them that he desired nothing but their assistance in settling the government.⁴ He, however, promised his protection to some, and wrote to calm the apprehensions of others who were at a distance from the capital.

All that was wanting to complete the settlement was the seizure of Suráj-u-Doula, and this consummation was not long withheld. He had reached Murshidábád early on the night of the battle, but could not bring himself to decide on the course he was next to pursue. He was advised to give himself up to the English, which he rejected with horror. He meditated another trial of his strength in the field, and he at last determined to make his way to M. Law and retreat with him into Behár. There, he thought, he might still hold out against his enemies until he could be assisted by M. Bussy or by Shujá-u-Doula, whose province was contiguous. He made some preparations to act on this plan, and sent off his wife and most of his women on elephants towards Behár, but his irresolution again came upon him, and he remained distracted by doubt and terror until the next evening, when the arrival of Mír Jáfir compelled him to accelerate his flight. He embarked on board a boat, disguised in a mean dress, accompanied by a

⁴ Scrafton, 91; Clive's evidence. During his examination Clive read part of a printed letter to the Proprietors of the East India Company, of which the following is an extract. 'Had I accepted these offers I might have been possessed of millions which the present Court of Directors could not have dispossessed me of. But preferring the reputation of the English nation, the interest of the nabob, and the advantage of the Company to all pecuniary considerations, I refused all the offers made to me, not only then but to the latest hour of my continuance in the Company's service in Bengal; and I do challenge friend or enemy to bring one single instance of my being influenced by interested motives to the Company's disadvantage, or to do any act that could reflect dishonour to my country or the Company in any one action of my administration either as Governor or commanding officer.' (Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 148.)

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favourite concubine and a eunuch, and carrying with him a casket of his most valuable jewels. He had reached Ráj Mahal, about seventy miles from Murshidábád, and was within twenty miles of M. Law's party, when his rowers became so much exhausted that they were obliged to put to for rest and refreshment. During this interval he concealed himself in a deserted garden, and was there discovered by a fakír whose nose and ears he had formerly cut off in one of his fits of passion. This man immediately gave notice to the governor of Ráj Mahal, who was Mír Jáfír's brother, and Suráj-u-Doula was seized and taken back with every indignity to Murshidábád. He arrived there on the night of July 2, and was carried into the presence of the new nabob. He prostrated himself before his former servant, and begged with tears and prayers for life alone. Mír Jáfír hesitated and desired that he might be kept in confinement, but his son Míran, a violent and unprincipled youth, ordered him of his own authority to be put to death in his prison. The particulars were not known to the English till many months later, and it is still uncertain whether Míran really acted without his father's knowledge. Such, however, was Mír Jáfír's assertion, and on it rested his apology to Clive.⁵

Suráj-u-Doula was only twenty-five years of age, and had reigned thirteen months. His youth was some excuse for his insolence and misconduct, but none for his treachery and cruelty.⁶

⁵ Orme; Sraffton; *Seir ul Mutakherín*.

⁶ Orme (185) makes him only twenty, in which he is copied by Stewart (*History of Bengal*, 531), although the latter writer has stated (495) that he was born at the time of Mír Jáfír's appointment to the government of Behár, which by his own account (421) was in 1729-30. This would make him twenty-six. The *Memoirs of the Revolution in Bengal* say he

The news of the victory was received by the English in Calcutta with unbounded joy, and their delight was increased soon after, when the first advance of the treasure arrived. It amounted to near a million sterling, perhaps the largest sum ever received at once into a British treasury. It was conveyed in two hundred boats, was escorted by a body of soldiers, and accompanied by all the boats of the squadron in triumphal procession, with music playing and colours flying. Those who, little more than a year before, had been reduced to the lowest extremity of humiliation and ruin, now saw riches pouring in on them beyond the dreams of their most exalted fancy, while their oppressor was crushed and their own disgrace effaced by the glory of the present successes. The effect of this influx of wealth, and of the other advantages of the treaty, soon showed itself in the altered state of Calcutta. Trade revived and increased, new houses were erected on a larger scale than before, and the city by degrees began to assume the appearance of the splendid capital which it now presents.

The joy and exultation of the public were first checked by the death of Watson, which happened on August 16. His place was well supplied by Admiral Pococke, who had been second in command; but his courage, integrity, generosity, and other virtues had endeared him to all, and his loss spread a gloom over every rank and description of his countrymen.

Whatever may have been the conduct of the English on particular occasions, it must be acknowledged that Suráj-u-Doula brought all his misfortunes on himself. His unprovoked attack on Calcutta led to retaliation,

was twenty-five; and the shorter period is quite inconsistent with the part he filled during the latter years of Ali Verdi.

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and that to mutual distrust, and his summons to Bussy, with his avowed partiality to the French, destroyed any chance that remained of a return of confidence. He had engaged in his letter accompanying the ratified treaty to look on the enemies of the English as his own, and ought therefore to have joined against the French as soon as hostilities broke out. If that letter be not regarded as equally binding with the treaty, he had a right to protect the French within his own provinces, and might wish to maintain them as a counterpoise to the English, but even in this case his object might have been effected without rendering peace impossible by calling in a force which he would never have been able to restrain. The English were certainly sincere in their promises not to attack Chandernagôr without his leave. If he had behaved with common steadiness and common honesty the neutrality would assuredly have been signed, the course of events might have turned the force of both parties towards the Deckan, and Bengal might not for a long time have suffered from the rivalry of Europeans.

But although the irreconcilable enmity which he showed towards the English entitled that nation to insist on securities, and to destroy his power if none such could be found, it could never entitle them to make war on him, under cover of apparent frankness and cordiality, nor to plot with his own servants for his destruction while professing to put him on his guard against the machinations of foreign enemies.

As the acts and fortunes of individuals engage our sympathy more than those of states, the case of Omi Chand has led to more discussion than the important event out of which it arose. The conduct of Clive, who was the prime mover of the whole, has by some been

thought worthy of entire approbation, and by others of unmitigated condemnation and reproach. When impartially considered, it appears not to be capable of justification, but to be accompanied by as many circumstances of extenuation as can attend any departure from principle.

Clive believed that the success of his enterprise and the lives of his friends depended on his making the promise; he believed that it was impossible to carry it into effect, and he was transported with a just resentment at the perfidy of his confederate and his own subjection to the dictation of such a traitor. Can we wonder if, under the influence of such feelings, he fell into an error which has misled the learned in their closets and the unlearned in their disinterested judgments?⁷ He gave the promise with his mind made up not to perform it, and was thence led almost necessarily into a long train of fraud and deception which he probably never foresaw.⁸

With the honourable exception of Watson, all Clive's contemporaries thought his conduct not only blameless but meritorious. Had there been a dissenting voice it

⁷ Some of the best writers on ethics maintain that as a forced promise gives no right to the exactor, it lays no obligation on the promiser; and the general opinion justifies a person who refuses to discharge a bond signed under duress, or to pay a sum promised to a highwayman. In these judgments it seems to be forgotten that there is a duty to society as well as to the other party, and that by it the promiser is bound in all cases to adhere to the general rules of morality. But in support of the doctrine, see the numerous authorities in Puffendorf's *Law of Nature and Nations*, Book iii. chap. vi. sects. 11, 12, and 13, with Barbeyrac's notes, Kennett's English translation, 285.

⁸ The double treaty and the fictitious signature were done in the first heat, and probably with alacrity; but the long course of dissimulation towards Omi Chand after he returned to Calcutta must have given sufficient time and more than sufficient motives for feelings of humiliation and almost of repentance.

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would have been in the fleet, and Watson's own surgeon assures us that 'all classes of people, from their knowledge of Omi Chand's avarice and treachery, applauded the artifice by which he was so dexterously outwitted.'⁹

No number or agreement of opinions can make wrong right, but where an error is general it should fall with less weight on each individual.

Clive's first object, after seating Mír Jáfir on the masnad, was to disperse the French party under Law, and within four days of the death of Suráj-u-Doula, a detachment was sent off for that purpose. It consisted of little more than 500 men, more than half sepoys, with two field-pieces, and was commanded by Captain Coote. Though this officer reached Patna, 200 miles from Murshidábád, in eleven days, he was unable to overtake Law, who had much the start of him from the first, and was favoured by the governor of the province. Coote, however, continued the pursuit to Chaprah, forty-four miles from Patna, where he learned that the French party had passed the frontier into Benares in the territory of the Viceroy of Oude.¹

Rám Náráin, the governor of Behár, had remained faithful to Suráj-u-Doula, and it was towards Patna that the flight of that prince was directed. On the death of his master he proclaimed Mír Jáfir, but was suspected of disaffection, and was even accused of a design to massacre Coote's detachment while halted at Patna on their advance. On these grounds Coote was ordered to

August 12.

⁹ Ives's *Voyage*, 147.

¹ M. Law seems to have been a man of considerable abilities. He was probably brother to the officer of the same name in the Deckan, who was nephew to the famous financier and father of the French general, the Marquis de Lauriston. He was at length taken prisoner while in the service of Sháh Alam, and returned to France. (*Biographie Universelle*, end of the article Law.)

dispossess him of his government. He returned to Patna for that purpose, and was on the point of attacking the town when he received a counter-order. A reconciliation took place with the government, and Rám Náráin remained in his office, but without any confidence between him and the nabob. Coote returned to Murshidábáb, and on the day after his arrival Clive set out for Calcutta. He left the detachment under Coote at Casimbázár, but removed the rest of the army to Chandernagór.

August 22.

Septem-
ber 14.

After so violent a revolution, it was natural to expect temporary disorders, but before Clive left Murshidábád, there were already signs of permanent weakness in the new government. The great claims of the English had left Mír Jáfir no means of gratifying his old adherents or rewarding those chiefs who had taken part with him in the late conspiracy; the transfer of so much money to a foreign territory was of itself unpopular, and the ascendancy of Europeans, hitherto only known as humble merchants, was odious to all classes, especially to the Mahometans. Mír Jáfir's own character was little qualified to remove these bad impressions. He was feeble and irresolute, indolent and insincere; he wasted his time in frivolous amusements, and embittered the disappointment of his unrewarded friends by lavish expenditure on his own pomp and pleasures. His son Míran, though so young, had, from his reckless energy, an ascendancy over him. This young man was rather popular with the soldiery, from a notion that he was unfavourable to the English; but his treachery and cruelty, his licentious and profligate character, made him detested by all other classes of the people. Neither father nor son understood the English, the most corrupt of whom despised habitual fraud and falsehood. If those

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around were discontented with the nabob, he was not better pleased with them. He had expected to step at once into the situation of Ali Verdi, and he found himself not only controlled by his allies, but tied up by engagements to his own subjects which he was not allowed to break. The first object of his jealousy was Rái Dúláb, who till the moment when he mounted the masnad had been his equal, and who from the agreement sworn to by himself and Clive, was still beyond the reach of his power. To deprive Rái Dúláb of this protection Jáfir brought forward all the accusations to which he gave credit, and others which he invented or did not believe. Rám Náráin having formerly been a dependent of Rái Dúláb, was supposed to be under his influence; insurrections broke out in different places which were attributed to him; a body of Marattas, who threatened Bengal from Cattac, were thought to have been invited by Rái Dúláb, and the troops more than once mutinied for pay, which was supposed to be at his instigation. How far Rái Dúláb was concerned in any of these machinations is doubtful, but he did the nabob as serious an injury, by endeavouring to impress on the English that he had formed a regular design for freeing himself by force from their control. He himself was alarmed for his life, and several times shut himself up in his house, suspending all the financial business of the state and depriving it of the services of the large body of troops which was under his personal command. This state of things kept the city in continual agitation and alarm. On one occasion during the nabob's absence a cry was raised of an extensive conspiracy headed by Rái Dúláb to put the infant nephew of Suráj-u-Doula on the masnad, on which Miran ordered the unfortunate child to be murdered, and imprisoned the ladies of Ali

Verdi's family. Temporary reconciliations were mediated by the English, but did not last, until Clive, judiciously availing himself of a period of embarrassment, convinced the nabob of the injury he was doing to his own affairs, and brought about an agreement which was effective for a considerable time.

The first of the insurrections alluded to was at Midnapúr, where the farmer of the revenue resisted the new government, but was brought to obedience by the interposition of Clive. The next was a plot at Dacca, to set up one of the family of Sarafíáz Khán, but that was quelled by the local officers. The most serious was that of Achal Sing, the farmer of Purniá, who set up a connection of Ali Verdi's family and raised a great body of troops. The nabob went in person against this insurgent, accompanied by Clive and the British troops. Their approach broke up the rebellion, and an officer of the nabob's, named Khádim Husén, who was sent in advance, took possession of the district and made Achal Sing prisoner. The nabob, thus freed from his other enemies, was eager to dispossess Rám Náráin, while Clive, who knew that he had collected an army, and feared that if driven to despair he would call in the Nabob of Oude and throw the whole country into confusion, was very averse to proceeding to extremities. He complied with the nabob's wish that he should march towards Patna, but he obtained his leave to attempt by fair means to obtain the submission of Rám Náráin, and wrote to that officer undertaking to guarantee the terms proposed by the nabob. On receiving this letter Rám Náráin set out from Patna, and came without hesitation to the camp, when he was presented to the nabob and was confirmed in his government. Rám Náráin on this occasion was quite sincere, and was effectually protected

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as long as Clive remained in India, but the nabob gave such proofs of sinister intentions during the transaction as to create a great degree of alienation between him and Clive, and even to excite some suspicions of hostile designs against the latter. When all was at last adjusted, the army returned to Murshidábád, Mír Jáfír following by a circuitous route. When the army reached the capital, Mírán affected alarm at the power of Rái Dúlab and fled to a country house, an act of folly which though in some degree repaired by his early return, revived the old estrangement of Rái Dúlab, and even implied distrust of Clive.

A considerable portion of the first payment to the English, which it had been agreed should be made in ready money, was still outstanding, and the expense of the present expedition increased the debt. Before the march of the army, Clive required that districts should be set aside from which the amount might be collected on account of the English, and the nabob at this time conferred a further favour on the Company by allowing it to farm the saltpetre monopoly in his province, though at the highest rate ever paid on any former occasion.²

After a short stay at Murshidábád, Clive proceeded to Calcutta. Despatches soon after arrived from England setting aside Clive, who had first been nominated as head of a committee for the settlement of Bengal, and appointing a council of ten, the four senior members of which were to preside for four months each in turn. This absurd arrangement was the result of a compromise between conflicting interests in the Court of Directors. It had taken eight months to reach Bengal, and had been

² The districts were subsequently restored before the whole debt had been liquidated, and a deposit of jewels was accepted as security for the remainder, which amounted to 200,000*l*.

drawn up before the news of the battle of Plassy had been heard of in England. Had that victory not taken place, the plan must have occasioned the immediate destruction of the British power in Bengal. Even in the actual state of affairs it was so pregnant with danger, that the members who would have formed the rotation government, to the great honour of their disinterestedness and patriotism, at once determined to waive the appointment, and with the consent of the rest of the council, offered the government to Clive.

Clive, though greatly offended at the treatment he had received, did not withhold his services, but accepted the charge without hesitation. This was the first instance of open disobedience to the orders of the Court of Directors, which was afterwards so often the theme of invective against their servants. The extreme importance of subordination, and the unnecessary breaches of it which sometimes occurred in India, make the general clamour on this subject natural and commendable, but in fact the distance of the Court of Directors, their ignorance of India, then only gradually becoming known to persons on the spot, their liability to local influence, and the necessary inapplicability of orders arriving at least a year after the exigency to which they related, made it often impossible to carry their instructions into effect. In the present case disobedience saved the province, and on many subsequent occasions the most useful and necessary measures were carried through in India, in direct opposition to the Court of Directors. In this instance a revolution of parties in the court led to a speedy correction of their error and confirmed Clive's appointment.

The nabob paid a complimentary visit to Calcutta soon after Clive's accession, and, in his absence, the long

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disputes with Rái Dúláb were brought to a crisis. That minister was desired to exhibit his accounts to be examined by Míran's díwán, and seeing the snare prepared for him, he requested to be allowed to retire to Calcutta. Míran refused, and at the same time instigated a body of troops to raise a mutiny and threaten the life of the minister. Rái Dúláb stood on the defensive until he was relieved by Mr. Watts, who returned from the nabob with a permission which he had obtained for the minister's departure. The removal of so powerful a subject was a great triumph to the nabob, but he did not feel safe while his enemy was at the ear of the British Governor. He had recourse therefore to new devices. Soon after his return to his capital he gave out that as he was going to perform his public devotions he observed a commotion among the troops whom he passed, and on reaching the mosque found that Khoja Hádi, who was posted there with his personal guard, was engaged in a plot to murder him, and to join in an extensive mutiny for which his death was to be the signal. No attempt on his life was made, and the threatened disturbance was quelled with unaccountable ease; but Khoja Hádi was dismissed from the service, and soon after the nabob pretended to have gained possession of a letter to him from Rái Dúláb. In this letter that veteran conspirator was made to avow his own share in the plot without reserve, and to say that he had obtained Clive's consent to it; and this was addressed to a man who, as the letter shows, required no such encouragement to induce him to go through with the plot. The intention of the letter was to irritate Clive against Rái Dúláb, but the forgery was too palpable to deceive anybody, and Clive contented himself with remonstrating against the nabob's giving ear to a story in which his

name was so dishonourably introduced. How much of the whole plot was real and how much invented by the nabob was never fully ascertained, for Khoja Hádi was allowed to depart with a small escort, and was murdered by a party of the nabob's troops in a defile through which he had to pass.

Before this, the French had sent such a force to Coromandel as obliged the English to stand on the defensive, and about this time intelligence arrived that they had taken Fort St. David and were threatening Madras. Earnest and repeated entreaties and injunctions had from time to time been received from the Madras Government for the return of Clive and his detachment to that Presidency. The course of the narrative has already shown the utter impossibility of compliance up to this period, and even now it was not competent for Clive to abandon his government, if he could otherwise have been spared. Even to weaken his force for a time was dangerous, and to do so permanently would have been ruinous. He, however, discovered a plan by which one part of the evil was avoided, and resolved to send an expedition into the French districts nearest Bengal, by which, if he did not effect a diversion, he would at least strike at the most important of the enemy's resources.

This resolution was opposed by the whole council without exception. Besides the perilous state of the interior, they still looked to the possibility of a descent by the French, and they thought, not without plausible reasons, that it would be an act of unpardonable rashness to weaken a province where their power was so precarious, and which was of so much more value than all the Company's old possessions. The expedition, however, sailed on Clive's sole responsibility. It was

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End of
Sep-
tember,
A.D. 1768.

commanded by Colonel Forde, and consisted of a full half of the troops.

The successes of the French opened new views to the nabob, and he was heard to say that if that nation were to come to Bengal, he would assist them, unless the British would agree to renounce all their pecuniary and territorial claims. But although the reduced numbers of the English was favourable to any design against them, none seems to have been formed. Jáfir was greatly irritated by the restraints imposed on him, and felt the increasing pressure of the Company's claims, and he was at first disappointed to find that the munificence of his presents to Clive produced no disposition to relax on public questions ; but he perceived how insecure his power would be without the English, and he still felt reverence and perhaps regard for their chief. Clive owed these sentiments as much to his steady conduct as to his services and station. He treated the nabob with frankness and temper, as well as with firmness ; trusting in general to reason and sometimes to time and patience for attaining his objects, seldom peremptory and never arrogant.

January,
A D. 1769.

Not long after the departure of the expedition, intelligence was received which showed in a strong light the danger of leaving Bengal so ill defended. Prince Ali Góhar, after his escape from Delhi,³ remained for several months in dependence on Najíb-u-Doula, but hearing of the distracted state of Bengal, he thought he might have some chance of supplanting the present occupant of that province. Shríjá-u-Doula, to whom he next repaired, had a secret motive for encouraging him to make the attempt, and for inducing his own

cousin Mohammed Kúli, Viceroy of Allahábád, to embark with the greatest zeal in his cause.

If the Empire had still been in existence, Ali Góhar was a rebel, for such he had been proclaimed by his father at Delhi ; his claim to Bengal was a fresh offence against his sovereign, for the king's patent for that province had not long before been sold to Mír Jáfir. But the Emperor was known to be a tool in the hands of Gházi-u-dín, and as the right of the house of Teimur had become a mere matter of feeling, it would have been idle to scrutinise the legal pretensions of any of its members. Ali Góhar's name, supported by the power and resources of Mohammed Kúli, drew together a force which was at one time estimated at 40,000 men. He wrote to Clive, promising whatever he chose to ask within the compass of the Empire ; but Clive plainly stated his relation to the nabob, whom he had recognised as master of the country, and, though in general very respectful, he on one occasion, when dismissing the prince's agents, told them that if they should return with similar proposals, he would put them to death as disturbers of the public peace. This conduct did much to quiet the mind of the nabob, but his knowledge of his own unpopularity, his fears of treachery from Rám Naráin, and his doubts of the fidelity of all his troops and officers, kept him still in great alarm. He even thought of buying off the prince with a sum of money, but Clive convinced him of the danger as well as disgrace of such a course, and, in compliance with the earnest entreaties of the nabob, he agreed to take the field along with Míran to oppose the invader. Though his force consisted of no more than 500 Europeans and 2,500 sepoy, he left Calcutta nearly stripped of troops. While he was preparing, and the nabob providing pay

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March 23

for his army, the prince and Mohammed Kúli had advanced into Behár, and Shujá-u-Doula, the Nawab Vizier of Oude, was making open preparations to follow. Rám Náráin wrote urgent letters for assistance, and Clive gave him the strongest assurances of support; but the enemy at last reached Patna, and Rám Náráin had no expedient left but to temporise. He waited on the prince and made the fullest submission, and so far won on Mohammed Kúli, that he promised to make him Díwán of Allahábád. But he allowed nobody to enter the city, and when at length the patience of the confederates was completely worn out, he shut his gates and stood on the defensive. It was never doubted at Murshidábád that he was sincere in his defection. The nabob was filled with fresh alarms; even Clive was misled and wrote to reproach him. But Rám Náráin was quite in earnest in his defence, and held out steadily against repeated attempts to breach and storm the walls. At the end of a fortnight the British army drew near, and he was still looking to their arrival for deliverance, when his difficulties were at once removed by an act of unparalleled treachery committed by Shujá-u-Doula. Having embarked his cousin in the invasion of Behár, he made a show of joining him, and obtained leave to deposit his family in the fort of Allahábád; when admitted he made himself master of the place, and, in the absence of their chief and his army, the whole country speedily submitted. Their recent repulse, followed by this calamity, disheartened Mohammed Kúli's men, who were afraid to face a force of Shujá's sent to attack him, and in the end he threw himself on his cousin's mercy and was immediately put to death. When he left Patna, the prince, who depended on him for his daily bread, was obliged to retire with him.

April 5.

At the time of this retreat, Clive's advanced guard was within a march of Patna, and he himself, with the young nabob, made his entry into the town five days after it. The prince repeatedly applied to Clive for an asylum, but Clive, though he replied in terms of sympathy, warned him that it would be his duty to make him prisoner if ever he came into his power. The end of their intercourse was a present of 1,000*l.* from Clive to relieve the prince's urgent necessities. After reducing some zemindars in the hilly part of Behár, who had declared for the prince, Clive returned to Murshidábád, where he was received with joy and gratitude by the nabob. As an unequivocal proof of those sentiments, he conferred on him as a *jágir* the rent reserved from the districts held by the Company, the value of which was 30,000*l.* a year. The magnitude of this gift, and the dependent condition of the nabob, naturally suggest a suspicion that such a sacrifice must have been extorted by the receiver, or must have been made with the expectation of obtaining some advantage in return. But on a close inquiry it appears that the only application made by Clive was an expression of disappointment, in a letter to the Sêts, that the nabob, when he procured him a high title from Delhi, had not assigned him a *jágir* for the support of his dignity; he begged the Sêts to apply to the nabob on this subject, as he had no intention of bringing it forward himself. The nabob returned an evasive answer, after which six or seven months elapsed, and Clive by his own account thought the affair forgotten. It is certain that he took no further steps relating to it, for the Sêts, when they report their ultimate success, and take credit for having kept the nabob in mind, still refer to Clive's first letter as the only communication they have had

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on the subject from him. Mr. Sykes, the Resident at Murshidábád, states in his evidence that he had received no application directly or indirectly from Clive, and had never heard of the intended grant till it was notified to him by the nabob. No urgency had been shown under apparent neglect, and the amount to be given was left entirely to the donor.⁴ The nabob no doubt expected some advantage from conciliating Clive, but he knew from former experience how little effect presents had in mollifying his strictness in public matters, and that he required no extraneous motive to induce him to show his gratitude to Clive is apparent from the circumstance of his leaving him a large legacy in his will. The transaction therefore was as free from corruption as from extortion; whether it was equally free from indelicacy on Clive's part is a very different question.

Not long after Clive's return to Calcutta, he had to encounter a new enemy. A strong expedition was fitted out by the Dutch at Batavia, professedly for the purpose of reinforcing their settlements on the coast of Coromandel, but really destined for Bengal. It sailed in the middle of June, touched at Negapatam on the coast, where it left no troops, and arrived in the Ganges in October. Its arrival placed the British Government in imminent danger. The absence of the force under Colonel Forde, the chance of renewed disturbances in the interior, even the uncertainty of the nabob's disposition, made its situation critical, and threw those at the head of it into great embarrassment. To allow the Dutch to establish themselves was to give up Bengal, and to oppose them during peace with their

⁴ Letters from the Sêts, First Report of 1772, 224; evidence of Clive, *ibid.* 153; evidence of Sykes, *ibid.* 153; Clive's *Letter to the Proprietors*, 35.

nation was a violent step for a subordinate authority. War with Holland was indeed expected, but it had not been proclaimed and in fact never took place. A prodigious responsibility was thus thrown upon Clive, and, to add to his perplexity, a great part of his private fortune was in the hands of the Dutch. He, however, gave no signs of hesitation, but acted with firmness and consistency from first to last.⁵

The nabob sent repeated prohibitions against the force landing, which were answered by promises of compliance by the Dutch. Hostilities were commenced by the invaders, but the English had previously determined to oppose them by force of arms.

The British troops took the field, to the number of 320 Europeans and 1,200 sepoy, leaving Calcutta in charge of 250 militia. They were commanded by Colonel Forde, who had returned after the conquest of the French districts on the coast, suffering severe ill-health, and just superseded in his command by the Court of Directors. His zeal and spirit were not the least abated; he took the Dutch post of Barnagor, dispersed an ambuscade which lay in wait for him in the ruins of Chandernagór, and took up his station near Chinsura to await the arrival of the Dutch force. He soon after learned that it had landed on the preceding day and was at no great distance.⁶ It consisted of 700 Europeans

⁵ He said to a friend who remonstrated against his incurring so great a responsibility, 'A public man must sometimes act with a halter round his neck.'

⁶ It is said with every appearance of truth, that he applied to Clive for final orders, which might be required for his justification in so questionable a case. Clive was playing at cards when the note was delivered to him, and without rising from the table he wrote with a pencil, 'Dear Forde,—Fight them immediately. You shall have the order of council to-morrow.'

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and 700 Malays, with some Indian foot soldiers. The Europeans were mostly Germans, and the commanding officer was a Frenchman. From their composition they were very superior to Forde's force. The action was short, bloody, and decisive; the Dutch had 300 killed and 150 wounded. A body of the nabob's cavalry which had joined Forde took an active part in the affair, especially in the pursuit. On the same day the seven Dutch ships which had brought the troops were taken by three English Indiamen after an action of two hours. The Government of Chinsura immediately came to terms. They engaged to pay for the damage done to the British merchant vessels and villages, and to restrict their military establishment for the future to 125 European soldiers. The Dutch well knew when they began that they would have to fight the British. Their expedition was an aggression against the nabob if he were a substantive power; if he were not so, it was an aggression against the English, whose ascendancy in Bengal had, from circumstances beyond their control, become necessary to their existence in that province.

The nabob was supposed by the English to have invited the Dutch, but to have changed his mind after the war with Ali Góhar. It is probable that though he would have been glad to see a counterpoise to the power of the English, he never went beyond some underhand assurances of favour in an early stage of the affair.⁷

February
5, A.D.
1760.

This was the last transaction of Clive's government. He sailed for England early in the next year.

⁷ See the letters of the Dutch Governor; First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 162.

CHAPTER IX.

Prince Ali Góhar assumes the title of Sháh Álam—Is routed by the English under Caillaud—Operations of Caillaud—Death of Míran—Crisis in the affairs of Murshidábád—Arrival of Vansittart—Decides on supporting Cásim Ali—Terms of the treaty—Jáfir Ali deposed—Remarks on the revolution—Presents to members of the Government—Defeat of Sháh Álam by Carnac, and his surrender to the English—Disputes with Cásim Ali—Private trade of the Company's servants—Its abuses—The Nabob abolishes all inland duties—Violent resolutions of the Council—The Nabob seizes boats with supply of arms for Patna—Capture of an English detachment—Murder of Mr. Amyatt—Treaty with Mír Jáfir and advance of the English army—Defeat of Cásim Ali—Massacre of the English at Patna—Cásim Ali takes refuge in Oude—Insubordination in the British force—Defeat of Shujá-u-Doula by Carnac—Another mutiny in the British army—Battle of Buxar—Sháh Álam joins the British camp—Capture of Allahábád and occupation of Lucknow—Shujá-u-Doula seeks assistance from the Marattas—Surrenders to Carnac.

BEFORE Clive's departure news had been received of the reappearance of the Prince Ali Góhar on the north-western frontier. He was not now supported by any of the great chiefs of Hindostan, but was invited by some zemindars and some military officers who thought themselves aggrieved by Mír Jáfir. In his present state of want and despondency, however, any adventure was worth the trial.¹ The chief of the malcontents was Cámgar Khán, a zemindar of Behár, and to him the prince entrusted the duties of prime minister and commander-in-chief during the whole of the expedition. Before he reached the frontier he heard of the murder

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IX.

A.D. 1759.

¹ 'The forlorn prince who had no house nor home of his own, wanted no better.' (*Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 92.)

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A.D. 1759.

of his father at Delhi, and immediately assumed the title of Emperor² and the name of Sháh Álam. His right was incontestible, and was generally recognised, and although it added little or nothing to his power and influence in the Empire, it made some impression in his immediate vicinity. Single adventurers joined him in greater numbers, and the neighbouring zemindars began to think better than they had done of his chance of success. He before long obtained a more solid advantage by the indiscretion of Rám Náráin, who was still governor of Patna, and who quitted the city for the purpose of meeting him in the field.

Rám Náráin had a native force estimated at 15,000 men,³ with twenty guns, but his own part of it was discontented for want of pay, and he had reason to doubt the fidelity of the zemindars who composed the other portion

² [The sovereigns of Delhi are usually described as kings in the English versions of the grants to the East India Company. The title, which is rendered Emperor in the text, is probably that of Padshah, which was uniformly borne by the members of the Mogul dynasties and by Sháh Álam himself at the lowest point of the fortunes of the family. (See the Essay on 'Imperial and other Titles,' *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. ix. N.S.). Eastern titles are very various, as Malik, Sultan, Sháh, or Khán, differing in linguistic origin and in the importance attached to each at different times. The title Khán was brought by the Mogul conquerors of Asia from the north, but on the decline of their power it drops out of history as a royal appellation. The title of Sultan was commonly borne by the early Mahometan conquerors of India. Baber was the first to take the title of Padshah. He says in his memoirs that he assumed it after his conquest of India. 'Till this time the family of Timur Beg, even though on the throne, had never assumed any other title than that of Mirza. At this period I ordered that they should style me Padshah.' The Imperial title now borne by our sovereign is that of Kaiser-i-Hind. The new designation steers clear of all controversy as to the employment of a title of Aryan or Semitic origin, and it is said to be one still recognised as Imperial in the East.—ED.]

³ MS. letter of Mr. Amyatt, dated Patna, January 17, 1760; 'the narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760,' reckons Rám Náráin's force at 40,000 men, and Sháh Álam's, at a later period, when at its highest, 60,000.

of his army. He was accompanied by seventy Europeans, a battalion of sepoy, and two field-pieces, which Clive had left as a garrison in the town.⁴ The prince's army was probably not so numerous, and had no guns. Rām Nārāin drew up his troops at too great a distance to allow of his receiving support from the English. Two disaffected zemindars changed sides in the beginning of the action, and fell on Rām Nārāin's rear; he was himself severely wounded, and his remaining troops dispersed. He owed his own retreat to the protection of a body of 400 English sepoy who moved to his assistance, and who after effecting that service were cut to pieces, with their officers, only twenty-five men surviving. The remains of the British troops made their way to the city through the midst of their victorious enemies.

Patna was thrown into consternation by this defeat, but the prince made no serious attack on it. He spent a few days in plundering the country, and probably in increasing his force, but his attention was chiefly directed to the approach of Mīran and the British. Colonel Caillaud (who had been summoned from Madras to command the army in Bengal) marched from Murshidābād on January 18 with 400 Europeans, a battalion of sepoy, and six field-pieces, accompanied by Mīran at the head of 15,000 men, and twenty-five pieces of cannon. On the 19th they were within twenty-eight miles of Shāh Ālam, who immediately moved against them. On the 22nd, in the evening, as the British were pitching their tents, they were attacked with vigour by the Emperor. Mīran's troops showed no want of courage, but were huddled up in a mass by the

February
9, A.D.
1760.

⁴ We learn from Vansittart (*Letter to the Proprietors*, 98) that the strength of a battalion was at that time 700 men.

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ignorance of their leader, and were on the point of giving way, when Caillaud wheeled up part of his sepoy, and took the enemy in flank. Their success was now turned into a complete rout; seventeen pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the English. But as Míran refused to pursue, the enemy's whole force was collected again within two days at Behár, ten miles from the field of battle and thirty-five from Patna. Míran himself was slightly wounded in the action, and made that a pretence for going into Patna and remaining there for a week.

February
29.

At length he was prevailed on to move, but before he reached Behár he found that Sháh Álam had left his opponents behind and boldly pushed for Murshidábád. Míran and his horse immediately pursued by forced marches, while Caillaud moved with equal speed in boats down the current of the Ganges. At the end of three days Sháh Álam found he could no longer escape along the river, and struck into the mountainous tract which covers the south of Bengal. Though he had only light horse, without guns or baggage, he was so much delayed by the thick woods and narrow passes in those hills, that it was not till the end of March that he presented himself within thirty miles to the west of Murshidábád. He was there joined by four or five thousand Berár Marattas, who had come on a plundering expedition from Orissa and had made their way so far towards the north. The nabob had had time in the interval to draw together some of his troops, with whom, and with 200 Europeans, he moved out to cover the city, where the greatest alarm nevertheless prevailed. Up to this time Sháh Álam had conducted his march with skill and energy, but he threw away the effects of it by hesitating to attack the nabob and push

March 8.

on to Murshidábád before any sufficient force could be assembled to oppose him. In a few days it was out of his power to do so, for Míran and Caillaud joined the nabob on April 4, and the Emperor had no resource left but to retreat. He was followed for two or three marches, and on this occasion, as well as on the march from Behár, several opportunities of destroying him were lost through the jealousy, sloth, or caprice of the nabob and his son. Sháh Álam seems now to have recovered his judgment, which had deserted him in the decisive moment. He recollected the defenceless state of Patna, and determined to march with all speed to that city in the hope of obtaining possession of it before any succours could arrive.

Till April
7.

He reached the neighbourhood of Patna about April 22, and was there most opportunely joined by M. Law, who had hitherto found shelter in Bundelcand, with the remnant of the French sepoys and some guns. With this accession to his means for a siege, he attempted both to breach and escalade the walls of Patna.

The garrison repulsed two attacks, but on the second the enemy had for a time got into the town through the breach, and they despaired of being able to hold out for another day, when their drooping spirits were revived by the most unlooked for appearance of a British detachment. It was under Captain Knox, who had left Caillaud's camp on April 16 with 200 Europeans, a battalion of sepoys, and two guns, had marched 300 miles in thirteen days, a distance almost incredible at that scorching season, and now threw himself into Patna soon after the second assault had failed.

Next day he surprised Sháh Álam's camp about noon, the hour for dinner and repose, and caused so

April 28.

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much loss, confusion, and terror, that the enemy withdrew fifty miles to the southward of the city, and remained there for a long time inactive.

From the beginning of Sháh Álam's invasion, Khádím Husén, governor of the district of Purniá, though a creature of Mír Jáfír's own, had, on some offence or alarm, carried on a correspondence with the Emperor, whom he promised to join. Had he done so at an earlier period, the fate of Patna would have been sealed. Even now it was of importance to prevent his forming a junction with Sháh Álam, and when he marched from Purniá along the left bank of the Ganges,

May 23. Caillaud and Míran set out from Ráj Mahal in pursuit of him. They themselves kept on the right bank, but wrote to Knox, as soon as Khádím Husén got near Patna, to cross and intercept him. Knox accordingly crossed when he was nearly opposite to Patna, and found himself with 200 Europeans, a battalion of sepoy, five guns, and 300 irregular horse, opposed to an army which the lowest account transmitted to us reckons at 12,000 men, with thirty guns. He was therefore obliged to act on the defensive; but so effectually did he repulse the repeated attacks of the enemy, that in the end he drove them from the field and captured eight of their guns. Khádím Husén now retired to the northward towards Batiá and the neighbouring forests. Míran and Caillaud followed in pursuit, but the monsoon now set in with its usual violence, and, while the army was encamped on the River Gandac, it was overtaken by a storm such as is common at that season; during the height of the tempest a flash of lightning struck Míran's tent and killed him with two of his attendants. The news was speedily and secretly conveyed to Caillaud, who concealed it from all but the

June 16.

principal chiefs until the necessary arrangements had been made and the army was on its return towards Patna, at which place it took up its quarters for the rains.⁵

The death of Míran brought on a crisis in the affairs of Bengal.

The mutual irritation between the nabob and the Company's Government had increased rapidly within the last few months. On Clive's departure the nabob lost all remains of his confidence in the English, and all the reverence which he had hitherto felt for their chief. Mr. Vansittart, Governor of Madras, had at Clive's recommendation been appointed to the government of Bengal. He had not yet reached Calcutta, and his place was filled for the present by Mr. Holwell, the senior member of council. The temporary nature of

⁵ The campaign against Sháh Álam is taken from Caillaud's evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, First Report, 158 *et seq.*, and from an anonymous *Narrative of what happened in Bengal in 1760*, published in England in the same year, and reprinted in the *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1800, as communicated by Colonel Ironside, who was probably the author. Further information is derived from the *Seir ul Mutakherin*. Two points were the subject of minute inquiry in consequence of charges brought against Caillaud in England. He was alleged to have engaged in a plot for dethroning Mír Jáfir, and, as preparatory steps, to have favoured the murder of Míran and promised a great reward to an assassin who was to take off Sháh Álam. We are astonished to find the name of Mr. Burke connected with this wild accusation. It appeared that there was not the slightest ground for suspicion in regard to this plot, or to the murder of Míran, but Caillaud did not escape so well from the charge respecting Sháh Álam. He had really countersigned a promise of Mír Jáfir and Míran to a person who had offered to murder Sháh Álam; but this he did at a time when the nabob and the English strongly suspected each other of negotiating with that prince, and under an impression that the whole overture was a trick of the nabob's for the purpose of putting Caillaud's sincerity to trial. It is certain that he had no design on the life of Sháh Álam, but he showed little regard to his own honour or that of his country in willingly connecting his name with so disgraceful a fabrication. The whole particulars of the inquiry are given in the Appendix No. 10 to the First Report, 238 to 249.

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this gentleman's authority lessened his weight with the nabob, who scarcely concealed his distrust in every transaction with the English. Mr. Holwell in his turn was provoked at the disregard of his just demands, gave ear to every report unfavourable to the nabob, and put the worst construction on all that prince's actions. But the embarrassment occasioned to the Government by its relation to the nabob was in itself of the most serious nature. As long as the treasures gained by the revolution lasted, the Company found no difficulty in defraying the heaviest and most unexpected charges; but when that fund was exhausted they began to discover that the provision made for the future by the treaty was quite inadequate to the demands of their new situation. The sum of a lac of rupees (10,000*l.*) a month, which the nabob was to pay while their troops were employed on his requisition, was scarcely sufficient to meet their actual field expenses for the time, while that of maintaining the troops when not on service, and supplying them with recruits and stores from Europe was totally unprovided for. The annual revenue of 70,000*l.* from lands ceded to them on other grounds would not, even if devoted to this object, have been nearly sufficient.

So far from being able to make up these deficiencies, the nabob had not the means of discharging his existing debt to the Company. The enormous sums which he had to pay at his accession had exhausted all the wealth at his command, and he was now without sufficient resources to support either the Company's government or his own. The monthly subsidy to the troops on service was two or three months in arrear;⁶ assignments for it had been given on the revenues of particular districts, but those districts happened to be the scene of the

⁶ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 34.

ravages of Sháh Álam and the Marattas, and the wants of the nabob's own officers also sometimes led them to encroach on the assigned revenue. This source of income was therefore unproductive, and the Company was reduced to extremities, obliged to suspend its trade, and yet unable to pay its troops, who in consequence showed a disposition to desertion.⁷

The nabob's own troops were much more in arrears, often mutinied against his authority, and sometimes threatened his life. Add to this that the revenue collected from his country was wasted by frauds and embezzlement before it reached his treasury,⁸ and that more than one of the principal zemindars became refractory, withheld their tribute, and threatened further disturbance.⁹ Even within his own territory the nabob was despised for his irresolution and hated for his exactions, and for several executions and assassinations, which his fears and suspicions had prompted him to order himself, or to acquiesce in when they originated in the violence of his son. The only remedy for all these evils appeared to Mr. Holwell to be to depose the nabob. It was to be done by obtaining from Sháh Álam the transfer of his office to the Company, on its engaging to pay to him the full tribute of Bengal and to assist him with all its means in recovering the throne of his ancestors.¹ The seizure of the province by the Company might perhaps have been accomplished, but the part of the project connected with Sháh Álam was not within the verge of possibility. By setting up the infant son of Míran or some equally helpless representative of the family of Ali Verdi, by adhering strictly to old forms,

⁷ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 34 and 36.

⁸ *Ibid.* i. 35.

⁹ *Narrative of what happened in Bengal* above referred to.

¹ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 59 and 60. See also 63.

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and keeping up the native mode of government, so as to afford the usual employment to all classes of its subjects, the English might perhaps have possessed themselves of all real power as easily as they did ten years later. Such a measure, if practicable, would have been attended with several obvious advantages, and would have been free from many of the objections to merely changing the nabob.

But the attempt to revive the Mogul government would have been an obstruction rather than an aid to the plan. The titular Emperor did not at that moment possess a foot of land, nor had he the means of influencing the transfer of an acre in any part of his so-called dominions.² We were to restore him to power by affording our assistance to the Mussulman chiefs and the Abdáli Sháh, but only a few months had elapsed since those powers had routed the Marattas at Pánipat and had nothing to obstruct any designs they might have entertained in favour of the Emperor. Yet except for a dutiful recognition of his title at the recommendation of the Sháh, the chiefs never mentioned Sháh Álam or gave a thought to his pretensions. The reason was obvious; their territories were formed out of the last possessions of the house of Teinur, and the first step towards restoring that family must have been to give up their own sovereignty. Even such disinterestedness would have made the Emperor but a petty prince at best. The Empire had died a natural death after a long decay commencing with Aurangzib, and the name was allowed to remain solely because it had no reality, and

² It may appear that an exception ought to be made of the city of Delhi, where Sháh Álam's son bore the name of Emperor, but the real possessor was Najib-u-Doula, the Rohilla chief of Seháranpúr, who alone exercised any authority in the city. (Dow's *Hindustan*, ii. 350.)

interfered with nobody. The English, even the most intelligent and best informed, entertained and continued for some years to entertain an exaggerated idea of the importance of the Emperor,³ but there was not a native chief in Hindostan or the Deckan who thought it worth while to make use of him even as a pageant.

When the council of Calcutta were on the point of opening a negotiation with Sháh Álam, accounts of Míran's death were received, and this event suggested a combination by which a new model of the nabob's government might be more easily effected.

Almost immediately afterwards, Mr. Vansittart arrived. The new Governor seems to have been endowed with judgment and integrity sufficient to guide him rightly in ordinary circumstances, but to have been unfit for any situation in which self-reliance or firmness of any kind was required. The strong opinions and ready arguments of Mr. Holwell seem to have overpowered him from the first, and in three or four days he announced his adoption of the last of that gentleman's plans.

End of
July A.D.
1760.

This was to confer on Cásim Ali, the nabob's son-in-law, the titles and offices formerly held by Míran, to invest him at once with all the powers of the state, and to secure his succession to the title also on the nabob's death. Cásim Ali was one of the ablest and most ambitious men about the court. He had been entrusted with important employments and commands, and from the moment of Míran's death seems to have fixed his

³ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 60, 61, 62; Minute of Colonel Coote and other opposition Members of Council, dated March 11, 1762, 17-19; Vansittart's *Narrative*, 254-9. Olive, in denying that Sháh Álam still rules over the Empire, admits that he may possess a twentieth part of it [*Letter to the Proprietors*, published 1764, 22]. It has been shown in the text that he did not possess any fraction of it.

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eye on the succession. In a desperate mutiny of the troops at the capital which followed that event, and in which the nabob's life was exposed to imminent danger, Cásim Ali stepped forth to pacify the tumult, became security for all the arrears due to the troops, and paid three lacs of rupees out of his own funds to appease the most pressing demands.⁴

September
20, A.D.
1760.Septem-
ber 25,
A.D. 1760.

This conduct gained him universal popularity, and led everyone to regard him as the only person fitted to retrieve the desperate affairs of the government. Soon after Míran's death he wrote to Mr. Holwell with the strongest professions in favour of the Company if they would procure his appointment to the station held by Míran.⁵ After Mr. Vansittart's arrival he was invited to Calcutta, and the nabob's consent was obtained on some pretext to his visit. After one or two ceremonial interviews with the Governor, he had a confidential meeting with Mr. Holwell. He commenced by insisting on the murder of Mír Jáfir as a necessary preliminary to his undertaking the government. Mr. Holwell explaining the horror in which such actions were held by the British nation, and the necessity for his renouncing all thoughts of them if he expected its support, he at length gave way, but with an appearance of dissatisfaction, and an observation that Mr. Holwell was not so much his friend as he had thought him.⁶ Ten articles were then agreed to after much discussion, by the principal of which it was settled that the government should be carried on in the name of the nabob, who should have a personal allowance of 120,000*l.* a year; that all the powers of the state should be vested in Cásim Ali, to whom the succession on the nabob's

⁴ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 71.⁵ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 67.⁶ *Ibid.* 69.

death should be secured ; that there should be an offensive and defensive alliance between him and the Company, and that the Company should always be ready to support him with their army, which they engaged was to consist of 8,000 sepoy, 2,000 Europeans, 2,000 irregular cavalry, and 500 European horse. In return for this he was to pay up all the moneys due, and cede the districts of Bardwán, Midnapúr, and Chittagong to the Company. The immediate recognition of the title of the nominal Emperor was pressed by Mr. Holwell, but objected to by Cásim Ali, and was at length allowed to lie over for further consideration.⁷

These articles, with the omission of the amount of Mír Jáfir's allowance and the number of the troops to be kept up, were signed on the next day but one by Mr. Vansittart and the select committee of the council, to whom the conduct of all business requiring secrecy was entrusted.⁸ Up to this time not a hint had been given to Mír Jáfir of an intention of deposing him. But when all was settled the Governor and Colonel Caillaud repaired to Murshidábád accompanied by a body of troops. At the two first interviews between these gentlemen and the nabob, the complaints of the Company and the necessity of redress were stated in vague and general terms. At the third, Mr. Vansittart, still in a circuitous and indistinct manner, intimated to the nabob that he must make a territorial cession to the Company, and must transfer the conduct of his government to some one of his relations, so that he might himself enjoy ease and tranquillity undisturbed by public affairs. The fitness of several relations was discussed,

September 27,
A.D. 1760.

October 15, A.D. 1760.

October 18, A.D. 1760.

⁷ Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 70.

⁸ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 101-4.

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and amongst others that of Cásim Ali, to whom Mr. Vansittart showed a strong inclination and the nabob a still stronger repugnance. This transfer, when once disclosed, was pressed with indecent haste ; the nabob was refused time for consideration or even for returning to his palace at his dinner hour ; he was obliged to send for his meal to the garden where the meeting was held, and was not allowed to go till he was so much exhausted with fatigue and anxiety as to be unable to attend to business. Nothing was settled when he went away, no hint was given of the treaty with Cásim Ali, and all seemed to be left for discussion at another meeting. Next day he was left undisturbed, but Cásim Ali exclaimed against the suspense, during which he said he was in hourly fear of assassination ; and Mr. Vansittart learning that the nabob had spent the day with some of the most worthless of his advisers, concluded that no good would come of the consultation, and determined to resort to force.

Accordingly, at three in the morning, Colonel Caillaud with the British troops, and Cásim Ali with his own, marched secretly to the nabob's palace, which they surprised and surrounded. They seized the ministers, and told the nabob that he must make over the conduct of affairs without delay to Cásim Ali. At first the nabob gave way to his surprise and indignation ; he reproached the English with their breach of faith, and threatened to defend himself to the last extremity ; but reflecting that, while in the palace, he was every moment exposed to the practices of Cásim Ali, he sent for Caillaud, and although he still rejected the proposed arrangement, which he said would place his life in the hands of his substitute, he expressed himself ready to abdicate, provided his life and an allowance for

his maintenance were secured. His offer was acceded to ; Cásim Ali was installed and proclaimed ; Mír Jáfir, who was afraid to remain a single night in Murshidábád, set off on his journey to Calcutta ; and the day passed with as much quiet and composure as if nothing extraordinary had happened.⁹ Never was a revolution effected on more slender grounds, nor a greater scandal than the deposal of a prince by the same body which had so lately raised itself to power by a solemn engagement to support his title. The reasons alleged were Mír Jáfir's plots to undermine the British authority, and the cruelty and oppression of his internal administration ; but few of those charges would have justified the subversion of his government, and fewer still could be substantiated by evidence.¹

October
20, A.D.
1760.

⁹ Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 109-136. Caillaud's *Narrative*.

¹ The following are the reasons assigned (Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*, 14, and Vansittart's *Narrative*, i.) :—

1st. That Mír Jáfir from his accession formed a design to reduce the power of the English.

2nd. That for this purpose he cut off or drove out of the provinces every person whom he suspected of being attached to us.

3rd. That he conspired with the Dutch to counteract and destroy our power and influence.

4th. That he and his son, on three different occasions of actual service, treacherously deserted our commander-in-chief.

5th. That he meditated a treaty with Sháh Álam and offered to sacrifice us.

6th. That he negotiated with the Marattas to introduce 25,000 or 30,000 of their troops into Bengal. (Letter to Mr. Amyatt ; p. 65 of Mr Holwell's *Address to the Proprietors*.)

7th. That his government was a continued chain of cruelty and oppression.

But most of these charges may be refuted or explained.

1st. Mír Jáfir, or whoever was nabob, would naturally desire to keep down the power of the English, and prevent its encroaching on his own ; but it does not follow that he had any wish to break the treaty or to shake a connection on which his own existence depended.

2nd. Mír Jáfir was very jealous of the English, and would not look with favour on any of his subjects who devoted themselves to that

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The only real apology for setting him aside would have been the absolute impossibility of carrying on the established system in conjunction with him; and such an impossibility is alleged to have arisen from the weakness and unpopularity of his government, and his inability to furnish the funds indispensably necessary to enable the British to keep their footing in the country. The first of these disqualifications is declared to have been so manifest that withholding the English protection would have put an end to the government if

interest, but there is no proof of a systematic persecution, or indeed of any persecution carried on against them.

The instances mentioned (Holwell, *Address*, &c. 8, and Vansittart, i. 49) of persons driven from the country are two, Rái Dúlab and Ómar Bég. The story of Rái Dúlab has been given (see *ante*, p. 335); it was more from jealousy of the man himself than of the English that he was attacked. Ómar Bég, by Mr. Vansittart's own account, embezzled the nabob's money entrusted to him, and fled the country in consequence (Vansittart's *Letter to the Proprietors*, 63). Of ten persons said to have been made away with (Vansittart's *Narrative*, 151), five were women and children of Ali Verdi's family; some of the remaining five were individuals whom the nabob thought dangerous to his person or government, but none appear to have been connected with the English. It is more than doubtful whether some of these murders were ever committed at all, and those which are certain were all the work of Míran.

3rd. The extent of his intercourse with the Dutch has been stated; the utmost it indicates is a wish to see them re-established in their factory as a counterpoise to the English.

4th. There are abundant proofs of inactivity and perhaps of cowardice in the repeated neglect of the nabob and Míran to support Caillaud, but no sign and scarcely a possibility of treachery.

5th. The plot with Sháh Álam is founded on a copy of an alleged letter from the nabob to that prince received through a most suspicious channel, and bearing obvious marks of forgery. The supposed combination is absurd in itself; Sháh Álam had no quarrel with the English but for preventing his taking possession of Bengal, a point on which the nabob and he were not likely to come to an agreement (see Mr. Holwell's correspondence on the subject with Colonel Caillaud and Mr. Hastings, *Address to the Proprietors*, 31-40).

6th. Of the negotiations with the Marattas, no proof whatever is offered. It is in itself highly improbable.

7th. His cruelties have been enumerated, and his oppressive government may be admitted, but our treaty gave us no right to punish either.

not the life of Mír Jáfir.² But if this statement proves the evil, it no less points out the remedy. Such a state of things must have compelled the nabob to accede to any reasonable proposals, or must have produced his removal without the interference of the English. The financial difficulty might have been removed by the same territorial cessions which were made by Cásim Ali, and if it were true (as is asserted) that Mír Jáfir would never have come to terms without force, it would have been better to have used force for the attainment of moderate concessions than for the total destruction of an ally. The terms offered were worse than deposal; Mír Jáfir might have accepted a minister named by the British, but the transfer of all his powers to Cásim Ali would have been the signal for his own execution.

But the best reply to the alleged impossibility of maintaining their relations with Mír Jáfir is that it was to him the English Government was obliged to recur after an unsuccessful attempt to support his rival.

In return for the good service received from them, Cásim Ali presented the Governor and the members of the select committee with 200,000*l*. It does not appear that they were influenced by the prospect of this reward, which was not stipulated for, which they declined at the moment, and which was paid to them at different periods after a long interval.³ Still it was a disgraceful proceeding. The committee had no pretext of losses suffered or risks run, and the money was to be drawn from a government the impoverished state of which was one of the strongest grounds for the revolu-

² Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 160.

³ First Report of the Committee of the House of Commons, 1772, 161, 163, and 164; also Third Report, 310-11, and Appendix, 402-4.

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tion. Mr. Vansittart received 50,000*l.*; he had at the time an allowance from the Company of 18,000*l.* or 19,000*l.* a year, and carried on trade on his own account besides.⁴

The whole of the transactions connected with the change of government had been conducted by the select committee. When they came before the whole Council, Mr. Verelst, Mr. Smyth, Mr. Amyatt, and Mr. Ellis recorded their disapprobation of the measure, partly as objectionable in itself and partly because it had been concluded without consulting them. This was the commencement of an opposition which led to serious results. The Madras service, civil as well as military, having now been long accustomed to wars and negotiations, seemed more likely to furnish men capable of political duties than the factories and commercial agencies of Bengal. For this reason Lord Clive had exerted his influence to procure the nomination of Mr. Vansittart to succeed him, superseding Mr. Amyatt, the senior civil servant of Bengal. The arrangement was regarded as an injury, not by Mr. Amyatt alone, but by the whole of the Bengal service. The opening of Mr. Vansittart's government was therefore looked on with no favourable eyes. His first act, which was so questionable in itself, was the worse received as coming from him, and as the knowledge of this feeling made Cásim Ali unite himself more closely with the Governor, they came to be regarded as forming one party, and the Company's servants were equally ill-disposed to Mr. Vansittart and his nabob. These gentlemen, under the influence of such prejudices, were ill prepared to control them by enlarged notions of their duty. Accustomed to buy and sell according to orders from England, they

⁴ Vansittart's *Letter to the Proprietors*, 138-40. See also 82-4.

saw nothing even of trade beyond its details. Their views of the Company's interests were, therefore, contracted, and the sudden change in their own situation, the acquisition of power, and the examples of rapid fortunes gained among their fellows, sometimes made them lose sight of those interests altogether. The means they took to gratify their impatience to enrich themselves often brought them into collision with the native functionaries, and though now elated with the pride of conquerors, they retained a lively impression of their former dependence, and thought it an act of spirit to repel what they still called the insolence of their fallen rulers.

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Wicked and unprincipled as the new nabob had shown himself, he was in many respects well suited to his situation in reference to the Company. He was fond of business, attentive to order and economy, vigilant, active, and acute. He soon brought about a reform in his finances, and cleared off all the numerous encumbrances that had been left to him by Mír Jáfir. He reduced his army from 90,000 men to 16,000, and yet increased its efficiency more than he diminished it in numbers. He made great advances towards bringing his zemindars into obedience, and would have done it effectually if he had remained long enough undisturbed. Such qualities and such accessions to his power, if not balanced by equal defects, might have made him formidable to the English, but his constitutional timidity restrained him from any bold enterprise, and the disaffection produced by the severity of his exactions and his suspicious temper must ever have retained him in dependence on the support of his allies. It is probable that he would have been at all times jealous of his authority, and that, when opportunities offered, he would have endeavoured

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to encroach on the English Government ; but he would not have pushed his intrigues so far as to endanger his safety, and on the whole there was every reason to calculate on the stability of the alliance. But the feelings which have been described on the part of the English led to a series of provocations which would have driven the most feeble and the most prudent of mankind into resistance.

On his flight from Patna, Sháh Álam had withdrawn to a position about fifty miles south of that city, and not far from the country of the hill zemindars. Here he remained inactive and undisturbed during the troubled period between the death of Míran and the deposition of Mír Jáfir, his troops were reduced to a miserable condition, but after the rainy season he rapidly increased his numbers ;⁵ and soon after Cásim Ali's accession he received an invitation from the zemindars of Bardwán and Birbúm, who had revolted, to pass through the mountains as before, and join them in their own country. This plan would have brought him into the immediate neighbourhood of Murshidábád, but it was frustrated by the promptitude of his antagonists. Cásim Ali moved in person against the two new insurgents, and, although his own troops were unsuccessful, the rebellion was almost immediately put down by a British detachment which had accompanied him in his march.⁶ Orders had previously been despatched from the Government to the officer commanding at Patna to attack Sháh Álam without delay,⁷ and they were carried into

⁵ Mr. Amyatt, in a MS. letter dated Patna, November 5, 1760, describes his force as a set of half-starved, water-soaked banditti, grown from neglect into a formidable army.

⁶ Vansittart's *Narrative* ; *Seir ul Mutakherín*.

⁷ Holwell, *Refutation of a Letter &c.*, 22 ; Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 142.

effect with great spirit by Major Carnac within a fortnight after he took the command. The nabob's troops having demurred as usual, he marched without them, leaving them to follow as they chose. He found Shāh Ālam posted on a considerable river, which he crossed unopposed, drove the enemy from position to position with his cannon, and at length dispersed his army without the loss of a man killed or wounded on his own side, and without one of his men having occasion to take a musket from his shoulder during the whole action.⁸

M. Law, with thirteen French officers and fifty privates, were taken prisoners, being the only part of the army that did not fly with precipitation. Owing to the slackness of the nabob's cavalry, who had joined him to little purpose, Major Carnac could not prevent the enemy from partially reassembling, but he allowed them no time to recover their courage, and, after refusing to negotiate for some days, Shāh Ālam gave himself up to the English, and the zemindars retired to their fortresses.⁹

Major Carnac received the Emperor with the utmost ceremony and escorted him to Patna, where an allowance of 100*l.* a day (afterwards increased to 130*l.*), was fixed for him at the nabob's expense.¹ The news of these

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January 1,
A.D. 1761.

January
15, A.D.
1761.

February
6, A.D.
1761.

⁸ Colonel Ironside's Narrative, *Asiatic Annual Register* for 1800, 24, 25.

⁹ Colonel Ironside's narrative; *Seir ul Mutakherin*. The Indian historian is struck with the spirit shown by Law in his resistance, the generosity and courtesy of Carnac in his treatment of him, and the cordiality between him and his captors from the moment of his surrender. Major Carnac's report of his victory to the Government is characteristic of the writer and of the times. It commences thus: 'Gentlemen,—The measure of my wishes is filled, and I have had the good fortune to answer the expectations of some of you and to disappoint the diffidence of others.' The allusion is to the Governor, with whom he was offended (MS. letter dated January 15, 1761).

¹ Colonel Ironside; *Seir ul Mutakherin*, ii. 169.

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events soon brought Cásim Ali to Patna; he was dissatisfied with the expense thrown on him for maintaining the Emperor, and was distrustful of the use the English might make of that prince's name in case of any disagreement with himself. These feelings were not alleviated by the channel of his intercourse with the Emperor and the British Government. Major Carnac was a devoted adherent of Clive (whose private secretary he had been, and with whom he was a favourite). He was naturally opposed to the reversal of his patron's measures in the case of Mír Jáfir, and was strongly prejudiced against the present nabob. He had been hurt by some disparaging expression of Vansittart's which came to his knowledge, and was now elated by his success against the Emperor, to whom he determined to show himself a generous conqueror. From these motives he treated the nabob with marked slight, while he behaved with the utmost deference and humility towards Sháh Álam. The nabob's resentment as well as his policy led him to do his best to disgust this favoured guest with his present residence. He refused to meet him except at the Company's factory, which might be regarded as neutral ground, and he is accused of having excited a serious mutiny among the troops that still adhered to Sháh Álam.²

Things were on this footing when Major Carnac was removed from Patna. That officer on his assuming the command had informed the Government, in reply to an order to support the nabob in a particular case, that he should do so in that instance, but that the British troops, while he commanded them, should never be made the

² Colonel Ironside's *Narrative*, 27; *Scir ul Mutakerín*; letter from certain Gentlemen of the Council (including Major Carnac), Appendix to First Report, 255.

instruments of violence or oppression ; and by an equally uncalled for declaration in public darbár at their first meeting, he gave great offence to the nabob, who felt the insinuation conveyed no less than the open disrespect, and perceived the effect which such an announcement must have on all who were inclined to resist his authority. Other disputes arising with Major Carnac, the Government took the first opportunity of superseding him in his command.³ It was afforded by the arrival of Colonel (afterwards Sir Eyre) Coote from Madras as commander-in-chief in Bengal. This distinguished officer disapproved of the removal of Mír Jáfír, but came to Bengal determined to avoid political discussions and to endeavour to reconcile his colleagues, with all of whom he was on terms of friendship.⁴ But his employment at Patna forced him to take a decided line. He found the nabob highly irritated, jealous of the British commander, and alarmed at the intrigues which he supposed to be carrying on between that officer and Sháh Álam. His distrust was so apparent in his neglect or rejection of Coote's advice, and in other matters, that Coote, naturally of a fretful temper, became provoked in his turn, and being surrounded by malecontents and in some sort at the head of a formed opposition, he was led to put the worst construction on all the nabob's actions, and to allow things to run into a state of greater exasperation than that left by Carnac.⁵

They began, however, with mutual civility. The first point they had to settle was that about Rám Náráin. This man, it may be recollected, was governor

³ Major Carnac's letters in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 182 and 186. See also the same volume, 189-91 and 198.

⁴ His evidence, First Report, 165.

⁵ Vansittart's *Narrative* and letters from Colonel Coote and the Nabob, i. 195-250.

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of Behár at the time of Suráj-u-Doula's fall, and only acknowledged the new nabob on condition of being guaranteed by Clive against any change for the worse in his condition under his former master.⁶ He had been steadily protected by Clive, and was so at first by the present Government,⁷ but the question how far protection should be carried was not without difficulties. On the one hand Rám Náráin asserted that he was persecuted merely on account of his attachment to the English, and on the other the nabob declared that he withheld the whole revenue of his province, and made use of the British protection to render himself in essentials an independent prince.⁸

April 21,
A.D. 1761.

These complaints were at their height when Coote went to Patna, and the Government requested him to investigate and report on the real state of claims, and in the meantime to prevent any oppression of Rám Náráin and to maintain him in his government.⁹ Mr. McGwire, the chief civil officer at Patna, was associated in the inquiry. Though disposed to put the best construction on the conduct of Rám Náráin, Coote began the investigation with every intention to do justice, but between the affected delays of Rám Náráin and the impatience of the nabob, he was not able to make much progress.¹ The Government would now have been justified in dictating some terms of compromise to both parties, but

⁶ See *ante*, p. 333.

⁷ Letter to Major Carnac of February 9; Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 180.

⁸ Major Carnac's letter, Appendix to First Report, 257; letter from certain Gentlemen of the Council, Appendix to the same Report, 256. The Nabob's in vol. i. of Vansittart's *Narrative*; Mr. McGwire's letter, Appendix to First Report, 328.

⁹ Letter to Colonel Coote; Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 191-2.

¹ Letter from Colonel Coote, Appendix to the First Report, 259; Nabob's letters in Vansittart's *Narrative*.

instead¹ of doing so they gave way to the clamours of the nabob, directed Coote to remove Rám Náráin from his government, and afterwards left him to settle with his own superior, only stipulating for his exemption from personal ill-usage. Before these orders arrived Mr. McGwire had been dismissed and Rám Náráin entertained hopes of greater support from his temporary successor Mr. Hay ; but the orders from Calcutta were peremptory, a guard of sepoys which had been detained at his house was withdrawn, and he was left at the mercy of the nabob only for the stipulation above mentioned. He had before offered 50,000*l.* in lieu of his arrears as the utmost sum he could possibly raise, but finding himself deserted and threatened by the nabob he agreed to pay 500,000*l.*, on which he was released and received a dress of honour from the nabob as a mark of his being restored to favour.² Up to this time no violence was used towards him,³ but how the engagement broke off or what subsequently became of Rám Náráin does not appear until two years afterwards, when he perished in the general massacre of the prisoners during Cásim Ali's flight.⁴

If Carnac and Coote favoured the alleged defaulter they did so from no sordid motives. Coote refused a

² Correspondence in Appendix No. 1 to the Third Report, 327-331.

³ Letter from Mr. Hay, dated September 7, 1761, in the same Appendix, 330.

⁴ Major Grant's evidence, Third Report, 305 ; *Seir ul Mutakherin*, i. 267. Several persons who had held employment under Rám Náráin's government, especially those employed in revenue departments, were imprisoned and had their property seized ; some were flogged to force them to disclose where their money was deposited. Rám Náráin probably escaped similar treatment in consequence of the stipulation with the British Government. Cásim Ali was capable of any injustice or cruelty, but in this instance his offences could not have remained concealed.

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bribe of 55,000*l.* to give up Rám Náráin, and Carnac, besides indefinite offers from the nabob, rejected 5,000*l.* from Rám Náráin's intended successor;⁵ but Mr. McGwire, who was still more zealous on the side of the nabob, was not so fortunate in the evidence of his disinterestedness. He had received 20,000*l.* (as a member of the select committee) on the nabob's accession, and he now accepted of 7,000*l.* or 8,000*l.* on pretext of some public occasion.⁶ It would not be just to pronounce that these presents, or those of a similar nature made to others, were given as bribes or immediately influenced the resolutions of the receivers, but they hung like a millstone round their necks ever after, and if they did not impede the freedom of their action, always led to a suspicion that the weight was not unfelt; Clive alone felt no embarrassment from benefits conferred on him, which his services entitled him to regard as rewards for the past, not retainers for the future.

Another source of contention arose from the continuance of the nabob's suspicions of Sháh Álam. That prince had at last agreed to remove to Oude, and Cásim Ali had engaged to pay to him 260,000*l.* a year on account of the revenue of Bengal; one half of the first year's payment was to be issued on his quitting the province, at which time also he was to be formally acknowledged as Emperor. He set out accordingly for Shujá-u-Doula's country, where he was received with every show of respect and then consigned to neglect and insignificance. But the credit afforded by the English to his pretensions gave him an importance in the places under their influence which he did not

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⁵ Coote's letter, Appendix to the First Report, 259. Carnac's evidence, Third Report, 300.

⁶ Mr. McGwire's evidence, Third Report, 300.

possessed elsewhere, and for this reason he continued to be an object of jealousy and apprehension to Cásim Ali. Major Carnac had accompanied him to the frontier, and on taking leave begged as a personal favour a confirmation of all the Company's privileges throughout the Empire. Sháh Álam promised compliance on condition of a pecuniary consideration, and (perhaps insidiously) offered of his own accord to add the Diwáni of Bengal on similar terms. This office in strictness conferred only the superintendence of the revenue, but in hands so strong as the Company's it involved the control of the administration in all its branches. The offer was therefore likely to alarm the nabob, and was on that ground rejected by the Government of Calcutta, and the whole application was censured as unauthorised and officious.⁷ But other measures of the Government itself did away the effect of this moderation. They had again taken up the scheme of restoring Sháh Álam to his throne; Coote was ordered to be ready to march to his support, and some correspondence to which this led came to the nabob's knowledge. Cásim Ali probably thought that the project of the British Government was only a cloak for some more rational negotiation, and he ascribed the communications which took place in connection with it to a plot for the transfer of his office of viceroy from himself to a descendant of one of the former nabobs, and in this he supposed Coote to be a principal actor.⁸ Sháh Álam having passed the frontier, the nabob agreed to proclaim him king as had been promised, and the principal people about Patna had been assembled

⁷ See the correspondence in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 255-64.

⁸ First Report, Appendix, 258; see also paragraphs 32 and 33 of the letter in p. 256.

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January
17, A.D.
1761.

for that purpose, but when the day drew near the nabob, either from timidity or some secret motive, refused to enter the town unless the British guards were removed from the gates. This seeming caprice provoked the English commander, some angry messages were exchanged, and at night information was brought to Coote that the nabob was about to attack the town. Coote kept his small force on the alert during the night, and about daybreak he rode to the nabob's camp, attended by his usual escort of a company of sepoys and some European dragoons. He alighted at the head-quarters, and as the nabob had not yet left the tents appropriated to his women, people were sent to call him, and Coote entered the reception tent with his pistols in his hand, after surrounding it with his troops to guard against treachery. As the nabob did not appear Coote mounted his horse, and after riding round the camp, where he found all quiet, he returned to the town.⁹ This act of haste and indiscretion made it impossible to keep Coote with the nabob. He was recalled to Calcutta along with Carnac, who would otherwise have succeeded him, and the command devolved on a captain subordinate to the civil chief.

The rough treatment which the nabob received from the military commanders was respect and courtesy compared to what he subsequently met with from the civil servants.

One of the last acts of Clive's government had been to sign a letter to the Court of Directors, pointing out the bad consequences of the harsh language in which they were accustomed to address their servants, and of the influence of private favour and enmity which ap-

⁹ Coote's letters in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 238 and 243, and his evidence, First Report, 166. Nabob's letter, *Narrative*, i. 216.

peared in their dispensations of censures and rewards. This remonstrance was not itself a model of the urbanity which it inculcated, and it gave such displeasure to the Court of Directors that they dismissed all the members of the council who still remained in India, and positively ordered them to be sent home by the first ships.

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This measure, together with the previous retirement of some of the councillors, threw out those who had concurred with Mr. Vansittart, and introduced others vehemently opposed to him. Mr. Hastings, who was one of the new councillors, alone supported the Governor in the subsequent transactions. Above all, the removal of Mr. McGwire necessarily conferred the chiefship of Patna on Mr. Ellis, a man of strong prejudices and ungovernable temper.

He had scarcely taken charge of his office when he gave signs of his disposition towards the nabob, but his first act of open violence was about two months later. An Armenian named Antoon, who held the office of collector of a district, either purchased or took by force a small quantity of saltpetre, for the use of the nabob, from one of the people whose business it was to make it. This was seized on as an infringement of the Company's monopoly, and Antoon was apprehended and sent down to Calcutta in irons. He was cousin to Gregore, another Armenian, who was in high favour with the nabob, and was supposed to be hostile to the English. His offence was therefore treated at Calcutta as a most serious affront to the nation. Some of the council thought he should be publicly whipped, and one (Mr. Johnstone) strongly urged cutting off his ears;¹ but common sense at last in some degree prevailed; he

November,
A.D. 1761.

January,
A.D. 1762.

¹ Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 11.

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February
4, A.D.
1762.

April 27,
A.D. 1762.

was sent back to the nabob to be punished, and was made over to him and dismissed from his service, after a confinement of three months and a journey of 900 miles.² About the same time, Mr. Ellis having received information (which proved to be unfounded) that two European deserters had taken refuge in Monghír, the nabob's principal fortress and the place he had fixed on for his usual residence, sent a company of sepoy to demand the deserters and to search the fort if they were not given up. The commandant refusing to admit an armed body into his fort, Mr. Ellis exclaimed against his insolence and declared that he would not withdraw the sepoy until a search had been allowed. The nabob remonstrated in terms of the highest indignation, but the British Government took no step for about three months, when it interposed a sort of mediation between its own servant and the nabob, and the dispute was with difficulty compromised.³ Mr. Ellis withdrew his sepoy, but from this time the nabob refused to have any further communication with him. It is obvious that Mr. Ellis ought now to have been removed to some other station, but he was supported by the majority of the council, and the representative of the British Government remained in open hostility with the ruler of the country. Alarm was added to the nabob's disgust by the unguarded language of Mr. Ellis and other members of council, who foretold his early deposition as a consequence of orders from England. Their threats were in some measure supported by the vacillating despatches of the Court of Directors, which

² Correspondence in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 300-305 and 323.

³ Vansittart's *Narrative*, and correspondence inserted, i. 305-14 ; also 326 to the end, and ii. 1-11.

were privately circulated among the natives and necessarily reached the nabob.⁴

These altercations made an impression throughout the country. A conspiracy against the nabob was discovered, the principal actors in which were put to death; and among the letters intercepted on that occasion was one encouraging a powerful zemindar to engage in it, on the ground of the approaching hostilities with the English, in which the nabob was sure to be driven out of the country.⁵ All these evils were magnified by the nabob's fears, and perceiving, as he thought, an intention to force a quarrel on him, he became apprehensive of an open and immediate attack.

Aware of the dangerous consequences of a continuance of such divisions, Mr. Vansittart prevailed on the board to depute Mr. Hastings to Patna, for the purpose of attempting a reconciliation between Mr. Ellis and the nabob. He failed, as might have been expected, but his mission brought to a crisis a question which had long been rising, which affected the interest as well as the pride of the parties, and which soon ran to a height that almost precluded reconciliation.

The Mogul's grant to the Company exempting their goods from customs was couched in general terms and accompanied by no limitation, but its obvious meaning was to confine the exemption to exports and imports. It was given, like Queen Elizabeth's grant to the same effect, for the purpose of encouraging foreign commerce, and not for that of conferring on an alien Company a monopoly of all the internal trade of the

⁴ Correspondence in Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 61-70, with his own remarks.

⁵ Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 13-16.

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Empire. In this sense it had been understood by both parties, and had been acted on up to the deposition of Suráj-u-Doula.⁶ After the ascendancy of the British was established, Lord Clive used to obtain from the nabob exemptions from internal duties in favour of particular persons, but those were always conferred by special passes from the nabob, and were never (unless secretly) assumed as a matter of right, or claimed under the Company's passport. In the weaker Government which succeeded, the Company's servants and other Europeans began to claim exemption without the nabob's passes; their agents did not always produce even the Company's pass, but hoisted a British flag which, from the awe inspired by it, was a sufficient protection to any cargo, even when used without authority, and by natives unconnected with the English. This abuse was often complained of by Mír Jáfír, but it had now risen to such a pitch as to eat up all that part of the nabob's revenue that was derived from customs and transit duties, and to throw out of employment all of his subjects who had been accustomed to live by the internal commerce. The privilege had only existed (even under the nabob's passes) since 1756, and in 1762 every attempt to question it was received with as much surprise and indignation by the council as if it had grown venerable under the sanction of ages.⁷

⁶ An attempt was made almost at the outset to apply it to internal trade, but this pretension was at once put down by the viceroy of the day, and was never after renewed. (Orme, ii. 25.)

⁷ For the recent origin of the trade, see Orme, ii. 25 and 26; Mr. Hastings' correspondence in Lord Clive's time, and other papers in the first section of Vansittart's *Narrative*; Scrafton's observations on Vansittart's *Narrative*, the minutes of Vansittart and Hastings, and the nabob's letters in the above *Narrative*. On the other side I know nothing but the minutes of the councillors given in Vansittart's *Narrative* and in the Appendix to the Third Report. Their argument generally is that the

A still worse consequence of the interference of Europeans with the internal trade was that it filled the country with commercial agents (*gomáshtas*) of private persons. Each of these was as proud and as rapacious as his master; he sold custom-free passes to people unconnected with the Company, he took the goods of the manufacturers and other dealers at his own price, and beat or imprisoned anyone who attempted to resist him; he interfered in all affairs in the village where he was stationed, and, being sure of support from the British authorities, he set the greatest of the nabob's officers at defiance. If any of those functionaries had spirit enough to maintain his authority, a detachment of sepoys from the nearest factory soon put a stop to his interference and often carried him off as a prisoner to answer for his insolence. In addition to these licensed harpies, another swarm carried on the same oppressions under their name. They pretended to be *gomáshtas* of English gentlemen, and dressed up people like the sepoys and the badged messengers of the Company to enforce their orders. The consequence was that the whole country became a scene of confusion and alarm, as if it had been suffering from the occupation of a hostile army.⁸ Mr. Vansittart had before this received many complaints of these disorders and had entered on a plan for restraining them, but he does not seem to have laid

king's grant gave the Company the privilege of the inland trade custom free; and that they were wrongfully kept from the enjoyment of it by the nabobs until they became strong enough to do themselves justice.

⁸ For the proceedings of the *gomáshtas* and of the European agents, see the statements of the nabob and his officers in Vansittart's *Narrative*; the letters of Serjeant Brego, *ibid.* ii. 111, and those of Mr. Gray and Mr. Senior, iii. 412-13; Lord Clive's letter to the Court of Directors, par. 12, Third Report, 394; Scrafton's *Observations on Vansittart*, 38; and many other authorities. On the opposite side the accusations are only met by a flat denial.

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anything before council. Mr. Hastings had warmly opposed them from the very beginning in the time of Mír Jáfir and Lord Clive, and had always maintained that the Company's passport should only be given to exports and imports, and that the nabob should be allowed to do himself justice in all cases where goods were not protected by that passport, and where agents in the country belonged to anyone except the Company.⁹ On his present journey, or rather voyage to Patna, he was surprised to see British flags in many villages and on almost all the boats that he met on the Ganges. He consulted Mr. Vansittart on the subject, and by the time he had to encounter the nabob's complaints, he was prepared to lay a paper before him in which were specified the points on which he might direct his own officers to check abuses without interfering with the rights of the Company. The nabob approved of the terms, but said it would be impossible to carry them into effect as long as every chief of a factory had the power to employ force to resist his authority. He therefore required that articles should be drawn up in a proper form under the seal of the Company and the Governor, and if necessary those of the council.¹

A long and dangerous illness of Mr. Vansittart prevented the preparation of such a document, and as the degree of control which he had hitherto been able to keep up over the abuses it was to remedy was removed by his absence from council, they multiplied with astonishing rapidity, and complaints poured in from every part of the country. The number of agents and of private European adventurers increased ; they extorted presents, decided causes, interfered in public business ;

⁹ See his letters written in 1758-9 in Vansittart's *Narrative*, i. 26-30.

¹ Mr. Hastings' letters, Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 78-96.

in short were going on to usurp the whole administration of the province. Some of them also, who held offices or farms from the nabob, refused to obey orders, or to pay what was due from them to the treasury. At the same time as loud complaints came in from the chiefs of the Company's factories. They said the insolence and outrages of the nabob's officers had increased to such a degree as to put a total stop to their business ; Mr. Ellis threatened to oppose force to force, and others applied for reinforcements and called for supplies of ammunition, as if they were on the very brink of a war.²

These indications of a rupture alarmed even the council at Calcutta. They sent orders on all sides to forbid the use of force ; they agreed that Mr. Vansittart, accompanied by Mr. Hastings, should repair to the nabob and endeavour to bring about an adjustment ; and even after those gentlemen were gone they continued for a time to conduct themselves with a laudable moderation. In fact the council was as yet composed of comparatively reasonable members ; four only were present, the rest being employed, according to the custom of the day, as chiefs of the different factories.

Mr. Vansittart therefore set out with strong hopes of effecting an arrangement, and with an impression on his mind that he had full powers to enter on the requisite engagements with the nabob.

October
20, A.D.
1762.

The meeting took place at Monghír, when the nabob renewed all his complaints and produced some letters from Company's servants expressed in disrespectful and menacing language towards his government. To give weight to his demand for redress, he announced that if it was not speedily granted he would abolish all internal

² Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 109-191.

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customs throughout his dominions, since at present they scarcely yielded any revenue and only served as protecting duties in favour of the English monopoly. It appeared also, by reports received by Mr. Vansittart, that the nabob's officers and the people of the country showed a marked spirit of resistance and hostility to the Europeans and their agents, and that three or four sepoy's had been killed in one place and a gomáshta in another.

The times seemed therefore to admit of no delay, and after frequent consultations with the nabob, Mr. Vansittart agreed to terms which were comprised in nine articles, and which he forthwith reported to the council.

The substance was that the Company's passport should only be granted to goods imported or intended for exportation ; that all other goods should take passports from the nabob's custom-houses, paying the duty beforehand, and being liable to no detention afterwards ; that boats furnished with the Company's passport should in no case be detained, but if it was suspected that the goods on board exceeded the amount specified in the passport, a complaint should be made to the nearest English officer ; that all boats without passports should be confiscated, even if sailing along with those provided with the Company's passports, and that the same rule should apply to boats carrying articles of internal traffic under the Company's passport clandestinely procured ; that the gomáshtas should trade like other merchants, and should be fully protected by the native government, but that all acts of oppression or other offences which they might commit should be punishable by the nabob's magistrates. Regulations were also included for the protection of the gomáshtas from

oppression, and severe punishment was promised against any of the nabob's officers who should offend in that respect.

The duties to be paid were fixed at nine per cent., which was that nominally paid by the Mussulmans; but as these last paid at a variety of different places and were liable to detention, imposition, and exaction, it was reckoned that their real payments did not fall short of fifteen per cent. at least.

A letter containing the above terms was written by Mr. Vansittart to the nabob, and everything being settled to the mutual satisfaction of the parties, Mr. Vansittart set out for Patna.

At Patna he met Mr. Ellis and inquired into some differences between him and the nabob's governor of Behár. They were unimportant, and Mr. Vansittart passed a decision on them which he thought had been acquiesced in by both parties.

As he passed Monghír on his return he stopped one day to see the nabob, who was just setting out on an expedition against Nepál, the mountainous principality which has since stood so stubborn a contest with the British.³

On January 28 he arrived at Calcutta.

January
28, A.D.
1763.

His report on the agreement (including the substance of the terms but not the letter to the nabob) had some time before reached the board, which determined to defer the discussion of it until the Governor should arrive. But this reasonable intention was rendered fruitless by the folly of the nabob.

It had been settled between Mr. Vansittart and him, that no use was to be made of the agreement until the Governor should have reached Calcutta. It was

³ Vansittart's *Narrative* (including the correspondence), ii. 141-194.

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then to be laid before council and instructions framed on it were to be sent to the different factories; at the same moment the Governor was to forward circular letters from the nabob to his chief officers, with which he was provided for the purpose. Yet no sooner was Mr. Vansittart gone, than the nabob, either from impatience to assert his own independence or from a wish to fix the terms on the British Government before there was time for the council to object, sent copies of Mr. Vansittart's letter in all directions, together with injunctions to his officers to carry it into immediate effect. This precipitancy defeated the whole arrangement. Not only did it set aside the authority of the council, but it sanctioned the confiscation of the property of those persons who had embarked their fortunes in the internal trade before they knew that it was to be forbidden. As if to complete the ruin of his own cause, the nabob in one of his letters directed that the present instructions should not be enforced against any trade carried on by Mr. Vansittart or Mr. Hastings. The first intelligence the board received of Mr. Vansittart's letter was through a Persian copy sent by the nabob to one of his own officers at Dacca, who triumphantly communicated it to the chief. The council, naturally indignant at the slight put on them, determined to take every means of reversing Mr. Vansittart's proceedings. They called in Major Carnac, though he was not entitled to a seat at their board except when military affairs were under discussion, but who was one of the most active, though not always the most prominent, of the opponents to the Governor's measures.⁴ His admission to the council

⁴ It is alleged by Mr. Vansittart that Major Carnac wrote all the minutes recorded by Mr. Amyatt, the ostensible head of the opposition in council (*Narrative*, ii. 272); and that he and Mr. Ellis were the

had a material effect at this crisis. He concurred in a resolution that the regulations made by the Governor were dishonourable to the council as Englishmen, and ruinous to their trade and the Company's; that the issue of them by the Governor was a breach of their privileges, and that instructions should be sent to all the factories to suspend acting on them. A still more decisive stroke was suggested by Major Carnac himself; it was to call in all the absent councillors, except Mr. Ellis and the chief at Chittagong, who were at too great a distance, and by this means the persons against whose proceedings Mr. Vansittart's measures had been directed, and who each regarded him as a personal enemy, were brought together to judge of his conduct. A council was thus formed which Clive himself might have proved unable to control, and to which Mr. Vansittart could scarcely offer any resistance. He was ill fitted by nature to bear up against the reckless counsels and vehement language of his opponents, and he was rendered feebler than usual by the consciousness of his pecuniary obligations to the nabob, and by his being himself engaged in the inland trade, though without partaking in the abuses.⁵ His colleagues pressed him

leaders of a party whose object it was to force a rupture with Cásim Ali (*ibid.* 233). It is true that Major Carnac corresponded with Mr. Ellis in cipher, and was the centre of all the correspondence of the malcontents throughout the civil service, but it does not appear that he and Mr. Ellis had any plan for bringing on a rupture, though like all the rest of their party they looked to it with pleasure.

⁵ He had in fact just received the 50,000*l.* promised to himself, and the 20,000*l.* for Colonel Caillaud. The money was paid to him at Monghír, though the circumstance was not then known to the Board. See Third Report of the House of Commons (1773), 310, and the appendices referred to. See also Caillaud's evidence, First Report, 161, and the extract from Vansittart's letter there quoted. It must, however, be remembered that Mr. Vansittart had long before taken his line on the question of the inland trade.

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hard on those points, treating him as the hired advocate of Cásim Ali, and accusing him of oppressing their trade to promote his own.

When the full council met, Major Adams, whose claim to a seat rested on the same ground as Major Carnac's, was admitted to the board, which then consisted of twelve members.

February
15.

At the first meeting of the full board, Mr. Amyatt brought forward an appeal from Mr. Ellis against the Governor's decision on the disputes at Patna.

On the same occasion Major Carnac presented a letter representing the hardship of his removal from the command at Patna, and requesting to be re-appointed.

The first subject of consideration was Mr. Ellis's appeal from Patna. There were three points in dispute. The first related to a privileged bazar set up some time before by the English, and this the council ordered to be done away. The other two arose from a plan for completing the fortifications of the town. It included shutting a small gate in one place and carrying the wall down to the river at another where there was a large space entirely open. Both of these alterations were inconvenient to the English residents, and the second of them would have protected the town against the factory no less than against other assailants. It was decided that the nabob should be requested to open the gate and throw down the new part of the wall, and that if he did not comply, Mr. Ellis should be instructed to do it by force.

February
19, A.D.
1763.

February
22 to
March 1,
A.D. 1763.

The discussion of the customs on inland trade next came on. As this was the great question on which the existence of the nabob's government was to depend, it is worthy of observation that it was one in which the

Company had no interest whatever ; their dealings were in exports and imports, and the internal trade was entirely in the hands of private individuals.

The board first came to a resolution, that in his letter to the nabob the Governor had exceeded his powers ; a decision which if it had not been accompanied with violence and invective, would have been justified by the fact.

They next resolved, the Governor and Mr. Hastings alone dissenting, that the King's grant entitled them to trade in all articles customs-free. Seven out of the twelve, however, were of opinion that a small duty on salt (two and a half per cent.) should be allowed to the nabob, it being carefully explained to him that it was granted of favour and not of right.⁶

With regard to native agents (*gonáshtas*) it was resolved that they should not be under the control of the nabob's government ; that, with respect to weavers, petty traders, and all others who received advances of money for goods to be provided, or were indebted for goods bought, the agents should retain their power to call such persons to account ; but that, in the event of their having complaints against the officers of government or their dependents, they should first apply to the local officer, and if they did not receive immediate satisfaction, they should forward their case to the chief at the factory, who should take cognizance of it and demand, or exact if necessary, the satisfaction the case required. Complaints against agents, from whatever quarter, were to be made to the chief, whose decision was to be final. In short, the agents were to be the only judges in all their disputes

⁶ The minutes on this question will be found in Vansittart's *Narrative*, ii. 309-429.

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with private persons, and the chief of the factory in those with the nabob's dependents.

This resolution was opposed by Mr. Hastings alone, even the Governor admitting the necessity of it. The great argument was the known injustice and corruption of the native officers, which would make it impossible to carry on trade under their authority. To this Mr. Hastings replied that we had carried it on formerly, when we had much less chance of redress than at present, and added the following striking testimony. 'As I have formerly lived among the country people in a very inferior station, and at a time when we were subject to the most slavish dependence on the government, and have met with the greatest indulgence, and even respect, from zemindars and officers of government, I can with the greater confidence deny the justice of this opinion ; and add further, from repeated experience, that if our people, instead of erecting themselves into lords and oppressors of the country, confine themselves to an honest and fair trade, they will be everywhere courted and respected.' ⁷

February
22, A.D.
1763.

When the nabob heard of the rejection by the council of Mr. Vansittart's agreement, he did not attempt to conceal his indignation. In answering some remonstrances which he received at the same time, he retaliates by setting forth his own wrongs ; he complains that his affairs are transferred from the Governor with whom he used to negotiate, to a body of gentlemen many of whom he understands are inclined to seat another person on his masnad ; he says that he had ceded territory to pay the English troops to fight for him, and now he was told they were

⁷ For the debate see the minutes just quoted, and for the resolutions Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 1-5.

to be employed against him ; that he was to bear the expenses of the province, and the English agents were to eat up the revenue ; that every complaint against his officers was believed, but that no attention was paid to his complaints against the agents. ' I must cut off my officers' heads,' says he to the Governor, ' but you have no power to punish any person that creates mischief under your administration. Your order is absolute with respect to my people, but you have not the least command over your own.'

He concludes by saying that, for as many boats as there are at Patna, he cannot get one to cross the Ganges ; the very boats he had provided for himself had been seized by the factory. In the course of his letters he more than once declares his readiness to give up the government, which he says it is impossible to carry on on such terms.

The council answered the nabob's remonstrance through the Governor (whom they compelled to explain that he was only their organ) by announcing the resolutions they had come to regarding the customs, and at the same time renewing the statement of their grievances, demanding the punishment of the offending officers and reparation for their own losses, and stating that they have referred the nabob's complaints to the gentlemen of the factories, and whatever injustice they may have committed the board will take care to see they make amends for.⁸

March 7,
A.D. 1763.

Things were now so obviously tending to a crisis, that the board resolved to try what could be done by a personal communication with the nabob, and they determined on sending Mr. Amyatt and Mr. Hay to Monghír for that purpose.

⁸ Correspondence in Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 6-30.

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IX.March 6,
A.D. 1763.

But before the mission set out, the peaceable settlement of disputes had become more improbable than ever. The effect of the nabob's orders to his officers to act on Mr. Vansittart's letter, and of those of the board to resist them by force, began to be felt. In many places the goods of Europeans were stopped by the local authorities, in some the nabob's officers were made prisoners by the English, and at a few, affrays and bloodshed occurred between the parties. But the most serious contest was in the neighbourhood of Patna, where the nabob in person was opposed to Mr. Ellis. He was at this time on his return from his expedition to Nepál, where he had been defeated, and had just passed Patna on his way to Monghír. Obstructions such as were generally complained of having taken place in his neighbourhood, Mr. Ellis detached three companies of sepoy's 'to clear the Company's business'—'and seize all who have interrupted it.'⁹ Their first acts were to apprehend a collector of the nabob's, to send him off to Patna under a guard, and to place a party of twelve sepoy's in the village where he resided. The nabob, incensed at such an outrage, almost under his own eyes, sent 500 horse to release his officer. They missed the escort, but attacked the village; the sepoy's defended it gallantly and lost four men, but were at last overpowered. The Company's native agent there was taken prisoner and sent to the nabob, who released him.¹ The nabob complained to the council, and (on March 24) they answered him through the Governor, highly approving of Mr. Ellis's conduct, declaring that they should insist on a compliance in every point with their resolutions and de-

⁹ Mr. Ellis's letter, Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 36.¹ Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 44 and 51.

mands, and that if the nabob opposed their people in the execution of their orders, they would look on it as a declaration of war.²

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Before this letter was despatched intelligence arrived that the nabob had fulfilled his former threat, and had abolished all internal duties for two years, thus throwing open the trade of the country to his own subjects on the same footing with that usurped by the British.

March 22,
A.D. 1763.

This intelligence transported the ruling part of the council beyond all bounds of reason. All declared it a violation of the Company's rights ; some pronounced it an act of usurpation to remit the Emperor's customs without his leave, though they had themselves accepted both exemptions and territories as little sanctioned by the Emperor ; others denied the right of a nabob whom they had raised to the subahdarship and supported by force of arms against the King, to employ the power ' with which they had been pleased to invest him ' to undermine their royal privileges and ruin their trade ; and one member derided the notion of the nabob's possessing any independence in his own territory, and treated the assertion of such a right as more worthy of his hired agents than of members of that board. All agreed that he should be required to recall his remission and collect the duties as before.³

This was the tone adopted by men who seven years before had lived in slavish dependence on the nabob's government, and who by their subsequent treaties had acquired no right or pretence for interfering in his internal administration. The motives they affected were proportioned to the greatness of their pretensions. No one hinted at the danger to their illicit

² *Ibid.* 58-60.

³ Minutes in Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 62-77.

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gains ; it was the honour of the factory, the dignity of the dustuck,⁴ above all the glory of the nation, which were to suffer by the suppression of smuggling. Soon after this angry council, accounts were received of another engagement between one of Mr. Ellis's detachments and the nabob's troops ;⁵ and about the same time the result of a former dispute led to still more irritating proceedings. The nabob's deputy in charge of the division of Dacca had put a stop to all the Company's trade in that district, and had been guilty of outrage and oppression towards some of their dependents. The council ordered three of his subordinate officers, who had been the instruments of his violence, to be sent prisoners to Calcutta. On their examination at that place such proofs came out of the deputy's active and inveterate enmity to the English as would have justified a war with Cásim Ali if he failed to punish the offender ; but instead of insisting on this atonement, the council adopted their usual practice, and ordered the deputy to be sent a prisoner to Calcutta, and this treatment of one of the most considerable persons in his dominions was deeply resented by the nabob.⁶

In the midst of these transactions, the nabob's answer to the Governor's letter announcing the resolutions relating to customs and gomáshtas was received. Though written in the usual style of compliment, it was filled with cutting reproaches to the council for their rapacity and breach of faith, and pointed out the inutility of a mission relating to the customs, as those imposts no longer existed. This letter was pronounced by the majority of the council to be insolent, improper, and

⁴ Pass or permit.

⁵ Correspondence in *Vansittart's Narrative*, iii. 88.

⁶ *Vansittart's Narrative*, iii. 136-140.

indecent, and it was debated whether the deputation should proceed or whether preparations for war should be made without delay. The first course was adopted, and Mr. Amyatt and Mr. Hay set out on their mission.⁷

• The choice of Mr. Amyatt for this duty was unfortunate. He appears to have been an amiable man in private life, but the nabob knew that he was the first to protest against his elevation and had headed the opposition ever since ; he could not therefore expect much favour or candour from such an envoy. The best selected embassy could scarcely have had a better prospect, for the instructions authorised no negotiation or concession, and confined the functions of the deputies to enforcing and insisting on the demands already made, with the addition of some very unacceptable articles.⁸ The nabob also had by this time, in all probability, made up his mind to go to war ; his letters, as remarked by Mr. Vansittart, are ‘those of a despairing man,’ and show throughout his conviction of a design to force him into a quarrel so as to afford a pretext for deposing him. Hostile intentions had been imputed to him from the moment of his accession ; his exertions to improve his army, his attempts to call in the dues of his treasury, everything that had a tendency to increase his own efficiency, was supposed to be designed against the English. Yet his conduct in other respects was irreconcilable to such a notion. He carried on no intrigues with European powers, made no overtures to the Marattas, and was less conciliating towards Sháh Álam and Shujá-u-Doula than the British themselves desired. He made enemies of all his zemindars, and, at the crisis of his dispute with the English, he undertook the distant

⁷ Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 80-124.

⁸ *Ibid.* iii. 128-135.

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and dangerous expedition to Nepál. Except in prematurely acting on the agreement regarding customs, he conducted himself under innumerable provocations with temper and forbearance, only showing as much firmness as seemed likely to repress encroachment, and it was not till the disappointment of all hope of support from England and the unqualified submission of Mr. Vansittart to his enemies, that he showed the least inclination to resort to the desperate expedient of taking up arms in his defence. The state of his mind is shown by two letters which he wrote to the Governor some days after the departure of the mission. In the first, dated April 11, he expresses his uneasiness at Mr. Amyatt's visit, and requests that his escort may not exceed one or two companies, and in the other (April 15) he exclaims against the duplicity of the Government, which, while professing peace and friendship, have sent their troops in several divisions through hills and forests towards his capital. At this time not a soldier had moved, but he was prepossessed with the idea that Mr. Amyatt's mission was like Mr. Vansittart's to Mír Jáfir, and that the scene which led to his own elevation was about to be repeated at his downfall.

Had he known the resolutions taken by the board the day before that of his last letter (April 14), he would have had some ground for his apprehensions. On that day a force was ordered to be prepared for service, and Mr. Ellis was warned that he might expect orders to take possession of the city of Patna.⁹

April 21,
A.D. 1763.

Before the embassy reached him, the nabob addressed a letter to the Company which he sent for transmission to the Government of Calcutta. It stated his grievances in very moderate language, and appealed to the Com-

⁹ Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 157.

pany for protection. But although its professed object was to procure their orders for the preservation of quiet, it is probable, from the state of the times, that it was really intended to justify himself in the event of war.

• About the same time he ordered the two Sêts to be brought by force to Monghír. These were the great bankers who figured in the first revolution, and were under the guarantee of the English. Their seizure led to remonstrance and to an angry retort on the part of Cásim Ali.

The interview with Mr. Amyatt and Mr. Hay at length took place at Monghír ; and, although the nabob at first declared that he conceived himself to be already at war and was making preparations for his defence, yet he was so much soothed by finding that no immediate step was about to be taken against him, that a faint hope was entertained that a reconciliation might yet be effected. But this hope disappeared when the deputies presented their demands in writing. They were eleven in number, and included a written recognition of the council's decision about customs and agents, a reimposition of the duties on the nabob's subjects, compensation to all who had suffered by the interference with the English trade, punishment of the nabob's officers, and many other unpalatable articles, all couched in the most peremptory language. The nabob replied to each article, but all in a contemptuous and sarcastic tone, and it became evident that an accommodation was more distant than ever.

May 15.

May 25,
A.D. 1763.

On the day after this correspondence, an accidental circumstance cut short the discussion. Some boats with a supply of arms for the troops at Patna arrived at Monghír and revived all the nabob's alarms. He ordered the boats to be detained ; said he had certain informa-

May 26.

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tion that Mr. Ellis intended to surprise Patna, and declared that he would not release the arms unless the troops were withdrawn from that city, or unless Mr. Ellis were removed, and Mr. Amyatt himself, Mr. McGwire, or Mr. Hastings, appointed in his room. *

June 9,
A.D. 1763.

The question of peace or war now turned on the detention of the boats, and at a meeting of the council at Calcutta on June 9, it was resolved that if the nabob did not immediately release them, Mr. Amyatt and Mr. Hay should quit his court, either formally announcing a rupture or in such other manner as was most consistent with their safety.

June 14.

The subsequent letters of these gentlemen show that the nabob, when war was inevitable, began to look with more confidence to the result. His language became more haughty and imperious, and the envoys found themselves neglected, and the gentlemen who attended them insulted in the streets. Cásim Ali had by this time commenced negotiations, which, if he had meditated war, would have been long since matured. He had as early as March despatched an emissary to sound Shujá-u-Doula on the subject of an alliance; ¹ early in June he received a formal appointment and investiture as subahdár from Sháh Álam; and not long after he withdrew his troops from the country of the zemindars of Behár, and moved them all towards Patna. When the alternative resolved on by the council on June 9 was made known to him, he at once replied that 'it was war.' He said that he should dismiss Mr. Amyatt as was desired, but that he would keep Mr. Hay as a hostage for the safety of his officers who had at different times been made prisoners, and were now in the hands of the English. Four or five

¹ *Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 218.

days later he seemed to have suddenly altered his views, for he announced to Mr. Amyatt that he had released the boats and that he was prepared to give up his demand for the evacuation of Patna. But these appearances were probably assumed to delay the breaking out of hostilities at that city, for which he nearly at the same time despatched a strong reinforcement of regular troops under an Armenian officer named Marcar. His proceedings on the following days seem to have varied according to the reports he received from Patna. On the 20th he complained to Mr. Vansittart that Mr. Ellis was constructing scaling-ladders and preparing to attack the town. On the same night he ordered Mr. Amyatt's boats to be closely surrounded by guards, but a day or two later he removed his guards and allowed that gentleman to depart, furnishing him with passports and a person of his own as a safeguard, and assuring him of the security of his life and honour.² He was perhaps sincere at the time, but things almost immediately took a turn which may have led him to forget his promise. As early as the beginning of June the governor of Patna had begun to tamper with the sepoys there, and had induced as many as 200 to desert.³ This was the most dangerous sort of hostility he could employ, and, combined with the subsequent direction of the nabob's detachments towards Patna and the state of the negotiations at Monghír, afforded a full justification to Mr. Ellis for the attack on the city which he had so long and so eagerly desired.

June 19.

June 22.

On the 24th he received intelligence of Mr. Amyatt's dismission, and on the same night he surprised the

June 24.
A.D. 1763.

² Mr. Amyatt's transactions, and those which took place elsewhere during his mission, are from the twelfth section of Vansittart's *Narrative* and the correspondence contained in it.

³ Mr. Ellis's letters in Vansittart's *Narrative*, pp. 273-5.

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IX.July 3 or
4.

city and carried it by escalade.⁴ The force consisting of nearly 300 Europeans and 2,300 Sepoys,⁵ ought to have been sufficient to keep the city in all circumstances, but they unfortunately dispersed to plunder, and the reinforcement under Marcar arriving while they were thus scattered, drove them out of the city in their turn and forced them to take refuge in the factory. That place was not tenable even if they had not been weakened and dispirited by their recent defeat; they therefore embarked on boats and got as far as Chapra (upwards of thirty miles west of Patna and not far from Shujá-u-Doula's frontier), but their retreat was retarded by some local officers until Marcar came up with his battalions, when they surrendered at discretion. Mr. Ellis and the other Europeans were sent to the nabob at Monghír.⁶ Cásim Ali was as much elated with this success as if it had been decisive of the war. He wrote a letter full of taunts and insults to Mr. Vansittart,⁷ and issued orders for the destruction of all the Europeans throughout his dominions. It is uncertain whether any more specific orders were sent for the murder of Mr. Amyatt, but his boat was stopped as he was passing a body of troops who were encamped near Murshidábád, and he was murdered by people belonging to Taki Khán, the commander-in-chief of the nabob's horse, who happened to be in the camp in person. It is uncertain whether the murder was premeditated or was the result of his resisting an attempt to make him prisoner.⁸ Some of the scattered English were killed, but most were kept prisoners by the local

⁴ Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 390.⁵ Return in Vansittart's *Narrative*.⁶ *Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 243 et seq.⁷ His letter, in Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 330.⁸ Third Report, p. 357; *Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 248.

officers, and released on the victory of their countrymen.⁹

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Intelligence of the murder of Mr. Amyatt, together with a rumour of the breaking out of hostilities at Patna, reached the board on July 4. They had determined as early as June 20, that in the event of a rupture Mír Jáfir should be replaced on the masnad; and they now concluded a treaty with him. Although the majority treated the reinstatement of this prince as a restoration to his just rights,¹ they did not scruple to impose new and severe terms upon him. All the concessions made by Cásim Ali were retained, the whole of the commercial privileges claimed by the Company's servants were insisted on, the force to be kept up by the nabob was limited to 6,000 horse and 12,000 foot, and he was to indemnify the Company and individuals for all the damage occasioned to them by the usurper whom their own Government had set up to supplant him.² By a separate agreement he was to grant a donation of twenty-five lacs of rupees to the army, and some gratification to the navy, which was not fixed at the time.³

July 7,
A.D. 1763.

The treaty was signed on July 7; Mír Jáfir was proclaimed on the same day; and on the 11th he set out to join the army, which had marched on June 26. Mr. Vansittart and Mr. Hastings, though they declined voting on the question of reappointing Mír Jáfir, signed the proclamation.

Cásim Ali's force was reckoned by the English to consist of 15,000 horse, ten or twelve battalions of

⁹ *Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 253.

¹ For the whole debate see the minutes in Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 279 et seq. and 321 et seq.

² *Treaties and Grants*, p. 113.

³ Vansittart's *Letter to the Proprietors*, p. 125.

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sepoys, seventeen guns well mounted, and 170 Europeans. The strength of the army lay in the regular infantry, most of which had been formed by Gregore, and had Armenian commandants to the battalions; the rest was under Sombre or Somroo, afterwards so notorious in Indian history.⁴

Gregore was an Arinenian of Isfahán. His nation are in general entirely given up to commerce, and destitute of all turn for military affairs; but Gregore was a man of another stamp. With the aid of some continental Europeans and some native deserters, he brought his sepoy to a state of discipline that surprised his English antagonists. He acquired a great ascendancy over the nabob, and was the chief means of encouraging him in all his disputes with the British Government. A portion of the cavalry was also in a high state of efficiency; though irregular, it was well organised, and commanded by Taki Khán, an officer of courage and abilities.

The British took the field with 650 Europeans and 1,200 sepoy, and were joined after the taking of Murshidábád by 100 Europeans and a battalion of sepoy from 800 to 1,000 strong. The relation between their power and the nabob's was the reverse of what it had been. They had lost half their army at Patna, and the result of that contest had dispelled the terror with which they were previously invested; they were ill provided with carriage, and they marched at the height

⁴ The real name of this adventurer is uncertain, as is his country. By one account he was a Frenchman, by another a German and a Protestant; a third reconciles the others by making him a native of Alsace. He was originally a carpenter, and afterwards a sergeant in the French army. After his desertion of Cásim Ali, he carried his disciplined battalions from service to service, and after his own death they were held together by his widow, a woman of talent, and finally were received into the pay of the British Government in 1803.

of the rains, when in Bengal it is generally thought impossible to move at all. Adams's military talents seem to have been adequate to the emergency, and but for the shortness of his career, his name might have stood with those of Lawrence and Coote among the founders of our Indian Empire.

Mír Jafir joined the army on the 17th ; it marched on the next day, and on the 19th engaged the enemy's army under Taki Khán at a place opposite Catwa. The battle was well contested, but was gained by the English ; Taki Khán was killed. The English marched on, stormed an entrenchment erected for the defence of Murshidábád, and took fifty guns. Mír Jáfir made his entry into his capital ; but in four days the army marched again, and on August 2 they found the whole of the nabob's force drawn up at Gheria, not far from the main stream of the Ganges. A severe action ensued. Part of the British line was broken, and two of their guns taken. His Majesty's 84th regiment was attacked in front and rear at once, and it was not till after a contest of four hours, that victory declared for the British. It was then complete ; all the enemy's guns were taken, and 150 boats loaded with provisions. After a halt of several days the army again marched forward, and on August 11 reached the neighbourhood of a brook called Údwa Nalla.⁵ At this place the southern hills approach the Ganges ; the pass they formed was defended by a fort, and was now entirely closed up by entrenchments thrown up for the occasion.

Here Cásim Ali had determined to make his last and desperate stand. He had assembled all the troops he could draw from every quarter, until, by the reports

July 19,
A.D. 1763.

⁵ Oudanulla in the maps, and Outahnnulla in the Third Report.

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July 24.

July 28.

that reached the English they amounted to 60,000 men. Up to this time he had remained in safety at his fortified town of Monghír, but he now determined to advance towards the scene of action, though he could not bring himself to join the army. He had sent his family to the fort of Rotás, and before he left Monghír he put all his own subjects whom he had in confinement to death. He saw his power escaping from him, and was determined not to be frustrated in his revenge. Rám Náráin and his rival Ráj Balab, the Rái Rárán, and several other ministers, with some zemindars of consequence, were murdered on this occasion. Bags of sand were fastened round their necks and they were thrown into the Ganges. For some reason, the Séts were passed over at this time, but were afterwards put to death. The Europeans were spared as giving a hold on their Government, and were dragged along with the camp.

The lines at Údwa Nalla were protected by a deep wet ditch fifty or sixty feet broad, extending from the hills to the river, and were defended by upwards of one hundred guns. In front of them was a morass, impassable at all points except for a breadth of one hundred yards close to the river. Of this space Adams feigned to avail himself for his attack ; he began to erect batteries, and though much pressed by the enemy's cavalry, carried on his approaches for several days, until the whole attention of the enemy was drawn to that quarter. He then marched before day-break, and turned the entrenchment by the foot of the hills before the enemy had time to oppose him. They nevertheless offered an obstinate resistance, and lost many killed, besides 1,000 horse who were shut in by a morass and taken prisoners. These were immediately released. This was the last stand in the field. The

nabob fled with precipitation to Monghír, and after some days continued his retreat to Patna. Signs of defection had appeared among his troops, and Gregore, whom he always kept near his person, had been killed in a mutiny. He wrote to Major Adams threatening to put his prisoners to death if the army continued to advance, and not long after came a noble letter from Mr. Ellis and Mr. Hay, requesting that no consideration for them might impede the operations of the army. Adams replied to the threat by the most solemn appeals and denunciations of vengeance, but they made no impression on Cásim Ali, whose hatred and cruelty were rendered fiercer by despair. Before he left Patna, he ordered a massacre of all his prisoners. Several native chiefs are said to have declined the duty,⁶ but it was accepted with alacrity by Somroo, and carried into effect without mercy. After having every means of defence removed (even to the knives and forks), he went himself to the outer court of the prison and sent for Mr. Ellis and a few of the principal persons; they were immediately cut to pieces, and their mangled bodies were thrown into a well. The other prisoners, about one hundred and fifty in number, were assembled in an inner court, where they were fired on and bayonetted by Somroo's sepoys, and were destroyed to a man. Mr. Fullarton, the surgeon at Patna, who had gained the friendship of many natives of rank, was alone spared from the massacre. Cásim Ali sent for him and spoke of an accommodation with the English, but two or three days afterwards he put to death seven more Europeans who were in a separate place of confinement and had been forgotten.⁷

Septem-
ber 9, A.D.
1763.

October 5,
A.D. 1763.

⁶ *Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 282.

⁷ Mr. Fullarton afterwards escaped and joined the army.

CHAP.
IX.Beginning
of Octo-
ber, A.D.
1763.November
6, A.D.
1763.December
4, A.D.
1763.December
9, A.D.
1763.End of
Decem-
ber, A.D.
1763.

Meanwhile the British army advanced to Monghír, which capitulated after a practicable breach had been made. The army then marched on to Patna. The garrison made a gallant defence. On one occasion they took possession of one of the batteries, and held out till the place was carried by storm.

Cásim Ali had retired towards the Caramnása, which forms the limits of his territory. Adams followed him up, and on December 1 he crossed into the dominions of Shujá-u-Doula. His flagitious character and the atrocities with which he closed his career deprive him of the sympathy which might otherwise have been excited by the tyranny and injustice of which he had been the victim.

The hardships of this campaign were fatal to Major Adams. He left the army as soon as the service was completed, and died before the expiration of a month. Major Knox, who succeeded him, was likewise obliged to retire from illness a few weeks later.⁸

Cásim Ali did not enter Shujá u-Doula's territory until he had received assurances of safety and protection from that prince, accompanied by a Koran as the most solemn pledge of fidelity to those engagements.⁹

⁸ The whole of the operations of the war are from the evidence of Major Grant, Third Report, p. 303, with additions from the *Seir ul Mutakherín*.

⁹ *Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 292.

[The author of the *Seir ul Mutakherín*, who accompanied Mír Casim in his flight to Benares, gives the following description of the allied forces in their advance to attack the English. They had been recently joined by the troops of Balwant Sing, Rája of Benares. 'This addition, great as it was, was hardly perceived in an army which proved so very numerous that, as far as the eye could extend, it covered the country and plains like an inundation, and moved like the billows of the sea. But there was so little order and discipline among these troops, and so little were the men accustomed to command, that, in the middle of the camp, they fought against each other, killed and murdered each other, plundered each other, and went out a plundering and marauding, without

Shujá was at that time on his march towards Allahábád, accompanied by Sháh Álam, his object being to put down some disturbances on the borders of Bundelcand. Cásim Ali followed and was received with great magnificence, and a treaty was concluded by which Shujá engaged to restore Cásim to his masnad, and Cásim to pay a subsidy of 110,000*l* a month during the time that the army was employed. In furtherance of this design, the two nabobs marched to Benares, where they were within three or four marches of the British army on the Caramnása. Shujá's wisest counsellors advised him to avoid a general action, to cut off the supplies of the English, to make incursions into the country in their rear, and thus compel them to retreat to Patna if not to Bengal. But Shujá himself was for an immediate action. In the midst of their consultations they received the unexpected intelligence that the British army had retreated of itself.¹

February,
A.D. 1764.

Cásim Ali had been tampering with the foreigners in the British service, and before Major Knox left camp three of them had attempted to desert. They were overtaken and seized, but the change of commanders and the want of authority to hold general courts-martial prevented their being punished.² Their impunity encouraged further offences; two months of inaction gave time for discussing grievances, and the donation pro-

the least scruple or the least control. No one would inquire into these matters, and these ungovernable men scrupled not to plunder to the right and left with impunity, and even to strip and kill people of their own army if they chanced to lag behind their main body, or to be found in some lonely spot. They behaved exactly like a troop of highwaymen. It was not an army, but a whole city in motion, and you could have found in it whatever could be found in Shahjehanábád (Delhi) itself whilst that city was the capital and the eye of all Hindustan,' ii. 306.—Ed.]

¹ *Scir ul Mutakhherin*, ii. 300 309.

² Major Grant's evidence, Third Report, p. 304.

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IX.February
12, A.D.
1764.

mised by the nabob, but not yet issued, was a ground for discontent to the other troops as well as to the foreigners. The result was that one day the whole of the Europeans fell in with the utmost regularity, and marched off with their arms and cannon towards Shujá-u-Doula's frontier. Captain Jennings, on whom the temporary command devolved, followed the deserters and endeavoured to persuade them to return. The nabob was brought up, and promised to issue 10,000*l.* immediately, but neither threats nor promises had any great effect until the mutineers reached the Caramnása. They were there prevailed on to halt and take a dram and a biscuit ; and Captain Jennings and his officers made so good a use of this delay that most of the English agreed to return to their duty ; 300 Europeans, however, held out and dashed across the river, where they were followed by many sepoy's belonging to a detachment previously stationed on the spot. Many of these returned on that day and the next, and the total loss only amounted to 150 European foreigners, mostly French, and 100 sepoy's. Three days later the sepoy's mutinied in consequence of the very unequal share of the 10,000*l.* which had been allotted to them. The Europeans were by this time thoroughly ashamed of their former conduct ; they got under arms of their own accord, and were with difficulty restrained from attacking the mutineers. All was settled by a further issue of money. Captain Jennings judiciously employed the troops in marches within the frontier (there being still peace with Shujá-u-Doula), and he was soon able to report the restoration of order and contentment, notwithstanding the high price of provisions, which began to be felt in camp.³

February
28, A.D.
1764.

³ Captain Jennings's despatches, Appendix to Third Report, pp. 364-366.

Things were in this state when Major Carnac took the command. He had been appointed to succeed Major Adams, and now arrived from Calcutta. He reported to the Government that he had reason to think the mutinous spirit of the troops not extinguished, and that further demands would be made for the donation. Soon after he received intelligence of the advance of Shujá-u-Doula, and marched to the frontier to oppose him. On this occasion he made a further issue of money, and, some of the sepoy's showing discontent, he punished two or three as an example, and dismissed them from the service.

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March 7
and 8, A.D.
1764.

At a subsequent period (March 26) a native officer was discovered attempting to induce his company to desert and was blown from a gun, which was the last symptom of mutiny during Major Carnac's command.⁴

Shujá's intentions being no longer doubtful, Major Carnac was anxious to advance and meet him within his own territory, where Balwant Sing, Rája of Benares, had promised to come over to his side. But being threatened with a failure of his provisions, he determined to meet the enemy on the Ganges, then to receive him at Baxar, and at length fell back on Patna, where he finally took his stand.⁵ Shujá-u-Doula, who seems to have entertained no doubt of an easy victory, crossed the Ganges and pursued his march to Patna, spreading the most destructive ravages throughout the country as he passed.⁶ He found the British drawn up under the walls and immediately attacked them. The battle began with a cannonade, after which Shujá made a

March 18,
A.D. 1764.

March 22,
A.D. 1764.

April 9,
A.D. 1764.

May 3,
A.D. 1764.

⁴ Major Carnac's letter, Appendix to Third Report, pp. 366-368.

⁵ Ibid., pp. 367-369.

⁶ *Seir ul Mutakherin*, ii. 309.

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vigorous attack with Cásim Ali's regular troops (now under Somroo) and his own cavalry. When this was repulsed he turned his attention to attempts on the rear. The contest lasted from noon till evening, when Shujá drew off his guns and retreated. His loss was thought to be immense ; that of the English was inconsiderable. The troops behaved admirably, but were kept strictly on the defensive.

A few days after the action, Shujá-u-Doula withdrew to a distance of four or five miles from the town, but continued in the neighbourhood for about three weeks. During this time Major Carnac remained in his position, from which the most pressing letters of the Government could not induce him to move. Shujá-u-Doula kept up the impression of his being on the point of another attack, but in reality was engaged in attempts to debauch the troops and to gain admission into the city by corrupting the nabob's officers. The failure of those attempts and the advanced state of the season at length induced him to retreat. He retired to the Són, about thirty miles from Patna, where he remained for about a fortnight. When the Government of Calcutta heard of his leisurely retreat they became more urgent than ever for the advance of Major Carnac. They had begun while the army was still on the frontier by earnest but respectful suggestions ; these were changed during the nabob's halt at Patna into peremptory orders to fight without delay ; and they rose before the end of the campaign to sharp reproaches and repeated directions to submit the question of an immediate attack to the judgment of a council of war. Major Carnac defended his delays on the ground of the opinion of his officers, of the failure of supplies, of the mutinous disposition of his troops, of the difficulty of ascertaining Shujá's posi-

May 23,
A.D. 1764.

tion, and the danger of his getting into the rear and taking Patna or carrying off the nabob. All these arguments, except the first (which they wished to have clearly ascertained by a regular council of war), appeared to the Government to have exactly the opposite tendency from that ascribed to them by Carnac, and to point out the necessity of bringing things to a speedy decision. Their opinion did not induce Major Carnac to move his main body, but he sent a detachment under Major Champion to get into Shujá's rear and invade his country.

The progress of this detachment, which before long crossed the river Gogra or Sarju, induced Shujá to fall back on Baxar, a town near his own frontier, though still within Mír Jáfír's territory. Here he took up his cantonments for the rainy season, leaving Champion at liberty to pursue his operations beyond the Ganges. This success did not satisfy the Government, which kept up a constant pressure on Major Carnac to advance, requiring him to explain how it could be safe for a small detachment to act in the enemy's country, and unsafe for him. But Major Carnac had now good reasons for his inactivity: his troops having suffered too much during their last campaign in the rains to undertake another in that season, his decision not to move had the decided concurrence of Major Champion and all the other principal officers to whom, in compliance with the orders of the Government, he submitted the question. Soon after Shujá's retreat, he applied for leave to come to Calcutta, that he might prepare for going to England, to which the Government readily assented.⁷

June 5,
A D. 1764.

⁷ The whole of the proceedings in the war with Shujá-u-Doula are from the correspondence in Appendix 67 to the Third Report, pp. 363-383. A few particulars are from the *Seir ul Mutakherin*.

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At the same time with the military operations some political transactions were likewise going on. After the breaking out of war with Cásim Ali, and the calamities which attended it, a great change took place in the spirit of the council; three new members came in to replace those cut off, several of the old opposition were gone back to their stations, and those who remained gave their zealous assistance to promote the public business. The time having arrived which Mr. Vansittart had fixed for returning to Europe, the seven members present (including Major Carnac and three others of the old opposition) unanimously requested him to remain till the country was completely settled; and to this spirit is to be ascribed their consistency and firmness during the subsequent transactions.⁸

Before Cásim Ali had crossed the Caramnása, Shujá-u-Doula made offers of his friendship to Major Adams, and proposed that the British should guarantee the payment of the revenues of Bengal to the King, in return for a patent conferring that province on Mír Jáfir. The British Government rejected this proposal, but the nabob gave in to it, signed an agreement to pay 280,000*l.* a year, and took measures for remitting half the money immediately. The Government put a stop to this proceeding, pointing out to the nabob that such an expense was useless in any circumstances, and at present pernicious, as supplying Shujá with funds to employ against the nabob himself. On this Shujá laid aside his pacific views, if they ever were sincere, made his treaty with Cásim Ali, and marched to invade Behár.⁹

⁸ Letter in Vansittart's *Narrative*, iii. 421.

⁹ Appendix 67 to the Third Report, pp. 363 and 365. *Seir ul Mutakherín*, ii. 300-304.

Mír Jáfir's anxiety to propitiate Shujá and to procure an appointment from Sháh Álam might in part be owing to timidity, but in a greater degree to a wish to strengthen himself in the event of any future dispute with the English. It was attributed by the Government of Calcutta to the influence of Nandcomár, of whose intriguing and unprincipled character they had long entertained great distrust. At the time of Mír Jáfir's restoration, this man was in confinement on account of some correspondence with the French, but the nabob made it a condition of his accepting the government that he should be allowed to employ him in his service. The majority of the council, though with great reluctance, thought it necessary to yield this point, and Nandcomár was now the nabob's prime minister.

The Government's suspicions of Nandcomár were increased after the breaking out of the war with Shujá. To him they ascribed the sudden emptiness of the nabob's treasury when the year's revenue had just been collected, the failure to provide grain for the army in an unusually abundant season, and the nabob's delay in returning to Calcutta where his presence was much required. The same opinions had occurred to Major Carnac, who had further reason to suspect a correspondence with the enemy, and he anticipated the wishes of the Government by earnest applications to the nabob to remove the suspected minister. They were, however, entirely unavailing, and Carnac judiciously withheld a direct demand of the same nature from the Governor himself, which it was obvious could have no good effect.¹

¹ Vansittart's *Narrative* and the *Minutes of the Council*, iii. 347-355; Appendix 67 to the Third Report, pp. 367-370.

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May 12,
A D. 1764

The negotiations broken off as above mentioned were renewed after Shujá's retreat. At the time of his invasion, he had written a letter to the English Government in the highest strain of Oriental arrogance, commanding them, on pain of the severest punishment,* to send back their troops to Europe, and to return to their usual obedience to the Emperor. After his repulse at Patna, he addressed a letter to Mír Jáfir in which he proposed that Jáfir should hold his provinces as deputy for his (Shujá's) son, on whom the Emperor had conferred them; the English also, if faithful and obedient, were to be allowed to retain their districts.

To this insulting proposal the nabob sent a submissive answer, saying that he had consulted Major Carnac, and that the English objected to any arrangement unless Shujá would either deliver up Cásim Ali and Somroo, or imprison them himself; that if this were done he would himself be ready to give every sign of his obedience and attachment, and the English would show equal devotion.

The first account of these negotiations received by the Government was an indistinct one through a private channel. As soon as it reached them, they wrote to Major Carnac to forbid all negotiations; they said the only terms they could accept were the surrender of Cásim Ali and Somroo; and that these could not be hoped for but through military operations, which they desired might not be delayed for a single hour. They disapproved of the nabob's solicitude to obtain a commission from Sháh Álam, and positively forbade his carrying on any negotiations without Major Carnac's concurrence so long as the war continued.

The correspondence was afterwards transmitted to the Governor by the nabob, as were some letters in

which it was kept up. These last mentioned were from two of Shujá's ministers, who professed to intercede with their master in the nabob's favour. They related his extreme displeasure at the proposal for surrendering his guests, but represented him as somewhat pacified by their entreaties, and at last induced to declare that if the province of Behár were ceded to him, he would take the demands of the English into consideration, otherwise they must be totally rooted out and destroyed. The cession of Behár was too much even for the nabob, who rejected the proposal with many complaints of its unreasonableness.

On the arrival of these letters the Government expressed its surprise at having received no information respecting them from Major Carnac, and appointed Mr. Batson Resident with the nabob, directing Major Carnac to proceed in conjunction with him.

Major Carnac explained his silence regarding the negotiations by saying that he had given himself no trouble about them, as they were carried on through an irregular channel. He defended the nabob's attempts to procure a commission from the Emperor, and, as he had before retracted his bad opinion of Nandcom r, he was now at variance with the Government on all subjects.²

The negotiations above described took place during Shujá's halt at Patna. After his retreat he found it necessary to lower his tone, and (to save his own dignity) he made use of the Emperor as a channel for his overtures. It was now proposed to imprison and punish Cásim Ali, but it was doubtful whether Behár was not required as the price of this concession.³

² Appendix 67 to the Third Report, pp. 373-378.

³ Mr. Batson's letter of June 10, Third Report p. 379.

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Major Carnac replied that nothing would satisfy the English but the actual surrender of Cásim Ali and Somroo. The negotiation, however, went on until the British Government repeated that they would not treat unless Cásim Ali and Somroo were first delivered up, and that even then they would not agree to any cession or payment, nor to any sacrifice beyond desisting from their invasion of Shujá's territories. They also directed that Shujá should be apprised that the bearer of any overtures from his camp made without the surrender of the two delinquents would be treated as a spy.⁴ By this time Mr. Batson had arrived in camp. Though formerly one of the most violent in opposition, he now concurred in the views of Government, and thenceforward there were no further negotiations on the part of the English, though a correspondence with the enemy was still kept up by the nabob.⁵

In the first of Shujá's overtures (May 12) he disclaimed all connection with Cásim Ali. It is probable he never intended to do more than use him as the means of acquiring the whole or a part of the Bengal provinces for himself. After his retreat, he took measures for getting rid of the engagements he had formerly entered into. He called on Cásim Ali to pay up the promised subsidy, and on Cásim's declaring his inability, unless he were allowed to go and levy contributions on his former territory, he announced that the Emperor intended to insist on the immediate payment of the arrears of the revenue due to him, and that he should not interfere to prevent his Majesty's enforcing the demand. Cásim Ali, who perfectly understood the real meaning of this message, abandoned

⁴ Appendix to Third Report, pp. 379-380.

⁵ Mr. Batson's letter of June 14, Third Report.

his tents and property and assumed the dress of a fakir. To remove this public scandal, Shujá desisted from his importunities, and went himself to persuade Cásim Ali to return to his natural character. But he only changed his mode of attack, for a few days after Somroo marched with his battalions and surrounded Cásim Ali's tent, demanding his arrears of pay. Cásim Ali produced the money from a concealed hoard, but declared himself unable to retain so large a body, and desired Somroo to restore the guns and muskets of the battalions, which were his property; but Somroo (probably on some pretext of unsatisfied claims) refused to give them up and carried them over to Shujá-u-Doula with whom he had already taken service. Whether the disclosure of concealed resources seemed to Shujá to afford a pretext for renewing his exactions from Cásim Ali, or from whatever other motive, he now threw off the mask of moderation, placed Cásim Ali in confinement, and seized on all his property.⁶

This was the state of things when Major Munro arrived in the English camp. He had been on the point of embarking for Europe from Bombay, when repeated expresses arrived from Bengal requesting him to come and take the command of the troops of that Presidency. On reaching Calcutta he was immediately ordered up to Patna, and arrived there some time in the month of July. He was accompanied by some reinforcements, native and European, which he had brought from Bombay. The army, no longer occupied by the presence of an enemy, had again shown a mutinous disposition. Immediately after Munro's arrival a battalion of sepoy's marched off from Chapra to join the enemy. Munro had arrived at that station the day

End of
June, A.D.
1764.

⁶ *Seir ul Mutakherin*, ii. 320 336.

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before, with a detachment of Europeans. He sent them with a battalion of sepoys who could be depended on to pursue the fugitives. They surprised them in the night and brought them back to Chapra, where Munro had the troops drawn up to receive them. He directed the officers of the battalion to pick out twenty-four of the most active ringleaders, tried them by a drumhead court-martial of native officers, and ordered them to be immediately blown away from guns. While four of the men were fastening to the guns, four others represented that they were grenadiers and entitled to the lead, and claimed their privilege on this occasion. Their demand was acceded to, for pardon was impossible, after which the officers of all the battalions of sepoys reported that their men would not suffer any more executions. If Munro had before thought of sparing any of the prisoners, it was now out of the question. He drew up the Europeans in front of the sepoys, loaded his guns with grape, and ordered the sepoys to ground their arms on pain of being treated as enemies. They grounded their arms, and the remaining prisoners were executed to the last man.

Septem-
ber 15,
A D. 1764.

Munro now prepared for movement, allowing the violence of the rains to pass, but before the end of the season he was in motion to engage the enemy. After some slight opposition at the Són he advanced to Baxar, where he found Shujá-u-Doula entrenched, with his left on the Ganges. While he was considering how to turn these lines, to his surprise he saw the enemy march out to attack him. The English had about 7,000 regular troops, of whom 840 were Europeans and 900 irregular horse. Shujá's army was not less than 40,000, including Somroo's regulars and 300 or 400 French, and it was well supplied with ordnance. The battle lasted

from nine till noon, when the enemy drew off in good order, breaking the bridge over a miry rivulet in their rear. They left 2,000 men killed and wounded on the field, and lost an equal number in the rivulet during their retreat. The British lost 847 killed and wounded. Major Munro had not surgeons enough to attend to his own men, but he daily visited every one of the enemy's wounded, and gave rice and water to such as would take it, which was all he could do for them. After burying the dead and arranging the hospitals, Munro marched on towards Benares.

On the morning after the battle he received a letter from Sháh Álam, stating that he had now separated from Shujá-u-Doula, by whom he had been detained as a state prisoner, and begging to be taken under the protection of the British Government. Munro answered that he could take no measures regarding him without orders from Calcutta, but Sháh Álam, continuing in repeated letters to beg that he might be allowed to join the camp, Munro at last consented, on condition that the permission was not to be regarded as implying any promise of protection, and Sháh Álam encamped close to the British lines. At his first interview he complained of the many grievances and hardships he had endured from Shujá-u-Doula, and offered to bestow that prince's territory, or anything else they might desire, on the English as the price of their support; but before long instructions arrived from Calcutta, and the Government promised its protection without imposing any conditions. At Benares Major Munro had an interview with Béni Bahádúr, Shujá's minister, who was sent to him to sue for peace. He offered on his master's part to make great pecuniary payments to the Company, and to give 80,000*l* to Munro himself, but, with a mixture

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of honour and depravity not unusual in the East, he positively refused to give up Cásim Ali and Somroo; and yet on finding Munro inflexible, proposed that Cásim Ali should be allowed to fly, and that if the major would send some officers to his camp, Somroo should be invited to an entertainment and put to death in their presence. These offers being instantly rejected, the treaty was broken off. At the same time Munro, looking on the difficulties of the war as at an end, applied to be relieved, that he might be in time for the last ships sailing for Europe; and Major, now Brigadier-General, Carnac was sent from Calcutta to succeed him. Before his departure Munro was associated with some civil servants in negotiating a treaty with Sháh Álam, on the conclusion of which he left the camp without any further military operation.⁷ It had been his design to remain inactive, in the hope that Shujá's army would disperse from want of funds, but this plan, so inconsistent with the energy just shown by its author, was set aside by Sir R. Fletcher, on whom the temporary command devolved. It is not certain whether an unsuccessful attack on the hill fort of Chunár, near Benares, was made by Munro or Fletcher, but it was the second of those officers who advanced into Shujá's country, breached and took the great fortress of Allahábád, while Shujá fled, with such adherents as he could still keep together, to Bareilly, and threw himself on the protection of the Rohillas, against whom he had formerly carried on so unrelenting a persecution. He was hospitably received, but could have entertained little hopes of assistance from the Rohillas, as he had recourse to the same Marattas who had been the instruments of his vengeance against

⁷ Major Munro's operations are from his evidence, First Report, pp 167, 168.

that people.⁸ Before he was joined by these new allies, he lost the services of Somroo, who marched off with his disciplined sepoys and 300 Europeans to enter into the service of the Játs at Agra.

• Shujá joined the Marattas under Malhár Ráo Holcar at Córa, and Brigadier-General Carnac, who had taken the command of the English army, marched towards that place to attack him. He had encamped within a few miles of the enemy when he perceived large bodies of horse hovering round him. These were the Marattas under Malhár Ráo, who were probably looking out, after their manner, for some opportunity of gaining an advantage. One party approached so near, under cover of a hollow way, as to kill some of the irregular horse, but they retired on a detachment being sent towards them, and the rest drew off without attempting to come to action, and soon after retired across the Jumna. They afterwards made an attempt to recross, but were met by Carnac, who crossed the river to attack them, and speedily forced them to retire.

May 3,
A.D. 1765

May 22,
A.D. 1765.

Shujá had taken no part in these skirmishes, and had separated from the Marattas at Córa, and being at length convinced of the hopelessness of all further resistance, resolved to throw himself on the clemency of the British Government, and came with a few attendants to General Carnac, who received him with every mark of courtesy and respect.⁹

May 27,
A.D. 1765.

In the meantime many changes had taken place in

⁸ *Seir ul Mutakherín*. ² Ellhott's *Life of Hafiz Rahmat Khán*, p. 86.

⁹ Report from Brigadier General Carnac to the President and Council, dated May 3, 1765; Appendices to the Third Report, p. 408, also pp. 416-420. *Seir ul Mutakherín*, II. 358-379

CHAPTER X.

Arrangements with Mír Jáfir—His death, and accession of Najum-u-Doula—New terms imposed on the Nabob—Presents to members of the Council—Complaints of the Nabob—Lord Clive's reception in England—Enters Parliament—Factions in the India House—Influence of the King's Government in the affairs of the Company—Sullivan's rupture with Clive—Dispute about Clive's Jágír—Alarm in England caused by the revolutions in Bengal—Clive is requested to return to India—His arrival—State of the Government and of the army—Oppression of the people—Clive's powers disputed—His victory over the Council—Investigations about presents and abuses—Civil servants reduced to obedience—Changes in the government of Murshidábád—Clive proceeds to Benares—Restoration of Shujá-u-Doula in Oude—Treaty with Sháh Álam and grant of the Dívání—Remarks on this transaction.

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THE settlement of the pecuniary arrangements with Mír Jáfir owing to the treaty being suspended during the nabob's absence with the army, the Government of Calcutta had for some time pressed his return to his capital.

About July or August 1764 he set out on that journey, and soon after went to Calcutta for the sake of immediate intercourse with the British Government. The terms imposed on him by the treaty were severe, yet fresh demands were added which were not yielded without bitter complaints upon his part.

It had been settled that all the expenses of the British troops were to be defrayed from his territorial cessions; but on the ground of the inefficient support given by his own troops in the late military operations, he was required to pay five lacs of rupees (50,000*l.*) a

month, as long as the war with Shujá-u-Doula should continue. Though this exaction was unjustifiable, it gave less disgust than two others which were more palpably extortionate. One was the donation promised in general terms to the navy, which was now fixed at twelve lacs and a half of rupees, although it was impossible to convince the nabob that the body to whom it was granted had taken any part in his restoration ; the other was the excess in the amount of private losses during the disputes with Cásim Ali, which he had been told would not exceed ten lacs, but which amounted to fifty-three lacs.¹

Considering the circumstances in which these losses were incurred, a demand for compensation from Cásim Ali himself would have been unjust, but to throw the responsibility of his actions on his rival whom the English themselves had dethroned to make room for him, was so repugnant to reason as to be insulting no less than oppressive.

These transactions being completed, and the requisite payments put in train, Mír Jáfir returned to Murshidábád, at which city he expired in the beginning of February 1765, at the age of seventy-one.

Mr. Vansittart had sailed for England before the death of Mír Jáfir, and the measures consequent on that event were left to Mr. Spencer, a Bombay civil servant, who had been appointed to succeed him.

Miran, the eldest son of Mír Jáfir, had left a son, an infant, but by the rules of Mahometan law, as interpreted by the sect established in India, living sons stand nearer in succession than the representatives of

¹ Third Report p. 304, &c. ; Letter from the Select Committee to the Court of Directors ; Verelst, Appendix, p. 14 ; Third Report, p. 306 ; *Observations on Vansittart's Narrative* (Scrafton), p. 68.

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their elder brothers deceased. The second of Mír Jáfir's sons was called Najum-u-Doula ; he was said to be illegitimate, but he had been associated in the government by his father for some months before his death, and he remained in quiet possession when that event took place. The Government of Calcutta acted right in determining to acknowledge him as nabob, but as the treaty with Mír Jáfir did not extend to his heirs, they resolved to withhold their formal recognition until the conclusion of a new agreement.²

For the purpose of settling the terms, a deputation was sent to Murshidábád. Two of the deputies were members of the council, one of whom, Mr. Johnstone, was at the head of the commission, and they were furnished with a treaty which the nabob was to sign.³

This treaty confirmed the preceding one with Mír Jáfir as far as it went, but introduced new clauses which entirely changed the relation between the two governments.

By the first of these the nabob engaged to appoint a naib or deputy for the management of all affairs under him ; to be guided in the selection or removal of that functionary by the advice of the Governor in Council ; and in the first instance to appoint Mohammed Rezza Khán, an officer who was favourably known to the English in his situation of governor of Dacca.

By another article the nabob bound himself to make the éléction and removal of all the principal officers in the revenue department subject to the approbation of the Governor in Council.

He further engaged to continue the payment of the five lacs promised by his father as long as the

² Third Report, pp. 305-307.

³ Third Report, Appendix, p. 381.

necessity for keeping the Company's army at so high an establishment should continue, and he consented to maintain no troops himself, except for purposes of state and for the collection of the revenue.

• By an express article he confirmed to the English their exemption from duties in all parts of the country.⁴

The proposal of these terms was very ill received by Najum-u-Doula. He saw the essential part of his government transferred to a person nominated by the Company, and he at first apprehended that the title would not long remain behind. After a fruitless resistance to this article, he strongly objected to the person selected for filling the new office, and insisted on the appointment of Nandcomár, in whom alone he said he had confidence.

On this point also he was overruled, and the treaty, which was brought from Calcutta ready signed by the council, received his signature on the very day of the arrival of the commissioners.

Not long after, Nandcomár was sent a prisoner to Calcutta, in consequence of the discovery of proofs of his correspondence with Shujá-u-Doula during the war in Behár.⁵

It was impossible for any settlement to have been less acceptable to the nabob, or for any commissioners to have more rigidly enforced the orders of their own government. Yet no sooner was the treaty concluded than presents were bestowed on all concerned with the same liberality which had marked the gratitude of Mír Jáfir and Cásim Ali, on their elevation to real power and importance.

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⁴ *Treaties and Grants*, p. 125.

⁵ Evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons, Third Report, p. 305 *et seq.*

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Mr. Johnstone received two lacs and 37,000 rupees (about 30,000*l.*), and his brother, a gentleman not in the Company's service, 60,000 rupees. The other commissioners received one lac and 12,000 rupees each. All this was in ready money.

Two lacs of rupees were afterwards promised to the Governor and one lac to each of the three councillors not on the commission, but only half of those sums were ever paid.

Mohammed Rezza also made presents to the commissioners on his own part — one lac and 50,000 rupees to Mr. Johnstone, a lac to each of the other three commissioners, and 25,000 rupees to Mr. Johnstone's brother. These sums were given in bills, and owing to circumstances arising from the sudden change in the Government of Calcutta, were never realised.

Smaller sums were also paid by the Sêts to the commissioners⁶ and to Mr. Johnstone's brother.

The offence of receiving presents had in this instance some peculiar aggravations. Mr. Johnstone, by whom the whole was conducted, had been a bitter opponent of Mr. Vansittart, and selected as his particular point of attack the acceptance of a pecuniary gratification by that gentleman from Cásim Ali. Positive orders from the Court of Directors against receiving presents had been received at Calcutta (on January 24, 1765), about a month before the appointment of the commission, but were not placed on the records of the council, though they seem to have been communicated to the members.⁷

After the arrival of Lord Clive, Najum-u-Doula

⁶ Resolution of the Select Committee in Bengal, quoted in the Third Report, pp. 315, 316; likewise in Appendices to that Report the evidence before the Committee beginning, p. 307; and Mr. Johnstone's *Letter to the Proprietors*, from p. 12.

⁷ Third Report, pp. 315, 432; Mr. Johnstone's *Letter to the Proprietors*.

addressed a letter to the new Government⁸ complaining of the usage he had received from Mr. Johnstone and the commission, and stating that a large sum of public money had been expended by Mohammed Rezza for the attainment of his own objects. This led to an inquiry in the course of which Mohammed Rezza, the chief Sét, and one Muti Rám, an officer of the nabob's who had been employed as a channel of communication about the presents, were examined.

By their account it appeared that none of the payments were voluntary, and that they had been yielded after much altercation to the demands of Mr. Johnstone, who had at first required much larger sums. Mr. Johnstone positively denied the truth of these allegations, and the other commissioners disclaimed all knowledge of them.⁹

Admitting the native evidence to be undeserving of credit, it is obvious that the nabob, who had received no favour from the commissioners, could only have made them presents to avert further injuries, and that the receivers could never have imagined that such contributions were the result of his free will.

The history of these presents in Bengal shows the progress of abuse when once admitted. Mír Jáfir, placed on the masnad by the result of a successful war, gave a share of the spoil to the agents of the power to which he owed his elevation ; Cásim Ali rewarded the zeal of those who effected a revolution in his favour, though the service was attended with neither difficulty nor danger ; Najum-u-Doula reluctantly gave way to the importunities of men who had just deprived him of his inheritance.

⁸ Dated from June 1, 1765, Third Report, p. 409.

⁹ Third Report, where above referred to.

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The nominal government of Najum-t-Doula had hardly been established when Lord Clive arrived in Calcutta.

This distinguished soldier had been received in England with the admiration due to the splendour of his success. A severe and painful illness, accompanied by fits of gloom and dejection, to which he had been subject in India also, entirely disqualified him for attention to business and deprived him of the power of profiting by the first impression in his favour. When his health was restored he showed, in the new scene on which he had entered, the same ambition which had urged him on in his previous career. He bought boroughs for his own disposal, stimulated and assisted his Indian friends in other elections, and took all means to obtain weight and influence in the House of Commons. Mr. Pitt (Lord Chatham) had welcomed the intelligence of his victories in Bengal in one of those bursts of eloquence and enthusiasm which none but himself could attain. Lord Clive had improved the connection by a private letter to him containing a proposal for bringing India directly under the King's Government, but soon after Clive became capable of taking part in business, Mr. Pitt retired from the Government (October 1761), and Clive for a time voted with the opposition. He ultimately attached himself to Mr. Grenville, and retained the connection until the death of that minister.

Although one of his principal objects in leaving India was to acquire the means of introducing his own plans into that country, yet his fear of provoking an attack on his title to his Jágir made him cautious in interfering with the affairs of the Company, or doing anything that might excite the jealousy of its leaders.

But when he found his moderation did not prevent secret hostility on their part, he entered with vehemence on the opposite course, and threw himself into all the contests and factions of the India House.

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Septem-
ber or
October,
A D 1760

• The administration of the Company's affairs was in the hands of twenty-four Directors annually elected by the proprietors. It rested with them to regulate all political and commercial transactions, and the Governments of India were subject to their orders. But the supreme authority was retained by the proprietors assembled in general court. All permanent, and many occasional, points of importance required the sanction of that court, which had also the power to interfere at its pleasure in the current business of the Company, and which, besides a regular meeting in every year, could at any time be assembled by a call of the Court of Directors, or by a requisition signed by any nine of its own members.

The Directors were generally persons connected with the Indian trade, or great moneyed men in the City. The proprietors were of the same classes, but the growing prosperity and importance of the Company had induced several peers and other men of station to enrol themselves among its members, and persons who had served in India began also to be anxious to obtain votes. The possession of 500*l.* in the Company's stock entitled a man to a vote in the Court of Proprietors, but 2,000*l.* was required as the qualification for a Director.

The King's Government had no avowed control over the Company, but the necessity for its assistance in naval and military co-operation, the power possessed by those who commanded a majority in Parliament, and the influence of the patronage of the Crown on individuals, gave great weight to the wishes of the

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ministry when they happened to take an interest in the Company's transactions.

The Court of Directors was at this time under the guidance of Mr. Sullivan, who owed his ascendancy to his own abilities, strengthened by connections which he kept up with some of the members of the King's Government. He seems to have been a man of general rectitude of purpose, but full of prejudices, partialities, and jealousies, such as accompany party spirit and love of power. He had a strong impression of the luxury, corruption, and insubordination of the Company's servants in Bengal, and never missed an opportunity of promoting members of the other Presidencies at their expense. While in India Clive had looked on him as a friend, and supported him with all his influence in the Court of Proprietors. After his return to England, they still kept up a great show of civility, but it is probable that Sullivan was alienated by the high tone assumed by Clive in Bengal, and by his want of deference for the Court of Directors. Feelings excited by the superior brilliancy of his position on his return to England, and some fear of the ascendancy he might so easily acquire in the administration of the Company, had probably also their effect. From whatever motive, his proceedings were such as to raise the alarm of Clive and to induce him to use every effort to overturn his authority. The means he took were to strengthen the party of Mr. Rous, the head of the minority in the Court of Directors, and for this purpose he strained every nerve in preparing for the next election, and did not scruple even to come forward himself as a candidate on that occasion. To promote his end he made fictitious transfers of his stock in lots of 500*l.* each, so as to create an additional number of voters in the Court of

Proprietors ; he expended 100,000*l.* in purchasing new stock for this purpose, and he urged all his friends to adopt the same course to the extent of their ability. This practice had long been understood and was employed by both parties, each exclaiming against the length to which it was carried by their opponents.

The contest seems to have been decided by the influence of the ministry. In retaliation for Clive's votes in Parliament, they threw their whole weight into the scale of his enemies. Mr. Sullivan and his friends were brought in by a triumphant majority, and Clive had the mortification of being defeated in a struggle in which perhaps it was scarcely consistent with his dignity to have engaged.

It was not long before he felt the effects of the victory of his opponents. He had now enjoyed his Jágír for more than four years. It consisted (as will be recollected) of the quit-rent due to the nabob from the lands granted to the Company, and consequently had been paid during the whole period by the Company's own officers to Clive's agents. Soon after his return to England he had been officially informed by Mr. Sullivan that the select committee of the Directors desired to confer with him regarding his Jágír. Clive expressed his readiness to meet them, but the message in all probability was only designed to make him cautious in interfering with the views of the leading Directors, and as it seemed to produce that effect, it was not further mentioned for three years. At the end of that time the newly-elected Directors, after a vague intimation to Clive of their doubts as to his title, sent orders to the Government of Bengal to withhold all payments, and to transfer the produce of the Jágír to the Company.

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If they had at first disapproved of the grant, and ordered the restoration of the Jágir to the nabob, they would perhaps have done no more than their duty ; the appropriation of it to themselves, after so long an acquiescence in Clive's title, was no more supported by law than justified by the motive. The Attorney-General and Solicitor-General, whom they had themselves consulted, gave their opinion against it. Clive instituted a suit in Chancery to set it aside, and warned the Government in Council that if they acted on the court's orders his agents had instructions to prosecute them in the mayor's court of Calcutta.¹

Mír Jáfir also, then in his second reign, insisted that on the extinction of Clive's right, the Jágir ought to revert to him ; his claim was admitted by the local government,² and the proceeds in all probability continued to be remitted to Clive. The pretexts of the Court of Directors were to the last degree frivolous. One was that the nabob could not give away this quit-rent without the consent of the Emperor, when he had already granted to themselves the very lands on which the rent was due, and there could be no doubt that Clive would have substantiated his claim by law if a change in his relation to the Directors had not put a stop to the dispute.

The revolutions in Bengal, the anarchy in the English council, the war with Cásim Ali, the massacre of the Europeans, and the general misgovernment and disorder, had filled all England with amazement. Those interested in India were in consternation, and saw no means of averting the immediate loss of the province but an immediate change of counsels.

¹ Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, and the documents there published.

² First Report, pp. 160 *et seq.*

In this crisis all eyes were turned upon Clive. It was proposed at a General Court in the face of the Court of Directors, that Mr. Spencer's appointment to Bengal should be reconsidered. This preparatory motion was lost, but after two more courts and some stormy debates, it was resolved that Lord Clive should be requested to undertake the offices of Governor and Commander-in-chief in Bengal.

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Feb. 27,
A.D. 1764.

Clive in reply begged to be allowed to delay his final answer till after the approaching election of Directors, and on being pressed for a decision he answered he wished to see whether Mr. Sullivan was to be in the chair of the Court of Directors, for he could not, he said, make himself responsible for the affairs of India if he was liable to be thwarted at home by a chairman who was his declared and inveterate enemy. Mr. Sullivan made protestations of a disposition to give him the most cordial support, but Clive evaded answering, and a few days after, the election took place. Mr. Sullivan was chosen a Director by a majority of one vote only, and at the subsequent nomination of a chairman, the choice fell on Mr. Rous.

March 12,
A.D. 1764.

April, A.D.
1764.

There was no longer any hesitation about Clive's appointment; an arrangement was made about his Jágir on his own terms. He was to hold it for ten years, or till his death if it happened within that period.

May 2,
A.D. 1764.

There was more difficulty in settling his powers. He himself desired that in case of any difference with his court, he should be allowed to act according to his own judgment and on his own responsibility. This was thought too great a power to be given ostensibly, but a compromise was come to, by which a committee consisting of Clive and four other members nominated by

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him, were authorised, if they thought it necessary for the restoration of peace and tranquillity, to assume the whole powers of the Government, independent of the remaining eleven members of committee. The committee consisted of Mr. Sumner, Colonel (now made Brigadier-General) Carnac, Mr. Sykes, and Mr. Verelst. Carnac was Clive's devoted friend; Sykes had acted with him during the revolution in favour of Mir Jâfir; Verelst, whatever was his connection, was steady in his support; but Sumner soon hesitated to concur in Clive's measures, and afterwards declared before the House of Commons that he had changed his mind on some of those in which he had concurred with him.

There was a difficulty also in the appointment of Clive to be Commander-in-chief, as interfering with Lawrence, who was now Commander in all India; but Clive willingly agreed to be subordinate to his old general, provided he were left unfettered in all that concerned Bengal.

The army of Bengal was at his suggestion divided into three brigades, each consisting of one European regiment, seven sepoy battalions, and a company of artillery, with a regular gradation of officers, from brigadier-general downwards; and after these arrangements he set out with a confident hope of accomplishing the arduous task which he had undertaken.³

He had declared that he should accept of no pecuniary advantage from his appointment, and as the question of his Jâgir was settled on terms less favourable than he would probably have obtained in a court of justice, he could have no motive for giving up the enjoyment of his wealth, for sacrificing his future quiet,

³ The regiments and battalions were about 700 strong, and the whole army amounted to more than 17,000 men.

and risking his health and fame, but the desire of preserving a country which he had so much contributed to acquire, and that innate wish to encounter difficulties and dangers which often gives the impulse to the greatest actions. He knew the opposition he was to meet with and the resentments he must provoke, and he could scarcely have failed to foresee the obloquy and misrepresentation which would be joined in the clamour against him ; but he was animated with feelings of confidence in himself and duty towards the public, and was content to bear general odium and unpopularity for a time as the price of solid and permanent reputation.

His voyage was unusually tedious. He sailed in June 1765, and did not reach Madras until April 1766. Hearing on his arrival of the prosperous state of the Company's affairs, he wrote secretly to England to purchase a large amount of the Company's stock ; a traffic unworthy of his station, but which has been unjustly represented as an abuse of his official intelligence.

To judge of Clive's conduct during his second administration, it is necessary to know the state in which he found his Government. The power of the Governor was entirely annihilated ; even in his intercourse with native princes he only appeared as the organ of the council. The oligarchy who had assumed his functions were swayed by party politics more than by any enlarged views of the general welfare ; they thought the interests of the service at least as important as those of the state, and each member was further influenced by regard for his personal concerns. All traded, and many of them were chiefs of subordinate factories, where each exercised the whole powers of the government without control.

CHAP. . Few ventured to complain against a councillor, when it
 X. was from his colleagues alone that they could solicit redress.⁴

The vacancies made by men retiring with fortunes, and by the massacre of so many of the upper ranks, had raised the junior servants to high stations, and those younger still, who traded with borrowed money or shared the profits of wealthy natives to whom they lent their names and privileges, looked forward to speedy retirement, and were indifferent to their rise or estimation in their profession. They lived in habits of perfect equality with their seniors, and any censure or interference from an official superior would have been looked on as a proceeding improper among gentlemen. Young and old vied with each other in luxury and profusion, and these importunate vices increased their ravenous appetite for gain.

The insubordinate behaviour of some of the principal commanders in the army has been noticed in the preceding narrative; their example, and the weakness produced by dissensions among the ruling authorities, relaxed the discipline of the officers, and encouraged the mutinous spirit which had so often broken into violence among the troops.

A system of waste and spoliation ran through all departments; no man executed a public work or other service for the Company without adding largely to his own fortune; the assessment and collection of the revenue, the appointment of native functionaries, and the protection of men already in power, afforded also abundant sources of emolument.⁵

⁴ Third Report, p. 442.

⁵ Clive's letter to the Court of Directors, Third Report, p. 391; Letters of the Select Committee, Third Report; and Appendices to Vattel.

The condition of the people under such a government requires no description, but of all their evils, those brought on them by private trade were the most general and most insupportable. The gomáshtas still kept up their oppressions, and a number of Europeans not in the service everywhere exercised nearly the same authority as the Company's servants. Their nation was a sufficient ground for assuming authority, and many were besides employed as agents to members of council and others who protected them against every complaint.⁶

There were doubtless in all classes in India honourable exceptions to the general corruption, but they were too few to stem the current of abuse, and nothing less than the strong mind and firm hand of Clive, supported as it was by so great a reputation, could have prevented the ruin which must have followed such a dissolution of society. Lord Clive, accompanied by Mr. Sumner and Mr. Sykes, reached Calcutta on May 3, 1765. Mr. Verelst did not arrive from his former station at Dacca until the end of the month, and General Carnac remained with the army in the field. As soon as Clive had assumed the government he brought forward the new arrangement for the army, which was passed in general council. Two days after, the select committee being of opinion that it was necessary for them to exercise the powers conditionally conferred on them, produced their commission to the council, and desired that it might be communicated to all the public officers. To this Mr. Leicester objected, on the ground that, as peace and tranquillity were already restored, the extraordinary powers granted for the restoration of them were virtually annulled. Lord Clive answered that any member of the board was at liberty to record his objection, but

May 3,
A.D. 1765.

May 5,
A.D. 1765.

⁶ Third Report, p. 439.

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that the committee alone could judge regarding the exercise of the discretion extended to it. Mr. Johnstone, generally bold enough in opposition, made further attempts to obstruct the proceedings of the select committee, but when asked by Clive whether he dared to dispute their authority, he protested that he had no such intention; and the dead silence which followed, with the pale faces of the councillors, showed that all open resistance was at an end.⁷ The committee was opened by a letter from Clive, to which they replied by an address promising unanimity and support. At a subsequent period they resolved that all intercourse with the native authorities should be conducted by Clive, who should from time to time communicate his correspondence to the committee.

The first official act of the committee was to enforce the order regarding presents. Covenants engaging to accept of none without the permission of the Court of Directors were signed by the councillors, and afterwards by all the other members of the Company's service.⁸ At

⁷ Clive's letter in Malcolm's *Life of Clive*, ii. 321-334.

⁸ General Carnac did not himself sign the covenant, though he enforced the signature on his officers. He afterwards gave as his reason that the covenants were dated so far back as to give them a retrospective effect, and he admitted that before he knew of them he had received 8,000*l.* from Balwant Sing on restoring him to his forfeited zemindary of Benares. After he knew of the covenants he received an offer of 20,000*l.* from Sháh Álam, but this he reported previous to acceptance, according to the covenant. From the many marks of attention the King had received from Carnac, there can be little doubt the present was given with good will, and, as Clive was always disposed to favour him, he strongly recommended to the Court of Directors to confirm the donation. It must be allowed in extenuation of the laxity of the Europeans in their acceptance of presents, that, as far as appears by the published cases, they never received money except from persons whom they were disposed to support on other grounds, and that, except in the case of Mr. Johnstone's commission, there was no appearance of compulsion in the liberality of the natives.

the same meeting the committee ordered all Europeans not in the Company's service to be sent to Calcutta, but on application they allowed some to remain for a limited period to enable them to wind up their affairs.

• Towards the end of May the nabob came to Calcutta, and on June 1 presented his complaint which led to the investigation about presents. This inquiry was prosecuted with strictness and commented on with asperity, but the decision was left to the Court of Directors. Other inquiries were set on foot into alleged abuses and embezzlements carried on by two of the councillors (Mr. Johnstone and Mr. Gray), at their respective factories. The accused gentlemen in minutes in council denied some of the charges and endeavoured to explain away others, but they laid most stress on the arbitrary and irregular method in which the inquiry had been conducted. Clive had placed some of the accomplices of the accused parties under a military guard, and against this proceeding the same men who but a year before had sent detachments to bring the nabob's officers in chains to Calcutta now exclaimed, and evinced a jealousy of military power and a zeal for the liberty of the subject, not exceeded by that shown during the proceedings against Mr. Wilkes by their contemporaries in England. Their minutes were written in the least guarded terms, and were full of reproaches to Clive for the inordinate wealth he had amassed through some of the very channels against which he now expressed such indignation.

The discussions of the council were at least as intemperate as those in the time of Mr. Vansittart, but the result was different. Mr. Johnstone and Mr. Gray resigned the service while their conduct was under consideration, protesting against the partiality of the

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tribunal. Mr. Burdett, another councillor, was suspended for disrespect to the Governor in the course of his individual duty, and ultimately resigned the service ; and Mr. Leycester, who headed the opposition, and continued to resist to the utmost the select committee, was expelled on the ground of his having misrepresented in public a conversation at the council board, which, according to his oath, he ought never to have divulged at all.

The civil servants were thus reduced to obedience, but they retained a deep resentment for the loss of their profits and consequence, and this was increased some months later by Clive's bringing four civil servants from Madras to fill the council of Calcutta, alleging as his reason the youth of the oldest Bengal servants and the school of corruption in which they had been brought up. His censures lost nothing by the language in which they were conveyed. His minutes and letters are written with uncommon force and a good deal of exaggeration. Offences are always described in the harshest terms, and the offences never mentioned but with scorn and indignation. With all this are mixed applauses of his own conduct and assertions of his own disinterestedness, which made his reflections on others more invidious at that moment, and which offend the reader even at this distance of time.⁹

During these reforms in the Company's service, Clive made an important change in the form of the nabob's government.¹ The great powers vested in

⁹ This species of egotism is not to be imputed as a peculiarity to Clive. Eminent men of that age indulged in protestations of honour and integrity which the most questionable adventurer of the present day would be ashamed to employ.

¹ Third Report, pp. 440 and 421.

Mohammed Rezza were now as suspicious to the English as they had always been to the nabob; and the remedy they had recourse to was to associate three persons in the exercise of them. Rái Dúláb and the two heads of the banking firm of Jaggat Sét were the new members of the commission, which was to act entirely under the direction of the Governor and Council, without any interference on the part of the nabob.

Having brought the affairs of the province to this point, Clive turned his attention to those connected with Shujá-u-Doula and Sháh Álam. Both princes had thrown themselves unconditionally on the generosity of the British Government, and were now awaiting its decision on their fate.

The settlement of the depending questions was thought sufficiently important to require the presence of Clive, and the committee invested him, in conjunction with General Carnac, with full powers to examine them in such manner as he might think expedient; at the same time they stated to him in a letter, which he probably drew up himself, the points to which they wished to direct his attention.² He left Calcutta on June 25, reached Benares about the beginning of August, and immediately entered on his negotiations.

The adjustment with Shujá-u-Doula was easy. On a payment of 500,000*l.*, he was restored to all his dominions except the districts of Córa and Allahábád, which were ceded to the King. No restraint was imposed on his independence, and a defensive alliance was agreed on between him and the Company, he paying the expenses of the Company's troops whenever he should require them.³

² Letter dated June 21, 1765, Third Report, Appendix, p. 422.

³ Treaty, dated August 16, 1765, Third Report, Appendix, p. 446.

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The agreement entered into with the King was by no means so simple a matter. Sháh Álam had previously, on the nabob's own application, granted the usual patent, appointing Nujam-u-Doula Subahdar or Názim of Bengal, Behár, and Orissa.⁴ He now fixed the amount of revenue for which he was required to account at twenty-six lacs, or 260,000*l.*, and, on condition of their becoming responsible for the payment of this sum, he appointed the Company to be perpetual Díván of the same provinces. He likewise confirmed the Company's title to its possessions in different parts of India. In addition to their guarantee of the tribute of Bengal, the Company transferred the districts of Córa and Allahábád, yielding 28,000*l.* a year, to the King.⁵

There are few transactions in our Indian history more difficult to explain than this treaty. On the one hand the practical good sense of Clive, not apt to be influenced by theories, or alarmed by imaginary dangers, makes us hesitate to suppose that so great a sacrifice could be made without an adequate motive, while on the other, the state of opinion in India at the time, the course of previous events, and the result of subsequent experience, leaves us without any ground for conjecturing what that motive may have been. The nullity of the King's influence as well as power has repeatedly appeared in the preceding narrative, and nowhere more conspicuously than in the war which led to the agreement in which a viceroy bearing the royal commission was expelled by the British, and the Vizir of the Empire, together with the Emperor in person, were defeated in

⁴ Third Report, p. 305.

⁵ The firmans and other papers, Third Report, p. 447, &c. The value of the cessions is stated by Clive, Third Report, p. 445.

attempting to restore him, without its exciting the smallest feeling in any part of India. Though the native princes generally provided themselves with commissions from the King, it was at a moderate price ; and it is possible that all the money he ever received on this account from every part of India did not amount to one year's produce of this tribute, the only tribute ever paid to him during a nominal reign of half a century.

If the King's grant had been of any value, the office granted was of none. The duty of the DÍwán, according to Clive's own definition,⁶ was 'to collect all the revenues, and after defraying the expenses of the army and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the Nizámat,'⁷ to remit the remainder to Delhi ; he had no right to interfere with the other departments of the government, or even to limit the Governor's expenses in the military or other branches of his administration. In practice he was completely overshadowed by the power of the Názim, and among so many revolutions, I cannot find another instance where his office was made a pretext for usurpation. It is true the Company were themselves in possession of the Nizámat ; but so they were of this DÍwání which was held under their authority by Rái Dúlab. What was to be gained by the present grant was a legal title ; and that was not conferred. The treaties with the nabob, from which the Company held their power, were nowhere confirmed, nor was the right of such an officer to make treaties anywhere recognised.

In the King's firmans the lands assigned by the nabob for the payment of the Company's troops are

⁶ Letter of the Select Committee to the Court of Directors dated September 30, 1765, in the Appendix to *Verelst's View of the English Government of Bengal*, p. 8.

⁷ Viceroyalty in the official documents of this and the preceding period. Subahdars are called Názims, and their government Nizámat.

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granted as a free gift from himself, without any reference to the former condition which that grant supersedes ;⁸ the employment of the troops is mentioned, but only incidentally, and without any notice of the footing on which they stand or of the duration of their service.⁹ •

The grant indeed, if it had any efficiency, would have been highly dangerous to the Company. If the King could appoint the *Díwán*, he could also appoint the *Názim* ; and the officer so appointed would be under no obligation to attend to the unconfirmed engagements of his predecessors. He could dismiss the English troops, increase or diminish the expenses of the *Nizámat*, and leave a surplus or a deficit in the revenue as suited his views.

Nor was the danger limited to the admission of theoretical principles. The possession of an independent territory and of Allahábád, one of the best fortified towns in India and the capital of one of the former Subahs, gave additional weight to any influence which *Álam* might possess over the provinces under the protection of the Company, and put it in his power, when it suited his own views, to introduce into the heart of those provinces the most dangerous rival that could be raised up against the English. This in fact he afterwards did by ceding the territory to the Marattas. It was owing to his inevitable insignificance alone, which ought to have prevented these sacrifices, that he failed to become through their operation a formidable neighbour to the power from which he received them.

A sufficient motive for this arrangement might have been to obtain a release from a former one entered on by Mr. Spencer's government, by which the English were

⁸ Firman No. 93, Appendix to the Third Report, p. 449.

⁹ Firman No. 91, Appendix to the Third Report, p. 447.

bound to put Sháh Álam in possession of all Shujá-u-Doula's dominions,¹ but this engagement is not adverted to by any of the parties in the present negotiation, and Clive rests all his concessions on the return he obtained in the DÍwání and the King's confirmation of the Company's possessions.²

Neither the former engagement nor the present concessions are noticed in the instructions from the select committee, who seem to have been fully aware of the King's real situation.³

¹ *Treaties and Grants*, p. 122, Appendix to Verelst's *View*, p. 163.

² The following is an extract from the letter of the Select Committee above quoted from the Appendix to Verelst, p. 9. 'By establishing the power of the Great Mogul, we have likewise established his rights, and his Majesty, from principles of gratitude, of equity, and of policy, has thought proper to bestow this important employment on the Company, the nature of which is the collecting all the revenues, and after defraying the expenses of the army and allowing a sufficient fund for the support of the Nizámat, to remit the remainder to Delhi, or wherever the King shall reside or direct. But as the King has been graciously pleased to bestow on the Company for ever such surplus as shall arise from the revenue, upon certain stipulations and agreements expressed in the Sunnud, we have settled with the nabob, with his own free will and consent, that the sum of fifty-three lacs (530,000*l.*) shall be annually paid to him, for the support of his dignity and all contingent expenses, exclusive of the charge of maintaining the army, which is to be defrayed out of the revenues ceded to the Company by this royal grant of the Dewonny.' Every word of which settlement with the nabob is rendered invalid by the recognition of his subordination to the King.

³ After adverting to the grant of the DÍwání as of the utmost importance, though formerly rejected when offered at too high a price, they say: 'Times are since altered. His whole hopes of protection and subsistence rest on us. It cannot, therefore, be supposed he will prove obstinate in denying a request of little consequence to him in the present circumstances, but advantageous to us, his greatest benefactors, and, we may say, his only friends.' Clive often changed his opinion about Sháh Álam, of whose real condition he knew very little. In his evidence before Parliament in 1773, he gives a vague notion of his wealth and power, but fails entirely when cross-examined as to particulars. (Third Report, p. 324.) General Carnac, on the same occasion, pronounces 'that Sháh Álam was really to all intents and purposes the Great Mogul, as much as any of his predecessors. Colonel Dow, who made the history of India his study, who was long stationed with Sháh Álam, was his

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Clive had no doubt approved of those instructions, if he did not himself draw them up, and it was not long before he recommended the same opinions. In a letter from him to General Carnac and the select committee, dated within less than a year from this time, he says of the Emperor, 'provided he withdraw himself from our protection, it is no great matter what refuge he seeks.'⁴

Soon after the settlement with Sháh Álam,⁵ a new agreement was entered into with the Nabob of Bengal, by which he relinquished all interference with his provinces on condition of an annual payment by the Company of 5,386,131 rupees, upwards of 54,000*l*.

On the Grant of the Dáwdni.

[MR. ELPHINSTONE'S history closes with the account of a transaction that has been regarded as an epoch in the history of British India. Up to this time the territorial possessions of the Company were limited to the lands in the immediate vicinity of Calcutta, ceded by Jáfir Ali in 1757, and the provinces of Bardwan, Midnapore, and Chittagong, ceded by Cásim Ali to meet the charges of the troops maintained by the Company for the support of the authority of the Názim. These cessions were confirmed by the new engagement, and an additional proviso was introduced as follows:—

'That as our troops will be more to be depended upon than any the nabob can have, and less expensive to him, he need therefore entertain none but such as personal friend and an enthusiast for his cause, represents his whole life as one of poverty and neglect, and expressly says that the money and territory he received from the British was all he possessed to support the dignity of the Imperial house of Teimur.' (*History of Hindustan*, ii. 356.)

⁴ Letter dated July 14, 1766, quoted in Bott's *Considerations*, ii. 445.

⁵ September 30, 1765. *Treaties and Grants*, p. 149.

are requisite for the support of the civil officers of his government, and the business of the collections of the different districts.'

. From this time the whole authority in these provinces passed into the hands of the servants of the Company, and the Názim became a dependent and pensioner of the British Government in Calcutta. The revolution was complete without calling in the authority of the titular sovereign of Delhi, or binding ourselves to the payment of a subsidy to a sovereign who might at any time revoke the grant under the pressure of other powers. This is a question which is forcibly put at the close of the preceding narrative, and the dangers to which we exposed ourselves received illustration from subsequent events.

When Lord Clive was afterwards questioned about this transaction by the Committee of Secrecy of the House of Commons, his replies were evasive. It was put to him pointedly, 'whether in his opinion the grant of the Dewanee was really a grant from a prince, or whether it was an instrument executed as a piece of form which he thought it expedient to take from political motives.' Clive referred the Committee in reply to the public records for his reports at the time, and when further pressed as to the position of Sháh Álam, he said he had a few thousands of troops under his command, and was in occupation of Allahábád, and many princes of the country made him large presents.⁶ Clive might have avowed openly that the grant conveyed no real authority, for the claimant of the throne of Delhi was a wanderer, but that he was regarded with superstitious respect by the people of Hindostan, and that the transaction was justifiable on the grounds of

⁶ Third Report of the Committee of Secrecy, p. 324.

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expediency in the then state of India; but he had committed himself by his despatches, in which the announcement was conveyed in pompous language as to the importance of the grant. In a despatch from the Council at Fort William dated September 30, 1765, which appears in the third report of the Committee of Secrecy, and which is usually quoted as an exposition of his views, there is much confusion between the effect of the grant by Sháh Álam and the treaty with the nabob.

‘By the acquisition of the Dîwání,’ he said, ‘your possessions and influence are rendered permanent and secure, since no future nawab will have power or riches sufficient to attempt your overthrow, by means either of force or corruption. All revolutions must henceforth be at an end, as there will be no fund for secret services, for donations or for restitutions. . . .’

‘The experience of years has convinced us that a division of power is impossible without generating discontent and hazarding the whole. All must belong either to the Company or to the Nabob, and we leave you to judge which alternative is the most desirable and the most expedient in the present circumstances of affairs. As to ourselves, we know of no system we could adopt that could less affect the Nabob’s dignity and at the same time secure the Company against the fatal effects of future revolution than this of the Dewany.’

The subject is pursued in a despatch of the following January:—‘The more we reflect on the situation of your affairs, the stronger appear the reasons for accepting the Dewany of these provinces, by which alone we could establish a power sufficient to perpetuate the possessions we hold and the influence we enjoy. While the Nawab

acted in quality of collector for the Mogul, the means of supporting our military establishment depended upon his pleasure. In the most critical situation, while we stood balancing on the extreme border of destruction, his stipulated payments were slow and deficient, his revenues withheld by disaffected rajahs and turbulent zemindars, who despised the weakness of his government, or they were squandered in profusion and dissipated in corruption.'

It must be obvious that all these advantages arose from the new engagements with the Nabob, and have little bearing on the cession from the Mogul. The expediency of fortifying our position by such a grant had, however, been long before Clive's mind, and formed an essential part of the plan he laid before the elder Pitt for acquiring the sovereignty of Bengal. In his letter to that statesman he proposed to obtain the Mogul's sunnud (or grant) in confirmation of their possession of the province under an agreement to pay the amount of tribute demandable, which he estimated at fifty lacs annually, or one-fifth of the revenues. This was double the amount which was afterwards agreed upon, and half that which was payable when the power of the Mogul was at its height.⁷

This letter was addressed to Pitt during Clive's first government of the settlement in Bengal. When he returned to India in 1766, he was met by tidings of our military success, and daring views of conquest passed before his eyes. These were unfolded in a private letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors on his arrival at Madras. 'We have at last arrived at that actual period which I have long foreseen, I mean that period which renders it necessary for us to determine whether

⁷ *Life of Clive*, ii. 119.

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we can or shall take the whole to ourselves. Jaffier Aly Khan is dead, and his natural son is a minor, but I know not whether he is yet declared successor. Suja-addowla is beat from his dominion, we are in possession of it, and it is scarcely hyperbole to say, to-morrow the whole Mogul Empire is in our power.'

The times were favourable for the rise of a new conqueror. By the battle of Pániput, fought in January 1761, the power of the Marattas was shattered, but such was the jealousy among the Mahometan princes that Ahmed Sháh, the Dúráni prince, was unable to follow up his victory, and retreated to his own dominions beyond the Indus. Three years later the Mogul princes of Hindostan were defeated at the battle of Baxar, and the English became the first power in Northern India, and the whole Empire seemed within our grasp.

A march to Delhi had already found much favour in the army, and was recommended to the Court of Directors in a letter of March 11, 1762, signed by Eyre Coote, Carnac, and three members of the Council who had dissented from the policy which had placed Cásim Ali on the throne of Murshidábád. Referring to an application they had received from the King for aid, they contended that the British force was equal to the enterprise, and as there was no European army to fear, and they might be expected to be joined by the Vizir of Oude and other powers, they would probably advance to the gates of Delhi, and the letter winds up by submitting 'whether so glorious an opportunity of aggrandising the Company in Hindostan should not be embraced.'⁸

From these views Clive very strongly dissented, and

⁸ First Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1772, p. 257.

his prudent resolutions were confirmed by the reports which met him on his arrival in Calcutta as to the state of the public service, and especially of the army. These are painted in his early letters in strong colours. In a letter of September 30, 1765, he describes the general corruption as extending to the writers, ensigns, and free merchants, the bands of discipline completely shattered and daily promoting the ruin of the army, the soldiers in the late campaign 'seizing without control the whole booty money and plunder on the capture of a city.' This, he added, took place at Benares. Referring to the recent mutiny, he observes that 'had it not been for the vigour of Munro your possessions in India might have been destitute of a man to support them.'

Commenting on the recent peace he observes, 'This event has disappointed the expectation of many who thought of nothing but a march with the King to Delhi. My resolution, however, was and will always be to confine our assistance, our conquests, our possessions, to Bengal, Behar, and Orissa; to go further is in my opinion so extravagantly absurd no Governor-General, no Council, in these times can ever adopt it unless the whole system of the Company's interest be first entirely remodelled.'

He defends the recent arrangement with Shujá-u-Doula on the policy of not extending the Company's possessions rather than on any sanguine hope of attaching the prince to our interests. 'The policy of aggression would,' he adds, 'require an addition to their force, and they must be prepared for the risk of losing the control over them,' while the attempt to administer the government at such a distance from the Presidency must lead to new abuses, laying the foundation of new

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wars, in which the natives must have finally triumphed from our inability to sustain the weight of our own ambition.⁹

Clive's letters of this date, both public and private, are full of allusions to the luxury and debauchery which pervaded all branches of the service, civil and military.¹ It would be difficult otherwise to understand why the cession of the Dīwāni was not followed up by the assumption of the direct administration of the civil government, as it already existed in the province of Bardwan.

Other considerations passed through his mind, of which it is not easy to recognise the force at the present day. In a letter addressed to the Court of Directors shortly before his departure, he lays stress on the jealousy which would be shown by foreign states if we 'threw off the mask' and did 'any act, by an exertion of the English power, which could equally be done by the Nawab at our instance.' 'Foreign nations,' he added, 'would immediately take umbrage, and complaints preferred to the British Court might be attended with very embarrassing circumstances;' and he adds in illustration the difficulties that might arise with regard to duties long paid by French, Dutch, or Danes under grants from former nawabs. Whatever weight may attach to these arguments, they fall far short of those which are founded on the state of the army and the public service generally.

In these latter views the Directors evidently concurred. They, too, distrusted their own servants, and this distrust was founded not only on the abuses of private trade and the corruption arising from their

⁹ Third Report of the Committee of Secrecy, 1773, p. 391.

¹ *Life of Clive*, ii. 331, 335, 373, 379.

political relations with the Nawab, but on the experience of the administration of the provinces already under British rule. In signifying their approval of the plans adopted for the execution of the office of DÍWÁN, they wrote : ' The experience we have already had in the province of Bardwan convinces us how unfit an Englishman is to conduct the collection of the revenues and to follow the subtle native through all his arts to conceal the real value of his country and to perplex and elude the payments. We therefore entirely approve of your preserving the ancient form of government in the upholding the dignity of the Subah.'²

This subject is pursued at greater length in the same letter, an extract from which is given in the ' Life of Clive,' ii. 357, in which some of the acts of peculation by their servants are referred to.

I have quoted these passages from Clive's letters and despatches because his moderation on this important occasion has been a theme of reproach from some writers on Indian history who hold that it was only necessary for him to have stretched forth his hand and grasped the dominion of Hindostan. The pacific views which have prevailed at intervals between periods of war and conquest have, according to such politicians, only served as foils to the energy and successes of their warlike successors. The policy of Clive in maintaining a double government in Bengal was, in this view, a sham, and doomed to be reversed in a very few years, and his forbearance in not pressing on after the victories in Behár was weakness.

It may be contended on the other hand that our Empire has grown to its present height because its progress was slow. Breathing times of peace were

² *Early Records of British India*, p. 338.

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required to consolidate our acquisitions, and train the civil service to the government of races differing in language, religion, and blood from their conquerors, and to bring our army to the standard of our ever-increasing territory.

The moderation with which we have acted after great successes has also had a great moral effect, and prepared the way for extensions which have gone beyond the dreams of the most zealous advocates of what is called a strong and forward policy. That of Clive may be vindicated by its success. The weakest point was the engagement with Sháh Álam, but in justice to Clive it should be considered that this prince had some inconvenient claims on the revenues of Bengal, which had never been repudiated by the Názim, and had been paid in recent times, and that there was a prospect of his cause being taken up by any military power that might arise in the confusion of the times.

There was nothing extravagant in the supposition that with such assistance as he received from the English he might to some extent restore the fortunes of his house, and oppose the power of the Marattas, which was the only formidable one at the time. Sháh Álam was a feeble prince, and within a very few years after his treaty with the English he succumbed to the reviving power of the Marattas, and ceded to them the provinces we had assigned to him, and this transaction was made the ground for the refusal of the tribute we had engaged to pay.

Though the attempt to prop up the fallen power of the Mogul dynasty at Delhi proved a failure, the engagement with the Nawáb Vizir was the most durable of the alliances the British Government formed in India, with the exception of that with the Nizam of Heiderábád, and

it stood us in good stead in all the contests in which we were engaged till the close of the century. During that period Hindostan was occasionally threatened by the Afgháns, and a struggle of some importance took place in 1772, in which the Marattas, the Rohillas, and the ruler of Oude took a part, and during which the English acted as auxiliaries to the latter. The affairs in the north of India gave us so little occasion for anxiety that Hastings was enabled to send Coote to Madras to meet the crisis occasioned by the invasion of Heider Ali, and send Goddard with a Bengal detachment to traverse central India and support the Presidency of Bombay. In fact, from the time of Clive to that of Wellesley, all our great wars were in the Deckan, and Hindostan enjoyed comparative tranquillity, and this was mainly due to the settlement of Clive.

The arrangements made for the civil government of Bengal were not of the same durable character. The change which was introduced in the actual administration was slight. The institution of the double government is described by Clive in a letter of April 20 of the following year. ‘Yesterday we held a Puncnah,³ agreeable to the custom of the country and to those ideas which we entertain of the Company’s honour and interest. His Excellency the Nabob sat in quality of Nazim, and the Right Honourable the President took his place as collector of revenues for his Majesty.’ From this time the functions of Názim as well as DÍwán were ostensibly exercised by the British Government ; the latter by⁴, irtue

³ This term is still in use in the Bengal provinces for the day on which the income for the ensuing year is settled. It is applied to an annual meeting of the direct revenue payers at the office of the chief collector, or of the cultivating tenants at the court of the zemindar, to determine the amount of the assessment. (See H. Wilson’s *Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms*.)

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of the grant from the Emperor, the former through the influence it commanded over the naib or deputy of the Názim. The Nawáb himself having become virtually a pensioner of the state, the native administration was controlled by the Resident at the Nawáb's court at Murshidábád and by the chief British authority at Patna, the active management in the latter case being placed in a former servant of the Názim.

The condition of the country under the civil and criminal administration of the native government, and the modification it underwent under English influence during the confused period which preceded the direct administration of the country, is clearly described in the seventh report of the Secret Committee of the House of Commons of 1773. The great rájas or zemindars held courts of criminal jurisdiction, entitled Foujdaree, a term that has come down to later times. The Foujdar, as the name implies, held a military command, and the term exemplifies the union of military authority and repression of crime. In capital cases the sentence was not carried out until it was reported to Murshidábád.⁴ The most frequent penalty was a fine, and this was the perquisite of the zemindar, a system that led to great abuses. The zemindar also held a court of civil jurisdiction, from which he also drew a perquisite, under the name of *chout*,⁵ or fourth part of the value of the subject of litigation. It is said that this court was not much resorted to, and disputes were largely settled by arbitra-

⁴ Third Report on the Condition of the E. I. C. 1773.

⁵ This term (lit. one-fourth) with which we are familiar as connected with Maratta exactions, appears to have been applied in Hindustan to other cases than that mentioned in the text, such as the fourth part of the pay of hired servants, or of fees levied by the head officer of a court as his perquisite. (See Wilson's *Glossary of Judicial and Revenue Terms*.)

tion. The jurisdiction was summary, as there was no judicial register or record, and the proceedings are said to have been marked by abuse and oppression.

• At the seat of government the Názim presided in all capital cases, and the Díwán had cognisance of all cases relating to titles to land, a jurisdiction that grew out of his revenue administration ; and his naibs, or deputies, throughout the country exercised a similar authority over the property of the country. This system, it is added, afforded no security to property or person ; the despotic principles of the government rendered them instruments of power rather than of justice. Accordingly, the English Company or their servants, when they had a demand against a person dependent or connected with them in the course of commerce, took the law into their own hands, the general practice being to lay hold of his person by their own authority, and this right sometimes was exercised even when the debtor did not fall under that description ; but this was an abuse, though generally overlooked by the government. The French and Dutch exercised the same privilege of seizing the debtor, and when the President and Council of Calcutta stepped forward to put an end to this abuse and prohibited the practice, the French in very strong terms remonstrated against the order as a violation of rights they had always exercised, and this dispute remained unsettled at the time of the House of Commons' report.⁶

This rude and rough system of administration prevailed during Mír Jáfir's government, and English influence gradually extended during that of his successor, Cásim Ali, in proportion as they spread over the country for purposes of trade. Under the third revolu-

⁶ Seventh Report, p. 325.

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tion, which restored Mír Jáfir, the administration of justice was openly controlled by servants of the Company whose situation gave them an opportunity of interference. To such an extent was this carried, that it is stated on the evidence of Mr. Keir, one of the witnesses examined by the Committee of 1773, that after the complete establishment of British power, the Banians, or agents of the English, wherever they resided, entirely governed the tribunals of judicature, and even sat as judges in the courts.

After the grant of the DÍWÁNÍ some feeble attempts were made to establish a more regular administration, and new courts were established under native judges, both at Murshidábád and in the provinces. Their jurisdiction was limited, and we are not informed what results followed the experiment. The abuses became so rife that the Government in Calcutta were before long compelled to take a step towards the direct administration of the civil government by the appointment of English officers under the title of supervisors. They exercised an authority over the natives employed in the collection of the revenues, and they were instructed to report fully on the condition of the country, the nature and amount of the revenues, and the administration of justice.⁷

The reports which they gave in furnished the first information we possess regarding the internal administration of the province, and led to further inquiries before Parliament. But it was not until seven years after the cession of the DÍWÁNÍ that the Government felt equal to undertake the reform of these abuses, when instructions were conveyed to the President and Council at Fort William 'to stand forth as DÍWÁN, and by the agency

⁷ Colebrooke's *Supplement to the Bengal Regulations*, p. 174.

of the Company's servants to take upon themselves the entire care and management of the revenue.'

• It is characteristic of the times, that while the authorities at home were so careful of securing a control over the finances, the criminal jurisdiction remained in native hands. A board of revenue was created, consisting of the president and members of the council, and the treasury was removed from Murshidábád to Calcutta. The supervisors became collectors, and with them were associated native officers styled DÍwáns. Courts were established in each collectorship, one by the name of the DÍwani, a civil court, and the other the Foujdaree, a criminal court. Over the former the collector presided in his quality of King's DÍwán. In the criminal court the cauzy and mooftee of the district sat to expound the Mahometan law. Superior courts were established at the chief seat of government, called the DÍwanee Sudder Adawlut, and Nizamut Sudder Adawlut, names which long survived when the reason of their institution passed away.⁸ Courts under similar titles were extended to the ceded and conquered provinces in the North-West in 1803, where the authority of the Názims and DÍwáns of the Emperor had long ceased.

From the date of this regulation the control of the public servants of the Company over the revenues was complete, but the administration of the criminal law remained for the most part in native hands. The collectors were directed to superintend the proceedings, and to see that in trials the necessary witnesses were summoned and examined, and that due weight was allowed to their testimony, and that the decrees passed were fair and impartial.⁹

⁸ Colebrooke's *Supplement*, p. 1.

⁹ This is the description of their duties in the preamble of the

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These instructions remained a dead letter, for the revenue duties were too absorbing to enable the collectors to superintend the administration of justice in great populous districts. The magistrates were natives, under the title of Foujdars, and their jurisdiction was continued till 1781, when it was transferred to the English civil judges of each district.

The crying evil of the time was dacoity, or gang robbery, which assumed more gigantic proportions in Bengal than in other provinces to which British rule extended, and attracted a large share of the attention of the Parliamentary Committee on Indian affairs which sat in 1812. There is an interesting paper on the subject by Warren Hastings, written in 1773, and recorded in the minutes of council in August of that year. The offenders against whom his remarks were directed were a race of outlaws, chiefly on the frontier, living from father to son in a state of warfare against society, plundering and burning villages and murdering the inhabitants. The first judicial regulations of 1772 directed against them the severest penalties—capital punishment, fines on the villages to which they belonged, and further provided that the family of a criminal should become the slaves of the state, and be disposed of for the general benefit and convenience of the people according to the discretion of the Government. This provision Hastings strongly recommended to be strictly enforced, anticipating a considerable fund from the sale of those slaves to meet the current expenses of the criminal jurisdiction of the state.¹

The principal object of the memorandum is to meet

Regulations of 1790, which gives a history of the changes in the criminal jurisdiction up to that date. See also Colebrooke's *Supplement*, p. 1.

¹ Colebrooke's *Supplement*, p. 114.

the defects in the criminal law of the Mahometans which continued to guide the practice of the courts of criminal jurisdiction.² So cautious were the Government in introducing innovations, that its terms and technicalities continued long to prevail, and in the times to which I refer were strictly applied. Under this law crimes were regarded as private rather than public wrongs. The nearest relative was invested with rights which belonged to the Arabs in the time of Mahomet. No capital punishment could be enforced without the consent of the nearest relation. Distinctions were drawn between murders perpetrated with an instrument formed for shedding blood, or by other means, and other frivolous distinctions were made which operated in favour of the criminal. Hastings, while pressing for a modification of these rules, admitted that popular opinion was averse to change, and that it would 'be dangerous, both to our characters and fortunes, to move a step beyond the plain and beaten path.'

In the following year, 1774, the subject of dacoity again engaged the attention of the Government, and a plan for the establishment of Foujdars was proposed by Warren Hastings, in which new and extraordinary powers were conferred on these officers. The abroga-

² Its principles were recognised, subject to certain modifications, in the Bengal Regulations of 1790, under which magisterial duties were transferred from the Foujdar or native magistrate to the English civil judge, and which form a code of criminal procedure. It is there enacted 'that the doctrine of Yusef and Mohamed in respect of trials of murder be the general rule for the officers of the court to write the futwas or law opinions applicable to the circumstances, and that the distinctions made by Abu Huneefah as to the mode of commission of murder be no longer attended to' (Colebrooke's *Supplement*, p. 154). Rules of Mahometan criminal law became latterly matters of mere technicality, but so long did the forms prevail that instruction in its principles formed at one time part of the course of lectures delivered at the East India College of Haileybury.

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tion of the authority of the zemindars, owing, to the introduction of the farming of the revenues, had thrown the country into confusion, and the new courts of justice were unequal to cope with the disorders that prevailed. 'I am sorry,' Hastings wrote, 'to enumerate amongst the causes of the increase of robbers, the regularity and precision which have been introduced in our courts of justice.' The dread of the dacoits, he added, deterred the common people from coming forward, and the rule which required two witnesses in every capital case afforded an assurance of impunity of crime.

Hence, he adds, 'among those who have been convicted of robbery I do not recollect an instance in the proceedings on their trial in which their guilt has been proved by evidence, but by their own confession only.' As the chiefs of these banditti were well-known public characters, the authorised practice of the former Government had been to ascertain the identity of the men, and to condemn them without any further process. To this summary process the Governor-General proposed to revert as the only mode of restoring the country to security and order, adding, 'A rigid observation of the letter of the law is a blessing in a well-regulated state, but in a government loose as that of Bengal is, and must be for years to come, an extraordinary and exemplary coercion must be employed to eradicate those evils which the law cannot reach.'³

Such were some of the difficulties that beset the path of British administrators in applying European principles and European agency to the government of the first great province that came under British rule. The cession of the Dîwāni was originally only a scheme of fiscal administration. It became one of civil govern-

³ Colebooke's *Supplement*, p. 121, 122.

ment. • The changes were gradual and cautious, and left behind, in the forms of the administration, traces of their origin. CHAP.
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• Their history belongs to that of the government of Warren Hastings and his successors —ED.]

CHAPTER XI.

Renewal of the war between France and England—Expedition sent to the East under the Comte de Lally—Previous career of the general—It is preceded by part of the force under M. de Soupire—Its inaction—Lally's precipitate march to Fort St. David—The siege and capture of that place—Lally complains of want of support from the council of Pondicherry—Expedition of plunder against Tanjore—Its failure—Naval engagement—Struggles of Bussy at Aurungábád—He is recalled by Lally—Forde's expedition to the Northern Circars—Defeats Conflans—Preparation for the siege of Madras—Advance of the French and occupation of the Black Town—Siege of Fort St. George—Its relief by the fleet and the retreat of the French—Colonel Forde's operations in the north—Siege and assault of Masulipatam—English alliance with the Nizám—First mutiny in the French army—Return of the French fleet to the coast and its departure—Second mutiny—French overtures to Salábat Jáng—English reinforcements—Siege of Vandewash—Its capture by the English—Battle of Vandewash—Lally retreats to Pondicherry—Fall of the French forts—Alliance with Heider Ali—The Mysoreans assist in throwing supplies into Pondicherry—Major Smith's invasion of Mysore and attack on Caroor—Defection of Heider Ali—English reinforcements—Siege of Pondicherry—Contests at the bound hedge—Blockade of Pondicherry—Expulsion of the native inhabitants of the fort—The storm and loss of English ships—The surrender—Violent proceedings against Lally—Demolition of the works—Fall of the other French garrisons and close of the war—Charges against Lally in France—His long imprisonment and trial—Iniquitous sentence and execution—Remarks on the history of the French settlements in the East—Renewal of the struggle between the French and English in the Deckan in 1780—Its final close.

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WHILE British arms were advancing to dominion in Bengal, events took place in the Deckan which led the way to a corresponding extension of British authority in the south, to which it is necessary now to advert before this history is brought to a close.

When the expedition under the command of Clive

was despatched for the recovery of Calcutta, the British force in the Carnatic was reduced so low that it was scarcely equal to the task of maintaining the authority of their ally Mohammed Ali. The French, on the other hand, weakened their force in that quarter by sending troops to the assistance of Bussy, and the operations on either side were limited to inconsiderable enterprises. The lull was not of long duration. War between the two powers broke out in Europe in May 1756, and the French Government came early to a decision to strike a decisive blow at the English possessions in the East. Orders were despatched to Pondicherry to refrain from any operation of importance in anticipation of the arrival of the armament.

The Count de Lally, who was selected for the command of the expedition, was the son of an Irish refugee, Sir Gerard Lally, a native of Galway, who settled in France after the Revolution of 1688, and commanded the Irish regiment of Dillon. The young Lally received his commission when he was only eight years of age, and did duty in the trenches at Barcelona while still only twelve. Destined from early years for a military career, he pursued his studies with ardour, and rose rapidly to distinction as an accomplished soldier and an ardent adherent of the house of Stewart. In this double capacity he visited the United Kingdom in 1739 to report on the facilities which its coasts afforded for a descent. His talents and enterprise hastened his advancement, and he was sent by Cardinal Fleury on a diplomatic mission to St. Petersburg, and prepared two reports on the statistics of the Empire, and its former relations with France. In 1742 he took a part in the war in Flanders with his regiment, of which he was now major. Here he acquired such reputation that an

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Irish regiment was formed which bore his name, and of which he took the command. This newly raised corps, with its gallant commander, bore a conspicuous part in the battle of Fontenoy, where he received from the King on the field of battle the promotion to the rank of brigadier. In the following month Prince Charles Edward landed in Scotland, and the impetuous Lally was instantly at hand with a plan for a descent in support of the enterprise. The project was taken up by the French Government, and an army was gathered on the coast of Picardy of which Lally was appointed *maréchal-général des logis* (quartermaster-general). Lally, remarks Voltaire, was the soul of the enterprise, but when it was postponed he joined the prince with a small detachment of Irish, and was present at the battle of Falkirk, after which he went through some romantic adventures in his escape from the United Kingdom. He then served with the army in Flanders till the peace of 1748, but when war with England broke out anew in 1755 he was sent for to Versailles, and was ready again with plans for a descent on England, and an attack on the British possessions in India or in America. D'Argenson, the Minister of War, at first destined him for the first of these enterprises, and he took the command of a force in Picardy, and opened a correspondence with the Jacobites, but when the plan was dropped he was appointed to the command of the expedition to India at the urgent solicitation of the secret committee of the East India Company. With brilliant talents were joined great failings that were well known to his friends. D'Argenson is reported to have warned the deputation that waited on him, that with his fiery activity were joined qualities that would render him an impracticable colleague and cause dissension, and even civil war in their walls while war was at their

gates. The deputation replied that they required a man of that stamp to cope with the abuses that prevailed in their settlements, and so Lally was appointed to the command, and invested with full powers as Lieutenant-General, commissary of the King, syndic of the Company, and with a general commission extending to all the French settlements in the East Indies. A brilliant staff, comprising some of the most illustrious names in France, was appointed to accompany him.¹

A fatality attached to the expedition from the beginning. The fleet, on leaving Brest, encountered such bad weather that some of the vessels were obliged to return to refit. In the meantime sinister accounts reached the French Government of the state of things in Canada, and some of the ships and two battalions were withdrawn for the defence of the French possessions in America. When at length the fleet sailed, it carried with it a malignant fever that carried off several hundreds of the seamen and troops, and after delays at Rio de Janeiro and again at the Isle of France, it reached the coast of Coromandel in April 1758, nearly a twelve-month from its departure, and nineteen months from the time when the expedition was resolved upon. French ascendancy in the Carnatic had been already secured by the arrival of part of the intended armament, comprising the regiment of Lorraine under M. de Soupire, and some artillery. This accession of force consisted of upwards of 1,000 men, and the occasion seemed favourable for striking an immediate blow at the English possessions, weakened by the absence of a large portion of their troops and of their whole fleet in Bengal. Lally, in his defence

Septem-
ber,
A.D. 1757.

¹ The chief authority for these details is an article in the *Biographie Universelle*, said by Sismondi (*Histoire des Français*, xxix., 304) to be written by Lally Tollendal, the son of the general.

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of his conduct during this campaign, bitterly complains of the inaction of his countrymen at this juncture; but the charge does not rest heavily on De Soupire. When that officer took the command of the troops on the coast he seems to have been impressed with the duty of acting with vigour, and summoned a mixed council of the civil, naval, and military authorities, to which he submitted a proposal to invest Fort St. David.² He was cautioned in his instructions not to engage in any distant enterprise. But the English settlement, from its proximity to Pondicherry, presented itself as the first of the English possessions for attack. The commander of the French fleet, however, refused his co-operation, and the project was dropped. Throughout this campaign the naval commanders of the French were cautious to excess, and on the present occasion the admiral was daunted by the information that reached him that the English fleet was soon to return to the coast. It seems that when the French squadron with the force under De Soupire first made its appearance, it was mistaken for the English fleet whose arrival was expected, with reinforcements, and the council of Fort St. David sent off a boat with a letter to the English admiral, urging him to cruise off Ceylon to intercept the French until he should be joined by the Bengal ships, which he was informed were expected in September, and on their junction it was suggested a heavy blow might be struck at the French possessions. When the agent who had charge of the message discovered his error, he endeavoured to conceal the letter between two planks, but in vain. The boat was seized and the letter was discovered. Had the act of the council of Fort St. David been a *ruse de guerre* it could not have been more successful. M. Bouvet, the

² Orme, ii. 235.

French admiral, after landing the troops at Pondicherry, announced his intention of returning to the Isle of Bourbon, without even landing the heavy guns and ammunition intended for the settlement, and left the coast

• Deprived of the co-operation of the navy, it remained only for M. de Soupire to engage in some enterprises of smaller importance. Eight forts in the heart of the Carnatic were reduced, and their possessions added to the revenues of the French. Only one of these, Chittapet, offered any protracted defence, and the French troops, after these successes, retired to Pondicherry to await the arrival of the armament under Lally.

Great alarm was now felt at Madras, and this was not removed by the tidings of the battle of Plassy which reached the Presidency on October 16 of the same year, for though they received some treasure, and their credit was established by the acquisition of the rich province and wealth of Bengal, there was no promise of the return of the troops to meet the coming danger. A.D. 1757.

So much was the authority of the British shaken by the events of the past year and the prospect of the approaching superiority of the French, that even the most insignificant chief who held under the nabob or the Company, began to question or insult their power.³ The only effort that was made to meet the coming danger was by the navy. Admiral Pococke returned from Bengal at the close of 1757 with a squadron, after an absence of seventeen months, and was joined by four ships of the line from Bombay. They were in number inferior to the French fleet, but were prepared for their reception on their arrival in the following April. When the expeditionary force under Lally reached the coast an indecisive engagement followed, in which the French A.D. 1758.

³ Orme, ii. 290.

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suffered a severe loss in men, but the English were so crippled in their hulls and rigging that they could offer no impediment to the landing of the troops, which was hurried on with the impetuosity of Lally's character. Before the engagement he had proceeded to Pondicherry to proclaim his commission, and on the same day, by his order, 1,000 men and as many sepoys were on their march for Fort St. David, commanded by the Count d'Estaing, who landed with him.

They advanced without provisions, were led astray by their guides, and the following morning they found themselves in the neighbourhood of the English fort, and so pressed with hunger that they broke into adjacent houses to obtain food. Though the garrison was aware of their presence no advantage was taken of the confusion, and by the following day De Soupire arrived with more troops, some battering guns, and a seasonable supply of provisions.

The works of Fort St. David had been planned with great care. They consisted of a parallelogram with four bastions, each mounting twelve guns. The outworks consisted of a hornwork to the north mounting thirty-four guns, and two large ravelins to the west and east. The body of the place measured only 390 feet by 140, and within this confined space was crowded a garrison of 1,600 natives, 619 Europeans [of whom 286 were effective], and 250 seamen. This fortress had long been a thorn in the side of the settlement at Pondicherry, from which it was only fifteen miles distant, and Lally was instructed, when he left France, to make it the first object of his attack.

To the south of Fort St. David, and across the river Tripopalore, lay the town of Cuddalore, enclosed by a rampart and small bastions, but open to the sea. It

had a slender garrison of three companies of sepoy, thirty Europeans, and some lascars. This was the first object of M. Lally's attack. The commandant was embarrassed by the charge of 150 French prisoners, and agreed to capitulate on terms if the breaching batteries were ready to open within three days. Lally now turned to the more important fortress. The French fleet, which had been driven to the north during the engagement, took six days to work its way to Pondicherry, where they landed their troops. These were hurried on to Fort St. David, and the heavy guns were landed at the mouth of the river Panár, to the north, only a mile from the fort. The reduction of the fortress could not be effected without a regular siege and many materials of war. To collect the requisite number of coolies, who are alone accustomed to carry burdens, required time. Lally, impatient of any delay, insisted on the indiscriminate pressure of the native inhabitants of Pondicherry without distinction of age or caste, a step that caused the utmost alarm, and the flight of many of the inhabitants. This led to strong remonstrances from M. de Leyrit, the governor of Pondicherry, and his council, who still retained their functions, and this was followed by an angry retort and charges of want of zeal for the public service.⁴ Such was the commencement of this great undertaking. The personal altercation among the authorities was only the prelude to more violent charges and recriminations, which, more than any other cause, contributed to the ruin of their affairs in the Deckan.

The siege of Fort St. David lasted from May 14, when the engineers began to erect their first battery, till June 1, when the garrison capitulated. The defence was not vigorous. Batteries were erected against the

⁴ Orme, ii. 305. Recueil des lettres par Messrs. de Leyrit et de Lally, p. 9.

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principal bastions without any interruption, unchecked by the fire of the place, and another battery was raised to the west which enfiladed the north front. The garrison were from the first daunted by the impetuosity of the enemy's attack, and when, by June 1, the works were advanced to the foot of the glacis opposite the north-east bastion, the batteries of the fort which defended this front were either dismounted or withdrawn. Their ammunition was now nearly exhausted, and despairing of relief from the British squadron, which they looked for very anxiously, the commandant, Major Polier, and the governor, Mr. Wynch, held a council of war, and yielded up the fortress, the garrison becoming prisoners of war.

The surrender was severely commented upon. Clive, who was keenly watching the progress of the great expedition, broke out in his letters to the Governor of Madras in strong denunciation against all who had signed the capitulation of a strong fortress till a breach was made and the garrison had sustained an assault.⁵

⁵ See *Life of Clive*, ii. 33, 36. 'I cannot express to you my indignation and concern at the infamous surrender of St. David. Had there been no powder left but for the musketry, there was no excuse for giving up the place till a breach was made, the covered way stormed, and the ditch filled. . . . I wish for the honour and welfare of our nation that a court-martial would make the severest examples of the guilty in these cases.' To Orme he wrote in similar terms. Since this was in type I have read a notice of the siege of Fort St. David in one of the series of papers which have lately appeared entitled *Some of the India Office Records*, in which it is said that after the surrender, 'a court of inquiry was appointed, and it was established that the fortifications were not in a state capable of withstanding the French force.' There is no mention of these proceedings in Orme's narrative, which I have followed in the text, and it is certain that his opinion as to the feebleness of the defence pointed in the opposite direction, for he supports his views by the opinion of the assailants. 'The French officers,' he says, 'on contemplating the works, were surprised at the facility of their conquest, not having lost twenty men by the fire of the place, though more by sickness and by strokes of the sun in the trenches.' (ii. 313.)

Lally had certainly good reason to congratulate himself on his first success. On the fall of Fort St. David he despatched a force to Devi-Cotah, which lay some miles to the south, at the mouth of the Coleroon, and the governor evacuated the place on their approach. The army then returned to Pondicherry, where they made a triumphal entry, and a grand *Te Deum* was chanted in celebration of the victory.

Lally now turned to Madras. Much anxiety was felt in the English settlement at the progress of the French, and it was fully expected that Fort St. George would be besieged as soon as the English squadron was obliged by the monsoon to leave the coast. In their alarm they turned to Calcutta, but Clive, whose mind was fully occupied with the politics of Murshidábád, hesitated to weaken his force in Bengal by detaching any considerable force to the coast of Coromandel. Troops were known to be on the way from England, and it was assumed that the authorities at Madras would detain them for their own relief. Clive, however, decided on an expedition which might act as a diversion to the great enterprise on which the French were bent. Overtures had been received from the Rájá Anunderáz, in the Northern Circars, for assistance in resisting the French power on the coast, and a small force was sent under Colonel Forde, whose operations acquired importance as the campaign proceeded.⁶

The field seemed now open for the attack on Madras. The English in their alarm had withdrawn some of the garrisons from the outlying forts to protect the Presidency, and the defences of the place were still imperfect. But an insuperable obstacle was placed to any considerable movement on the part of the French by the

⁶ See *ante*, 337; see also Orme, ii. 363.

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announcement of M. de Leyrit that Pondicherry was unable to furnish either money or means of transport, and the Count d'Aché, who commanded the French squadron, declared it was impossible for him to support the march of the French troops.

It is certain that the French were crippled throughout the campaign by the want of funds. The country from which they drew their resources had been wasted by the continuous struggle of the past seven years. Their possessions in the Deckan originally consisted of a territory of a limited amount in the neighbourhood of Pondicherry, Cárical, and Masulipatam, ceded to them by the Subahdar ; but the same grant conferred on M. Dupleix a superiority over the nabob and a virtual command over all the country occupied by the French forces. Their authority had been rudely shaken by the war which closed in 1754, and they would not have retained their hold over the country had it not been for the possession of the numerous forts which rise abruptly from the plain. This part of the Carnatic consists of some rich districts, mixed with sandy tracts of several miles in extent covered with stubborn thickets, and occupied by poligárs or chiefs. In such a country no revenue could be gathered except in presence of an army ; the most important of these forts were in French hands, but the garrisons had been largely withdrawn to prepare for the struggle on the coast. The means of supporting this force were wanting. Lally, however, was strongly prepossessed with the belief that all his difficulties had their origin in the corruption that prevailed among the authorities of Pondicherry. He was specially enjoined by the Council of India before he left France to reform the numberless abuses which prevailed in the settlement, and to check the

prodigality and disorder which had wasted the revenues. Lally had talents and enterprise for any undertaking of which the plan and means were provided by the Government he served, but he had neither the capacity nor the patience to unravel the accounts of the local government, nor, indeed, did the French Government offer him any aid in conducting such an inquiry. The armament with its brilliant staff was expected to carry all before it, and the country itself to supply the means of carrying on the war. The temper in which he met the difficulties he encountered on his arrival is illustrated by a letter which he addressed to De Leyrit, the governor of Pondicherry, from the trenches before Fort St. David. After complaints of the lethargy and indifference he had experienced on his arrival, he proceeds: 'This letter will be a secret between you and me if you furnish me with the means of conducting my enterprise. I left you 100,000 livres of my own money to assist in providing the funds which it requires. I did not find on my arrival a hundred sous in your chest and in that of your council. You have all refused me the support of your credit. I hold you, however, more indebted to the Company than I am . . . If you persist in leaving me in want of everything, and obliged to contend with the general discontent, not only will I inform the King and the Company of the zeal which their servants display for their service, but I will take effective measures not to depend during the short stay I desire to make in the country on the party spirit and personal motives with which I see that every member appears occupied, to the risk of the total ruin of the Company.' ⁷

⁷ *Mémoire pour le Comte de Lally. Pièces justificatives, No. 9.* The correspondence which passed between Lally and his contemporaries, and

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Voltaire might well say in quoting this letter that it was not calculated to bring him friends nor money. It was a declaration of war against those with whom he had every motive to act in harmony, and was very feebly followed up, for on his return to Pondicherry he took

which is appended to the *Mémoires* subsequently prepared in his vindication, are a valuable commentary on the narrative of Orme; but neither the letters nor the documents prepared for publication would of themselves afford the materials for a narrative of the war, as the more important events are obscured by angry comments on incidents of secondary importance. The letters of Bussy, though sometimes bitter in tone, are generally dignified, and show an intimate knowledge of the politics of Southern India, and of the motives by which the different states were actuated. Those of Lally seem to explain 'the true causes of the loss of the Indies,' and confirm the accounts of the man conveyed to us by contemporaries. That by D'Argenson, which has been referred to above, is by a friendly hand, but it points to the one great defect which made him an impracticable colleague. 'C'est du feu que son activité. Il ne transige pas sur la discipline, a en horreur tout ce qui ne marche pas droit, se dépite contre tout ce qui ne va pas vite, ne tait rien de ce qu'il sent et l'exprime en termes qui ne s'oublient pas.' The following is the picture which was presented to Bussy soon after his arrival in India, and before they were estranged. It is said to be by the pen of one of the principal officers of the army. 'Vous allez voir, Monsieur, l'homme le plus extraordinaire qui soit jamais venu aux Indes. Vous êtes trop bon patriote pour ne pas lui passer ses fougues, ses écarts et ses disparates; il vous en fera à chaque instant. Vous éprouverez aussi ses emportements, surtout lorsqu'il s'agira de redresser ses idées, souvent de travers. Je vous conjure au nom de la nation et pour le bien public de ne point vous décourager. Je vous préviens de son grand foible, c'est que, ne sachant rien faire par lui-même, il veut avoir l'air de tout faire et de ne recevoir d'avis de personne. Vous aurez aussi beaucoup de peine à le fixer; car en traitant les affaires les plus sérieuses et les plus pressées, il s'amuse d'une bagatelle, d'une historiette et rien ne se finit. Il faut encore vous prévenir qu'il croit être impénétrable et qu'il sait très-mauvais gré à ceux qui le devinent. Je finis ce tableau par vous dire que c'est l'homme le plus avaricieux de l'Europe, et qu'il s'imagine être assez fin pour en imposer à toute la terre sur ce point.' (*Mémoire pour le Sieur de Bussy, Lettres*, p. 21.)

I subjoin another picture by an English officer after the fall of Pondicherry. 'Monsieur Lally is arrived amongst us. Notwithstanding his fallen condition he is now as proud and haughty as ever. A great share of wit, sense, and martial abilities, obscured by a savage ferocity and an undistinguished contempt for every person that moves in a sphere below that of a general, characterises this odd compound of a man.' (*Mémoires of Count Lally*, p. 354.)

counsel with the authorities against whom he launched this attack, and at their instance embarked on an expedition of plunder against Tanjore.

• The Maratta prince of that state, when besieged by Chanda Sáheb, aided by the French, in 1751, had given a bond of 5,600,000 rupees to that prince in composition for his arrears of tribute, and this bond came into the possession of the Government of Pondicherry. To quicken the apprehension of the rája, threats were held out of supporting the pretensions of another member of the family, who had fallen into their hands when they took Fort St. David. On the invasion of the country by the English in 1749 they took up the cause of a claimant to the throne, and the reigning rája on surrendering Devi-Cotah, stipulated that they should prevent this pretender from offering him further molestation. The English could not enforce this article against the claimant who retired from the scene, but they detained his uncle who was in their camp and was the leader of the party. Him they confined at Fort St. David, and when the place fell, Gatica, which was the name of this prince, was brought forward and treated with great ceremony at Pondicherry, in order to excite the fears of the rája. •

On the arrival of the army within six miles of Tanjore, some fruitless negotiations ensued. The rája volunteered some payments of limited amount, which he afterwards offered to increase, but the tone of menace that Lally assumed rendered negotiation useless, and decided the former to defend himself to extremity. The siege, therefore, was commenced in form. After five days' firing the batteries had produced a breach of only six feet wide, but the ammunition was almost wholly exhausted, and there remained only provisions for two

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days in the camp. The anxieties of the French were increased by the want of intelligence from the fleet. Advices were received that another engagement between the squadrons had taken place, after which Cárical, on which the French army depended for their supplies, was threatened by the English fleet. A council of war was now held, and two only of the ten officers present advised an assault. Retreat was now resolved on, the guns were spiked, and the French force commenced a harassing march, followed by the enemy, and returned discredited to Pondicherry.

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The naval engagement referred to above took place off the mouth of the Coleroon. In this, as on the former occasion, the French suffered heavily in men, while the English ships were crippled in their rigging. There was no disparity between the forces, but the French admiral was cautious to excess, and the flag-ship experienced a series of disasters; the rudder was twice disabled, a gun burst and the powder-room took fire. This caused confusion in the line, and the whole fleet bore away to Pondicherry, while the English ships were too disabled to follow up their success. . .

The result of this engagement gave a first blow to the fortunes of the French, for D'Aché, disheartened by this second encounter, encumbered by sick and wounded, and with damaged ships, decided to quit the coast for the Mauritius, against the joint remonstrance of Lally and the council of Pondicherry. From this time the English had the command of the sea, with all the advantage it gave them in their operations offensive and defensive. D'Aché returned to the coast of Coromandel in the following year, with some small supply of money and men, but his stay was short, and after another feeble attempt to cope with his adversaries off the coast,

he again bore away from the Indian seas, and never appeared again.

• As the attack on Madras seemed for the time hopeless, Lally resolved to engage in some smaller enterprises with a view to establish his authority in the Carnatic and give employment to his troops, and in the meantime sent instructions to Bussy and Moracin to join him without delay, and confer on the means of conducting his great enterprise. After attacking in succession three forts, only one of which offered a stout resistance, he threatened Arcot, which surrendered without a blow. But these acquisitions yielded no fruit beyond some seasonable supplies to his army, and the reputation which the French gained by the success. New difficulties pressed on him on all sides. When Bussy received intelligence of Lally's arrival he had just passed victoriously through one of those conflicts which form the staple of Indian history during the Mahometan period. Recent events, described in a preceding chapter,⁸ had rendered French influence predominant in Heiderábád, and Bussy took advantage of this, by despatching a force to the province on the coast ceded to the French in 1754, and the whole of the year 1757 was employed by him in reducing some refractory hill chiefs, and in occupying the English settlements in that quarter. Vizagapatam was the only English possession on the coast that was defended by troops, but the fort was pronounced untenable, and it was surrendered by the garrison on favourable terms. During his absence in the eastern provinces a revolution occurred in the government of Heiderábád; Salábat Jang, the titular Nizám, under the advice of the Díwán Sháh Nawáz, advanced his two brothers to high commands, against the counsel of Bussy.

⁸ Chapter VII.

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The eldest, Nizam Ali, used his power to such effect that he compelled his brother to surrender the seal of state and reduced him to complete insignificance. Bussy acted with great promptitude; a forced march of 400 miles in twenty-one days brought him to Aurungábad where these events had occurred. He brought with him a force of 500 European infantry and 200 cavalry, besides 5,000 sepoys, and at his approach all intrigues were suspended. He visited Salábat Jang with great ceremony, and the intriguing Díwán and a Maratta chief who had taken some part in the preceding events acknowledged his authority.

The kiladar of the powerful fortress of Dowlutábád, in the immediate neighbourhood, a dependent of Sháh Nawáz Khán, admitted Bussy's troops into the citadel, and after a confused struggle, in which one of Bussy's generals was assassinated by Nizam Ali, Sháh Nawáz Khán lost his life during a conflict in the camp, the authority of Salábat Jang was restored, and Bussy returned in triumph to Heiderábád.

On the day of his arrival he received a letter from Lally, written on June 25, ordering him to repair to Pondicherry without delay, with all the troops that could be spared from the defence of the northern provinces, and to join M. Moracin, who was in command in that quarter, and had received similar instructions. Salábat Jang was in despair, and remonstrated in vain against the withdrawal of the force which was the main support of his power. The instructions Bussy received were peremptory, and left him no discretion. The French garrison was withdrawn from Dowlutábád, the whole French army moved away from Heiderábád, and after effecting a junction with Moracin on the Kishna, he delivered over his command of the ceded

province to M. Conflans, and hastened on to join Lally in the Carnatic. The junction of the forces was effected on October 12.

The accession of force he brought was more apparent than real, for Bussy, strongly impressed with the danger of withdrawing any portion of his army from the territory of Heiderábád, remonstrated against this step, and asked to be allowed to return with a reinforcement. Lally refused peremptorily, and received no cordial support from his lieutenant during the subsequent operations. The views of these commanders were indeed too discordant to admit of any compromise. Bussy, like his great predecessor Dupleix, regarded an alliance with a great native state as the basis of the military power which would establish the ascendancy of his countrymen in the Deckan, and ultimately oust the English from India. Lally regarded these schemes as visionary; the power raised on such foundations was in his view unstable, and the only object on which he was bent was to bring the whole military force at his disposal to bear on the British possessions.⁹ The rashness with which he pursued this policy received an early illustration.

In recalling Bussy and Moracin from the Deckan Lally was completely borne out by his instructions, which suggested, though they did not enjoin, their employment

⁹ 'Le roi et la Compagnie m'ont envoyé dans l'Inde pour en chasser les Anglois; c'est avec eux que nous avons la guerre, tout autre intérêt m'est étranger: il m'importe peu qu'un cadet dispute le Décan avec son aîné, ou que tels et tels Rajas se disputent telle ou telle Nabobie. Quand j'aurai exterminé les Anglois de toute cette côte, je serai en état de faire, sans sortir de mon cabinet, et à peu de frais, des opérations beaucoup plus sûres que celles qui ont coûté jusqu'ici tant de sujets au roi et tant de roupies à la compagnie.' (*Memoire, &c.*, No. 30, à M. de Bussy, le 13 Juin, 1758.) Further on in the same letter he explains his policy in these terms: 'Je me borne seulement à vous retracer toute la mienne dans ces cinq mots, ils sont sacramentaux: Plus d'Anglois dans la Péninsule.'

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in the Carnatic. Before leaving the province, Bussy made over the command of the ceded district to M. de Conflans, leaving a force under his command which, under an able commander, should have been equal to its defence. Within a week from the day on which Bussy joined Lally's camp, a force from Bengal landed in the province; a few weeks later Conflans was defeated in the field, his troops shut up in Masulipatam, where they finally succumbed to the attack, and the province was lost to the French.

The expedition from Bengal was the act of Clive. When intelligence reached him of the critical state of things in the Deckan, it was thought dangerous to detach a considerable portion of the force to the assistance of Madras, where they would be beyond recall in case of any troubles arising with the nabob. Confused accounts arrived of Bussy's struggle at Aurungábád, and overtures were made by Anunderáz, one of the rájas of the northern territory, for English help. Clive was sanguine in the belief that the British force in the Deckan, supported by their fleet, which was now superior to that of the enemy, would hold its ground with the assistance that was expected from Europe. He decided therefore to employ all that could be spared in an attack on the French in this province, and thus destroy the resources on which their army largely relied.

The conduct of the expedition was entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Forde, and consisted of 500 Europeans, including artillerymen, and 2,000 sepoys. They arrived off the coast at the end of October, and formed a junction with the Rája Anunderáz at Cossimcotah, in the neighbourhood of Vizagapatam. From this place they advanced to meet Conflans, whose force was superior to that of Forde in native troops and artillery. The engagement which followed was fought in an open country, and

Decem-
ber 8,
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afforded no opportunity of manœuvring. The small armies advanced in line. A field of Indian corn interposed, which prevented either of the contending parties having a full view of their adversaries. The French battalion, which inclined to the right, and beyond the field, came in conflict with the sepoy, whom, from their red coats, they mistook for the English battalion. The French fire at a distance of 200 yards was steady and effective, and the sepoy battalion, threatened by the enemy's men and horse on its flank, broke and fled. The French victory was now apparently assured, and their battalions pressed on in pursuit, when they suddenly observed a new line of men marching fast and firm from behind the field of corn to occupy the ground which the sepoy had abandoned. The French line was in confusion, and, before they could form, such a deadly fire was poured in upon them, that they fled to rejoin their guns, which they had left half a mile in their rear. Colonel Forde allowed them no time to rally; they were driven from the guns, and after a halt to allow the sepoy to rejoin him, Colonel Forde advanced to attack the enemy's camp. The victory was complete; the enemy fled in disorder, leaving thirty guns and seven mortars, with their ammunition, besides tents and equipage, as the prizes of the victors. M. de Conflans himself fled to Rajamundri, forty miles distant, without drawing bridle, but finding himself insecure in his position, and pressed by his adversary, who reached Rajamundri on the following day, he fell back with the wreck of his force on Masulipatam.¹

This action was the first heavy blow struck at the ascendancy of the French in the Deckan, and although Forde was unable to follow up his success by an immediate attack on Masulipatam, owing to the absence of

¹ Orme, ii. 375.

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support of the rája and the want of funds, it had the effect of limiting the resources of the French, and raising the reputation of the English among the native powers.

The battle was fought on December 3, by which time the long pending conflict before Madras had begun. More than six months had elapsed from the arrival of the force that was to sweep the English into the sea ere the means were collected of transporting even half the heavy artillery and stores required for the siege. Some assistance was rendered by two frigates that were in the roads of Pondicherry in transporting another store of artillery that was deposited at Alamparva. The opportune arrival of a vessel from the Mauritius with treasure on October 18 and a supply of 100,000 rupees which M. Moracin brought with him. enabled him to put his troops into motion. With great effort Lally had also scraped together a small fund to which he contributed from his own means, and by his example he obtained some cash from De Leyrit and some other members of the council.

During the months of September and October the head-quarters of the French had been at Vandewash, and from this place detachments had been sent against Arcot and other forts that fell into their hands, and here he was joined by Bussy. Early in November they crossed the Paliar and took post at Conjeveram.

The force with which Lally advanced consisted of 2,700 European infantry, besides cavalry, artillery, and sepoys.² With this small army he attacked a

² These are the numbers as given by Lally in his defence. Those of the garrison were, according to Orme, 1,758 Europeans, including officers, and some topasses, that is, men of mixed descent, and 2,200 sepoys. Lally's force of sepoys amounted to 5,000, but he says they were all employed in covering the attack against the attempts at relief. (Orme, ii. 388; *Mémoire pour le Comte de Lally*, 107.)

fortress which had, in anticipation of his attack, been strengthened and rendered impregnable, except against a regular siege, well supplied with stores, open to the sea, and with a garrison not one-third inferior in number to that of the enemy. So rash a proceeding raised misgivings in the mind of Clive, who was watching the coming struggle with the utmost eagerness, that he would not have embarked in it with a force less than double that of the English, unless he were in expectation of the arrival of reinforcements.³

Lally's situation was very critical. He had a superiority in men, but an almost barren exchequer and no credit, and no native ally on whom he could rely, for the Nizám was alienated by the withdrawal of Bussy, and was now making overtures to the English. The news from Europe was discouraging. In the years 1757-8 the French had been driven from their possessions in Africa and the West Indies, and they were attacked in Canada. They experienced disasters at sea,

³ When reports reached Bengal of the arrival at the Mauritius of a new armament and the expectation of a fourth, Clive instantly wrote to Pitt as follows: 'I presume it must have been in consequence of this intelligence that M. Lally took part before Madras, as I cannot think he would have been so imprudent as to come there with a force not double that of the garrison, were he not in expectation of a reinforcement. Should that arrive upon the coast before our squadron from Bombay, or should the enemy's fleet, by the addition of this third division, prove unfortunately superior to ours, the event is to be feared. Much, very much indeed—perhaps the fate of India—now depends upon our squadron.' In a letter to the Chairman of the Court of Directors of the same date, he wrote in sanguine terms of the result. 'To give you my opinion, I think Lally will fail in his attempt, so great is my confidence in the strength of the garrison and the experience and valour of the officers. The arrival of Captain Cailland with the sepoy and Tanjorine horse will distress our enemies greatly, if not oblige them to raise the siege; and if they continue till the arrival of our reinforcements from Bombay they run the risk of a total defeat. I can no otherwise account for this undertaking of the French general than from his distressed situation for want of money. He is really risking the whole for the whole.' (*Life of Clive*, ii. 52, 55.)

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and their armies were fully engaged in a continental struggle. Slender hopes could be entertained of reinforcements or supplies from France.

Dec. 12,
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Colonel Lawrence, who commanded the army in the field, watching the movements of the French from the left bank of the Paliar, retired slowly before the enemy, maintaining a steady front till he entered Fort St. George. On his arrival the council of the Presidency assembled, and by a unanimous vote committed the defence to the Governor, Mr. Pigott, recommending him to consult Colonel Lawrence on all occasions, and on extraordinary emergencies to assemble a council of superior officers of the garrison.⁴ It affords a remarkable testimony to the harmony which prevailed between the services, that this singular arrangement proved eminently successful. The Governor set an example to all of activity and resolution. He visited the works every day, encouraging the garrison by his presence, and rewarding those exposed to severe services with money.

It is nowhere hinted that he interfered unduly with the authority of the commanders. Every effort was made by the civil authorities to prepare for the coming struggle. Provisions of all kinds, and of the best condition, had been laid up, and these as well as all the military stores were distributed from the different magazines under the direction of the members of the council, assisted by the inferior servants of the Company, whose habits of business enabled them to manage these details free from all confusion.

Such were the conditions under which a struggle commenced which the English historian characterises as 'without doubt the most strenuous and regular that had ever been carried on in India ;' adding, 'we have

⁴ Orme, ii. 388.

detailed it in hopes that it may remain an example and incitement.'

The settlement of Madras had been for about a century the principal establishment on the Coromandel coast, and was built on a narrow territory, only five miles in length, ceded by the Mogul. The town consisted of three divisions. That to the south was inhabited by Europeans only, and was known by the name of the White Town or Fort St. George. At the time of its surrender to Labourdonnais it was surrounded by a weak wall with bastions, and the houses of the native quarter, or Black Town, as it was called, almost touched the wall to the north. These two quarters were now separated by a wide esplanade. Beyond them to the north lay another suburb inhabited by natives of a poorer class. The Black Town was also protected by a wall, but it had fallen into decay and the suburb was quite open to the north.

Fort St. George is protected on the east by the sea, and lies within twenty yards of the surf, with a frontage of upwards of 500 yards. On the south and west it is guarded by the North river, which passes at one point along the foot of the glacis. The ground is more favourable to the besieger on the north, and the works on this side became the object of attack; they had however been much strengthened in 1756 when a renewal of the war was expected. The French advanced from the south-west across the Choultry plain, which commences about 2,000 yards from the fort. Thence passing the Tripopalore, which joins the North river at the sea, they moved to the north towards the Black Town, which lies at a distance of a quarter of a mile from the fort. At the same time part of the force passed the St. Thomé river several miles to the south, and a

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slender guard of sepoys which occupied a redoubt withdrew at their approach. The English who were in the Black Town made a show of defence and then withdrew, while the French entered on the north side and pushed on to the sea, where they commenced to prepare their batteries, the regiment of Lally being nearest to the beach, that of Lorraine on some rising ground to the west. The occupation of the town was followed by a scene of pillage and drunkenness that demoralised the troops, and to which the French historians attribute the failure of the enterprise. The English garrison took advantage of the confusion, and 500 of the best troops were told off to attack the enemy in the town. The attack was at first successful, and they entered the streets unperceived, drove back the regiment of Lorraine, and penetrated to the heart of the town, when the French rallied and a scene of street fighting ensued, with much confusion, and the English force was driven back with some loss of men and prisoners. The affair had no important bearing on the operations of the siege, although the English could ill afford the loss of 200 of their best troops.⁵

⁵ When the controversy grew hot between Lally and his adversaries, it was made a charge against Bussy that he had not taken advantage of the confusion of the retreat of the English and led the regiment of Lally to a bridge that lay between the fort and the town, by which the troops engaged in the sally had to retreat. The Chevalier de Crillon is said to have urged him to take this step, and it was contended that had he done so the whole of the force would have been cut off to a man, and, as Lally expresses himself, the siege would not have lasted a fortnight. (*Mémoire, &c.*, 105.) To this Bussy replied that he had no command, that he served on this occasion as a volunteer, that he received the thanks of the governor of Pondicherry for his conduct during the sortie, and that Lally himself, on the field of battle, gave him the command of the brigade of Lorraine, vacant by the capture of the Comte d'Estaing on the occasion? (*Mémoire pour le Sieur de Bussy*, 24.) This should dispose of the personal part of the question. It is of historical interest to determine whether the failure of the campaign was due to the conduct of some particular officer on one

The siege which was now commenced was carried on by regular approaches to the crest of the glacis, where the breaching batteries were erected. Though the garrison made no new sortie in force, the works of the besiegers were attacked almost nightly by small parties, and the progress of the works was delayed.

The possession of Chinglepet, about forty miles south-west of Madras, the garrison of which had been reinforced in anticipation of the coming struggle, now stood the English in good stead. Captain Preston, who commanded there, with the aid of some native auxiliaries, interrupted the communications and compelled Lally to maintain a considerable force at St. Thomé, to the south of Madras, in order to cover the siege. A desultory warfare was carried on in which he was generally successful, but it proved harassing to the besiegers⁶ and encouraged the garrison, who kept up

occasion, a line of argument to which Lally returns over and over again; and here we have the advantage of having a witness at hand who can speak with impartiality. Orme says that the men of Lally's regiment, many of whom were reeling drunk, advanced under the cover of the houses till they were within 300 yards of the street where the English were retreating, and the interval between them was exposed to the fire of the fort, the fear of which and the mistrust of these intoxicated men deterred the French officer from making the attack. (Orme, ii. 393.) This is confirmed by the map of the fortress which is appended to the work, and by the aid of which one traces every incident in the action. And it appears that the bridge in question, where the English party should have been cut off, is on the esplanade, within 300 yards of the fort, and under the fire of its guns. Enemies that advanced to it must have been exposed to destruction.

⁶ When Lally first heard that the English at Chinglepet had formed a junction with the troops under a native commander, he made a savage attack on M. de Latour, who commanded in the field, and wrote to the governor of Pondicherry in the following terms: 'L'enfer m'a vomi dans ce pays d'iniquités, et j'attends comme Jonas la baleine qui me recevra dans son ventre.' Voltaire quotes this to show that he at this time despaired of his enterprise. This was his usual style of correspondence. On another occasion he expressed himself to the same correspondent with a similar illustration from the Bible. 'J'irais plutôt commander les Cafres

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their communications with the English army in the field, to whom they remitted money, of which they received a seasonable supply from Bengal. The French began to prepare their batteries on December 15, the day after the sharp conflict in the Black Town, but it was not until the 7th of the following month that they opened fire, and this was so hotly returned that within an hour one of the batteries was silenced, and the attack was not renewed for four days, and then they had no such superiority in their fire as to give them a prospect of success. However, 3,000 shells of all sorts were thrown into the fort, to the destruction of all the buildings in the place. A breach was at length effected in a north-east bastion, but not till February 7, being fifty-four days from the commencement of the batteries. Lally, whose ammunition was running short, was eager for an assault, but he was dissuaded by his own officers, who pronounced the attempt to be desperate, as the troops in their descent into and passage of the ditch, and on the breach itself, would be exposed to a formidable fire from the adjoining bastion whose fire had never been silenced.

From this time the siege may be said to have been at an end. The enemy's mortar fire was exhausted, but they kept up an active fire from their batteries, and this was continued for nine days more in the hope, it may be supposed, of receiving reinforcements. On the 16th intelligence reached the fort that a British fleet was approaching from Bombay, escorted by two frigates and bearing 600 men. The same afternoon they were discovered standing towards the road, and at ten at night the

que de rester dans cette Sodôme, qu'il n'est pas possible que le feu des Anglais ne détruise tôt ou tard au défaut de celui de ciel.' Another time, according to Voltaire, he threatened to put in harness the governor and all the council if certain munitions that he expected did not arrive.

ships, guided by the lights held out in the fort, anchored in the road. When day broke the beleaguered garrison discovered the whole French force in full retreat crossing the Choultry plain.

‘Joy and curiosity,’ adds Orme, ‘carried out every one to view and contemplate the works from which they had received so much molestation, for the enemy’s fire had continued forty-two days. Thirty-three pieces of cannon, eighteen- or twenty-four pounders, were found in their forts and works, of which twenty-six were disabled.’

They evacuated St. Thomé, and all guards between that place and the fort were withdrawn at the same time that the enemy left the Black Town. The garrison on their departure sent out parties who collected nineteen guns more, chiefly iron three-pounders ; 150 barrels of good powder were found at St. Thomé. But the strongest proof of the hurry and confusion with which they raised the siege was the neglect of their sick and wounded. They left forty-four Europeans in their hospital in the Black Town, with a letter from M. Lally recommending them to the care of the English Governor.’

• Thus ended this important siege, and with it closed the hope of driving the English from the peninsula; for though the struggle was prolonged for two years, and the French were enabled to cope with the English in the field, and sustain a general engagement before they were shut in within the walls of Pondicherry, they fought at a continually increasing disadvantage, as will be shown by the brief narrative of the succeeding events.

• The English historian dwells with great pride on the zeal and constancy displayed by the Governor of Madras. ‘Scarce a murmur had been uttered,’ says

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Orme; 'all was emulation.' Lally, on the other hand,

⁷ Orme, ii. 459. Mr. Vansittart, a member of the Council of Madras, who succeeded Clive in the government of Calcutta, wrote to Clive the following soldierly account of the operations. 'I am very glad,' he observes, 'to begin with acquainting you that the siege of Madras is raised. Certainly it was an undertaking too great for M. Lally's force, and it was undoubtedly a want of men that obliged him to confine his approaches to so narrow a front. I will send you a plan of them as soon as I can find one of our engineers at leisure. The trenches are the weakest that ever were seen, and yet they pushed them up close under our nose. Three or four times small detachments sallied and took possession of the head of their sap almost without resistance. Our people retired after destroying a little of the work, and then the enemy returned and worked on. Their grand battery, the first that they opened, tore our works a good deal, but our men were active, and got them repaired in the night. This continued for a few days, but our fire was not decreased. The enemy then lost all patience, and advanced with all our defences in good order. When they got to the foot of the glacis, they erected a battery against the east face of the north ravelin, but they could never stand there for an hour together, as we had a heavy fire both on their flank and front. In three or four days they abandoned that, but they still kept pushing on their sap, and presently got up to the crest of the glacis, where they erected another battery close to the north-east angle of the covered way. This cost them very dear, and they well deserved to suffer, for all our defences were yet perfect, nay, we had more guns than we had at first. For six mornings running they opened this battery at daybreak and were obliged in an hour or two to shut up their embrasures. Their loss there must have been very great, for it was raked from one end to the other by the flank of the royal bastion, had a front fire from the north-east bastion, and was overlooked by the demi-bastion so with musketry, that it was absolutely impossible for a man to live. At the end of six days they gave it up, and at the same time, I believe, gave up all hopes of success. It is true that they had opened a narrow passage through the counterscarp of the ditch by a mine, and had beat down so much clay from the face of the demi-bastion that there was a slope which a nimble man might run up, and that is what M. Lally calls a breach. But his people were wiser than he, if he proposed to assault it, and they refused. That letter of M. Lally's is a most curious piece. I am glad it was intercepted, that he may not say the arrival of the ships obliged him to raise the siege, and that the officers and men of the garrison may have the honour they deserve. Their duty was really severe, and, what was yet worse, they had not a safe place to rest in when off duty, for there is not a bombproof lodgment in garrison, except the grand magazine and the casemate under the nabob's bastion, where the sick and wounded lay. Nevertheless there was a universal cheerfulness from the beginning to the end, and (what M. Lally so much expected) a capitulation never entered, I believe, into the head of any one man in the garrison.' (*Life of Clive*, ii. 48.)

dealt out invectives against all from whom he looked for co-operation, and when the conflict was over the true causes of the extinction of the French power were lost sight of in mutual recrimination. It has been pointed out that the naval superiority of the English, and their resources in Bengal, enabled them to hold the balance for near a twelvemonth against the superior armament of France. From this time it inclined in their favour. Lally, in his invectives against De Leyrit, Bussy, and D'Aché, on whom he attempted to fasten the odium of these disasters, makes only a casual allusion to the scantiness of the reinforcements he received from home. The great enterprise seems to have been abandoned by the French Government almost from the commencement, and the unfortunate commander had to struggle on for two more years with a force that was gradually diminishing in strength, and that force impaired and discontented by severe reverses. The energy with which he fought against these odds would deserve all honour, were not his soldierly qualities marred by a suspicious nature and ungovernable temper.

The failure before Madras was followed by a new disaster in the north. Colonel Forde, after his victory on December 3, advanced on Masulipatam in the hope of attacking the place before the French could recover from the blow of their late defeat; but his action was paralysed by the hesitation of his only ally, the Rája Anunderáz, who returned to the hills that skirt the province, and seemed to await the issue of events in the south. The credit of the English was shaken by the struggle that was going on at Madras, and in the meantime Salábat Jang, after his abandonment by Bussy, feeling himself unable to coerce his brothers without the assistance of the French, determined to cast

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in his lot with the force under Conflans, and moved to the Krishna. Here he was joined by his brother Basálat Jang. The subahdar now summoned Anurderáz and the zemindars who had joined the English to repair to his standard; this excited the liveliest alarm in the mind of the rája, but at length the prince, feeling himself compelled to take a line, decided to join the English, and, after a delay of fifty days, terms were arranged, by the intervention of Mr. Andrews, the representative of the Company at Vizagapatam, and Colonel Forde was enabled to make his long-delayed attack on Masulipatam.

The position of Forde was now critical. The power under Conflans exceeded his own, and his movements were threatened by a small force of 200 French and 2,000 sepoys, detached to maintain the communication with the south, and by the army of the subahdar. To retreat was impossible, so he decided to press the attack with vigour. On March 6, when the English force appeared before the place, it was cheered by the intelligence that reached them that Lally had raised the siege of Madras.

A.D. 1759.

The fort of Masulipatam stands on a morass at a distance of more than a mile from the town, with which it is connected by a causeway. The defences were modernised by the French and consisted of irregular bastions with a wet ditch, but no glacis nor outworks. The English force took up its position on some sand hills, from which they were separated from the works by the morass, and here they planted their batteries. They received support from the 'Harwich,' a Company's ship, which lent them guns and men, and were able, owing to the absence of any glacis or outworks, to commence a fire at some distance from the wall. This

was the only advantage they possessed, for the garrison was superior in the number of the Europeans and strong in artillery, and two armies were moving to its succour.

So desperate did the undertaking appear, that the whole line of Europeans turned out on March 19, and threatened to march away unless they received the prize money already due to them, and were assured of the whole booty in case of the fall of the place. Forde had no money, but satisfied them with promises to pay them their prize money out of the first he should receive, and to solicit the Company, in consideration of their services, to give up the whole of what might be taken in Masulipatam. Upon this they returned to their duty. For ten days a hot fire was maintained from their batteries against the eastern front, and the breaches were declared to be practicable, but the ammunition was now nearly exhausted and the relieving forces were at hand. The rāja again faltered, and threatened to abandon his ally. But Forde was a man of resolution, and in these desperate straits he took a resolve the apparent rashness of which contributed to his success.

The little force was divided into four parties, three of which assaulted the breaches on the east, while a false attack was made on the south-west, where the wall was protected by a quagmire which had been tried by two British officers on the previous night, and found to be passable. Another false attack was made by the rāja's troops along the causeway that connected the fort with the town. The attack was made at midnight; the garrison gathered on the breaches, but made a feeble defence, and every bastion was carried in succession. Confused, confused at the suddenness and boldness of the attack, surrendered at discretion. The prisoners

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consisted of 500 Europeans and 2,537 coolies, topasses, and sepoy. A hundred and twenty pieces of cannon, and abundance of stores, were the prize of the conquerors.*

The assault took place on the night of April 7. On the 15th two French vessels appeared before the place with 300 troops, whom Lally had despatched on receipt of the tidings of the siege, but finding the fort in possession of the enemy they sailed away. Greater events followed this double success. Salábat Jang was within fifteen miles of the coast, and made some demonstration with his Maratta auxiliaries up to the walls of the fort, but Forde, embarrassed as he was with the number of prisoners, held a bold countenance, and the Mogul prince, finding his old allies crushed, offered to come to terms with the power that was now in the ascendant.

The intelligence from Heiderábád quickened his resolve. His brother, Nizam Ali, was approaching the capital with a large force, and as he felt it impossible to hold his ground without European auxiliaries, and the French having disappeared from the northern province, what was more natural than that he should ally himself with the victor? Colonel Forde was received in his camp with honour, and a treaty was now arranged by which he assigned territory amounting to four lacs, and bound himself to aid in driving the remaining French troops across the Krishna. Such was the commencement of the long alliance of the British with the Nizam of the Deccan.

While these important events took place in the north, the war dragged on languidly in the Carnatic. After a campaign of 100 days which followed the siege of Madras, during which 8,000 or 10,000 men were in arms, not five were killed. The principal object of

both sides, as Orme observes, was to protect their respective territories, and not to risk an engagement without a prospect of positive advantage. To such straits were the French driven that Lally had recourse to private contributions to meet some importunate demands of his troops, an expedient to which he had recourse again and again. He claims credit at this time for raising no less than 312,000 livres by fines on the agents of members of council, who were accused of malversation in dealing with the rents of the Company.⁸

Now for the first time signs were manifest of disaffection in the French forces, which later on assumed the most malignant form. Overtures reached the English from the garrison of Arcot, which consisted of sixty Europeans and six companies of sepoy, offering to deliver up the fort for money. This was followed by similar offers from the Killadars of Covrepack and Timery. In each of these cases the proposal came from the native portion of the force; but in August Lally's own regiment, with the exception of the sergeants, corporals, and fifty of the soldiers, mutinied and marched out of the fort of Chittapet, declaring that they would not return to their colours until they received their pay, now many months in arrear. Their officers, by advancing their own money and pledging their honour for more, brought them back, with the exception of thirty, who dispersed about the country; but this defection, which it was impossible to visit with serious punishment, shook the discipline of the whole army, and the result was soon to be displayed.⁹

August,
A.D. 1759.

The long-expected fleet which was to bring rein-

⁸ *Tableau Historique de l'Expédition de l'Inde*, p. 21.

⁹ Orme, ii. 501, 507.

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Septem-
ber,
A.D. 1759.

forcements in men and supplies, and to restore the broken fortunes of the French, was now at hand. °Comte D'Aché, who had left the coast in September of the previous year, returned with eleven sail of the line, numerically superior to the English fleet under Pococke. It appears from D'Aché's narrative, that the French fleet, on arriving at the Isle of France in September 1759, found in the port a reinforcement of three men-of-war under M. d'Eguille, besides several of the French Company's ships. The force under his command, amounting to more than 5,000 men, now proved an embarrassment, and, as they could not be supplied in the isle, more than half the force was detached to the Isle of Bourbon and the Cape of Good Hope to make purchases. This was effected at a great cost, and in the meantime some of the Company's ships were equipped and fully armed. At length the fleet, formidable in numbers and superior to the English in artillery, made sail for India, and was not long in encountering the English under Pococke. The engagement which followed was one of those indecisive affairs which characterised the naval history of this period. The English fleet had the advantage of the wind and commenced the attack, and the engagement became general along the line, but as vessels on either side suffered in their rigging or took fire, they dropped out of the line. After two hours of cautious warfare, D'Aché was wounded, his captain killed, and the officer in command wore his ship to join those which had fallen astern. The remaining ships accepted this movement as a signal of retreat, left the line of battle, and were soon all out of gunshot. None of the English ships after the action could set half their sails, and the French fleet, two days after the engagement, anchored in the roads of Pondicherry.

The reinforcements that this great armament brought with them amounted to only 180 men, and the treasure to something more than 400,000 livres in dollars. Some diamonds, which had been taken from an English ship, valued at 400,000 livres, were added to this supply.¹

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September 16,
A.D. 1759.

The disappointment was great in the colony, and it broke into consternation when they found the fleet preparing for immediate departure. A public meeting was held, and attended by the officials and inhabitants of Pondicherry. They remonstrated in the strongest terms against the proposed desertion, involving, as they believed, the ruin of the French settlement. In the protest which was drawn up, D'Aché was held responsible for its loss, and a threat was held out of addressing an immediate complaint to the King and the ministry. Alarmed at this resolution, D'Aché consented to land some of the force, consisting of 400 Caffres and 500 Europeans, but adhered to his resolution of leaving the coast.

Whether more could have been effected seems doubtful. The English fleet confronted their opponents while they lay off Pondicherry, and although the latter got under way, no engagement ensued. Orme says the English fleet was driven by the current to the north; the French admiral says he was becalmed. Neither of them was eager for an encounter, and in the state of their vessels this is not surprising. So straitened were the French at Pondicherry that they could neither supply provisions for the fleet nor the means of refit; and their cordage and timber had been largely used up by the artillery; and so D'Aché bore away to the distant isles in the Indian Ocean.²

¹ Lally, *Mémoire*, &c., p. 128.

² This is D'Aché's statement (*Mémoire*, p. 26). His defence of his

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XL

If Lally ever entertained any hopes of bringing his enterprise to a successful issue, they were now dashed for ever; and he not unreasonably refers, in his subsequent defence, to the act of D'Aché as giving a final blow to his policy. From this time the coast was occupied by the fleet of the English, and the prospect of any material relief from France was cut off.

The moral effect of the departure of the fleet now manifested itself in a most alarming form. Complaints were openly made by the troops, whose pay was more than a year in arrear, and the officers could not venture to check them, because they were incontestable. At length the attempts to punish some acts of insubordination brought matters to a crisis. Within an hour the drums of the Lorraine regiment beat to arms, and in an instant every man was on the parade.³ The commissioned officers, and every serjeant except two, were excluded, and the regiment marched to a neighbouring mountain, lately occupied by the English force. The two other regiments, on hearing the drums of the Lorraine, also beat to arms as if expecting an attack. A party from the Lorraine was sent to confer with them, and invited them to join in redressing their wrongs. These words ran like fire; a cry was raised to march. and in spite of the exhortations of their officers, who were desired to retire, they marched off with seventeen pieces of cannon, their bazar and market, to which they appointed the usual guard. On

Oct 17,
A D 1759

conduct during the campaign shows him to have been very irresolute; but he may be credited in what he says of the want of preparation for a naval campaign, and the straits to which he was driven to refit his ships, for they had no port or magazines in the Eastern seas, except at the Isle of France

³ Lally's biographer says that this was the tenth mutiny, but that the others were partial

reaching the mountain of Vandewash, they appointed the sergeant-major of the grenadiers of Lorraine their commander-in-chief, and he in turn appointed another sergeant his major-general, and others of the rank and file to the command of companies, with the usual titles of commissioned officers. The most perfect order was maintained. The camp was pitched, and every detail of duty and discipline strictly observed. Some of their officers were allowed to enter the camp, but they were forbidden to attempt to exercise any authority, and on fears being expressed that they intended to go over to the enemy, they pointed to their guns, which were ranged in front of the camp in the direction from which the English army might be expected.

When the news of the revolt reached Pondicherry, a council was held, and Lally advanced 10,000 pagodas from his own chest, and his example was followed by members of the council, who sent their own plate to the mint. The alarm was so great that many of the inhabitants came forward with similar offers. Viscount Fumel was sent with full powers to treat with the mutineers, and after considerable negotiation, which was at one time broken off by the violence of some of their number, they were induced to accept half the pay due at once, with the promise of the rest in a month, and a free pardon for the past. The army then marched back to Vandewash under their old officers, where the evening was passed in dances and merriment as after some signal success.⁴

So complete a triumph confirmed the mutineers in their belief that Lally had purposely withheld the money he had received by the fleet, and he had henceforth to experience the alienation of the army in addition to that

⁴ Orme, ii. 528.

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of the civil and military authorities of Pondicherry. His differences with the latter now broke out afresh, owing to the unfortunate action of the home government. His early successes had made them sanguine of future triumphs, and the despatches which reached Pondicherry from the Company and ministers, complimented him on the fall of Cuddalore, Fort St. David, and Devi-Cottah, which, they added, 'will render for ever memorable your arrival at Pondicherry.' They added some instructions to carry on his inquiries into the state of the Company's affairs, to which they had attached so much importance on his appointment to the command.

The confusion which reigned in the finances of these settlements had already led to the appointment of a special commission charged with the control over the territorial revenues and the disbursement of funds required for the war. Monsieur Clouet, who was charged with this duty, after passing several months at Pondicherry, gave up the attempt in despair and quitted the settlement. The Company in their despatch charged the council with refusing to give the information M. Clouet required, and evading the inquiry. They now ordered him to return, and charged Lally with the task of inquiring into the whole administration of the Company, and tracing the origin of what they pronounced to be abuses without number. Reference was specially made to the collection of the revenues of ceded districts and the system of renting, regarding which little information, and that of an unsatisfactory kind, had reached France.⁵

A more unfortunate appointment could not have been made to carry out such an inquiry, even if Lally

⁵ *Mémoire pour le Comte de Lally, Pièces Justificatives*, pp. 21, 28.

had been supported by colleagues familiar with details of Indian administration. Charged as he was with the conduct of a war, and broken in health and worn with anxiety, it remained a dead letter, and only served to point the sarcasms he addressed to those with whom he was henceforth in constant collision.

Well might Voltaire say, referring to these instructions, that had Lally been the mildest of men he must have been hated. This unfortunate step on the part of the authorities at home rendered co-operation next to impossible, and contributed to the downward course of subsequent events.

The same despatches invested Bussy with the rank of second in command, and for a time brought these two generals into some accord. Lally made advances to his colleague, but their views were discordant, and in the conferences which followed, Bussy reverted to his old views of reviving the alliance with the Viceroy of Heiderábád.

After the fall of Masulipatam Salábat Jang hastened back to the capital, and came to terms with his brother Nizam Ali, who was reinstated in his high office. The younger brother, Basálut Jang, alarmed at this combination, made open advances to the French, and marched southward accompanied by the small French force of 200 Europeans and 2,000 sepoy, that had been dignified with the name of the army of observation. Bussy urged Lally to enter into alliance with the Viceroy, and in the straitened state of the French fortunes Lally made no objection. A meeting took place between Bussy and Basálut Jang in the neighbourhood of Cuddapa, about 100 miles distant in a direct line north of Arcot. But so low was the reputation of the French that the Mogul prince made it a condition of his alliance that the

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French should surrender to him Arcot and other possessions in the Carnatic, subject to the payment of one-third of the revenues, assist him in his war with his brother, and that after the peace he should be placed in possession of the whole Carnatic. As a climax, Bussy was to advance four lacs of rupees for the payment of the troops.⁶ These proposals rendered all negotiation impossible, and Bussy returned to the Carnatic to meet the taunts of his commanding officer, and their estrangement was greater than ever.

While these difficulties gathered round the French colony, the affairs of their rivals continued to improve monthly. In the month of March the resources of the English had been so much straitened that the Presidency, when pressed by Colonel Forde to send reinforcements of men and money, inclined to bring their troops into cantonments and send 200 men to the force before Masulipatam. From this they were dissuaded by Lawrence, who, while satisfied of the imprudence of attacking the French in the threatening position they occupied at Conjeveram, was equally persuaded of the danger of retreating before them. The army was kept in the field. Having given this counsel, Lawrence, whose health was much impaired, resigned the command of the army and returned to England.⁷ In the latter

⁶ *Mémoire pour le Sieur de Bussy. Lettres*, p. 144.

⁷ Since these pages were in type I have found among Mr. Elphinstone's papers the following fragment on the close of the career of Lawrence:— 'Lawrence now went home, worn out by ill-health and long and severe service. In addition to his many honours he went home poor; there was then no provision for retired officers, and the Court of Directors, who but for him would have seen the Company end its career at Trichinopoly, voted him a pension of 500*l*. Clive, in gratitude to his old commander, had previously begged his acceptance of an annuity of the same amount from his private fortune. The Court of Directors would have been liberal in rewarding a captain who had saved one of their merchant ships, but they were incapable of appreciating the merits of soldiers or statesmen.'

part of June three vessels reached Madras from England with 200 recruits for the Company's regiment, and bringing the welcome intelligence that the 84th regiment in the King's service, consisting of 1,000 men, would arrive shortly on the coast. Colonel Coote, in command of the regiment, was appointed to the command in Bengal, but with permission to stop and serve on the coast of Coromandel if his services were required. The satisfaction arising from this intelligence was damped by the information that accompanied it, that no more treasure would be sent till the following year. The wealth of Bengal, it was assumed, would supply the wants of the other Presidencies.

The expected reinforcements did not reach Madras till the following October, when 200 men were detached to Bengal, and Coote took the command of the force on the coast. This distinguished commander, who had served under Clive in his campaign against Suraj-udoula, was an able and wary warrior, and soon earned the confidence of the troops who served under him. His first act was to call a council of war at Conjeveram, where the largest portion of the troops were in cantonments. The utmost harmony prevailed, and it was determined to strike a blow at Vandewash.

The fort of Vandewash, on which turned the chief interest of the campaign, was about equidistant from Madras and Pondicherry, and commanded a rich extent of country on the Paliar, and was, with the exception of Arcot, the most important place in the occupation of the French in the Carnatic.

It had been attacked by the English in 1757, but when the French concentrated their force rapidly for its relief the siege was abandoned. A more determined attack was made in September of the year 1759. The

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enterprise had been meditated for some time by the authorities of Madras, who collected a force for the purpose. It was suspended when they heard of the arrival of the French reinforcements. Major Brereton, however, who was in command, on hearing of the expected arrival of Coote, would brook no delay and insisted on carrying out the enterprise, from which he expected to win laurels before he could be superseded ; and the Presidency gave way.

The assault was made at night by two columns, which advanced from the south and west. The pettahs were entered and traversed, and an irregular conflict ensued, but as the French rallied rapidly and were well supported by artillery, the advance was checked and the column which made the attack on the west parted from their commander and became confused ; and as the day broke that from the south bore the brunt of the fight. The French advanced their artillery into the streets and took the English in flank, and a retreat was then ordered. Upon this a grenadier company in passing through the gateway quickened their pace and began to run. Major Calliaud, who was at hand, instead of calling to them, rapidly ran past and stopped short before them, crying halt. The instinct of discipline prevailed, and they formed again and followed him into the pettah. It was too late, however, to rally the troops for a new attack. They were drawn off in good order, and no attempt was made by the enemy to pursue them.

This gallant attack, and the skill with which the force was drawn off in the face of a powerful artillery, is said by Orme to have increased rather than diminished the confidence of the army, but the victory remained with the French, and when the news reached Pondicherry Lally was so elated that he ordered a salute to

be fired in celebration of the victory. It was his last success, and was followed by new disasters.

Vandewash was now to be attacked again, and at last with success. The urgent wants of the French compelled them to scatter their forces with a view to maintenance and for the collection of their revenues. An expedition was organised to the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly for the protection of some territory from which they derived a considerable revenue. This led to a strong remonstrance from the council of Pondicherry, and formed one of the most severe charges brought against Lally at the close of the war. He justified himself in his defence on the plea of necessity, and added that one of his objects was to remove to a distance the battalion of India, which he accused of taking a leading part in the recent mutinies.⁸ Such were the difficulties of his position. He relied at the time on being joined by the army of Basálut Jang, but we have seen that this resource failed him, and the garrisons of several forts were weakened to maintain a show of force in the field, and Vandewash was defended only by a small force of less than 100 Europeans and about the same number of sepoy, besides the native garrison under the killadar. Coote moved against Arcot while Brereton proceeded with a strong detachment against Vandewash, and the following day, November 27, assaulted the pettah,⁹ which fell after a slight resistance. On the 29th a battery with two eighteen-pounders opened against the fort, and a breach was effected on the same day. Coote arrived with the remainder of the army, and the killadar offered to

A.D. 1759,

⁸ *Mémoire*, &c., p. 472.

⁹ *Pettah*, from the Tamil word *Pettai*, the suburb of a fortress. It is often separately fortified.—Yule's *Glossary of Indian Terms*.

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surrender, stipulating for terms apart from the French. This getting wind, the French soldiers appeared on the walls and offered to surrender the fort. Coote, who was in the battery, ordered a company of sepoy to enter the breach, and the place was won.

This success, in which not a man was killed on the side of the English and only five wounded, was followed by the capture of the fort of Carangoli, which lay thirty-five miles to the south-west of Vandewash. The pettah was attacked on December 4, the battery opened fire and breached the walls on the 6th. Colonel O'Kennedy, an officer of reputation in Lally's regiment, refused all terms, and a hot fire was continued for two more days, when there remained shot for only two more hours in the besiegers' battery. A flag of truce appeared unexpectedly on the walls, and Coote, to whom time was of the highest importance, granted nearly all that was asked. The garrison, which consisted of one hundred Europeans besides sepoy, marched out with their arms, colours flying and drums beating.

These successes raised the reputation of the English army in the southern provinces, and the King of Tanjore sent horse and foot to the nabob at Trichinopoly. Lally became sensible of his error in detaching so large a force to the southward, which nothing but the sternest necessity could have justified. He therefore sent orders to recall them all with the exception of 300 Europeans who were left in the pagoda of Seringham.

January,
A.D. 1760.

The French force was at this time concentrated in the neighbourhood of Arcot, and the two armies remained facing each other for several weeks without either of the commanders venturing to strike a decisive blow. Coote's hesitation was justified by the superiority of the enemy's cavalry. Lally had better reasons for

avoiding an action in his distrust of his own troops, and he was moreover in expectation of an early return of the force under Moracin from the northern province.

Both leaders were during the interval in treaty for aid from Maratta soldiers of fortune who were ready to sell their services to the highest bidder. Lally offered terms which brought to his side a detachment of more than 1,000 horse, and his superiority in the field was so established that Bussy, who was advancing rapidly to join him, ventured to offer him a piece of counsel which might have averted the disaster that followed. He urged him to engage in no more enterprises which would divide his forces, but keep them concentrated on the Paliar, detaching the Marattas to lay waste the English districts, when they would be reduced to the necessity of either giving battle under disadvantages, or retiring for subsistence on Conjeveran, where they would be hemmed in, and leave the French in command of the neighbouring districts.¹

The wisdom of this advice is confirmed by what we are told by Orme of the shifts to which the English were now driven by the clouds of native horsemen that surrounded their camp and cut off their supplies, while plenty poured into the enemy's camp. It was enough for Lally that this proposal came from Bussy, against whom his feelings were so embittered, and it was set aside.

Lally decided on the step which proved his ruin—the attempt to recover Vandewash. Here again the warning voice of Bussy was raised, urging him to return to the policy he adopted on his first arrival in India, and to concentrate his forces and occupy a position

¹ *Lettres de Messieurs de Bussy, de Lally, et autres*; Letter of October 5, 1759.

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Jan. 16,
A.D. 1760.

between the enemy and Madras, which would force them to fight at a disadvantage, but the advice was proffered in vain. The facility with which Coote had gained possession of the place encouraged Lally in the belief that he would carry it before Coote could bring relief. The first dash was attended with success. Some hesitation was shown by the French troops when they approached the wall of the pettah, whereupon Lally rode up, and, calling for volunteers, ran forward to the ditch and mounted the wall, followed by the troops. The English were driven out and batteries erected against the fort. Coote, who had long expected this movement, now prepared for action. His measures were soon taken. A breach had been made on the 20th, and on the following day Coote was at hand with his cavalry to reconnoitre the position. Receiving a message from Shirlock, who was in command of the garrison, that a breach had been effected, he ordered the main body of the army to advance from Outramalore, a distance of about fourteen miles.

Jan. 22,
A.D. 1760.

The mountain of Vandewash extends for about a league from the north-east to the south-west, the fort lying at a distance of about two miles from the western extremity. The French attack was made on the south front by a portion of the army, and was covered by the remainder, which lay at three miles from the eastern end of the mountain, and at about two from the fort; the left of its camp was protected by some tanks and enclosures. The plain was hard and dry, and admitted of the advance of the troops in order of battle. After reconnoitring the position, Coote rode back to his troops and announced his intention of leading the army to a general action; this was received with acclamation, and the troops formed in line of battle. As this was followed

by no corresponding movement in the French camp, Coote decided on an operation which seems hazardous in the face of so active an adversary. He drew his army off, coasting the mountain along some stony ground at its foot, where the enemy's cavalry could not act, with the object of forming afresh when he arrived opposite the fort, whence he could either throw new troops into the fort or engage the enemy, supported on his flank by the fire of the fort.

This skilful manœuvre determined the action of the French general. The camp immediately beat to arms, and soon after the troops were seen issuing from the lines to take up their position on the field chosen by the British general for the decisive conflict. The accounts which are presented to us of the relative strength of the two armies differ materially. According to Orme, the French force, independent of those in the trenches, consisted of 2,250 Europeans and 1,300 sepoy. The English army consisted of 1,900 Europeans and 2,100 sepoy, besides native cavalry. Lally says (*Mémoire*, &c., p. 476) that he had only 1,100 Europeans against 2,600 English. It is admitted by Orme that the English had a superiority in field artillery.

While the two lines were approaching, and before they were within cannon shot, the French European cavalry, taking a large sweep on the plain, came down on the left wing of the English army. The British native cavalry attempted to wheel to meet this attack, fell into confusion, and left the British horse, only eighty in number, to bear the brunt of the attack. The division of sepoy on the left being ordered to fall back in an angle, also got into confusion, but Captain Barker brought two guns to bear upon the approaching horsemen when they were within point blank range ;

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the quick firing of the guns brought down ten or fifteen men and horses, and threw them into such confusion that they went off in a gallop.

This is the account of the affair as described by Orme, from, it may be presumed, eye-witnesses of what occurred. It appears from Lally's account that he headed the charge, and throws the blame of the failure on the regimental officers who refused to follow him, one of whom he suspended on the spot. The troopers whom he harangued then advanced, but only for 150 yards, when they were dispersed by the fire of one of the enemy's guns, leaving their general alone on the field.² The result of the battle, he says, would not have been doubtful if his European cavalry had not refused to follow him in the charge of the enemy's left wing, which began to give way. In the same spirit he taunted Bussy with being the only prisoner made by the English.

The English army halted while this attack was repulsed, but now advanced to close with the enemy. Their artillery fire was better directed than that of their adversaries, and the Lorraine regiment on the French right was much galled by it. Lally, who had joined them, ordered them, with his usual impetuosity, to close with their enemy. They advanced in column, and broke through the opposing British line; but the rest fell on their flanks, a hand-to-hand encounter ensued, and the Lorraine regiment was scattered and ran in disorder to regain the camp. This was followed by a scene of confusion on the left. The explosion of a tumbril in the entrenched tank blew up eighty men and drove the

² *Mémoire pour le Comte de Lally*, p. 163. Lally says in a previous page that none of the Maratta auxiliary horse left their camp with the exception of 40, and this is confirmed by Orme. This may explain the hesitation of the French cavalry.

survivors from the tank, who were followed by 400 sepoys, who were in its rear. Coote instantly sent an aide-de-camp to order Draper's regiment to take possession of the entrenched camp before the enemy could recover from the confusion. Bussy was in command on the left. After attempting in vain to rally the fugitives, he endeavoured to check the British advance with Lally's regiment. Both French and English accounts agree that Bussy was ill-supported, and as two pieces attached to Draper's were brought to bear on the flank of Lally's regiment, the men began to waver, and Bussy found himself with only twenty men, his horse was shot under him, and before he could extricate himself he was a prisoner.

This decided the battle. The wings being broken, the centre fell back, but not in disorder, followed by the English regiments, which re-formed and entered the enemy's camp without meeting any opposition. The French cavalry, 300 in number, alone prevented the victory being converted into a rout. When they saw the confusion, they formed in the rear of the camp and checked the English horse, who were too few in number to venture an attack. The field-pieces in the rear of the camp, assisted in covering the retreat, and the whole army moved off, passing the pettah of Vandewash, where they were joined by the besieging troops from the trenches, leaving twenty-four pieces of cannon in the hands of the English, besides eleven tumbrils of ammunition, tents, stores, and baggage. The loss of the French, including prisoners, was estimated by Orme at 600 Europeans.

In Lally's own account of the engagement the loss of European troops is said to have been equal on both sides. This is denied by Orme, who gives the English

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loss in killed and wounded at 190, while the French left 200 dead on the field besides 160 prisoners, chiefly wounded, who fell into the hands of the victors. The moral effect of the victory was incalculable, and the unfortunate French general, with a demoralised army and at war with all around him, and deserted by his own Government, was unable henceforth to attempt any operations in the field, and confined himself to taking up a defensive position at Valdore, within a mile of Pondicherry, from which he could keep open his communications with the southern districts.

It is contended by Lally that the French resources were now so low that if Coote had followed up his success by moving on Pondicherry he would have become master of the place in eight days, inasmuch as it did not contain a single magazine.¹ One receives with some distrust statements intended to convey a charge that the council of Pondicherry, and not the general, was answerable for the fall of the place and the extinction of French power in the Deckan; but there seems every reason to believe that no provision had been made for a siege, for the efforts of the French were directed during the several months which followed to collect supplies and prepare for a struggle which was inevitable.

The field was now open to Coote to strike successive blows at the French fortresses throughout the Carnatic. In the course of three months Chittapet, Arcot, Trinomali, Permacoil, Alamparvah, and Cárical, Valdore, and Cuddalore fell into British hands. Of these Cárical

¹ *Tableau historique de l'expédition de l'Inde*, p. 32. The general says that he had for two years addressed orders and menaces to De Leyrit to form magazines. The same charge is retorted on Lally by the council, and forms one of the seven capital indictments they framed against him.

alone, an important port on the coast, offered any spirited resistance.

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The sacrifice of these small garrisons, including several hundreds of European troops, increased, if possible the odium with which Lally was regarded, though most unjustly, for had not the progress of the English army been delayed by these operations, Pondicherry would have been at once hemmed in and cut off from all supplies. In these desperate circumstances an unexpected ally appeared in the field, and checked the progress of the English for a time.

Heider Ali had in the preceding year acquired the whole power of the government of Mysore. Mahomed Beloly, his great-grandfather, was a native of the Punjab, and settled in the Deekan as a fakír. He acquired some reputation for sanctity, and with it some property. His descendants became successful soldiers, some of them taking service with the Rájá of Mysore. Heider's rise was rapid. He showed such ability and resources that he eclipsed or destroyed his rivals, acquired possession of the powerful fortress of Dindigul, and aspired to a lead in the politics of the country. The occasion was afforded by a mutiny of the troops of the Dalwái or regent, the rája's uncle. Heider used the authority of the rája to reduce that of the regent, and compelled him to retire to a Jágír. The rája was now brought forward, but, being young and unequal to the burden of the government, the whole power fell into the hands of Heider Ali, who readily entertained the overtures made to him by Lally. Negotiations were opened through a Portuguese monk of the name of Noronha, titular Bishop of Halicarnassus, who had resided for many years in the south, and acquired some knowledge of the politics of the country. A treaty was arranged,

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by which Heider was to supply a force of 2,000 horse and 4,000 sepoy with artillery, to be subsidised by the French, and to have the important fortress of Thiagar made over to him. Terms were also arranged for the division of future acquisitions by the allies. By this treaty Heider found employment for a large force, and what was at the time more important, the possession of a fort beyond the territory of Mysore, where he could store his treasure and find a refuge in case of any turn of fortune. He therefore engaged in the enterprise with great alacrity.

A force of 1,000 horse and 200 sepoy arrived at Thiagar early in June, and began to press on Kisanrao, the Maratta auxiliary of the English. They were joined after an interval by a French detachment, and as they increased in number they began to sweep the territory of the Nawab, and collected a large herd of cattle.

Their first attempt to throw supplies into the French camp was successful. The negotiation had been conducted with such secrecy that Coote received no intelligence of the alliance till the army was in motion, and he had no force at hand to check their advance. A mixed force under Major Moore of less than 3,000 men, 230 of whom were English, encountered the Mysore army near Trivadi, which lies south-west of Pondicherry, and were repulsed with severe loss, and the convoy reached Pondicherry in safety. Another convoy was collected at Jinji, but the English were now on the alert, and the French force at Pondicherry experienced great difficulty in keeping open the communication with their new allies. The marauding portion of the Mysore army was very active, and the revenues of the Nawab were lost wherever these parties appeared. The French took up a position several miles from Pondicherry, to

cover the action of their allies, but avoided an encounter with the enemy.

These plundering enterprises were attended with very moderate success, and the provisions collected were largely consumed by the Mysore force who had joined the French camp. Several months were consumed in this irregular warfare, in the course of which an incident occurred which serves to illustrate the disorder which prevailed at the head-quarters of the French. The ill-feeling which had long prevailed was heightened, if possible, by the successive losses of the detached garrisons, and gave rise to charges of incompetence or treason, to which Lally retaliated, complaining to the council of the cabals and intrigues against which he found it impossible to contend.²

In this state of feeling an English squadron suddenly appeared in the roads. There were only 600 European soldiers, invalids, in the town ; but there were, in addition, 500 European residents, a large number of whom were the covenanted servants of the East India Company. Orders were given to parade the whole number on the strand in view of the squadron, but a short time before the hour, the servants of the Company proceeded in a body to the court of the Government House and flatly refused to move, unless ordered to do so by the Governor and council. De Leyrit, to his credit, offered to place himself at their head, but the other councillors declared that none were obliged to bear arms out of the walls of the town. Lally confined himself to arresting the two spokesmen of the council and two of the most forward of the mutineers, and after disarming and dismissing the rest, he went on with the review. Such was the temper in which the French

² Letter of February 9, 1760. *Recueil des lettres par Messrs. de Leyrit et de Lally*, p. 423.

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colony were prepared to enter on their final struggle for existence.³

The town of Pondicherry—the prize for which the English were contending—lies about seventy yards from the sea, and was defended by several low bastions which commanded the road. On the three sides to the land it was fortified by a wall and rampart, flanked by eleven bastions, and surrounded by a ditch and imperfect glacis. At a distance of a mile from the walls ran a hedge of large aloes and other thorny plants, intermixed with palm trees, forming a defence impenetrable to cavalry, and of very difficult passage to infantry. This enclosure began at the north near the sea, and ran for five miles and a half, till it joined the river Ariocopang at a point a mile and a half from the sea. The river, which has two arms enclosing an island, completed the barrier to the south. Five roads led from the town, and at each of the openings in the hedge was built a redoubt mounted with cannon. Beyond the river was a fort of the same name, capable of holding a garrison of 300 men. The area enclosed by the hedge comprised nearly seven square miles, and afforded pasture for a number of cattle.⁴

The strength of the works had been tested by the English attack in 1748,⁵ and Lally was confident that with the aid of the Mysore troops he might keep the English at bay and secure the arrival of occasional convoys till relieved by the French fleet. Five hundred Europeans were detached to secure the fortresses of Jinji and Thiagar, and keep open their communications.

Their plans were frustrated by the defection of the

³ Orme; *Mémoire pour le Comte de Lally*, p. 140.

⁴ Orme, i. 104; ii. 655.

⁵ See *ante*, p. 113.

Mysore general. The alliance was not very cordial from the beginning. On the arrival of his brother Mukdúm Sahib at Pondicherry he became aware of the disunion that prevailed. Lally says that De Leyrit disapproved of the convention, and warned Heider Ali of the disfavour with which it was regarded, adding that Lally might soon expect his recall; whereupon the Mysore chief refused to take any part in the struggle until the signature of the Governor and council was added to the treaty. De Leyrit being thus obliged either to dismiss the auxiliaries or support the measures of Lally, reluctantly consented to the latter alternative, and the measures for provisioning the town proceeded.

Difficulties, however, arose in Mysore which brought that alliance to a close. When Major Smith, who commanded at Trichinopoly, heard of the arrival of the Mysore force in the Carnatic, he proposed to the Government of Madras to create a diversion by invading Mysore. This met with its approval, and he now prepared to carry this out with a force consisting of 50 Europeans, with two guns and four cohorns, 700 sepoys, 600 horse, and 1,000 peons armed with matchlocks, drawn from the territory of the Nabob of Tanjore. Besides these were 3,000 coleris from the neighbouring Poligárs, who joined in the hope of plunder. With this motley force he advanced boldly to attack the fort at Carúr, within the territory of Mysore, only fifty miles from Trichinopoly, and occupied by a strong garrison equal in number to the attacking force, exclusive of the coleris. Under cover of their field-pieces they crossed the river on which the pettah is placed, occupied it, and from this approached to within forty yards of the fort, and thence proceeded by double sap, with earth and gabions on each side, to the edge of the

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ditch and blew in the counterscarp. The latter operation, owing to the small number of Europeans, was tedious, and seven days were employed in carrying the sap; but the success which attended the advance alarmed the garrison, who saw their enemy approaching under cover to the foot of their walls, and fearing the fort might be entered by the same means, they proposed terms. The Governor disavowed any participation of the King of Mysore with Heider Ali, whom he styled a rebel, and offered to surrender the bastion attacked, the rest of the English force remaining in the pettah, until orders arrived from Madras, with whom would rest the decision whether the fort should be surrendered. As one eighteen-pounder of the besiegers burst during the negotiation, Captain Smith accepted the terms which placed British troops in a commanding position in the fortress, and his conduct received the approval of the Presidency, who were now satisfied that Heider Ali and the King of Mysore were at variance, ordered Smith to hold possession, disavowing at the same time any hostility to the King.

While this little campaign was in progress events occurred in Mysore which determined the alliance of Heider Ali with the French. Bálaji Ráo, the general and regent of the Marattas, crossed the Kishna early in the year to levy chout in the Deckan, and in the month of June appeared on the confines of Mysore. At this critical movement Heider Ali, as if by disgust, resigned his post of general and minister, in the full expectation that the approach of the Marattas would lead to his reinstatement in increased power. The artifice nearly proved fatal to him. He discovered that the Marattas had engaged to seize his person, on which he mounted in the dead of night and fled with a hand-

ful of horsemen from the neighbourhood of Seringapatam, where he was residing with his family in fancied security, and reached Bangalore the next day, and having secured the garrison, he sent orders to his brother to quit the Carnatic without delay and join him at Bangalore. Mukdúm Sáhib hesitated to sacrifice the prospects of plunder and of cessions of territory from the French alliance, and remained in the Carnatic till he received more peremptory orders from his brother at the beginning of September, when he retired from the Carnatic with all his troops, restoring to his allies the fort of Thiagar. Such were the ups and downs of public life in India in those days.

Lally now experienced a more serious defection than that of the usurper of Mysore. The French squadron at the Isle of France encountered at the end of January a hurricane which inflicted serious damage on the fleet, swept the island, and destroyed the magazines of grain. Months were employed in repairing the damages to ships, and in their crippled condition very little could be done to supply the fleet with the provisions they usually procured at the Cape or at Madagascar. On June 8 a vessel arrived from France with intelligence that an expedition was being fitted out in England to attack these possessions, and that a regiment would be sent from France for their defence. The squadron was ordered to remain there. A.D. 1760.

The news of the storm reached Pondicherry in July, with dubious assurances of the return of the squadron to the coast of Coromandel. Lally put little faith in these promises, and when he received intelligence concerning the supposed attack on the Mauritius, he abandoned all hope of relief, though he concealed his opinion, and gave out that the ships which had

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left for Madagascar might shortly be expected on the coast.

Many months had elapsed ere the French had received any reinforcements. They were abandoned by their own Government and unable to form any alliance with any native power. Under such disadvantages, and at war with those around him, Lally maintained a determined front to the attack of his besiegers, and compelled them to resort to the slow process of a blockade, protracting his resistance for nearly a twelvemonth from the battle of Vandewash.

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The last day of August brought to the English camp the welcome intelligence of the arrival on the coast of six Company's ships, with 800 men drafted to replace the deficiencies in Draper's and Coote's regiments. The British general now made preparations for an attack on Pondicherry. In this he received the hearty co-operation of Mr. Pigott, Governor of Madras, who represented in a memorial to Admiral Stevens the necessity of getting possession of the bound hedge⁶ and its redoubts without delay, and with a view to the completion of the investment of the place, he urged the attack on the fort of Ariocopang which lies to the south.⁷ He therefore pressed the admiral to land all the marines of the fleet to support the attack, and to remain on the coast through the approaching stormy season to complete the blockade. The admiral was loth to deprive himself of the marines in case of the approach of the enemy's squadron, but readily acquiesced in the importance and benefit of the service

⁶ I use the name which is applied to the fence by Orme and other English writers. It is properly the hedge of the bounds or limits of the French possessions, when they first established a factory on the coast. 'Ce n'était d'abord qu'un comptoir entouré d'une forte haie d'acacias, de palmiers, de cocotiers, d'aloès; et on appelait cette place la haie des limites.' (Voltaire, *Fragments sur l'Inde*.)

⁷ See ante, p. 113.

they might render ashore, and landed the whole force at Cuddalore, amounting with their officers to 423 men.

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Five days later there arrived at Cuddalore three King's ships with a convoy of several Company's ships, and an addition to the land forces of part of a Highland regiment. The fleet before Pondicherry now amounted to seventeen sail of the line.

Some difference of opinion existed between the two English commanders as to the point to which the first attack should be directed. Coote attached the first importance to the possession of the fort of Ariocopang which guarded the approach on the south, while Monson urged an immediate attack on the bound hedge, which with its redoubts covered the east and north fronts.

The pertinacity with which the latter pressed his views caused some delay, and Lally hearing of movements in the besieging camp, and suspecting that they intended to take the initiative, determined to be beforehand with them, and marched boldly out to attack the enemy's camp. The enterprise was well planned, and the surprise was complete.

The French were divided into three columns, which advanced along two avenues that led from the west of the town. One of the attacks, delivered against a redoubt on some elevated ground to the left of the English position, was repulsed. Another division passed to the left, and carried a redoubt on a hillock in front of the English camp. A sharp encounter occurred at a retrenchment in the avenue to the left, but the promptitude with which Coote brought down troops to defend the position checked the enemy, and the French officers, hearing nothing of the main attack on the left and rear of the English camp, which had been repulsed,

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drew off, and the enterprise collapsed. The failure was attributable to a mistake made by the column on the right, which did not arrive at its appointed place till the other attempt had either been repulsed or ceased—not an uncommon event in midnight enterprises conducted by different forces under a common design—but it furnished Lally with the means of making a sharp attack on the commander of the Company's troops who led the column.

At this critical period a change took place in the command of the English troops which is imperfectly explained. The ships which last arrived brought commissions from the War Office promoting Majors Brereton and Monson to the rank of lieutenant-colonels, with dates prior to that of Colonel Coote; but they were ordered not to assert their commission while he remained on the coast. The latter officer, however, rightly assumed that it was intended to remove him to his original command in Bengal, and decided on delivering over the command at once to Monson, notifying his intention to proceed with his whole regiment to Bengal. The President remonstrated against this, and Monson declared that if this part of the force were withdrawn, he must abandon the siege. Coote, thus appealed to, consented to their remaining, and himself left for Madras.

Coote's supersession did not last long. Monson, on taking the command, seized on the opportunity to deliver the attack on the bound hedge which he had lately pressed ineffectually on his superior in command. The redoubts which covered the line of defence guarded the avenues which led to the town from the west, and were held by the principal part of the French force, some of which was advanced to the village of Oulgarry which

lay between the hedge and the English camp, but the numbers were unequal to the defence of such a position, and it was not conducted with vigour.

The English force was divided into two brigades ; that to the left, which was commanded by Monson, had to take a large circuit through some rising ground, and fall on the extreme right of the French position. The right attack, which was commanded by Major Joseph Smith, the senior officer of the Company's troops, advanced direct from the English camp on the village of Oulgarry. A sharp encounter took place at this post, which was defended by an entrenchment. This work was stormed by two companies of the attack, and the main body passing to the left through some gardens came on the force in the village which now opened fire from the field-guns. The English guns were drawn out to reply, but Major Smith, who enjoyed the confidence of his men, ordered an instant attack, and the enemy who were dispirited by the loss of the entrenchment, offered only a slender resistance and were driven out of the village.

A scene of confusion now arose similar to that which had marred the French attack and nearly proved fatal to the enterprise. The left attack wandered among the sand-hills, and the officer who led to the right also lost his way and sent back to Monson for instructions. When day broke Monson found his troops in disorder, but pushing boldly on through ground broken by enclosures, he came suddenly on the redoubt and received the fire from a twenty-four pounder which killed eleven of the assailants and wounded twenty-six, among whom was Monson himself, whose leg was broken in two places. This did not check the advance of the grenadiers, who made their way through

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the embrasures, and the garrison ran out at the gorge, and those who defended the hedge, which was attacked at the same time, abandoned their posts also, and hurried in disorder to gain the glacis.

Meanwhile Monson's rearguard, which had lost its way, advanced between the two attacks, and its sudden appearance equally startled both friend and foe.

Major Smith, who commanded the left attack, sent messenger after messenger to discover who they were, but the French who were in advance of the hedge lost heart and returned to the redoubt, into which they were followed by Major Smith with such vigour that the English passed the hedge and the garrison of the redoubts returned to the town.

On the ensuing night the enemy made a vigorous attack on the forts which they had abandoned, the gorges of which were open to the town, but they were defended with resolution, and the attacking party was too small to make an impression.

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The judgment with which the enterprise was planned was confirmed by the abandonment of the Ariocopang fort. Two days after the fall of the western redoubts, the French retreated from the south side, and as they were leaving it they sprang a mine which blew in the bastions to the west, and laid the whole place open.

When the news of these successes reached Madras, Coote was still on the coast, and as Monson was disabled by his wound, Coote was urged by the President to assume the command. He accordingly returned to the camp before Pondicherry on September 20, and followed up the attack which Monson had initiated, with such vigour that in the course of ten days the enemy were driven out of the two redoubts that

remained in their possession, and the bound hedge was converted from a line of defence to one of investment, which effectually closed the approach on the land side, except where a small island in the Ariocopang river kept open the communication with the south.

The last redoubt was carried on September 27. A.D. 1760. The rainy season was drawing to a close, and the besiegers, distrusting the results of a blockade, which might at any time be terminated by the return of the fleet, decided on taking advantage of the change of season to press the siege with vigour. Battering guns and ammunition were brought from Madras; a battery was formed on the north-east angle of the works, and opened fire on November 10. Some more batteries were completed at the beginning of December, but the work of landing stores was slow, and the fire was ineffective. Frequent attempts were made by the French to keep open the communication with Thiagarand Jinji, where the garrisons were active in collecting provisions, and frequently skirmishing with the English force in the field.

• • Their efforts were supported by three French ships, which lay under the command of the guns of Pondicherry. Two of them, however, were cut out by the boats of the English fleet; a spirited enterprise in which 26 boats with 400 men were engaged, and carried off the ships in spite of a heavy fire from the French batteries.

As the resources of the garrison became more limited signs of the straits to which the garrison were reduced became frequent. • At the beginning of November an attempt was made to force the English lines by a detachment which was sent to reinforce the troops in the field, but they were intercepted and driven back. Later in the month, about fifty horse, the remains of the

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cavalry, for whom no forage could be found, were supplied with picked riders, and thrown across the river, and the men were ordered to make their way to Thiagar. They were accompanied by 200 grenadiers who, passing the river on rafts, advanced and delivered their fire, and under the confusion which arose, this small band dashed off across the plain.

In October, when the want of provisions began to press hard, Lally assembled a general council and proposed the immediate expulsion of the black inhabitants. The proposal was resented by the Europeans as depriving them of their domestics, and the assembly broke up without coming to any decision. But on November 27 the garrison was reduced to such straits, that this act of authority was put in force by Lally without remonstrance, and a motley crowd of 1,400, of both sexes and of every age, were expelled from the gates. On reaching the English lines they were stopped by the advanced sepoys, and compelled to retire; they returned to the foot of the glacis, and some of them who attempted to pass over to the covered way were fired upon and killed. For six days these wretched people wandered in bands over the plain, till at length Colonel Coote, finding the French general inflexible, allowed the whole multitude to pass.

The French troops were now put on an allowance of a pound of bread a day, with occasionally a little meat; but as the provisions became scanty, strict search was made in every house, and whatever could be found was brought to the common store. At the close of December the public store did not exceed the consumption of three days.

At this conjuncture an event occurred which promised for a time a prospect of deliverance. There were

at this time eight sail of the line besides frigates lying in the road. On December 30 a large swell came in from the south-east, giving warning of an approaching storm. During the following day the wind blew in squalls, every one stronger than the last. At ten at night Admiral Stevens' ship cut her cable, and fired a signal for the other ships to do the same, but the signal guns were not heard, and the ships rode till their cables parted with the strain, and with some difficulty got before the wind. About midnight the wind veered from the north-west, where it began to blow, to the north-east, and fell dead calm, and then flew round to the south-west, and blew with such fury that one line-of-battle ship was thrown on its beam ends, and only righted after cutting away her mizen and main-masts. Three others rode it out, one after cutting away all its masts. Three other vessels drove towards the shore. The roaring of the surf was not to be distinguished in the tumult of the elements; they were driven ashore two miles to the south of Pondicherry. Two other line-of-battle ships and a store ship survived the shock and preserved their masts; but this constituted a new danger, for in bringing them up for the purpose of anchoring, they were upset and went to the bottom, and 1,100 Europeans perished with them.

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The ravage on land was scarcely less severe, though not accompanied by so great loss of life. All the tents and temporary casernes in the camp to the north and at the outposts were blown to pieces. The ammunition served out for service was destroyed; nothing remained uninjured that was not under the shelter of masonry. The soldiers left their muskets on the ground, and sought shelter where it could be found, and many of the natives perished in the inclemency of the hour.

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The following morning the sun rose bright, and showed the havoc spread around. When the garrison looked out on the scene of destruction, it was proposed to march out to attack the English army; but the sea had everywhere broken over the beach, and overflowed the country as far as the bound hedge, destroying the batteries wherever raised. No artillery could move through the inundation, nor could the troops carry their ammunition dry, and the attempt to move from the walls was pronounced impracticable. Otherwise, it is said, for three hours after daylight scarcely a hundred men of the attacking force could have been collected together in a condition to resist them.⁸ The opposing armies now looked earnestly to the sea; the garrison in the expectation that the Madagascar fleet might at last make its appearance, the besiegers in their anxiety for the missing ships of the squadron. All that Lally could now do was to send messages to Tranquebar and Negapatam to send supplies at every risk and on any vessel that could be found. Even this resource failed. Within seven days the English ships which had put to sea returned in a shattered state, and the four dismasted vessels were rigged in a condition to keep at sea, and thus the garrison, whose minds had been elevated by

⁸ A recent historian of these events, who takes the most favourable view of Lally's conduct throughout, contends with confidence that the sortie ought to have been made, and assumes that it would have been made had not Lally been prostrated by illness. Orme, who was a fair if not a good judge of military matters, affirms that any such attempt was 'impracticable;' and this was the opinion of Lally himself, against whom the charge was afterwards preferred that he had not seized on the occasion to attack the enemy. In reply he confirms what Orme says of the extent of the inundation, and says that the garrison was too reduced by famine to make the attempt, and refers to the evidence of Landivissau, who was in command of the garrison, and said it would have resulted in a useless sacrifice of troops. (*Mémoire pour le Comte de Lally*, pp. 34, 35.)

the hope of deliverance, found the road again blockaded by eleven sail of the line, though three were only of fifty guns, but strengthened by the crews of the stranded vessels, and their boats swept the coast and drove away all the coasting vessels that came with provisions. During the confusion which followed the storm some boats escaped from the town, one of them carrying the son of the unfortunate Chanda Sáheb, who since the defeat of Vandewash had resided at Pondicherry.

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It was known to the English general that the French to the last were carrying on negotiations with the Marattas. Lally's sanguine spirit clung to the hope of aid from this quarter when all other resources failed. The Marattas made overtures to both sides, and at one time threatened to join the French. It became therefore of importance to push on the works, and not trust to the slow process of the blockade. The breaching batteries when repaired were advanced within 500 yards of the north-west angle, and opened a fire which was returned hotly from the town. Still the attack was carried on, and preparations were made to advance the batteries nearer to the walls when this protracted contest was brought to a close.

On the evening of January 15, Coote, while making his way to the batteries, observed a flag approaching which preceded a deputation that came on foot, as the town had neither horses nor palanquins. They consisted of Colonel Durre, the commander of the artillery, Father Lavour, superior of the Jesuits, who played a prominent part in the politics of the community, and two members of the council. The message which was delivered by Colonel Durre, and which bore Lally's signature, was haughty and uncompromising. It

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charged the English with having taken Chandernagór against the faith of the treaties of neutrality which had always prevailed among the European nations in Bengal, though the French settlement had rendered the English the most signal service in succouring the inhabitants of Calcutta when surprised by Suraj-u-Dowla. It denounced the Government of Madras for refusing to fulfil the conditions of the cartel concluded between the two crowns. This conduct, the message proceeds, 'puts it out of his power to propose a capitulation for the city of Pondicherry. The troops of the King and Company surrender themselves, for want of provisions, prisoners of war to his Britannic Majesty, conformably to the terms of the cartel which Mr. Lally claims for the inhabitants, as also for the exercise of the Roman Catholic religion, the religious houses, &c., referring to the two courts to decide a proportional reparation for the violations of treaties so solemnly established.' A special demand was made in favour of the family of Chanda Sáheb, which was as follows :—

'From a principle of justice and humanity alone, I demand that the mother and sisters of Rajahsaheb be permitted to seek an asylum where they please, or that they remain prisoners of the English and be not delivered into the hands of Mehemetalikan, which are still stained with the blood of the husband and father that he has spilt, to the shame indeed of those who gave him up to him, but not less to the commander of the English army who should not have allowed such barbarity to have been committed in his camp.' A separate message was delivered from the Governor and council of Pondicherry, with a series of requisitions claiming protection for the inhabitants for themselves and property, and for the exercise of their religion ; no buildings to be

demolished until the decision of their respective sovereigns should be taken.

These impossible demands from the military and civil authorities were simply set aside by the English general, who, in his reply to Lally's message passed over the reference to Chandernagór and the dispute regarding the cartel as having no bearing on the surrender of Pondicherry, but insisted that the garrison should surrender as prisoners of war, to be treated at his discretion, which should not be deficient in humanity. Assurances, however, were conveyed that proper care should be taken of the family of Rájá Sáheb, and that they should not be delivered into the hands of Mahomed Ali.

On the following day the citadel was delivered up, and the garrison drew up on the parade facing the English troops, and 1,100 men, exclusive of commissioned officers and invalids, whose faces showed marks of the privation they had undergone, took a part in this surrender. It was found that not two days' provisions, at the scanty rate to which they had been reduced, were found in the stores.

The dissolution of authority in the town was followed by a scene of violence and outrage. Whatever were the faults and shortcomings of the unfortunate general, it could not be denied that he had kept the English at bay for nearly twelve months from the battle of Vandewash, and for four months from the commencement of the blockade, and that the place only surrendered under the extremity of famine; but so strong was the feeling in the settlement that he was the author of their calamities, that he was assailed by the most violent menaces. A party of officers, chiefly of the French Company's battalion, endeavoured to force their way to

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his apartment, and were kept back only by the guard, and when he prepared to leave the place a still larger number assembled with demonstrations of violence. After the menace of the morning, he had applied to the English general for an escort. It consisted of fifteen English hussars, and they conveyed him in safety beyond the walls. An hour afterwards, M. Dubois, the King's commissioner, made his appearance, but on foot. The same assembly was at hand, and assailed him with similar menaces. Dubois put his hand on his sword, and was instantly assailed by one of the number, who on the second pass ran him through the body. Such was the temper of the community that his body lay for four hours on the door step, and the curé of the parish refused to assist in his interment, which was performed in the garden by his servants. The unfortunate intendant was the depository of all the complaints that had been addressed to Lally against the officers and employés of the Company, and of all documents connected with the administration of Masulipatam. Immediately after his death a seal was placed on his papers by the procureur du roi, but none of the documents were afterwards produced.

On the fourth day after the surrender, the harmony which prevailed between the English civil and military authorities was broken by a dispute which, under other circumstances, might have been attended with serious consequences. Mr. Pigott demanded of Colonel Coote that Pondicherry should be delivered over to the Presidency of Madras under the King's patent of January 14, 1758, which regulates the Company's share and title to captures. Colonel Coote summoned a council of war, composed of the chief naval and military officers, who disputed the pretension; whereupon

Pigott boldly declared that unless Pondicherry were delivered up to him he would not furnish the money for the subsistence of the King's troops or for the prisoners. Neither the admiral nor the commander of the King's troops were authorised to draw bills on the government at home, and acquiesced in the demand, declaring the Presidency answerable for the consequences.

The first use that the council of Madras made of this authority was to demolish the fortifications of Pondicherry. It was part of Lally's instructions to destroy the maritime possessions of the English which might fall into his hands. The instructions were intercepted, and the Directors of the East India Company gave instructions to deal out the same measure to the settlements of the French should they fall into their power.

The demolition was carried out without delay, as the English fleet had to repair to Bombay to refit, and apprehension was felt that the French might arrive on the coast during their absence.

The fall of Pondicherry virtually brought the war to a close. There remained only on the coast of Comorandel two fortresses in possession of the French, Thiagar and Jinji. They occupied the crests of elevated mountains, the latter being of great extent, the walls of the works measuring more than 12,000 yards, and the forts being supposed to be unapproachable. The garrison of Jinji consisted of only 150 Europeans and 600 sepoys, besides irregulars, and that of Thiagar was but little more. After some show of resistance they capitulated on terms. The fort of Mahé and its dependencies, on the coast of Malabar, was also reduced, and on April 5, 1761, the day of the surrender of Jinji, there remained not a fortified post in the possession of the French, thus terminating a contest which had lasted with scarce an

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intermission of a year for fifteen years, from the date of La Bourdonnais' attack on Madras in 1746.

For more than five years after these events was the struggle between Lally and his enemies carried on, till it was closed by the sword of the executioner. Two months after the fall of Pondicherry, he sailed for England, a prisoner of war, and arrived in London in September of the same year. He there heard that a storm was gathering in Paris, and that the complaints of the council of Pondicherry had already reached the capital. He instantly asked and obtained permission to return to France on his parole, to meet the charges on the spot.

He was soon followed by his enemies, and a series of printed volumes were launched on either side, and circulated freely in the city.

It would not appear from the statement of Lally's biographer that the ministers were disposed to make him answerable for the loss of the Indian possessions.⁹ His reception was not discouraging. The Duke de Choiseul sought to reconcile him with Bussy; D'Aché made open advances to him in the full court; the Minister of Finances stood by him, and pressed Lally to submit himself to the decision of the King, a proposal tending to crush the whole dispute. In the temper in which Lally returned to France, conciliation was impossible, nor were his adversaries more inclined to moderate counsels. Lally had enemies in the ministry who were ready to take advantage of the storm that broke on his head, and screen themselves under the cover of those attacks. A war had now ended, in the course of which the armies and navies of France had been worsted, and it had been stripped of important possessions in all parts of the world. On November 3, 1762, terms of

⁹ *Biographie Universelle*, xxiii., article 'Lally.'

peace were signed under which these cessions were acknowledged. On the 1st of the same month the Minister of War signed the lettre de cachet, by which Lally was to be consigned to the Bastille. Intimation was conveyed to him by the friends of the Minister, in the hope that he would quit the scene. He was too proud and too conscious of his innocence to act on the suggestion. On the contrary he hastened to Fontainebleau, and wrote to the Duke de Choiseul, bringing, as he said, his head and his innocence, and he surrendered himself to the prison which he was not to quit till he was dragged to the scaffold.

In the petition which the Governor and council of Pondicherry presented to the King in reply to the attacks of Lally, they urged him to name the tribunal to which they should be referred. A difficulty now presented itself to the Government as to the court which should take cognisance of these mixed charges of military and civil crimes and misdemeanours. They were instituted in the first instance in the Châtelet or criminal court, but the letters patent of the King removed them to the grand chamber of the Parliament, and the charges were drawn up in general terms which involved inquiry into the conduct of all parties. They were there required to investigate all criminal acts in India both before and after the arrival of Lally in the settlement.¹ This show of impartiality was set at naught in the subsequent proceedings. The Procureur-General directed the proceedings against Lally alone, and as the terms

¹ These are the terms of the reference as quoted by the author of the article in the *Biographie*. The court was instructed to take cognisance 'de tous les délits commis dans l'Inde, tant avant que depuis l'envoi du Comte de Lally.' The words italicised do not appear in the terms as quoted by Voltaire, but he adds words which make them equally general: 'Pour être le procès fait et parfait aux auteurs desdits délits, selon la rigueur des ordonnances.'

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high treason and *lèse-majesté* had been introduced into the act of accusation, he was deprived of the aid of counsel. The accused now became accusers and witnesses in their own cause, and the disgraceful spectacle was produced of a general officer being confronted with officers of the lowest rank before a civil tribunal of the highest instance, to meet the accusations of a monk and a party of merchants regarding the operations of a campaign. The scandal of the procedure did not rest there. For nineteen months he remained in prison before he was subjected to the usual interrogations. Through the whole of the proceedings he was deprived of counsel, though on three several occasions he made the demand to be allowed the assistance afforded to the meanest criminal. For two more years did this disgraceful process drag on, during which he was confronted with a troop of witnesses, against thirty-four of whom he entered charges of incompetence. With his usual indiscretion he had brought charges against Bussy and D'Aché—against the latter with some reason, as having by his abandonment of the coast been the chief cause of the fall of Pondicherry; though the charge really bears more against the Government at home for their long neglect of the settlement.

These officers published volumes in vindication of their conduct, and contributed to swell the proceedings and confuse the case. During the whole process the general maintained the same haughty and intemperate bearing, retorting charges against one and all of his accusers, and even attacking his judges. This last conduct was calculated to provoke an adverse decision, but neither the violence of the attack nor of the defence serve to clear the conduct of the court in their sentence.

The Parliament of Paris when in full court consisted

of upwards of 100 persons, and by its constitution was independent of the crown. It had been on some memorable occasions in conflict with its authority. It had sympathies with the people and had partaken of the passions of the multitude. Two French historians, Voltaire and Sismondi, referring to these transactions, attribute their conduct on this occasion to their hostility to all officers in military command, and reference is made by the latter historian to various instances where this spirit was shown.

The charges against Lally resolve themselves into three heads ; abuses of his authority in his treatment of public servants in the East, pecuniary corruption, and military misconduct. The council of Pondicherry, in framing this indictment, did not pretend to specify any acts of malversation, but held him accountable for the receipt of revenues and contributions, leaving the pecuniary question to the investigation of the Government, and nothing but vague suspicions were alleged against him on that score. It was on the last charge that they laid the principal stress, and they were embodied in nine articles, which in their words proved 'something more than mere want of capacity.'²

They cover the whole campaign, which was marked by many blunders, but none of them warranting the malignant accusations against him, and embraced such questions as the conduct of the siege of Madras, the division of the French army before Vandewash and its dispersion after that event, the imprudence of keeping the Mysore forces inactive on the glacis of Pondicherry, to the exhaustion of the stores of the place ; and finally the rejection of every expedient and counsel that was incessantly offered to him for the relief of the place

² Lally, *Mémoire, Pièces Justificatives*, No. 98.

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These were questions for a military tribunal, which Lally in vain demanded. The Parliament of Paris, after admitting every frivolous accusation, specimens of which may be found in Voltaire's narrative,³ gave a deliverance which stands as a monument of judicial folly. No specific acts of misdemeanour are alleged, the military misconduct is entirely passed over, but he is declared attainted and convicted of having betrayed the interests of the King, the State, and of the East India Company; of abuse of authority, and exactions and vexations against the subjects of King and foreigners, inhabitants of Pondicherry; in expiation of which he was condemned to be deprived of his honours and dignities, and to be beheaded by the public executioner.

Voltaire, in recording this sentence, takes pains to inform his readers that the expression 'betray interests' signifies in French no more than to neglect or injure interests, and not fraud, and that it has no analogy to the high treason of England, the corresponding words in French law being *lèse-majesté*. The terms in the sentence were employed deliberately to give colour to the malignant cry that was raised in France that he had sold Pondicherry to the English, and they were so understood by Lally himself, who, when the sentence was read, interrupted the officer of the court when he came to the words betrayed the interests of the King, and exclaimed 'It is false; never, never!' He then broke out into violent language against his judges and the ministers, whom he accused of being the authors of his fate; then recovering himself he suddenly seized a compass that was lying on the table and plunged it into his bosom. The blow did not penetrate the heart, and he submitted with fortitude to the sentence, which was

³ *Fragmens sur l'Inde*, article xix.

attended with circumstances of unusual ignominy. The execution was hastened by six hours, in order to anticipate, so it was supposed, any appeal to the crown; a common cart was prepared, and a large gag was placed in his mouth, and in this state he was dragged to the place of execution.

So perished, in the sixty-seventh year of his age, a man whose faults of temper and want of judgment are conspicuous in the narrative of the struggle in which he took a part. The national historians of these events take pains to point out the extravagance of the charge against him of having sold Pondicherry. They do not deserve a serious refutation; and yet it was to the belief in his guilt in this respect that he owed his fate, and this sentence was pronounced by a tribunal composed of public functionaries of the highest dignity, not in the first burst of passion which followed the announcement of the national dishonour, but upwards of five years after the events to which they refer, and nearly four years after the signature of the treaty of peace.

Orme closes his narrative of the career of Lally with a brief review of the military questions which would have been submitted to a board of general officers had his request been complied with, and points out that, of the many errors attributed to him, some were venial, and others capable of justification in the difficult circumstances in which he was placed, and all would have been viewed with discernment and judged with impartiality. His narrative closes with a well-merited encomium on the sagacity and enterprise displayed by Coote throughout the campaign, in which he won the confidence of his troops, and was seconded by the civil authorities.

It is to be remembered throughout that Lally was confronted by public servants of the highest abilities

(Olive, Coote, and Pigott) who acted together with the utmost harmony, in marked contrast to the wretched bickerings of the French.

Ten years later this iniquitous judgment was annulled by an act as formal as that which had pronounced the sentence.

Lally left a son to whom he gave a parting charge to vindicate the memory of his father. On his coming of age he presented a petition to the Council of the King to annul the judgment. So complete was the change in public opinion that the petition received the unanimous assent of eighty magistrates, and after thirty-two sittings of the court the unanimous decree of seventy-two magistrates was declared, not merely on the injustice but the illegality of the former sentence. The violation of legal forms which had preceded and accompanied this judgment was so glaring that the reporter, Lambert, in drawing up the decree of cassation pronounced emphatically that there were no witnesses and no crime.

The memory of Lally was now vindicated, not merely in public opinion, but in the technical language of the court. The young Lally, to make his victory complete, resorted to another process, not unusual in French history, by which the attain which attaches to those who have suffered for the crime of *lèse-majesté* has been removed by subsequent judicial proceedings. He demanded his honourable acquittal of the crime of *lèse-majesté*. This appeal was also accepted, and the procedure was closed by a royal edict in which a high eulogium was passed on the conduct and services of the unfortunate Governor.⁴

The death of Lally did not restore life to the French East India Company. On the termination of the war,

⁴ *Biographie Universelle*, article 'Lally.'

when the settlements were restored to France, it became a question with the Government whether the exclusive privilege of trade should be renewed. A review of the disastrous career of the Company was drawn up by the Abbé Morellet, who spoke on this occasion, according to Voltaire, as the mouthpiece of the ministry, and in opposition to the renewal of those privileges which it was contended had been the cause of their ruin, and which ought never to have been confirmed.

It would be harsh to pronounce with this writer that there was something in the genius of the French character, if not its Government, which rendered them incapable of association for such commercial enterprises.

The failure of the French, as contrasted with the success of the English, the Dutch, and even the Danes, is pointedly referred to by the Abbé Morellet, with the apparent approval of Voltaire ; but this failure is rather attributable to the acts of the Government than to the servants of the Company. The Company of France had been pampered from the time of Richelieu, and between the years 1727 and 1769 they had been supplied with funds from the State amounting to the enormous sum of 376 millions of livres,⁵ while the treatment of men

⁵ Voltaire, *Fragmens sur l'Inde*. He contends that were it not for the monopoly they possessed of the sale of tobacco, their bankruptcy was inevitable. The Abbé Raynal (*Histoire Philosophique*, ii. 479) concludes his history of the French settlements in the East with a review of their finances, and concurs with Voltaire in attributing their failure in a great degree to their dependence, or, as that author expresses it, to their servitude to the Government, more particularly after the year 1723, when the Directors were appointed by the Court, but overshadowed by the King's commissioner. But Raynal attributes far more to the corruption that pervaded every branch of the administration. The local government was tainted by the irregular gains which the wars of Dupleix and the alliances with native princes gave rise to, and the speculation was unbounded. Men of quality with ruined fortunes flocked to the East, and the Directors who profited by the patronage were obliged to shut their eyes to the disorders that prevailed. Many of the charges detailed by Raynal are a repetition

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like La Bourdonnais, Dupleix, and Lally, would have destroyed any State however prosperous.

The French settlements never recovered from the ruin of their affairs in the war which closed in 1762. Pondicherry was restored at the peace a heap of ruins. The council of Madras, in their dread of the revival of French influence, had destroyed not merely the fortifications but the interior buildings. It was again occupied by French forces, and when the war broke out in 1778 it was defended for forty days, when it again succumbed, with other French settlements, to the now well-established power of the English. In the course of the war which proved so disastrous to England in America, a vigorous effort was made to re-establish French influence in the Deckan. When Heider Ali invaded the Carnatic in 1780, and reduced the British power in the Deckan to the lowest ebb, overtures were made to France to join in the attack on their common enemy. A fleet was despatched to the Eastern seas in March 1781, conveying a considerable land force under Bussy. In a campaign which lasted about eighteen months the French fleet under Suffren, one of the most able and enterprising sailors that ever served in the French navy, encountered the English on four several occasions in 1782, though the latter were superior in numbers of vessels and guns, and wrested from them Trincomalee.

of those that had been advanced by Lally in his *Mémoires*, and which the Directors, in their zeal for reform, had commissioned him to redress. Similar charges, we know, were brought against the early English administrators of their Indian possessions, who were exposed to and succumbed to the same temptations. The contrast between the treatment by England and France of their Indian rulers has been often remarked upon. Voltaire was the first to institute the comparison. The parallel which he draws between the career and lot of Lally and Clive is forcibly drawn, and in no respects more marked than in his concluding remarks: 'The one was a conqueror, the other conquered. The one was beloved, the other hated.'

A final encounter took place off Cuddalore, which was occupied by the French under Bussy. The English had commenced the siege of the place with an inferior land force, but with the support of their fleet. Suffren, by a skilful manœuvre, interposed between the English fleet and the fort, and as harmony now reigned between the naval and military commanders, he borrowed 1,000 men from Bussy, and attacked the English fleet, now seriously reduced in numbers by the scurvy. In the encounter which followed both suffered severely. The English found themselves so seriously weakened that they bore away for Madras, and Suffren returned to the forces ashore the men he had borrowed, and added a corps of sailors from the fleet, which established their superiority over their opponents, whose numbers were so wasted by casualties and sickness that their position became very critical.

In these circumstances intelligence reached the belligerents of the signature of the terms of peace at Versailles, and terminated a war which had assumed proportions dangerous to the stability of British power in the south of India. A.D. 1783.

In this struggle the relative position of the French and English was completely reversed. Unseemly struggles broke out among the English authorities both in Calcutta and at Madras, which was carried so far that Pigott, who had been honoured with a peerage, and was sent out to India to reverse the decision of the Madras council regarding the Rāja of Tanjore, was, in a dispute arising out of the claims of the notorious Paul Benfield, arrested and confined in a prison, where he languished and died. General Stuart, who was the instrument of the civil government, was in his turn arrested by the order of Lord Macartney, Governor of

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Madras, and sent home. When the war broke out with Heider, the Governor of Madras was suspended, by the orders of Warren Hastings, and Coote employed the extensive powers conferred on him with effect and dignity ; but on his retirement to Bengal, on account of his health, the want of harmony between the civil and military authorities again proved disastrous to our affairs.

This was summarily terminated by the arrest of General Stuart, who had been the instrument of the Council on a former occasion in the arrest of Pigott, and was sent home. Though no imputation rests on Sir Edward Hughes, who commanded the fleet in the Eastern seas, for any want of zeal in co-operating with the land forces, and he fought five actions with his adversaries ; yet on one occasion, when he left for the coast of Malabar to refit his shattered vessels, he experienced the same reproaches which assailed D'Aché in the former war, when he left the coast in possession of the enemy. Two duels arose out of these contentions ; Hastings challenged and shot Francis, and Lord Macartney was challenged and wounded by General Stuart when he returned to England.

So closed the last effort of France to contend with its rivals for empire in India. Dreams of Eastern conquest, we know, passed through the mind of Napoleon, and excited a temporary alarm in the councils of England, but they had little influence on the politics of India itself ; and from 1783 until the British armies passed the Indus in 1839, all the wars of the English arose from their relations with the native states only, and with no reference to the affairs of Europe. From the close of the struggle with France we enter on a period distinguished by a new class of events. England

became the first military power on that continent, and its government took a firmer tone in its dealings with the native powers ; but its history is not that of wars and brilliant conquests only, but of the administration of a great empire, embracing the conduct of its governors and the well-being of the people, and involving questions which for more than a hundred years have profoundly interested the people and parliament of England. Here, therefore, naturally closes the first chapter in the history of the rise of British power in the East.

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